




**CJCSM 3500.04B**



# **Universal Joint Task List**



**Version 4.0  
1 October 1999**



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- References:
- a. CJCSI 3500.01A, 1 July 1997, "Joint Training Policy for the Armed Forces of the United States"
  - b. CJCSI 3500.02A, 1 May 1998, "Joint Training Master Plan 2000"
  - c. CJCSM 3500.03, 1 June 1996, "Joint Training Manual"

1. Purpose. This manual provides a standardized tool for describing requirements for planning, conducting, assessing, and evaluating joint and multinational training.
2. Cancellation. CJCSM 3500.04A, 13 September 1996, is canceled.
3. Applicability. This manual applies to the Joint Staff, Military Services, combatant commands, activities, joint organizations, and combat support agencies responsive to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
4. Policy. Title 10, United States Code, section 153, prescribes that, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be responsible for (a) "formulating policies for the joint training of the armed forces," and (b) "formulating policies for coordinating the military education and training of members of the armed forces." See details in reference a.
5. Definitions. See the Enclosure.



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6. Responsibilities. See reference a.
7. Procedures. Detailed procedures for implementing joint training policy are contained in references b and c.
8. Summary of Changes. Version 4.0 conforms to Defense Planning Guidance 1999-2003 to incorporate NBC considerations in all applicable tasks and be updated to reflect C4ISR, space, and information assurance considerations and to add peace operations tasks at the operational level. The tasks, measures, and criteria have been combined in Chapter 2. The definitions in Appendix A have been revised to conform to those in reference a. Additionally, the Joint Exercise Management Package III Mission Requirements Module (MRM) library of operations definitions has been added as Appendix C. Joint/interoperability tactical tasks have been added to the tactical task section in Chapter 2. Finally, a separate classified supplement has been created as CJCSM 3500.04B-01, *Classified Supplement to the Universal Joint Task List*.
9. Releasability. This manual is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. DOD components, other Federal agencies, and the public may obtain copies of this manual through the Internet from the CJCS Directives home page located at <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/cjcsd.htm>.
10. Effective Date. This manual is effective 1 October 1999.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

  
GARRY R. TREXLER  
Major General, USAF  
Vice Director, Joint Staff

Enclosure:

Universal Joint Task List Version 4.0

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**ENCLOSURE**

**UNIVERSAL JOINT TASK LIST  
VERSION 4.0**



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# **CHAPTER 1**

## **INTRODUCTION**

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## Introduction

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1. Purpose. The *Universal Joint Task List Version 4.0* (CJCSM 3500.04B) serves as a common language and common reference system for joint force commanders, combat support agencies, operational planners, combat developers, and trainers to communicate mission requirements. It is the basic language for development of a joint mission essential task list (JMETL) or agency mission essential task list (AMETL) that identifies required capabilities for mission success.

2. General.


a. The Universal Joint Task List (UJTL), when augmented with the Service task lists, is a comprehensive integrated menu of functional tasks, conditions, measures, and criteria supporting all levels of the Department of Defense in executing the National Military Strategy.

b. The UJTL provides a common language and reference system for various users to include joint force commanders, strategic and operational planners, combat developers, combat support personnel, and trainers. For example, planners and analysts can use it to translate missions into common language tasks that trainers, in cooperation with planners, will use to derive training requirements. This mission-to-task-to-training connectivity will assist forces in training the way they intend to fight. In addition, Procedures for the Review of Operation Plans, CJCSM 3141.01A, establishes a standard for plan review to include identification of tasks in the mission statement, concept of operations, subordinate taskings and coordinating instructions using the UJTL. Additional applications of the UJTL are described in Paragraph 10.

c. The UJTL is a key element of the requirements-based, "mission-to-task" Joint Training System (JTS) (see Figure 1-1 on the following page). In implementing this system, all users conduct mission analysis, identify specified and implied tasks, use the UJTL to describe these tasks (including supporting and command-linked tasks), apply guidance to determine essential tasks, select conditions that impact the tasks, and select measures and criteria that form the basis for standards. They document these essential tasks, conditions, and standards as their warfighting requirements in a JMETL/AMETL. The JTS and JMETL/AMETL development process are described in detail in the *Joint Training Manual* (CJCSM 3500.03). A summary of the JMETL/AMETL development process is in Paragraph 9.

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d. In support of the JTS, a JMETL/AMETL is the foundation for deriving training objectives that then become the basis for developing command-training events. It is also the basis for the commander's



**Figure 1-1. The Joint Training System**

evaluation of command training performance in training events and the overall assessment of training levels. Observations collected during joint training events and operations are keyed to a JMETL/AMETL. It provides the linkage between the mission-based capability requirements and required training events.

e. The JTS applies to the Joint Staff, Services, combatant commands, activities, joint organizations, and combat support agencies responsive to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The JTS also applies to Service components that develop Service component mission essential task lists (METLs) to describe their interoperability requirements to their combatant commanders. In addition, it applies to combat support agencies that develop agency METLs to describe the support they provide to combatant commanders.

### 3. Universal Joint Task List.

a. Chapter 2 contains a comprehensive hierarchical listing of the tasks that can be performed by the Joint Staff, Services, combatant commands and components, activities, joint organizations, and combat support agencies responsive to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The task listing actually includes several tasks that may be considered as missions or operations (e.g., *SN 3.3 Employ National Strategic Firepower*, *ST 1.6.2 Gain and Maintain Air Superiority in Theater of War*, *OP 1.2.5 Conduct Offensive Operations in the Joint Operations Area (JOA)*). While these may not be "pure tasks", they provide a framework for mission analysis and structuring training events. The relationship between missions, operations, and tasks is discussed in Paragraph 8.

b. In addition, Chapter 2 includes a menu of measures of performance and criteria associated with each UJTL task. These measures and criteria, when selected by commanders, become the standards of performance consistent with mission requirements. Measures and criteria are neither directive nor all-inclusive. They should be used as a guide and may be modified or expanded based on the user's experience and needs.

c. The UJTL identifies "what" is to be performed in terms common to the Joint Staff, Services, combatant commands and components, activities, joint organizations, and agencies responsive to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The UJTL task description does not address "how" a task is performed (found in joint doctrine/joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP)), or "who" performs the task (found in the commander's concept of operations and joint doctrine/JTTP).

d. When selecting tasks, the normal methodology is to select the task that most closely describes "what" is being performed as part of the mission and operations analysis. Within the UJTL hierarchy, when a one or two digit task is selected as an essential task, it is a statement that all tasks below it are essential and are assumed to be part of the JMETL/AMETL. This type of general selection does not provide the focus required to identify those tasks that are essential to mission success based on the commander's guidance. Selecting tasks at the three and four digit levels provides a sharper focus of what required capability (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, people, and education) will lead to mission success.

e. Chapter 3 of the UJTL contains a listing of conditions in the physical, military, and civil environments that may be used to describe the operational context for selected mission tasks. Conditions are neither



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directive nor all-inclusive. They should be used as a guide and may be modified based on the user's experience and needs.

#### 4. Joint Tasks.

a. Joint tasks describe, in broad terms, the current and potential capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States. Joint tasks are actions or processes accomplished by a joint organization under joint command and control using joint doctrine. They are assigned by joint force commanders to be performed by joint forces, staffs, and integrated Service components. This CJCSM provides an overall description of joint tasks that can be applied at multiple levels of command, i.e., strategic national, strategic theater, operational, and tactical (each Service publishes its own task list to supplement the UJTL).

b. The joint tasks listed in this manual are not all-inclusive. Service components are capable of tasks beyond those listed. JFCs and Service components are capable of directly performing tasks at the strategic national, strategic theater, operational, and tactical levels. A detailed description of each of these tasks is provided in dictionary form in Chapter 2.

5. Conditions. Conditions are variables of the environment that affect the performance of a task. Some conditions are designed to help describe the theater of operations (e.g., host-nation support); others describe the immediate joint operational area (e.g., maritime superiority), while still others describe the battlefield conditions (e.g., littoral composition). When linked to specific joint tasks, conditions help frame the differences or similarities between assigned missions.

#### 6. Measures and Criteria of Performance Comprise Standards.

Commander's approved measures and criteria of performance comprise the task standard to describe how well a joint organization or force must perform a joint task under a specific set of conditions. The joint force commander uses criteria and measures to establish task standards based on mission requirements. These standards, when linked to conditions, provide a basis for planning, conducting, and evaluating military operations as well as training events.

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7. Definition of Terms. Key terms that apply to understanding the UJTL and its application to the requirements-based joint training process are shown in Table 1-1. **These terms and definitions are applicable within the JTS and should not be referenced outside it.**

**Table 1-1. Definition of Terms for Joint Training**

<b>Term</b>	<b>Definition</b>
<b>command-linked tasks</b>	Discrete events or actions designated by a joint force commander that must be performed by commands and agencies outside the command authority of the joint force, if the joint force is to successfully perform its missions. Command-linked tasks are designated by the supported joint force commander, but are normally scheduled for training, evaluated, and assessed by the organization providing the support.
<b>conditions</b>	Those variables of the operational environment or situation in which a unit, system, or individual is expected to operate that may affect performance.
<b>criterion</b>	The minimum acceptable level of performance associated with a particular measure of task performance. It is often expressed as hours, days, percent, occurrences, minutes, miles, or some other command stated measure.
<b>essential task</b>	Tasks based on mission analysis and approved by the commander that are absolutely necessary, indispensable, or critical to the success of a mission.
<b>implied task</b>	A task that is not stated, but necessary to do the mission.
<b>interoperability</b>	The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.
<b>joint mission essential task (JMET)</b>	A mission task selected by a joint force commander deemed essential to mission accomplishment and defined using the common language of the Universal Joint Task List in terms of a task. Force providers will also select additional tasks in accordance with their joint

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<b>Term</b>	<b>Definition</b>
	training mission for assigned combatant headquarters and forces and deemed essential to the mission of the combatant headquarters and forces. Also called JMET.
<b>joint mission essential task list (JMETL)/agency mission essential task list (AMETL)</b>	A list of JMETs/AMETs selected by a commander to accomplish an assigned or anticipated mission. A JMETL/AMETL includes associated tasks, conditions, standards, and requires the identification of command-linked and supporting tasks. Also called JMETL or AMETL.
<b>joint training</b>	Military training based on joint doctrine or joint tactics, techniques, and procedures to prepare joint forces and/or joint staffs to respond to strategic and operational requirements deemed necessary by combatant commanders to execute their assigned missions. Joint training involves forces of two or more Military Departments interacting with a combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander; involves joint forces and/or joint staffs; and is conducted using joint doctrine or joint tactics, techniques, and procedures.
<b>measure</b>	Provides the basis for describing varying levels of task performance.
<b>mission</b>	An assignment with a purpose that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore. (See the glossary for other definitions of mission.)
<b>operation</b>	A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, Service, training, or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign.
<b>specified task</b>	A task explicitly stated and assigned.

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<b>standard</b>	The minimum acceptable proficiency required in the performance of a task. For mission essential tasks of joint forces, each task standard is defined by the joint force commander and consists of a measure and criterion.
<b>supporting task</b>	Specific activities that contribute to the accomplishment of a joint mission essential task. Supporting tasks associated with a command's or agency's mission essential task list are accomplished by the joint staff or subordinate commands or agencies.
<b>task</b>	A discrete event or action that enables a mission or function to be accomplished by individuals or organizations.

#### 8. Mission, Operation, and Task Relationship.

a. Understanding the relationship of mission, operation, and task is important to the successful use of the UJTL in establishing joint training requirements. The definitions of mission, operation, and task are in Table 1-1. The relationship between these three elements becomes clearer through mission analysis. The product of the analysis is the identification of operations and tasks that must be performed for mission success.

b. In the JTS, the relationships between these terms may be described as follows:

(1) A mission is an assignment with a purpose and consists of operations;


(2) An operation is a military action that supports a mission and consists of tasks;

(3) A task is a discrete event based upon doctrine, TTP, and an organization's SOP that is executed to accomplish operations (see Figure 1-2 on the next page).

c. The mission/operation establishes the requirement to perform tasks and provides the context for each task performance (including the conditions under which a task must be performed). It determines where and when a task must be performed (one or more locations). Finally, it determines the degree to which a task must be performed (implied in the

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concept of the operation) and provides a way to understand precisely how the performance of a task contributes to mission/operation success.



**Figure 1-2. Relationship of Missions, Operations, and Tasks**

9. JMETL/AMETL Development Process.


a. A command or combat support agency can develop a JMETL/AMETL based on an analysis of assigned missions and application of the JMETL/AMETL development process (see Figure 1-3 on the next page). The development process can be used by non-Defense organizations to analyze assigned missions and develop their own METLs. Service components use Service doctrine to develop their METL. This CJCSM supports the JMETL/AMETL development process in the Requirements Phase of the four-phased JTS.

b. JMETL/AMETL are developed by joint force commands/agencies and are reviewed annually for modification and revised when missions change. The JMETL/AMETL is documented in the organization's joint training plan. It provides, among other things, the basis for linking mission requirements to training that is needed to ensure mission success.

c. Combatant commanders are assigned missions and tasks based on their geographic areas of responsibility or on their functional capabilities. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) provides guidance to the

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combatant commanders and the Services to accomplish missions and tasks based on current military capabilities. The JSCP provides a coherent framework for capabilities-based military tasks assigned by the National Command Authorities (NCA), treaty obligations, or other documents supporting the Unified Command Plan (UCP).



**Figure 1-3. JMETL/AMETL Development Process**

d. Through careful analysis of assigned missions, the combatant commander will develop a concept of the operation and identify a set of mission-based tasks (including supporting and command-linked tasks). Using the JMETL/AMETL development process, these mission-based tasks are then screened against the JMET/AMET selection criteria to determine which tasks are essential to mission success. Once the JMETS/AMETs and their supporting and command-linked tasks are selected, the commander selects conditions and standards for each task based on the concept of operations. As an exception to the process, conditions and standards for command-linked tasks are mutually derived between commanders. The combination of these tasks, conditions, and standards form the JMETL/AMETL for the mission.

e. Each command/organization JMETL/AMETL, while showing overall mission capability, may be separated into specific mission/operation required capability (shown in Tab B Mission Capability Matrix to the joint training plan). For example, a CINC develops a CINC's JMETL that focuses on the essential tasks that he believes must be performed to ensure success of all missions. Each mission in turn should have a respective JMETL that indicates what must be done for individual mission success.

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The CINC may direct, as part of the JMETL development strategy, that each joint staff directorate, functional component, commander joint task force (CJTF), and Service component develops their JMETL/METL respectively, which indicates what essential tasks they must perform for mission success. The result is a pyramid effect with the CINC's JMETL at the pinnacle supported by staff, functional component, and CJTF JMETL and Service component METL.

10. Applicability to Other Processes. The UJTL and JMETL/AMETL have uses beyond the JTS.

a. The UJTL and JMETL structure can be used to focus requirements for joint simulations (i.e., Joint Simulation System (JSIMS)). JMETL assessments can assist in the Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR) process.

b. The Joint Warfighting Capability Assessments (JWCA) can be indexed to multicommand JMETL assessments that indicate long-term, systemic issues that can be addressed in terms of doctrinal, training, organizational, or materiel improvements.

c. Institutions providing joint professional military education (JPME) may cross-reference learning objectives to the UJTL tasks to better align the joint training and education systems.

d. The JCS Joint Information Exchange Requirements (JIER) and the ASD (C3I) C4ISR Architecture Framework Document require the JIER and Joint Operational Architecture be mapped back to the UJTL which directly relates C4ISR requirements to the warfighters' training and operational environment. This is an integral component to OSD/JCS policy in the generation of joint operational architectures and C4ISR requirements.

e. Finally, JV 2010 uses the UJTL in describing capabilities required to execute the National Military Strategy found in the Joint Strategy Review and JV 2010 *Concept for Future Operations*.

11. UJTL Version 4.0. This UJTL incorporates several changes from UJTL Version 3.0.

a. For ease of reference the tasks, measures, and criteria have been combined in Chapter 2.

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b. The glossary in Appendix A has been standardized using the glossary in the *Joint Training Policy for the Armed Forces of the United States* (CJCSI 3500.01A) as a guide.

c. The operations library for the Joint Exercise Management Package III Mission Requirements Module (JEMP III MRM) has been added as Appendix C.

d. The tactical task section in Chapter 2 has been revised to incorporate joint/interoperability tactical tasks and the Service tasks that are linked to them. The Service tasks are used to describe the details of the joint/interoperability tactical tasks.

e. Defense Planning Guidance 1999-2003 directed that the UJTL will incorporate NBC considerations in all applicable tasks and be updated to reflect C4ISR, space, and information assurance considerations as these technologies mature. In addition, peace operations tasks have been added to the operational task list in Chapter 2.

f. A separate classified supplement has been created as CJCSM 3500.04B-01, *Classified Supplement to the Universal Joint Task List*. Copies have been distributed and it is on the SIPRNET at <http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl>. The supplement consists of task titles and applicable classified measures. The UJTL is cross-referenced to the classified supplement where appropriate.

12. Updates to the UJTL. The US military operates in a dynamic environment of changing threats, technology, doctrine, and resources. As a result, it is important that this manual be updated periodically. Such updates will draw heavily from experienced users in the field. Only in this way will the UJTL maintain its utility to these users. Updates to this manual should be developed using the applicable guidance in Chapters 2 and 3. Updates should be forwarded to the USJFCOM. The UJTL can be found on the USJFCOM home page at <https://www-secure.jwfc.acom.mil/protected/psp/ujtlindex.html>. Non acom.mil users will be prompted for a user name and password or to complete an access request form. The UJTL Version 4.0 is included in the Joint Electronic Library compact disk, which is distributed semi-annually.



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# **CHAPTER 2**

## **UNIVERSAL JOINT TASKS, MEASURES, & CRITERIA**

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## **Universal Joint Tasks, Measures, and Criteria**

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### **PREFACE**

This chapter is the task, measures, and criteria reference for the strategic national (SN), strategic theater (ST), and operational (OP) hierarchy established for the UJTL. It includes a tactical (TA) task section that provides linkage to joint/interoperability tactical tasks and the applicable Service tactical tasks. This chapter is divided into three sections. Section I is a discussion of tasks and their application to mission essential task list (JMETL/AMETL) development and training requirements development. Section II is a discussion of the measures and criteria and how they are used to create standards for tasks. Section III is a listing of all SN, ST, and OP tasks, measures, and criteria and TA tasks that provide the hierarchical linkage to the Service Task Lists that are published separately.

### **SECTION I – TASKS**

1. Introduction. The task listing in this section is designed as a reference aid in communicating mission capability requirements in a JMETL/AMETL. The JMETL/AMETL process is initiated through mission analysis to identify specified and implied tasks. Once identified, the specified and implied tasks are then matched to the definitions in this section to describe the tasks in common, joint terms. As applied to joint training, the task list provides the common language that can be used to document their warfighting requirements and develop joint training plans.

2. Joint Tasks.

a. Joint tasks are identified and defined in this section. The definitions do not specify who or what means will be employed in performing the task, nor how the task will be performed. The definitions are not doctrine, but are based on joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

b. JFC missions and operations have been included in this task section on a limited exception basis and have become ingrained in the UJTL through usage and user preference. They provide a way of organizing capability requirements to identify which tasks support a specific mission or operation. They are not intended to dictate the manner in which a JFC should execute a mission, develop a concept of operation, or limit operations to only those in this section. Once a mission or operation has been selected from this section or a new one created from another source, this section can be used to identify specific tasks that support it. The discussion on operations templates in Paragraph 9 provides a graphic depiction of the relationship between a mission or operation and applicable tasks.

c. The current listing of joint/interoperability tactical tasks identified by USJFCOM has also been added to the TA Section III of this chapter. They provide the hierarchical linkage between the TA tasks and the applicable Service level tasks that support execution.

3. Levels of War. This paragraph defines the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war and discusses their relationship to the UJTL structure.

a. Strategic is the level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve these objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. In the UJTL, this level of war is divided into strategic-national (DOD/Service/interagency) and strategic-theater (combatant command) to provide clarity and focus for task development and execution.

b. Operational is the level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives.


c. Tactical is the level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives.

#### 4. UJTL Organization.

a. The UJTL is organized into four separate parts by level of war (see Figure 2-1 on the next page). Each task is individually indexed to reflect its placement in the structure and coded as follows:

- (1) Strategic level - National military tasks (prefix SN)
- (2) Strategic level - Theater tasks (prefix ST)
- (3) Operational level tasks (prefix OP)

(4) Tactical level tasks (prefix TA) include joint/interoperability tactical tasks and the applicable Service tasks.



**Figure 2-1. Relationship of Levels of War to Objectives**

b. Service task lists are published by each Service. These lists are linked to the UJTL through the tactical tasks listed in Figure 2-1 and the joint/interoperability tactical tasks at the end of this chapter. Service task lists may be found as follows:

(1) The Air Force Task List has been published as AFDD 1-1, *Air Force Task List (AFTL)*, 12 August 1998. It is located at <http://www.usafdc.maxwell.af.mil/Library/Doctrine/afdd1-1>. The AFTL complements the UJTL by providing Air Force specific tasks. It contains tasks

that may occur at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war because aerospace forces operate at all levels of war. While the AFTL does not numerically align with the UJTL, the tasks are functionally related.

(2) The Army Universal Task List (AUTL) draft is dated 23 June 1999 and is located at <http://www-cgsc.army.mil/cdd/index.htm>. The AUTL is a comprehensive listing of tactical level of war tasks that describes the Army's unique contributions to the JFC capabilities. It is subordinate to the UJTL and provides a common reference system for collective tasks performed by Army units and staffs from corps down to the company/troop/battery echelon. It does not include tasks performed by Army forces at the operational and strategic levels as part of a joint and multinational force.

(3) The Universal Naval Task List (UNTL) has been published as OPNAV Instruction 3500.38/Marine Corps Order 3500.26/USCG Commandant Instruction (CMDTINST) M3500.1, *Universal Naval Task List (UNTL) Version 1.0*. It is located on the Navy Warfare Development Command home page at <http://www.ndc.navy.mil>. It provides naval planners and trainers with a single task list to articulate both joint and naval specific training requirements. It is linked to the UJTL by including the SN, ST, and OP levels of war tasks.

c. The relationship of levels of war to objectives of a military force is crucial to selecting tasks to achieve an objective. Figure 2-1 illustrates that if a military force is attempting to accomplish objectives at the strategic theater level of war (e.g., accomplish objectives of theater military strategy) then the tasks it must perform will originate at that level (e.g., ST 1, *Deploy, Concentrate, and Maneuver Theater Forces*; ST 2, *Conduct Theater Strategic Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance*). The objective that places a force at a particular level of war may result in subordinate objectives for a portion of that force, with tasks at a lower level of war.

5. Relationship of Levels of War to Theater Structure. While there is no direct link between levels of command and levels of war, certain commands tend to operate at particular levels of war. Table 2-1 on the following page summarizes typical relationships of commands, and by implication their commanders, to the three levels of war.

a. The concepts of theater, theater of war, theater of operations, and joint operations area are helpful in understanding the distinctions between the strategic and operational levels of war. Joint doctrine (JP 1-02) defines a theater as the "geographic area outside the continental United States for which a commander of a combatant command has been assigned responsibility." It goes on to define a theater of war as "the area of air, land, and water that is, or may become, directly involved in the conduct of the war. A theater of war does not normally encompass the geographic combatant commander's entire area of responsibility and may contain more than one theater of operations." Joint

doctrine defines a theater of operations as "a subarea within a theater of war defined by the geographic combatant commander required to conduct or support specific combat operations." Thus, a theater of war may contain more than one theater of operations. A joint operations area (JP 1-02) is defined as "an area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force commander (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. Joint operations areas are particularly useful when operations are limited in scope and geographic area or when operations are to be conducted on the boundaries between theaters."

b. The combatant commander normally operates at the strategic level of war, applying the military element of power in coordination with the other elements of national power to achieve the desired military end state within the strategic end state determined by national security or strategic military objectives and guidance. A theater of operations commander (e.g., unified commander, sub-unified commander, or CJTF), however, operates more often at the operational level of war, applying military power in the designated theater of operations toward the strategic military objectives assigned by the geographic combatant commander or national command authorities.

#### Level of War

COMMAND	STRATEGIC	OPERATIONAL	TACTICAL
Unified Command (Geographic)	X	X	
Unified Command (Functional)	X	X	
Sub Unified Command	X	X	
Joint Task Force Command		X	X
Functional Component Command	X	X	X
Service Component Command		X	X
Combat Support Agencies	X	X	X

**Table 2-1. Notional Relationships of Commands to Levels of War**

6. Tasks and the Levels of War. Many tasks in the UJTL structure have parallel tasks at other levels of war. For example, the task OP 2.2, *Collect and Share Operational Information*, has parallel tasks at other levels of war: ST 2.2, *Collect Theater Strategic Information* and SN 2.2, *Collect Strategic Information*. In examining an intelligence task that is being conducted as part of a joint military operation, it may be difficult to determine at which level of war that task is being performed. The level of war of an intelligence task can be determined by




identifying the objective of the intelligence collection effort, the theater structure of the military operation, the organizations or components performing the task, and the level of command directing the intelligence collection activity.

7. Task Linkages. Tasks in the UJTL can be linked to other tasks within and across the levels of war. Fundamentally, vertical and horizontal linkages exist among UJTL tasks. Vertical linkages connect related tasks between levels of war. Vertical linkages can also be characterized as end-to-end linkages. Horizontal linkages, referred to as parallel linkages, connect different tasks at the same level of war. The basis for linking these tasks is that in the context of conducting a military operation, tasks that are linked must all be performed to standard and in concert with one another for a military operation to succeed. Horizontal linkages involve the synchronization of a variety of tasks in time and space based on a commander's concept of operations for a mission and in accordance with joint doctrine.

a. Vertical linkages cross the echelons of command. Vertical linkages provide the connecting structure among tasks in the UJTL across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Intelligence is an example of a task with vertical linkages across the levels of war. Although the generic elements of strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence are similar (i.e., planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination and integration, and evaluation and feedback), the tasks and subtasks associated with each level are distinct in terms of objective, scope, and what type of organization is assigned to perform them. At the strategic level, national means are used to collect, analyze, assess, prepare, and disseminate intelligence to many users, ranging from theater commanders to tactical units. Conversely, information and intelligence collected at the tactical level of war are passed up by tactical commanders through the same chain to the national level where they are collated, analyzed, and assessed to form a worldwide intelligence picture. These vertical relationships, which form an "intelligence system," are maintained to some degree regardless of the type of military operation being planned or conducted.

b. An example of vertical linkages in the UJTL is illustrated in Figure 2-2 with maneuver tasks.

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**Figure 2-2. Task Linkages Across the Levels of War**

(1) Figure 2-2 displays the tasks involved in bringing forces to bear on an enemy. In one of the first actions, forces might have to conduct a theater strategic movement and maneuver (ST 1, *Deploy, Concentrate, and Maneuver Theater Forces*) based on a request from a joint force commander. Once in the theater of operations, or joint operational area, it may be necessary to further deploy these forces (OP 1.1.2, *Conduct Intratheater Deployment and Redeployment of Forces Within the Joint Operations Area (JOA)*) into positions that will respond to enemy force movements. The movement will give them a relative advantage over enemy forces and support the joint force commander's intent for his subordinate campaign plan. At the same time, joint forces in the joint operations area could be maneuvering (OP 1, *Conduct Operational Movement and Maneuver*, and OP 1.3, *Provide Operational Mobility*) to put forces into a position from which they can deploy and conduct tactical maneuver (TA 1, *Deploy/Conduct Maneuver*) and employ direct and indirect fires. Included in this is the transitioning of forces to battle formation (OP 1.2.1 *Coordinate the Transition of Joint Forces to and from Tactical Battle Formations*). At the tactical level of war, maneuver deals with achieving positional advantage over an enemy force in conjunction with fire support.

(2) Figure 2-2 can also be viewed from a bottom-up perspective as shown by the dotted line from the tactical level to the operational level. In this case, the results of a tactical level maneuver (TA 1, *Deploy/Conduct Maneuver*) could achieve an advantageous position over the enemy. At the tactical level, a


penetration, or flanking maneuver might achieve tactical success and permit maneuver to operational depths (exploitation and pursuit), helping to achieve operational and theater strategic objectives (OP 1, *Conduct Operational Movement and Maneuver*).

(3) The vertical linking of the tasks across levels of the UJTL can be used to make connections between related capabilities at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war and illustrate how an inadequate capability at any level of war can impact the ability of a joint force to integrate that capability across the three levels of war. Such linkages exist in all general task areas of the UJTL, to include movement and maneuver, intelligence, firepower, sustainment, command and control, and protection.

c. Horizontal linkages describe the operations concept. A horizontal or parallel linkage is defined in the context of a military operation. That is, when conducting a military operation, different tasks (e.g., intelligence and fires) interact with one another to achieve the effects desired by the commander. The interactions among such tasks may be temporal, informational, or spatial. One way of describing these horizontal linkages is through operations templates.

8. Operations Templates. Operations templates provide a graphical depiction of the activities performed as part of a military operation. It depicts activities and interactions among them. The activities represented in an operations template can include tasks performed by the commander and staff, tasks performed by other combatant commands or agencies (e.g., command-linked tasks), and tasks performed by subordinate commands or organizations (e.g., supporting tasks). Three basic types of task characteristics and interactions among tasks may be depicted in operations templates. They are temporal, informational, and spatial. A different view can be constructed to depict each of these types of characteristics and interactions.


a. Temporal view characteristics of tasks refer to whether a task occurs once, more than once (e.g., cyclically), or continuously. Temporal interactions among tasks refer to the sequencing of tasks. That is, one task must be completed before another one can begin (prerequisite or successor), one task might begin at the same time as another one (concurrent beginning), or one task might have to be completed at the same time as another (concurrent ending). For example, suppose a joint force air component commander (JFACC) has tasked units of one or more components to perform an air interdiction operation. Tasks comprising the operation can be identified from the UJTL and temporal interactions (i.e., sequencing) among the tasks can be depicted, as shown in Figure 2-3. Operations templates can be developed to varying levels of detail. The example shown on the following page simply illustrates the kinds of information that can be included in an operations template temporal view and how that information can be displayed. Additional data describing the temporal characteristics of each task included in a template (e.g., identifying who performs the task) can be linked to each task.



**Figure 2-3. A Temporal View Operations Template for an Air Interdiction Operation**

b. Informational view characteristics of tasks refer to the need for information to perform tasks (e.g., task of selecting targets to attack requires intelligence data), the transformation of one type of information into other types during the performance of a task (e.g., task of selecting targets to attack transforms raw intelligence and targeting data into a target list), and the output of information after a task is performed (e.g., task of selecting targets to attack yields target lists, such as found in a master air attack plan). Informational interactions among tasks concern the input and output relationships among various tasks involved in a military operation (task to synchronize operational firepower receives inputs from the task of selecting operational targets to attack). Some tasks provide informational inputs to other tasks, or require inputs from other tasks. Consider again the example of a JFACC who has tasked units of one or more components to perform an air interdiction operation. Tasks comprising the operation can be identified from the UJTL and informational interactions among the tasks can be depicted, as shown in Figure 2-4. This example illustrates the kinds of information links that can be depicted in an operations template view. Additional data describing the informational characteristics of each task included in an informational template (e.g., identifying systems that generate or communicate informational products) can be linked to each task.


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**Figure 2-4. Informational View Operations Template for an Air Interdiction Operation**

c. Spatial view characteristics of tasks refer to the location of task performance (geographic coordinates). For example, tasks may begin and/or be completed at a specific location (e.g., complete a resupply task at a location where a fires task is taking place; begin a medical evacuation task where friendly forces are engaged and end it where medical care can be provided) or perform a task at multiple locations (e.g., deploy various ships in a fleet to different locations). Spatial interactions among tasks could include the requirement to perform a task in a location relative to where another task is being performed (e.g., conduct close air support task near a maneuvering friendly force). Consider once again the example of a JFACC who has tasked units of one or more components to perform an air interdiction operation. Tasks comprising the operation can be identified from the UJTL and relative locations of performance can be depicted, as shown in Figure 2-5. This example shows how several tasks are performed at the JFACC HQs and how another task (i.e., OP 3.2.5.1 *Conduct Air Interdiction of Operational Forces/Targets*) is performed along various routes. A task performed in an area, as opposed to a specific location (e.g., employing operational IO), can be shown as a shaded area (see Figure 2-5).

Additional data describing the spatial characteristics of each task included in a template (e.g., changes over time in the location of task performance) can be linked to each task.




**Figure 2-5. Spatial View Operations Template for an Air Interdiction Operation**

d. Operations template views can represent various task characteristics and interactions among tasks that influence their combined effect on mission success. Template views can be especially useful in understanding the performance relationships among tasks in the context of the commander's concept of operations. Operations templates can aid joint force commanders in identifying the most essential warfighting tasks and identifying training requirements in advance of actually conducting such military operations.

## 9. Linkages Between Joint Operation Planning and Joint Training.

a. Joint operation planning, by establishing responsibilities for every element of a joint or multinational force, provides the foundation for the Joint Training System and the development of joint training requirements. Figure 2-6 illustrates a methodology describing a multi-echelon concept of operation and tasks assigned to subordinate commands.



**Figure 2-6. Joint Operation Planning Supports JMETS Development**

b. Consider the perspective of a joint force commander (e.g., CJTF) assigned a mission by a combatant commander to "eject enemy armed forces from an ally's territory." This CJTF and staff must conduct a mission analysis to identify operations to support the mission or "how" the mission will be accomplished. Operations and contingency plans are published that specify and imply tasks to be performed by the command, subordinate commands, and supporting commands for operations success. These tasks are used to develop joint mission essential tasks by applying commander's criteria and then applying conditions and standards that are based on the OPLAN/CONPLAN concept of operations. Additionally, supporting and command-linked tasks are identified with their conditions and standards. This methodology produces a JMETS that is used as the basis for identifying requirements-based training.

c. For operations assigned to subordinate commands (e.g., gain and maintain air superiority), analyses must be conducted, in turn, by these commands to determine what tasks, (with conditions and standards) must be performed and by

whom for operation success. The product of all of these tasks, conditions, and standards from the CJTF and staff, subordinate commands, and supporting commands is a JMETL.

d. The JMETL is the source for developing mission required capability that is used to develop joint training requirements by a combatant commander and his staff, his subordinate commanders (e.g., CJTFs), and their subordinate commanders (e.g., component and unit commanders). The JMETL is the mission to task linkage that is the foundation for the Joint Training System. The tasks with conditions and standards provide the basis for deriving training objectives that are used to develop training events. While the number of JMETs for any one command may consist of only a small number of tasks, the total number of JMETs for all commands associated with a CINC mission may be much larger (as illustrated in Figure 2-6).

10. Task Development Guidelines. The following guidelines that were used to develop the tasks in the UJTL should be used to develop proposed changes and additions to the task listing. These recommended changes should be forwarded to USJFCOM for approval and insertion in the UJTL.

a. **Tasks should be based on joint doctrine.** The identification of tasks should have some basis in doctrine. That is, joint doctrine should identify the activity as something performed by a joint force, military Service, or combat support agency and should provide enough description of the activity to contribute to the development of a definition. However, in some cases a capability may exist to perform a task before doctrine is written describing it. For example, the task SN 5.7.1 *Provide Decision Support*, does not yet have approved doctrine.

b. **A set of UJTL tasks should be comprehensive and mutually exclusive.** The UJTL is organized around a series of high-level tasks (e.g., develop intelligence). These high-level tasks are designed and defined as much as possible to be comprehensive while being mutually exclusive. The comprehensiveness of these tasks is designed to ensure that any task performed by joint force or Service unit or organization could fit underneath one of these tasks. The mutual exclusivity of these tasks is designed to ensure that any task performed by any joint organization or Service unit (i.e., Navy, Marine Corps, Army, Air Force, or Coast Guard) or combat support agency will fit in only one place in the task structure.

c. **Tasks and definitions should avoid specifying means.** Tasks contained in the UJTL should avoid specifying particular means (i.e., type of unit, organization, or system) involved in task performance. The UJTL is a mechanism for describing capabilities.

d. **Placement of tasks in UJTL should maintain hierarchical structure.** Tasks contained in the joint and Service task structures are arranged in a series



of hierarchies. A hierarchy has several key characteristics. First of all, when moving from any level of a hierarchy down to the next level of detail, the subordinate tasks are supposed to, in total, comprehensively and without redundancy, define all activities involved in the higher level task. That is, one way of understanding the full dimensions and complexity of a task is to examine the immediate subtasks of that task. In addition, each of the subtasks is supposed to be distinct from the other subtasks at the same level in the hierarchy.

e. **A task list should normally include tasks but not operations.** The UJTL focuses, as much as possible, on tasks and avoids including terms that refer to more global activities like operations types. A military operation, like conducting a blockade or conducting an amphibious assault, is broader than a task, and therefore should not be included in the task list. Some operations have been included in this UJTL on a limited exception basis per paragraph 2-b Section I.

f. **Joint and Service tasks should not be organized to describe a sequence or a process.** The tasks included in joint and Service task lists simply describe force capabilities, rather than the way that these capabilities are selected or applied. Task lists are not organized as a dynamic representation of the sequence and interactions among tasks as they are performed in the context of a military operation.

g. **A task definition should not include conditions.** The joint and Service task lists focus on the activities performed by military units, organizations, and systems. Sometimes in the process of defining a task there is a tendency to include conditions to amplify or clarify the task definition. Keeping conditions out of the task definitions ensures that the tasks will be applicable to a wider variety of operations and regions where operations might be conducted.

h. **Tasks should be placed at appropriate levels of war.** Not all tasks should be included at all levels of war because they do not actually take place at all levels of war. For example, intertheater deployment of forces occurs primarily at the strategic level of war and therefore, should not be included at the operational or tactical levels. On the other hand, the task of occupying a combat area may be considered primarily tactical. Some tasks may, however, be performed at more than one level of war. The level of war of an activity is determined by the nature of the activity itself and by the context in which it occurs. For example; the decision to employ nuclear weapons and associated planning will be strategic (SN/ST) in almost all instances, but actual delivery will include "tactical" level tasks to execute the purpose and intent in the commander's concept of operations.

## 11. Doctrine and Policy Linkage.

a. Linkages are provided at the end of each task definition (see task SN 1, *Conduct Strategic Deployment and Redeployment* as an example of linkage). The joint doctrinal publications and CJCS directives shown in **boldface** type are the primary sources for the task. Joint doctrinal publications and CJCS directives shown in normal font provide supplemental or supporting documentation. The same publication may appear in both primary and supplemental or supporting documentation categories because of the level of information referenced. In future electronic versions of this manual, the user can click on the reference to see the citations in the selected reference. Click again on a citation and go directly to the applicable paragraph within current joint doctrine. The electronic versions will provide the most up-to-date doctrine reference links.

b. If a task does not have a reference shown in **boldface** type, it indicates that at the time of development of this CJCSM, approved joint doctrine or CJCS directives did not fully support the task. Only approved joint publications, CJCS Directives, and DOD Directives/Instructions were used as references; draft joint publications were not used. It is recommended that users review the current version of the Joint Electronic Library (JEL) on either the CD-ROM or the Chairman's Joint Doctrine Home Page on the World Wide Web site (<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine>) to obtain the most up-to-date doctrine references.

## SECTION II-MEASURES AND CRITERIA

1. Introduction. The measures and criteria in the UJTL are provided as a guide for CINCs and their staffs to establish standards of performance based on their assigned missions, or they may prepare their own measures and criteria based upon theater experiences. These measures and criteria are a common language reference system for joint force commanders, operations planners, and trainers. They are also useful to analysts and planners for understanding and integrating joint operations.

2. Definition of Standards. A standard provides a way of expressing the degree to which a joint organization or force must perform a joint task under a specified set of conditions. A standard consists of one or more measures for a task and a criterion for each measure. The terms "measure" and "criterion" are defined below.

a. **A measure provides the basis for describing varying levels of joint task performance.** A measure is directly related to a task. For example, take the task, OP 5.1.1, *Communicate Operational Information*, which refers to the sending and receiving of information from one unit or organization to another by any means. Measures of performance for this task include the speed with which information is transmitted (queuing time for message transmission) and the accuracy of

communications (percent of messages sent to the right addresses with the right content).

b. **The second parameter of a standard is the "criterion."** A criterion defines acceptable levels of performance. It is often expressed as a minimum acceptable level of performance. The combination of the measure and the criterion comprises the standard for a task.

3. Setting Standards. The standard for a joint task is set within the framework of the joint force commander's mission and in the context of the conditions, either most likely or worst case, that are linked to those missions. Thus, the standard(s) for a joint task can only be set when (1) the mission analysis is complete, (2) the conditions affecting the task have been identified and described, and (3) measures and criteria have been selected that reflect the task contribution to mission accomplishment. This means that standards are tied to missions. That is, just because a joint task has a particular standard on one mission does not mean that the same standard will apply to other missions. A task standard could be the same across missions, but it could also be different for each mission.

a. **Each joint task has a standard with one or more measures.** A standard can be set using any measure(s) that apply to a task. In some situations, one measure may be sufficient. However, in most situations, a commander may have to specify a standard using more than one measure to fully define a required level of performance.

*For example, in specifying a standard for engaging enemy targets (OP 3.2.6, Provide Firepower in Support of Operational Maneuver), under the condition of overwhelming threat land forces (C 2.9.5.1), measures for both the time to engage (M1, Minutes to complete attack after target identification) and the accuracy of the engagement (M4, Percent of enemy forces destroyed, delayed, disrupted, or degraded) may be needed to fully define a required level of performance. The resulting tasks, conditions, and standards will comprise the joint mission capability requirements for a combatant commander.*

b. **A standard for a single joint task does not normally have to be met by a single joint force component.** In many cases in joint operations, several elements of the force (system types, component commands, and coalition members) will be assigned responsibility for a joint task. Therefore, the assessment of performance will often reflect the aggregated capabilities of multiple force elements.

c. **Joint task standards reflect the combatant commander's understanding of required capabilities based on his assigned missions (and the associated concept of operations) and the conditions likely to be experienced in carrying out that mission.** Joint task standards also should be

established with cognizance of friendly force capabilities (i.e., do not expect a division to be as capable as a corps; a single ship to be as effective as a carrier battle group).

d. **Joint task standards should be traceable across levels of command.** A commander who has established task standards based on an analysis of assigned missions must assume some level of performance for organizations performing command-linked and supporting tasks. For example, in a strategic deployment mission, assume that a JFC has a command-linked task (needs support from outside the command) for moving forces to the theater (SN 1.2.5, *Move Forces from POE to POD*). Once the functional combatant commander accepts the tasks the JFC is requested to execute a command-linked task (ST 7.1.4, *Determine and Validate Forces and Cargo to be Deployed or Redeployed*) to provide required information to the functional combatant commander. Also, a component command of the functional combatant command must meet a performance standard on a supporting task (SN 1.2.7, *Coordinate Global Strategic Refueling*). As a result, when each of these commands establishes its task standards for a mission, it must be aware of the relationship between its own task performance and that of the command(s) with whom it operates.

4. Development of Measures and Criteria. The following guidelines that were used to develop the measures and criteria in the UJTL should be used to develop proposed changes and additions to the measures and criteria listed. Recommended changes should be forwarded to USJFCOM for approval and insertion in the UJTL.

a. **Keep measures simple.** A simple measure requires only a single measurement (e.g., hours to develop an operation order). These measures may be the easiest for operators to understand. A more complex measure might involve a ratio (e.g., ratio of enemy targets destroyed to friendly losses). Such complex measures, while attempting to be more meaningful, actually tend to reflect contributions of more than one task (e.g., number of targets destroyed is related to engaging enemy targets while friendly losses is related to protecting friendly forces and systems).

b. **Measures and criteria should reflect an understanding of a task.** Carefully read the task definition to understand the scope of the task and what activities it comprises.

c. **Measures and criteria should reflect how a task contributes to mission success.** Measures and criteria are selected to establish standards based on the context of a mission. The mission establishes the requirement to perform a task and provides the context for task performance (including the conditions under which a task must be performed). It determines where and when a task must be performed (one or more locations). Finally, it determines the degree to which a

task must be performed (implied in the concept of the operation) and provides a way to understand precisely how the performance of a task contributes to mission success.

**d. Measures should be sensitive to the impact of conditions on task performance.** Examining conditions that can impair task performance during a mission can provide clues as to the key dimensions of performance that should be measured. For example, if the primary targets of intelligence collection are fixed sites (i.e., condition of target mobility), the currency of intelligence data would not seem to be a critical aspect of performance. On the other hand, if the targets at which intelligence collection is aimed are highly mobile, the currency of the collected intelligence data would seem to be a key measure of performance.

**e. Criteria should reflect the key dimensions of task performance.** Every task has multiple dimensions of performance that can be observed and the criteria to specify an acceptable level of performance for each dimension. At a minimum, most tasks can be measured in terms of the time required to initiate or to complete a task (i.e., response time), the rate at which progress is being made (e.g., rate of movement), an overall level of completion or success (e.g., percent of targets correctly identified, hit rate), size of deviation (e.g., proximity of fires to target) in terms of power (e.g., engagement range), lethality (e.g., rate of kills given a hit), or success (e.g., percent of messages accurately transmitted). Key dimensions of task performance should be found in the commander's guidance and concept of operations.

**f. Measures should be developed that distinguish among multiple levels of performance.** Good measures distinguish among multiple levels of performance (as opposed to a go/no go measure). This can be accomplished most easily using either an absolute numerical scale (e.g., applicable to number, time, or distance) or a relative scale (e.g., proportion of number, time, or distance).

**g. Measures should focus on the outputs, results of performance, or on the process to achieve the task.** In identifying dimensions of task performance, focus on the outputs or results of performance and, in selected cases, the process followed (e.g., number or percentage of substeps performed correctly or in the correct sequence). The dimensions of task performance should not be peculiar to a specific means for performing a task; rather, they should apply to all means that can be employed to perform a task.

**h. Measures should try to take advantage of the strengths of both absolute and relative scales.** Absolute scales are those that, beginning from a start point (usually zero), measure the number of occurrences, the amount of time, or the movement across distance. The advantage of absolute scales is that the result or output is clearly specified. The disadvantage is the lack of information about the adequacy of any particular value (from simply looking at the measure) on the absolute scale. Relative scales are those that compare a

particular value to the total and are often expressed as a proportion or percentage (e.g., percent complete). The advantage of relative measures is that they clearly indicate the degree of completion of a task. The main disadvantage is that such measures do not indicate the size or scope of effort on the task.

5. **Organization of Measures and Criteria.** The measures and criteria for each UJTL task are listed under that task and are numbered sequentially beginning with M1, M2, etc. Some tasks may have only a few measures while others may have ten or more. Measures and criteria are not listed in order of precedence or importance.

### **SECTION III LISTING OF TASKS, MEASURES, AND CRITERIA**

#### **STRATEGIC NATIONAL TASKS, MEASURES, AND CRITERIA**

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## SN 1 CONDUCT STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT.

To conduct the relocation of forces to desired theaters and their return in accordance with national military strategy and OPLANs. This task focuses on the movement of forces and resources from a point of origin to a specific operational area. Strategic deployment encompasses relocation of forces, equipment, and supplies to a theater from CONUS, or from one theater to another, for subsequent reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI). This task applies to mobilization and nonmobilization situations. Forces include air, land, and sea forces, as well as special operations forces. **(JP 0-2, 3-35, 4-0, 4-02.1, 5-0)** (JP 1, 3-0, 3-04.1, 3-07.5, 4-0, 4-01, 4-01.1, 4-01.2, 4-01.5, 4-02.1, 4-05, 5-0)

**Note:** See ST 1.1, *Conduct Intratheater Strategic Deployment* for subsequent intratheater strategic deployment and concentration.

M1	Percent	Of TPFDD sealifted units closed by LAD.
M2	Percent	Of TPFDD airlifted units closed by LAD.
M3	Percent	Of units close by LAD.
M4	Percent	Of sustainment movement requirements met by available sealift (during execution).

**SN 1.1 Determine Transportation Infrastructure and Resources.**

To identify demands on common-user, organic, and contracted-commercial lift assets and en route support required to move forces to and from theaters in support of national military and theater strategies, operation plans, and multinational and regional needs. **(JP 0-2, 4-0, 4-01, 4-01.3, 5-0)** (JP 3-05.3, 4-01.2, 4-01.7, 4-02.1, 5-03.1)

**Note:** Deployment/Redeployment planning is considered under SN 5, *Provide Strategic Direction and Integration*.

M1	Hours	To determine transportation feasibility.
M2	Hours	To identify available common-user lift assets worldwide to support critical, short-notice requirements in support of national or theater military strategies.
M3	Hours	To identify requirements for lift assets (in crisis situation).
M4	Months	From approval of JSCP to approved OPLAN/TPFDD.
M5	Percent	Of airlift requirements miss LAD because of unforeseen lack of en route support.
M6	Percent	Of requirements close between EAD and LAD.
M7	Percent	Of requirements planned to close between EAD and LAD.
M8	Percent	Of sealift requirements have adequate origin outload and destination reception support infrastructure.
M9	Weeks	Since demands on common-user and organic lift assets last verified.
M10	Y/N	In crisis action planning, USTRANSCOM can determine transportation feasibility in time to allow the supported CINC to complete the CINC's commander's estimate for submission to the CJCS.
M11	Hours	To determine transportation feasibility of Supported CINC's TPFDD (from warning order) (assuming required overflight rights, landing rights en route support facilities, and critical common-user lift assets are available).
M12	Y/N	The combatant command in coordination with USTRANSCOM will determine if an OPLAN or CONPLAN with TPFDD is transportation feasible as a result of the final TPFDD refinement conference.
M13	Percent	Of OPLANs and CONPLANs with TPFDDs determined transportation feasible NLT final TPFDD refinement conference.

**SN 1.1.1 Determine Transportation and Support Availability.**

To determine installation materiel handling capability, port throughput capacity, onward movement capability, transit times, overflight and landing rights, en route support facilities, and critical common-user lift asset availability. **(JP 4-0, 4-01)** (JP 4-01, 4-01.3, 4-01.5, 4-01.7, 4-02.1)

M1	Days	To update and modify an assessment.
M2	Hours	To determine commercial transport industry response times and asset availability (from execution).
M3	Hours	To ascertain current state of CRAF, SRP, VISA, and RRF assets.
M4	Hours	To identify SPOEs (after CJCS Warning Order).
M5	Hours	To identify transportation availability data for combatant command Course of Action development or analysis (for CONUS).
M6	Hours	To verify availability of all sourced civil reserve air fleet (CRAF) aircraft and crews.
M7	Hours	To verify en route support facilities available, functioning at projected level or capable of reaching required operational levels with sourced deploying en route support equipment and personnel.
M8	Hours	To verify impact of current and forecast weather on transit times.
M9	Hours	To verify mission capability of all sourced airlift aircraft.
M10	Hours	To verify mission capability of all sourced deploying en route support personnel (during crisis action planning).
M11	Hours	To verify overflight and landing rights.
M12	Hours	To verify transit times with respect to weather (assuming required transit rights, vessel berthing permissions, landing rights, en route support facilities, and critical common-user lift assists are available.).
M13	Hours	To identify POE/POD current and predicted throughput capacity (after CJCS Warning Order).
M14	Hours	To verify mission capability of all sourced airlift aircraft (during crisis action planning).
M15	Hours	To verify mission capability of all sourced airlift aircrews (during crisis action planning).
M16	Months	Since last theater on-site capability assessment.
M17	Percent	Of CONUS installation outloading capability available at execution, compared to DD Form 1726 Reports.
M18	Percent	Of POE/POD capacity employed.
M19	Percent	Of TPFDD estimated rail capacity from point of origin to port of embarkation, actually in place.
M20	Percent	Of TPFDD estimated throughput capacity for installation, actually achieved.
M21	Percent	Of TPFDD estimated throughput capacity for POD, actually achieved.
M22	Percent	Of TPFDD estimated throughput capacity for POE, actually achieved.
M23	Hours	To verify OPLAN/CONPLAN transit times with respect to current and forecast weather (assuming transit rights, vessel berthing permissions, landing rights, en route support facilities, and critical common-user lift assets are available).
M24	Hours	To verify mission capability of all sourced deploying en route support equipment.

M25	Y/N	Planned throughput does not exceed capacity of any POE/POD used.
M26	Percent	Of POE/POD with planned throughput exceeding capacity.
M27	Y/N	USTRANSCOM can identify transportation availability data required for supported CINC's Course of Action development or analysis NLT time coordinated with supported CINC/CJCS.
M28	Hours	To verify status of available personnel and equipment.
M29	Hours	To verify mission capability of all sourced airlift aircraft.

### SN 1.1.2 Coordinate and Match Transportation Resources and Requirements.

To compare deployment requirements against the actual strategic lift assets made available. If a change in the allocation is required, the supported combatant command, in coordination with USTRANSCOM, requests additional transportation allocations from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. **(JP 4-0, 4-01, 4-01.1, 4-01.2, 4-01.3, 4-01.5) (JP 4-01.2, 4-01.3, 4-01.7)**

M1	Percent	Of ULNs arrive NLT LAD in airlift (during TFE).
M2	Percent	Of ULNs arrive NLT LAD in sealift (during TFE).
M3	Hours	To reallocate strategic lift assets IAW CJCS direction.
M4	Hours	To justify and obtain change in lift allocation (during crisis action planning).
M5	Hours	To provide CONOPS and estimate of lift capability in relationship to apportioned airlift and sealift assets (during crisis action planning).
M6	Hours	To validate and recommend change in lift allocation (during crisis action planning).
M7	Percent	Of planning time, used to determine transportation feasibility.
M8	Percent	Of unique deployable criteria, addressed.
M9	Y/N	The combatant command in coordination with USTRANSCOM will determine if an OPLAN or NPLAN with TPFDD is transportation feasible as a result of the final TPFDD refinement conference.
M10	Hours	To determine transportation feasibility of Supported CINC's TPFDD (from commander's estimate).
M11	Percent	Of TPFDD LADs planned with sufficient transportation resources for stated requirements during deliberate planning.
M12	Hours	Deviation from supported commander's CAP TPFDD closure and USTRANSCOM's evaluation.
M13	Hours	For USTRANSCOM assist in development of an initial closure estimate in time to allow the supported CINC to complete CINC's commander's estimate for submission to the CJCS.
M14	Y/N	Determine if a COA is transportation feasible in time to allow the supported CINC to complete the CINC's estimate for submissions to CJCS (during crisis action planning).

M15	Y/N	During crisis action planning, USCINCTRANS determines if a Course of Action (COA) is transportation feasible NLT the time coordinated with the supported CINC.
M16	Hours	To verify mission capability of all lift assets to final destination.

### SN 1.1.3 Determine Possible Closure Times.

To determine the arrival date of a specified movement requirement at port of debarkation (POD). This task includes conducting a detailed, integrated air, land, and sea transportation analysis to determine the transportation feasibility of a course of action. It employs common-user lift assets apportioned for planning and supporting command deployment estimates for organic movements.

USTRANSCOM evaluates the capability to deploy the force within the transportation priorities established by the supported command. Services and Service components also provide an estimate of the ability of their installations and forces to meet required arrival times at POE and onward movement from POD to destination. **(JP 4-0, 5-03.1)** (JP 4-01.2, 4-01.7, 5-0, 5-00.2)

M1	Days	Deviation between LAD and RDD for self-deploying Service and component forces.
M2	Days	Deviation from LAD in airlift (during TFE).
M3	Days	Deviation from LAD in sealift (during TFE).
M4	Percent	Of ULNs close after their RDD.
M5	Y/N	USTRANSCOM can determine initial closure times in time to allow the supported CINC to complete the CINC's commander's estimate for submission to the CJCS (in crisis action planning).
M6	Percent	Of planning time USTRANSCOM uses to determine initial closure times.
M7	Hours	To determine transportation feasibility of supported CINC's TPFDD (from warning order).
M8	Y/N	In deliberate planning, USTRANSCOM can project closure dates during TPFDD refinement conferences.
M9	Percent	Of time USTRANSCOM projects closure dates by end of final TPFDD refinement conference.
M10	Percent	Of ULNs arrive NLT LAD in airlift (during TFE).
M11	Percent	Of ULNs arrive NLT LAD in sealift (during TFE).
M12	Hours	Of planning time needed to determine JRSOI and theater distribution of forces and sustainment to final destination.
M13	Y/N	Can determine initial closure times in order to allow the supported CINC to complete the CINC's commander's estimate for submission to the CJCS (in crisis action planning).
M14	Weeks	Needed to determine aerial port requirements based on post forces conference TPFDD during deliberate planning.
M15	Days	After deliberate planning final TPFDD refinement conference, identify percentage of cargo and passengers that will close on time.
M16	Days	After deliberate planning final TPFDD refinement conference, identify all closure dates.

M17	Y/N	In crisis action planning, USTRANSCOM determines closure time NLT the time coordinated with the supported CINC.
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#### SN 1.1.4 Provide for En Route Support and Clearances.

To arrange support, diplomatic clearances, and overflight/transit rights with affected countries for forces that are in transit from one locality to another. Many strategic deployments need intermediate staging bases or areas for refueling, air-bridge operations, forward basing/staging of personnel and equipment, regrouping of ship convoys, replenishment, exercise, inspection, and concentration or redistribution of forces. Staging bases or areas may require airfields and facilities (e.g., navigation aids, communications, maintenance and servicing facilities), augmentation support, parking and transshipment facilities, construction services, health services, berths, beaches, stevedores, and utilities. **(JP 3-0, 4.04, 3-07.5, 3-08v1, 4-01.1)** (JP 1, 2-01, 3-07.5, 4-01.1, 4-01.5, CJCSM 3122.03)

**Note:** To determine if mutual support agreements exist or to negotiate required support see SN 3.1.3, *Support Establishment of Access and Storage Agreements* and SN 4.2.9, *Acquire Host-Nation Support (HNS)*.

M1	Airframe-Days	Lost en route maintenance.
M2	Airframe-Days	Lost to indirect routing.
M3	Days	To post changes to DOD Foreign Clearance Guide.
M4	Hours	Before C-Day and L-Hour, support teams available.
M5	Hours	Until support teams available (after C-Day and L-Hour).
M6	Hours	To be prepared to request priority diplomatic clearance (after CJCS Warning Order).
M7	Hours	To verify overflight and landing rights needed for deployment execution (during crisis).
M8	Hours	Until support teams available (after L-Hour).
M9	Percent	Decrease in ship deployments because of nonavailability of staging bases, bunkering, or routing.
M10	Percent	Of airlift/tanker sorties diverted or canceled.
M11	Percent	Of airlift/tanker sorties overfly planned en route support bases (due to lack of base, fuel, support facilities, or ramp space).
M12	Percent	Of Defense Courier Service movements, jeopardized by overflight/layovers in nation not covered by SOFA or other agreements.
M13	Percent	Of HNS and diplomatic clearance requirements, provided to supported CINC before he submits his commander's estimate.
M14	Percent	Of ship sailings, delayed, diverted, or canceled (lack of diplomatic clearance).
M15	Percent	Of sorties containing courier material diverted or canceled.
M16	Percent	Of support, clearance, and overflight permit requests, filled using current references/SOPs.



M17	Percent	Of tanker sorties diverted or canceled.
M18	Percent	Of tanker sorties overfly planned en route support bases (due to lack of POL, support facilities, or ramp space).
M19	Percent	Of TPFDD airlift sorties have required diplomatic clearances.
M20	Percent	Of unique deployable criteria, addressed.
M21	Percent	Of ship days lost because of ship husbanding or repair facilities en route.
M22	Steaming-Days	Lost because of lack of available ship handling and repair facilities en route.
M23	Y/N	USTRANSCOM identifies HNS and diplomatic clearance requirements to support Course of Action analysis (in crisis action planning).
M24	Percent	Of HNS and diplomatic clearance requirements identified (to support COA analysis).
M25	Hours	To identify HNS and diplomatic clearance requirements (to support COA analysis).
M26	Y/N	USTRANSCOM identifies HNS, en route support, intermediate staging bases, and diplomatic clearance requirements to support given COAs and provide this information to the supported CINC prior to his submission of the commander's estimate.
M27	Hours	To identify HNS, en route support, intermediate staging bases, and diplomatic clearance requirements (to support COA analysis).
M28	Instances	Of airlift sorties which must overfly planned en route support bases (due to lack of POL, support facilities, or ramp space).
M29	Hour	To determine firefighting requirements for deployed locations.
M30	Hours	To develop aircraft parking MOG for all deployed locations.
M31	Days	To develop aircraft parking plans for en route locations.
M32	Days	To plan and source engineering support, personnel, and equipment.
M33	Hours	To determine airfield support requirements.
M34	Hours	To determine the fuel systems maintenance requirements.
M35	Hours	To determine EOD support requirements.
M36	Days	To determine and validate support facility requirements.
M37	Days	To assist in development of OPORD for deployed locations to include measures required for disaster control.
M38	Hours	Until support team is tasked.
M39	Y/N	En route support bases are fully operational before first planned aircraft arrival time (during execution).
M40	Hours	For USTRANSCOM to identify en route facilities in advance of a deficiency affecting operations during execution.

### SN 1.1.5 Determine Impact of Climate and Geography on Deployment.

To examine the departure, en route and arrival area climate, and geography. Based upon examination, to determine changes in deployment transportation

modes or assets, routing, or protection. **(JP 2-01, 3-11, 4-01.1, 4-01.2, 4-01.3, 4-01.6)** (JP 2-01, 3-07.5, 3-08v2, 3-11, 3-56, 4-02.1, 4-01.6)

**Note:** See SN 2, *Develop National Strategic Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance*, for examination of the impact of threat and geography on deployment.

M1	Minutes	To verify OPLAN/CONPLAN transit times with respect to current and forecast weather.
M2	Percent	Of airborne strategic airlift/tanker deployment missions, delayed, diverted, re-routed, or canceled (due to weather conditions that should have been predicted prior to takeoff).
M3	Percent	Of transit time computations include factors for historical data on adverse weather.
M4	Percent	Of strategic airlift/tanker sorties changed or canceled (due to unanticipated geographic considerations).
M5	Percent	Of strategic airlift/tanker sorties changed or canceled (due to unanticipated climatic considerations).
M6	Percent	Of strategic sealift changed or canceled (due to climatic considerations not forecast at least 24 hours in advance).
M7	Days	Projection of weather by METOC for daily presentation to CAT.
M8	Y/N	Location and climatology considered during planning and execution.

#### **SN 1.1.6 Determine the Impact of Threat Activity on Strategic Mobility.**

Examine potential and actual threats at departure and arrival locations and en route (along lines of communications), including possible use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and determine necessary changes to operations. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-07.2, 3-10, 3-15, 4-0, 4-01, 4-01.2, 5-0, 5-03.1)** (JP 3-07.2, 3-07.5, 3-10, 3-15, 4-0, 4-01.1, 4-01.2, 4-01.5, 4-01.6, CJCSI 3100.01, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3141.01)

M1	Hours	Since distribution of last combatant command classified weekly INTEL summary.
M2	Hours	From action by threat until an update presented to CAT by J-2.
M3	Hours	From identification of event until contingency planning document (CPD) or theater planning document, disseminated.
M4	Hours	To reroute airlift and sealift flow around new threats.
M5	Percent	Of strategic airlift/tanker missions lost, delayed, or diverted (due to unpredicted threats).
M6	Percent	Of strategic airlift/tanker deployment aircraft, destroyed by hostile enemy action.
M7	Percent	Of strategic sealift voyages, delayed, diverted, changed or canceled due to identified enemy action.
M8	Percent	Of strategic sealift vessels, destroyed by hostile enemy action.

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M9	Percent	Of strategic sealift assets lost, delayed, or diverted (due to unpredicted threats).
M10	Percent	Of priority intelligence requirements are tasked for collection.
M11	Hours/ Days	Of delay to strategic air/sea lift by use of NBC.
M12	Hours	From last update J-2 provides updated information on possible hostile actions posing threat to deployment operations.
M13	Y/N	Distribute daily intelligence summary.
M14	Percent	Of strategic airlift/tanker deployment missions are delayed, diverted, re-routed, or canceled due to identified enemy action.
M15	Number	Of strategic airlift or tanker deployment destroyed by identified enemy action.

### **SN 1.2 Conduct Deployment and Redeployment.**

To move forces and cargo in accordance with both national strategic and theater strategic requirements and in conformance with the supported commander's concept of operations. This may be included in an OPLAN, CONPLAN, or OPORD. **(JP 3-0, 4-0, 4-01, 4-01.3, 5-0, 5-03.1)** (JP 3-0, 4-01, 4-01.2, 4-01.5, 4-01.7, 4-02.1, 4-05)

M1	Hours	To evaluate validated TPFDD force modules and pass to components.
M2	Percent	Of available ship days, lost awaiting cargo.
M3	Percent	Of cargo planned for delivery, delivered.
M4	Percent	Of ULNs close by RDD.
M5	Percent	Of ULNs closed within EAD/LAD window.
M6	Percent	Of delivered cargo not identified in JOPES.

#### **SN 1.2.1 Integrate Deployment Systems.**

To manage the employment of common-user and organic lift assets of deploying forces through movement control and ADP systems. While execution is decentralized, centralized integration permits worldwide strategic mobility operations. The global transportation network (GTN) integrates data from transportation and logistics automated information systems for mission area applications. GTN should be used for in-transit visibility. Utilize the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) for deployment, sustainment, and redeployment operations. The umbrella for the JOPES system is the Global Command and Control System (GCCS), which will provide visibility to all users. **(JP 4-0, 4-01, 4-01.1, 4-01.2, 4-01.3, 4-01.5, 4-01.7, 5-0)** (JP 4-01, 4-01.1, 4-01.7, 5-00.2, 5-03.1, CJCSM 3122.02, CJCSM 3122.03)

**Note:** For description of C4, see SN 5.1.2, *Establish and Direct National Military C4 Systems Worldwide for Communicating Strategic Information.*

M1	Hours	To modify TPFDD after receipt.
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M2	Hours	Maximum lag in high priority cargo in-transit visibility (ITV).
M3	Hours	Lag in high priority cargo in-transit visibility (ITV).
M4	Hours	To account for all rolling stock.
M5	Hours	To generate, transmit, and centralize movement information from source systems.
M6	Hours	To generate, transmit, and centralize movement information from various sources for access by GTN.
M7	Hours	To locate specific personnel or cargo en route.
M8	Hours	To review feasibility for supported commander's high priority cargo versus available lift assets (after supported commander's warning order).
M9	Minutes	To obtain selective GTN query responses (by type, mode, geographic area, date, IB/OB, on hand waiting).
M10	Percent	Accuracy in generated movement information for GTN.
M11	Percent	Completeness in generated movement information for GTN.
M12	Percent	Of DCS materiel, delayed more than 24 hours (faulty prioritization procedures).
M13	Percent	Of ADP systems interface or have work-around.
M14	Percent	Of cargo, visible during transit (ITV).
M15	Percent	Of generated movement information for GTN, current.
M16	Percent	Of supported commander's high priority cargo, identified.
M17	Y/N	During Planning and execution no data transfer between networked stations is responsible for a supporting command failing to meet a request/requirement.
M18	Percent	Percent of currency in generated movement information in GTN.
M19	Hours	To notify the system owner that a source system for GTN is providing inaccurate or incomplete data, after receipt of batch data feed.
M20	Hours	To identify inaccurate or incomplete data coming from a near real-time data feed to GTN and to identify the source system owner.
M21	Minutes	For personnel operating command and control systems to get desired or requested output from those systems (within system capability) for a simple query.
M22	Hours	For personnel operating command and control systems to get desired or requested output from those systems (within system capability) for a complex query.

### SN 1.2.2 Provide Forces and Mobility Assets.

To provide the transportation assets (e.g., road, rail, sealift, and airlift) required in an operational configuration for the movement of forces and cargo. Mobility assets involve military and commercial means that includes assets from multinational partners. **(JP 3-07.5, 4-01, 4-01.1, 4-01.2, 4-01.3, 4-01.7, 4-05)**  
(JP 3-07.5, 3-08v2, 3-17, 4-0, 4-01, 4-01.1, 4-01.7, 4-02.1, 4-02.2)

M1	Days	For railroad cargo support to reach full capacity.
M2	Hours	Prior to first planned aircraft arrival time, deploying en route support elements, in place.

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M3	Hours	To alert deploying en route support elements, prior to planned departure time.
M4	Hours	To reconfigure commercial aircraft to support military operations (down time).
M5	Percent	Of APOD throughput capacity, available prior to first EAD.
M6	Percent	Of en route support bases, fully operational prior to first planned aircraft arrival.
M7	Percent	Of FSS, MPS, RRF ships met activation schedule.
M8	Ship Days	Lost because of ship maintenance problems.
M9	Percent	Of assigned APODs, operating at EAD.
M10	Percent	Of allocated/apportioned transportation assets, available for movement of forces and cargo.
M11	Percent	Of required transportation assets arrive at the POE (in proper configuration and operational status).
M12	Percent	Of sourced airlift aircraft, mission capable by C-day.
M13	Percent	Of sourced tanker aircraft, mission capable by planned deployment date.
M14	Percent	Of sourced units report equipment readiness levels at C2 or better.
M15	Percent	Of SPOEs and SPODs reach required operational capability NLT first ALD.
M16	Percent	Of tasked units receive valid tasking in time to meet ALD.
M17	Percent	Of allocated/apportioned transportation assets, provided by USTRANSCOM.
M18	Percent	Of transportation assets meet ALD/RLD.
M19	Ship-days	To make ships fully operationally ready (down time).
M20	Hours	For carrier providing AE aircraft to divert aircraft to support maintenance facility (to reconfigure).
M21	Hours	For carriers to supply aircraft (after call up).
M22	Hours	Prior to first planned aircraft arrival, en route support bases fully operational.
M23	Days	To assemble airlift forces for strategic intratheater deployment of forces.
M24	Hours	For contractor to reconfigure to AE aircraft.
M25	Hours	For carriers to supply aircraft after call up in Stages I and II.
M26	Hours	For carriers to supply aircraft after call up in Stage III.
M27	Hours	To assemble rail and ground assets for intratheater deployment of forces.

### SN 1.2.3 Conduct Terminal Operations.

To conduct reception, processing, and staging of passengers; receipt, transit storage, and marshaling of cargo; loading and unloading of ships or aircraft; maintain in-transit visibility (ITV); and manifesting and forwarding of cargo and passengers to destination. This task applies to ports of embarkation normally within the continental United States and can also apply to ports of debarkation

outside the continental United States. (JP 4-0, 4-01.1, 4-01.2, 4-01.3, 4-01.5, 4-01.6) (JP 3-02.2, 4-01.2, 4-01.5, 4-01.6, 4-01.7, 4-02.1)

M1	Days	For APOEs to reach full operating capability.
M2	Days	For SPODs to reach full operating capability.
M3	Days	For SPODs to reach initial operating capability.
M4	Days	For APODs to reach full operating capability.
M5	Days	For SPOEs to reach full operating capability.
M6	Percent	Of SPODs, open by required time.
M7	Hours	Delay in opening of APOD or SPOD because of late arrival of port personnel and equipment.
M8	Hours	For TPFDD-identified theater APOD to reach initial operating capability (IOC).
M9	Hours	Maximum port hold time for TP2 and 3 air channel cargo.
M10	Hours	Maximum port hold time for transportation priority 1 air channel cargo.
M11	Percent	Of aircraft, loaded at APOE within CONOPS/specified time.
M12	Percent	Of APOE throughput capacity achieved prior to first ready to load date (RLD).
M13	Percent	Of cargo unloaded at POD incorrectly manifested.
M14	Percent	Of cargo, damaged during terminal operations.
M15	Days	To move cargo from reception area.
M16	Percent	Of cargo frustrated by shortfall in reception capability.
M17	Percent	Of cargo, visible during terminal operations.
M18	Percent	Of POEs reach required operational capability IAW TPFDD NLT first ALD.
M19	Percent	Of required APODs, operating at EAD to support mission mobility requirements.
M20	Percent	Of standard ship load and unload times, achieved.
M21	Percent	Of support element, fully operational at APOD 24 hours prior to first scheduled aircraft arrival.
M22	Percent	Of APODs, open by required time.
M23	Y/N	Sufficient APODs operating at EAD to support mission mobility requirements by time and phase.
M24	Percent	Of required APODs operating at EAD.
M25	Hours	After notification, all aerial port personnel and equipment are deployed.
M26	Percent	Of aerial port equipment and personnel in place 24 hours prior to scheduled arrival of forces IAW CONOPS.
M27	Hours	Prior to expected peak workload, augmentation personnel and equipment are in place.
M28	Percent	Of aircraft unloaded at the APOD within CONOPS/specified time (during execution).
M29	Y/N	En route support teams are available for transportation NLT than their ALD and in place NLT their latest arrival date (LAD) (during execution).

#### SN 1.2.4 Provide Movement to POE.

To move forces, individuals, and equipment/supplies from origin installation, or mobilization station if used, to marshaling area and then to ports of embarkation (POE). (JP 4-0, 4-01.2, 4-01.3, 4-01.5, 4-01.7) (JP 4-01.2, 4-01.3, 4-01.7, 4-02.1, 5-03.1, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Hours	Between unit's C-Day and L-Hour and unit's departure from HS for POE.
M2	Hours	To validate location of DOD-owned prepositioned transport assets.
M3	Percent	Port calls issued IAW established time standards.
M4	Percent	Of cargo arrived at POE on or before its TPFDD ALD.
M5	Percent	Of DFB alignments to installations and units, still valid at execution.
M6	Percent	Of DOD organic transport and DOD commercial capability meet TPFDD RLD/ALDs.
M7	Percent	Of DOD-owned prepositioned transport assets have valid location held at L-Hour.
M8	Percent	Of movements delayed by late port calls.
M9	Percent	Of movements rerouted because of lack of waivers for hazardous materials.
M10	Percent	Of ports have Port Support Activities in place at time first load arrives.
M11	Percent	Of TPFDD RLD/ALDs met by DOD organic transport and/or DOD commercial capability (during execution).
M12	Percent	Of ULNs arriving at POE, properly configured to load.
M13	Percent	Of ULNs arriving at POE, properly documented.
M14	Percent	Of waivers and permits, granted in time to preclude cargo delays (during execution).
M15	Percent	Of units requiring MTMC-generated port calls receive them in time to arrive at the POE NLT their ALD.

#### SN 1.2.5 Move Forces from POE to POD.

To move forces by air and sea strategic mobility assets to ports of debarkation (POD) in theaters. (JP 4-0, 4-01, 4-01.3, 4-01.5, 4-01.7) (JP 4-01.1, 4-02.1, 5-03.1)

M1	Percent	Of air cargo, damaged en route.
M2	Percent	Of cargo closed before JFC EAD without any place to offload or store.
M3	Percent	Of sea cargo, damaged en route.
M4	Percent	Of strategic mobility and support assets, in place to move forces IAW validated TPFDD.
M5	Percent	Of supported CINC validated requirements (ULNs) arrive at the TPFDD POD NLT their LAD.
M6	Percent	Of combat support and combat service support units closed within supported combatant commander's EAD/LADs
M7	Percent	Of strategic mobility assets, required to move cargo not identified in JOPES

### SN 1.2.6 Conduct Redeployment or Retrograde of Personnel and Equipment from Theater.

To conduct redeployment of US and other designated personnel and equipment from theater of operations/joint operations areas, often using the retrograde capacity of mobility assets during strategic deployment operations. **(JP 3-17, 5-03.1)** (JP 3-0, 4-01.1, 4-02.1, 4-05, 5-0, 5-00.2, 5-03.1)

M1	Days	Cargo (other than major end items) awaiting backhaul.
M2	Days	Delay for major end items awaiting backhaul.
M3	Hours	Delay for personnel awaiting movement.
M4	Percent	Of supported CINC validated backhaul requirements are scheduled to arrive at the POD by their ALD (during execution).
M5	Percent	Of cargo aircraft leave theater below capacity (with items awaiting transport).
M6	Percent	Of passengers and cargo, visible during transit (ITV).
M7	Percent	Of ships closed within supported combatant commander's ALDs.
M8	Percent	Of supported CINC validated backhaul requirements (ULNs) arrive at the TPFDD POE by ALD.
M9	Percent	Of sealift leave theater below capacity (with items awaiting transport).
M10	Percent	Of patient movement by retrograde aircraft if the aircraft will not deviate from its scheduled missions and the AE CRAF has not been activated.
M11	Percent	Of patient movement by regularly scheduled AE channel missions.

### SN 1.2.7 Coordinate Global Strategic Refueling.

To coordinate refueling for (1) the strategic deployment of aircraft to reach their destination with minimum dependence on landing rights in foreign nations, and (2) the enhancement of range, loiter time, and payload of aircraft conducting strategic air operations. It can also include replenishment (fueling) at sea for strategically employing and deploying ships and convoys. **(JP 3-17, 4-0, 4-01.1, 4-01.2)** (JP 4-01.2, 5-03.1, CJCSI 3110.11B, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Days	For ships transit.
M2	Hours	To provide supported CINC feasibility study on short notice requirement for air refueling assets.
M3	Percent	Of aircraft, diverted from planned destination (missed aerial refueling).
M4	Percent	Of airlift sorties stopped en route because of lack of tanker support.
M5	Percent	Of bomber combat missions, diverted or canceled for lack of tanker support.
M6	Percent	Of combatant UNREPs (for fuel), conducted by gray bottoms.
M7	Percent	Of fighter deployments (USAF, USN, or USMC) must use en route stops (lack of tanker support).



M8	Percent	Of receiver aircraft must divert (tankers missing ARCTs).
M9	Percent	Of tanker packages (ULNs) meet complete scheduled offload.
M10	Percent	Of tanker packages, which support strategic AR (ULNs), meet LAD.
M11	Percent	Of air refueling requirements for direct to strategic deployments and air-bridge operations validated prior to final TPFDD refinement conference.
M12	Hours	To source air refueling resources for validated short-notice air refueling requests.
M13	Hours	To provide a feasibility analysis for short-notice requests for additional apportioned tactical air refueling assets to the appropriate supported CINC.
M14	Hours	To provide a feasibility analysis for short-notice requests for additional apportioned strategic air refueling assets to support the air- bridge.
M15	Y/N	Provide, when asked, tanker cell to plan and task deployed tankers units supporting AMC operations.
M16	Hours	After receipt, USTRANSCOM validates incoming short-notice requirements for air refueling and notifies AMC.

#### **SN 1.2.8 Provide Global Patient Movement and Evacuation.**

To provide evacuation and control of patient movement worldwide. This task includes the evacuation of combat casualties from theater of operations/joint operation area (JOA) and worldwide movement of ill or injured patients within theater, between theaters or between the theater and CONUS, or within CONUS. (JP 4-0, 4-01.3, 4-02, 4-02.1, 4-02.2,) (JP 3-07.5, 4-01.3, 4-02.2)

M1	Days	For mobile aeromedical staging facility (MASF) to be operational.
M2	Days	Recycle time for AE or MTF provided medical equipment to be returned.
M3	Days	Supply of medications, special diets, and consumable supplies.
M4	Days	To deploy aeromedical evacuation operations team to theater of war or joint operations area (JOA) locations.
M5	Hours	Delay for aeromedical evacuees awaiting transportation.
M6	Hours	Aeromedical evacuees remain on ground during intermediate stops awaiting fuel or repairs.
M7	Hours	For aeromedical evacuation CRAF aircraft to be available (once activated).
M8	Hours	For aeromedical evacuee to be moved bed-to-bed.
M9	Hours	For departure of first aircraft scheduled (after validated requirement in an emergency).
M10	Hours	For deployable TPMC to be available for deployment.
M11	Hours	For deployable TPMC to be in place and operating (after designation of unit C-Day and L-Hour).
M12	Hours	For joint movement center and TPMC to adjudicate disconnects in patient movement.
M13	Hours	To reconfigure an airlift aircraft for aeromedical evacuation use.

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M14	Kilometers	From E4 MTF to designated aeromedical evacuation point.
M15	Minutes	Aeromedical evacuees remain on aircraft at destination awaiting movement to treatment facilities.
M16	Percent	Of aeromedical evacuees' condition worsens during MEDEVAC flight.
M17	Percent	Of aeromedical evacuees, determined to have not been suitable patients for movement by air.
M18	Percent	Of aeromedical evacuees, moved within 24 hours of being available.
M19	Percent	Of aeromedical evacuees can be tracked through ITV.
M20	Percent	Of patients have no loss of personal effects during transfer.
M21	Percent	Of patient records, available at destination medical facility with or before patient arrival.
M22	Percent	Of patients (scheduled for strategic evacuation), actually evacuated.
M23	Percent	Of special needs patients have medical attendants assigned to them for AE.
M24	Percent	Of time, in MOOTW theater medical assets, reduced below planned levels to support AE.
M25	Weeks	For OSIA charges to be posted.
M26	Percent	Of patients scheduled for strategic evacuation (IAW evacuation policy).
M27	Percent	Of patient movement by retrograde aircraft (aircraft do not deviate from schedule missions).
M28	Hours	Maximum to notify CRAF carrier of selection of AE CRAF aircraft for callup after identification requirement.
M29	Hours	Maximum to identify and deploy aeromedical aircrew to meet AE CRAF aircraft after identification of requirement to use them.

## **SN 2 DEVELOP NATIONAL STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE.**

To produce the intelligence required by strategic consumers for formulating national level policy, strategy, systems acquisition, and military plans and operations. The strategic intelligence task applies across the range of military operations including military operations other than war. This task includes providing national strategic surveillance and reconnaissance. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 2-02, 3-01.1, 3-07.4, 3-07.5, 3-08v2)** (JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-01.1, 3-11, 4-02.1)

M1	Days	Of warning time (of actual enemy action).
M2	Days	Of warning time (of potential enemy action).
M3	Months	To update assessments of overall regional threats.
M4	Percent	Of PIRs with new intelligence data.

### **SN 2.1 Plan and Direct Strategic Intelligence Activities.**

To assist strategic consumers in determining their intelligence requirements, then planning the strategic collection effort and issuing the necessary orders and

requests to intelligence organizations. This task includes reviewing, validating, and prioritizing requirements and taskings. Requirements include intelligence for US forces and for host nations or groups in supporting the full range of military operations. **(JP 0-2, 2-0, 2-01, 2-02)** (JP 2-0, 4-02.1)

M1	Percent	Of new requirements not previously met.
M2	Percent	Of PIRs with supporting intelligence data.

### **SN 2.1.1 Develop National Strategic Intelligence Policy.**

To assist and advise the NCA on the development of policy governing strategic intelligence operations. It also includes developing intelligence planning guidance, identifying major intelligence deficiencies, establishing goals and associated objectives to overcome these deficiencies at the national and combatant command levels, and identifying intelligence resource requirements. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 2-02, 3-07.5)** (JP 2-0, 3-08v2)

M1	Days	Since intelligence data on PIRs last collected.
M2	Hours	In advance of collection, deployment intelligence collection requirements identified.
M3	Instances	Of identified threats, en route or at PODs, resulted in diverted or delayed sealift missions.
M4	Instances	Of PIRs identified after collection begins.
M5	Percent	Of new requirements not previously met.
M6	Percent	Of PIRs covered by collection plan.
M7	Percent	Of supporting combatant commander PIRs contained in theater collection plan.
M8	Percent	Of supporting combatant commander PIRs satisfied (in time to support deployment planning).
M9	Percent	Of validated PIRs have no collection effort.
M10	Percent	Of duplicate PIRs eliminated (during validation).
M11	Months	Since information on theater OPLAN PODs and transportation infrastructures updated.
M12	Percent	Of essential elements of information are collected.
M13	Percent	Instances of NBC threats/use resulting in delays or damage.

### **SN 2.1.2 Determine and Prioritize National Strategic Intelligence Requirements.**

To assist the NCA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the combatant commander in determining and prioritizing their strategic intelligence requirements. This task applies to the full range of military operations. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 2-02)** (JP 2-01, 3-55, 5-00.2)

M1	Hours	In advance of collection, intelligence requirements identified.
M2	Hours	To disseminate initial and subsequent PIRs to all components.

M3	Hours	To prioritize requirements.
M4	Percent	Of prior PIRs require modification or deletion.

### SN 2.1.3 Prepare National Strategic Collection Plan.

To develop a strategic collection plan that will satisfy the strategic intelligence requirements. Collection planning includes assigning the appropriate collection capabilities to fulfilling specific intelligence requirements. (JP 2-0, 2-01, 2-02) (N/A)

M1	Hours	To create collection plan.
M2	Hours	To revise collection plan.
M3	Percent	Of PIRs not covered by collection plan.
M4	Days	Before collection begins, distribute collection plan.

### SN 2.1.4 Allocate National Intelligence Resources Worldwide.

To assign adequate resources to national intelligence agencies and combatant commands to permit the accomplishment of assigned intelligence tasks. This task includes requesting support from allied sources, when required. (JP 2-0, 2-01, 2-02) (JP 2-0, 2-01)

M1	Number	Of augmentees provided by National and Combat Support Agencies.
M2	Percent	Of collection plan satisfied.
M3	Percent	Of collection plan satisfied by assigned theater assets.
M4	Percent	Of validated PIRs denied collection effort by national level.
M5	Hours	Range in overtime worked in DOD intelligence organizations.
M6	Hours	Range in overtime worked in DOD intelligence organizations (during non-crisis period).
M7	Percent	Of requested augmentees provided by National and Combat Support Agencies.

### SN 2.1.5 Determine National Strategic Intelligence Issues.

To identify issues involving intelligence collection, planning, exploitation, production, and dissemination that requires resolution by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), military intelligence board, or NCA. (JP 2-0, 2-01, 2-02) (N/A)

M1	Percent	Of collected material backlogged.
M2	Percent	Of validated PIRs with no collection effort.

**SN 2.2 Collect Strategic Information.**

To exploit sources of strategic information and to deliver the intelligence obtained to the appropriate processing organization for use in producing strategic intelligence. Strategic surveillance and reconnaissance are related to this task.

(JP 2-0, 2-01, 2-02, 3-01.1) (JP 2-01, 3-01.1, CJCSM 3150.14)

M1	Days	Between quality/utility assessments (scores outside average).
M2	Days	Between quality/utility assessments (scores within average).
M3	Feet	Horizontal and vertical geolocation accuracy.
M4	Hours	For C2 structure to receive threat warning (from identification of threat to combatant command resources).
M5	Hours	Since data last collected.
M6	Hours	To disseminate data to users.
M7	Percent	Level of assuredness.
M8	Percent	Of intelligence products produced IAW Intelligence Planning/Programming Analysis Tool.
M9	Percent	Of PIRs satisfied.
M10	Percent	Of quality scores on quality/utility assessments fall within average.
M11	Percent	Of unit support tailored to meet validated joint force requirements.
M12	Targets/ Day	Collected.
M13	Targets/ Day	Detected, classified and identified.

**SN 2.2.1 Collect Information on Strategic Situation Worldwide.**

To obtain information and data from all sources on the strategic situation. Areas of interest include activities and situations that could impact US national security interests and objectives, multinational and regional relations, or US and allied military forces. Of particular importance is information relating to enemy or potential enemy's strategic vulnerabilities, strategic forces, strategic centers of gravity, and NBC capabilities. This task includes collecting information on key foreign leadership/decision makers and cultural factors that may influence decisions. Information is also collected on the nature and characteristics of theater and regional areas of interest. This task also includes collecting against high-payoff and high-value targets of national strategic value, whose attack will lead directly or indirectly to the enemy's defeat. This collection task requires that deployment transportation information (e.g., threat to and status of transportation infrastructures and PODs en route and within the AOR) be collected to support predeployment planning for inter/intratheater airlift, sealift, and land movements. This task includes collecting battlefield damage assessment, munitions effects, medical assessments, and hazards information such as NBC contamination to conduct mission assessment. This task also includes collecting counterintelligence information, meteorological, oceanographic, and geospatial (e.g., aeronautical, hydrographic, geodetic, topographic) information; ballistic missile information on operations, intentions, and rules of engagement; and

information on drug trafficking and terrorist activities. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 2-02, 2-03, 3-08v2, 4-04, CJCSM 3150.14)** (JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-08v2, 3-11, 3-55)

M1	Feet	Of horizontal/vertical accuracy of national military and theater strategic geographical location data.
M2	Hours	To provide strategic intelligence data in support of operational commander (from receipt of request).
M3	Hours	For reconnaissance or surveillance assets to respond (from receipt of tasking).
M4	Hours	Since high priority targets last detected, identified and located.
M5	Hours	To prepare CI collection plan effort before becoming aware of CI requirement.
M6	Hours	Until reconnaissance or surveillance assets respond (from receipt of tasking).
M7	Instances	Of failure to respond to commander's requirements for reconnaissance or surveillance assets.
M8	Instances	Of unit support tailored to meet validated CTF requirements.
M9	Instances /Day	Of information collected on strategic targets in support of operational commander.
M10	Months	Since available meteorology, oceanography, geospatial data updated (at crisis outbreak).
M11	Months	Since information on OPLAN theater strategic situation updated.
M12	Percent	Of commander's geographic area has required reconnaissance and surveillance assets.
M13	Percent	Of counterintelligence PIRs satisfied.
M14	Percent	Of counterintelligence PIRs filled.
M15	Percent	Of disease nonbattle injury (DNBI) (from unanticipated medical threats).
M16	Percent	Of manned sorties requiring imagery have current imagery before flight briefing.
M17	Percent	Of outstanding PIRs (on situation).
M18	Percent	Of PIRs where at least one source yielded intelligence information.
M19	Percent	Of PIRs where more than one source yielded intelligence information.
M20	Percent	Of PIRs with more than one collection source.
M21	Percent	Of potential high-payoff targets accurately located.
M22	Percent	Of PIRs collected.
M23	Percent	Of proposed potential targets dropped for lack of adequate information.
M24	Percent	Of targets accurately identified.
M25	Percent	Of targets accurately located.
M26	Percent	Of targets detected, identified, located and classified in detail IAW Defense intelligence guidance.
M27	Years	Since most current geospatial data updated.
M28	Hours	After PIR satisfied CRM retasks collection asset to outstanding PIR.

M29	Percent	Of unsatisfied (i.e., do not exist or not adequate) priority one geospatial information and services generated or made adequate within required timeframe.
M30	Percent	Of unsatisfied (i.e., do not exist or not adequate) priority two geospatial information and services generated or made adequate within required timeframe.
M31	Percent	Of unsatisfied (i.e., do not exist or not adequate) priority three geospatial information and services generated or made adequate within required timeframe.

### **SN 2.2.2 Support Combatant Commander's Surveillance and Reconnaissance Requirements.**

To provide surveillance and reconnaissance support to combatant commanders. This task includes providing, either on a time-share or dedicated basis, assets or asset protection to meet the needs of combatant commanders and designated subordinate joint force commanders. **(JP 2-0, 2-02, 3-01.1)** (JP 3-07.5, 3-55)

M1	Percent	Of national asset capability untasked with combatant commanders having validated requirements.
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### **SN 2.3 Process and Exploit Collected Strategic Information.**

To convert collected strategic information to forms that can be readily used by intelligence analysts during production. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 2-02)** (JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-0)

M1	Percent	Of multiple sources integrated and deconflicted.
M2	Days	To provide initial assessment of captured enemy materiel from in country.

### **SN 2.3.1 Conduct Technical Processing and Exploitation of Strategic Information.**

To perform activities such as imagery development and interpretation, document translation, data conversion, technical analysis of captured enemy material, and decryption of encoded material. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 2-02)** (JP 2-01, 3-07.5)

M1	Hours	To process raw material (from receipt).
M2	Hours	To decode messages (for which keys exist).
M3	Minutes	To read wet film after recovery of aircraft or other photo system.
M4	Minutes /Page	To translate foreign national security material into English.
M5	Percent	Of collected information processed within 24 hours.
M6	Percent	Of intelligence collection data correctly processed for further exploitation.
M7	Percent	Of national asset collection of raw data processed within one year.
M8	Weeks	To provide final assessment of captured enemy materiel.

**SN 2.3.2 Collate National Strategic Information.**

To identify and group together related items of information for critical comparison. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 2-02, 3-08v2)** (JP 2-0, 3-01.1, 3-07.1)

M1	Percent	Of packages returned to all source analysts for additional items of information.
M2	Percent	Of unincorporated items of information identified as critical after intelligence produced.

**SN 2.3.3 Correlate National Strategic Information.**

To associate and combine data on a single subject to improve the reliability or credibility of the information. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 2-02)** (JP 2-0, 3-08v2)

M1	Data Points	Assembled on single subject.
M2	Percent	Of reported information graded credible based upon number of pieces of data combined and associated.
M3	Percent	Of reported information which graded high reliability.
M4	Sources	Provided information.

**SN 2.4 Produce Strategic Intelligence.**

To convert processed and exploited information into intelligence that satisfies the strategic consumer's intelligence requirements. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 2-02, 3-08v2)** (JP 3-07.5)

M1	Days	Between quality/utility assessments (scores outside average).
M2	Days	Between quality/utility assessments (scores within average).
M3	Hours	For newly received intelligence to be passed to components or joint force.
M4	Hours	Until completion of initial analysis of raw information (from receipt).
M5	Percent	Of intelligence products produced IAW Intelligence Planning/Programming Analysis Tool.
M6	Percent	Of quality scores on quality/utility assessments fall within average.
M7	Percent	Of recipients having received information in timely manner (as defined by customer requirements).
M8	Percent	Of strategic intelligence collection and dissemination capability in place prior to D-Day.

**SN 2.4.1 Evaluate, Integrate, Analyze and Interpret Information.**

To appraise information for credibility, reliability, pertinency, and accuracy (Evaluate). It includes forming patterns through the selection and combination of processed information (Integrate). The task further includes reviewing information



to identify significant facts for subsequent interpretation (Analyze). Finally, the task is to judge the significance of information in relation to the current body of knowledge (Interpret). **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 2-02, 3-08v2)** (JP 2-0, 3-07.1, 3-07.5)

M1	Hours	To report change in enemy condition (e.g., disposition, order of battle).
M2	Percent	Of PIRs have complete data.
M3	Days	Since last review of critical intelligence data.
M4	Days	Since last vulnerability assessment.
M5	Hours	To review critical intelligence data.
M6	Days	To review intelligence data.
M7	Days	Since last review of intelligence data.

#### **SN 2.4.1.1 Identify Global and Regional Issues and Threats.**

To assess threats to the United States, US military forces, and the countries and forces of our multinational partners. This task includes assessing potential issues and situations that could impact US national security interests and objectives.

**(JP 2-0, 2-01, 2-02, 3-01.1, 3-08v1, 3-08v2)** (JP 2-01, 3-01.1, 3-08v2)

M1	Hours	To report change in enemy condition (disposition, order of battle).
M2	Months	Before fielding, new formations or weapons systems identified.
M3	Days	Since last review of critical intelligence data.
M4	Days	Since last review of intelligence data.
M5	Hours	To review critical intelligence data.

#### **SN 2.4.1.2 Determine Enemy's Global Capabilities and Strategic Courses of Action.**

To identify, at the national strategic level, what an enemy (or potential enemy) can do, as well as when, where, and with what strength. This task addresses both military and nonmilitary capabilities. Under military capabilities this task examines ground, air, space, naval, nuclear, chemical/biological, information operations, special operations, and joint capabilities. Nonmilitary capabilities include political and economic actions. This task also includes identifying all strategic courses of action open to the enemy, and where sufficient intelligence is available, determining the relative order of probability of each course of action. Any factors that may influence the enemy to adopt a course of action should be identified. Finally, determine the susceptibility of the vital elements of the enemy's national power to potential actions of another nation. Enemy strategic vulnerabilities may come from political, information, geospatial (e.g., aeronautical, hydrographic, geodetic, topographic), climatic, economic, scientific, societal, or military factors. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 2-02, 3-01.1)** (JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-07.5)

M1	Percent	Of joint force(s) identified enemy decisive points and HVTs being monitored.
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M2	Days	Less warning than predicted warning period.
M3	Days	Warning of war.
M4	Months	Lead time in identifying emerging threats to the nation.
M5	Percent	Of enemy decisive points and HVTs identified.
M6	Percent	Of nuclear production, storage, and delivery systems identified "Strategic National."

### SN 2.4.1.3 Determine Enemy's Centers of Gravity.

To identify, at the national strategic level, the sources of an enemy's power and/or collective will to continue the conflict. In addition to identifying centers of gravity (COG), operations and intelligence planners must recommend the best way to influence the COG. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 2-02, 3-0, 3-55, 5-0)** (JP 1, 2-01, 3-0, 3-07.4, 3-56.1)

M1	Instances	Of centers of gravity identified and addressed.
M2	Instances	Of centers of gravity identified (before onset of crisis).
M3	Instances	Of emerging or new centers of gravity correctly identified.
M4	Percent	Of centers of gravity identified (before onset of hostilities).
M5	Percent	Of recommended counters to enemy centers of gravity are accepted.
M6	Instances	Of centers of gravity identified and addressed in detailed planning.

### SN 2.4.2 Prepare National Strategic Intelligence Products.

To prepare intelligence products that meets the needs of national strategic planners and decision makers. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 2-02, 2-03)** (JP 2-01)

M1	Days	Between quality/utility assessments (scores outside average).
M2	Days	Between quality/utility assessments (scores within average).
M3	Hours	For intelligence to be passed to components or joint force (from receipt).
M4	Hours	Until initial analysis of raw information complete (from receipt).
M5	Percent	Of distributed copies of finished intelligence product are read by at least one person (from a sample).
M6	Percent	Of intelligence products produced IAW Intelligence Planning/Programming Analysis Tool.
M7	Percent	Of quality scores on quality/utility assessments fall within average.
M8	Days	Projection of weather by METOC for daily presentation to CAT.
M9	Percent	Of required priority one geospatial information and services that exist as standard/substitute products/information.
M10	Percent	Of priority one geospatial information and services that exist as interim products/information.
M11	Percent	Of priority two geospatial information and services that exist as standard/substitute products/information.
M12	Percent	Of priority two geospatial information and services that exist as interim products/information.

M13	Percent	Of priority three geospatial information and services that exist as standard/substitute products/information.
M14	Percent	Of priority three geospatial information and services that exist as interim products/information.

#### **SN 2.4.2.1 Provide Worldwide National Strategic Indications and Warning.**

To report time-sensitive intelligence on foreign developments that could threaten the United States, its citizens abroad, or allied military, political, or economic interests. This task also includes identifying hostile reactions to US reconnaissance activities and indications of impending terrorist attacks. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 2-02, 6-0)** (JP 2-01, 3-55, 6-02, CJCSI 6510.01B)

M1	Days	Less than predicted warning period for deliberate planning.
M2	Days	Less warning, than predicted warning period.
M3	Days	Since indicators last reviewed (in peacetime).
M4	Hours	For first update after designation of warning problem.
M5	Percent	Of indicators developed, reported.
M6	Percent	Of warnings issued result in diplomatic, economic, or military action.
M7	Days	Warning of war.

#### **SN 2.4.2.2 Provide Current Intelligence to National Strategic Planners and Decision Makers.**

To report strategic intelligence of immediate value relating to particular areas of concern to the NCA and strategic planners. This task includes the preparation of intelligence estimates and assessments and periodic intelligence briefings and reports. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 2-02, 6-0)** (JP 2-01, JP 6-0)

M1	Hours	Lag between breaking events and dissemination to NMCC CAT planning personnel.
M2	Minutes	After breaking events of national strategic importance to prepare briefing for decision makers.
M3	Minutes	Since last J-2 update to CAT on possible hostile actions posing threat to deployment.
M4	Percent	Of basic background facts adjusted between initial and next subsequent briefing.
M5	Percent	Of METOC updates in time for next day's planning.
M6	Hours	From last update J-2 provides updated information on possible hostile actions posing threat to deployment operations.

#### **SN 2.4.2.3 Provide General Military Intelligence to National Strategic Planners and Decision Makers.**

To provide intelligence about the strategic military capabilities of foreign countries and organizations to planners and decision makers. This task includes creating

and maintaining databases relating to the military capabilities of current and potential adversaries. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 2-02, 6-0)** (JP 2-01, 3-0)

M1	Hours	Between electronic updates of Defense intelligence reports on enemy military capabilities.
M2	Percent	Of actual enemy military strength (number of people, equipment or sustainment) compared to Joint Staff J-2 estimate.
M3	Percent	Of questions on enemy military forces answered by data in DIA, Service, or other national data bases.
M4	Days	Between hard copy updates of defense intelligence reports on enemy military capabilities.

#### **SN 2.4.2.4 Provide Intelligence for National Strategic Targeting.**

To provide strategic targeting intelligence to targeting planners. This includes supporting the strategic targeting process as well as target battle damage assessment. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 2-02, 2-03)** (JP 2-0, 2-01)

**Note:** This task supports SN 3.2, *Manage National Strategic Firepower*, ST 3.1.3, *Conduct Theater Combat Assessment*, and ST 3.2.3, *Synchronize Theater Strategic Firepower*.

M1	Percent	Of enemy targets identified by USSTRATCOM or component targeteers.
M2	Percent	Of failed attacks on national strategic HPTs (attributed to incorrect location data).
M3	Percent	Of national strategic HPTs have correct location data.
M4	Percent	Of enemy targets identified as national strategic HPTs by USSTRATCOM or component targeteers.
M5	Percent	Of target locations verified by USSTRATCOM or component intelligence before launch of follow-on missions.
M6	Hours	To provide battle damage assessment following execution on enemy targets.

#### **SN 2.4.2.5 Provide Scientific and Technical Intelligence for R&D and Force Planning.**

To provide intelligence on foreign developments in basic and applied sciences and technology to analysis centers. This includes reporting on the development of foreign strategic weapons systems. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 2-02)** (JP 2-01, 3-08v2)

M1	Months	Lead time provided on foreign developments in applied research.
M2	Months	Lead time provided on foreign developments in basic research.
M3	Months	Lead time provided on IOC of non-US strategic weapons systems.
M4	Months	Lead time provided on IOC of non-US weapons systems.
M5	Percent	Of weapons system's actual characteristics relative to predicted.
M6	Percent	Of weapons system's actual capabilities relative to predicted.

## **SN 2.5 Disseminate and Integrate National Strategic Intelligence.**

To provide strategic intelligence, in a timely way, in an appropriate form, and by any suitable means, to those who need it and to ensure that the intelligence is understood and considered by the consumers. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 2-02, 6-0)** (JP 2-0, 2-01, 6-0)

M1	Days	To evaluate threat estimates for potential threat nations.
M2	Hours	To disseminate data to users in support of operational commander.
M3	Hours	To prepare, publish, and disseminate intelligence report.
M4	Minutes	After major change in threat to update intelligence.
M5	Months	Since last review and update of strategic and operational centers of gravity of national threats.
M6	Months	To update evaluation of overall threats to combatant commander's assets and operations.
M7	Percent	Of significant new formations or fielded weapons systems were correctly anticipated.
M8	Percent	Of required priority one geospatial information and services provided within required timeframe.
M9	Percent	Of required priority two geospatial information and services provided within required timeframe.
M10	Percent	Of required priority three geospatial information and services provided within required timeframe.

### **SN 2.5.1 Provide Finished Intelligence Products to National Strategic Planners and Decision Makers.**

To provide all source fused intelligence that has been processed to ensure the comprehensive analysis of the information for planners and decision makers in form appropriate to support planning and course of action development. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 2-02)** (JP 6-02)

**Note:** SN 5.1.1, *Communicate Strategic Decision/Information*, provides the transmission of intelligence products by message or hard copy or other methods.

M1	Days	For all combatant commands to receive hard copy product (after printing run).
M2	Days	For Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) to arrive in theater and be operational.
M3	Days	For distribution of hard copy intelligence products (from final copy).
M4	Days	To provide customer pull on demand capability.
M5	Days	To provide intelligence in appropriate form and suitable means to consumer.
M6	Hours	To post electronic copy of intelligence products (from final copy).
M7	Hours	To convert compartmented intelligence updates to intelligence annexes and briefings.

M8	Minutes	To respond to request for information on threats to and status of inter/intratheater transportation infrastructures and PODs.
M9	Percent	Of finished intelligence products distributed by user preferred means.
M10	Percent	Of intelligence consumer requests requiring clarification.
M11	Percent	Of intelligence personnel with authority to sanitize, summarize, and interpret highly classified information and intelligence.
M12	Percent	Of joint force intelligence organizations or higher echelons with pull on demand capability for national intelligence data base.
M13	Percent	Of major headquarters (joint and component) with installed SCI intelligence chatter nets.
M14	Percent	Of planners and decision makers with need to know receive finished intelligence products.
M15	Percent	Of plans and orders have updated intelligence products.

### **SN 2.5.2 Provide Follow-on Intelligence Support to National Strategic Planners and Decision Makers.**

To participate in national strategic planning and execution and to provide intelligence inputs in response to queries based on furnished intelligence products or the evolution of events. **(JP 2-0, 2-02)** (JP 2-0)

M1	Days	To evaluate new threat estimates for potential threat nations.
M2	Percent	Of crisis response products that have active follow-up.
M3	Percent	Of routine products that have active follow-up.
M4	Percent	Of significant new formations or fielded weapon systems, correctly anticipated.

### **SN 2.6 Evaluate Intelligence Activities.**

To evaluate intelligence operations and to recommend any necessary improvements. The primary factor to be considered is whether or not the consumer's intelligence requirements being satisfied on time. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 2-02)** (JP 2-0)

M1	Hours	To provide initial feedback (after evaluation of national strategic intelligence activities).
M2	Percent	Of combatant command intelligence evaluations reviewed for applicability to national strategic level intelligence activities.
M3	Percent	Of deficiencies noted in national strategic intelligence activities incorporated in joint lessons learned system.
M4	Percent	Of evaluator observations of joint intelligence activities validated.
M5	Percent	Of intelligence evaluator feedback recommendations adopted.
M6	Percent	Of respondent's time consumed by evaluator interviews and data collection.
M7	Percent	Of the five intelligence tenets evaluated in examining national strategic intelligence activities.

M8	Percent	Of users of national strategic intelligence products surveyed.
M9	Weeks	To provide feedback after evaluation of national strategic intelligence activities.

### SN 3 EMPLOY FORCES.

To employ forces to achieve desired end states. Employment at the strategic national level includes the commitment of functional combatant command assets or other forces under direct supervision of the NCA to execute a national mission. This task includes efforts that integrate two or more theater strategies or US and multinational national level efforts. It also includes coordination and integration of non-DOD support to combatant commands and DOD support of non-DOD agencies and other nations and groups. **(JP 0-2, 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-08v1)** (JP 0-2, 3-05, 3-07.5, 3-08v1, 3-12, 4-01, 4-02.1, 5-0)

**Note:** Deployment of joint, single service, or multinational forces from one theater, or CONUS, to another for executing strategic plans is included under SN 1, *Conduct Strategic Deployment and Redeployment*.

M1	Days	From decision to employ national strategic firepower until desired damage levels achieved.
M2	Minutes/ Hours	From event detection to data receipt by NORAD.
M3	Minutes	From initial notification until establishment of a missile event conference.
M4	Percent	Of potential multi-crisis situations (requiring apportionment of national assets) waged.
M5	Percent	Of space and missile launch events detected.
M6	Days	To designate a primary theater in a multi-crisis situation (requiring allocation of forces or assets).

#### **SN 3.1 Coordinate Forward Presence of Forces in Theaters.**

To collaborate with other US departments and agencies and the US Congress and to work with foreign governments to allow the stationing of or temporary presence of US combat and support units and individual Service members or DOD civilians. The objective is to allow the rapid application of the military instrument of national security by placing US forces in a position from which they can rapidly respond to a crisis or can support the rapid response of other forces to such a crisis. This is a crucial element of deterrence and can be a demonstration of resolve to allies and potential adversaries. **(JP 3-0, 4-01.2)** (JP 3-0, 3-05, 3-07, 3-07.5, 3-08v2, 4-01.2)

M1	Days	For interagency coordination of theater SOFAs or bilateral political agreements.
M2	Percent	Of stationing costs in AOR supported by host nation(s).

M3	Hours	To construct a theater option consisting of one weapon against one target (TDD available).
M4	Hours	To construct a theater option consisting of one weapon against one target (TDD not available).

### SN 3.1.1 Station Forces Forward in Theaters.

To collaborate with other US departments and agencies and the US Congress and to work with foreign governments to allow the permanent stationing of US combat and support units. Further, to act on agreements with foreign governments by the assignment of forces to combatant commanders for stationing overseas and to provide the DOD funds necessary to support those forces and any accompanying dependents. **(JP 3-0)** (JP 0-2, 3-07, 3-07.5)

M1	Percent	Of annual commitments to host nations satisfied.
M2	Percent	Of housing for unaccompanied personnel meets CONUS housing standards.
M3	Percent	Of stationing costs provided by host-nation funding.
M4	Man-days	Spent annually collecting, coordinating, and submitting to Congress mandated overseas troop strength data.
M5	Percent	Of host-nation's authority (over control and punishment of US forces under SOFA or like instruments) ceded to US.
M6	Hours	Provide adequate information to the NCA, obtain and disseminate Presidential approval, and transmit the appropriate messages/emergency actions messages (EAMs) to deploy nuclear weapons OCONUS.
M7	Hours	Provide adequate information to the NCA/CJCS, obtain NCA/CJCS approval, and transmit the appropriate messages/EAMs to transfer OPCON of nuclear forces.

### SN 3.1.2 Coordinate Periodic and Rotational Deployments, Port Visits, and Military Contacts.

To collaborate with other US departments and agencies and the US Congress and to work with foreign governments to allow for US combat, support, and training units and individual Service members and DOD civilians to visit foreign nations. This task includes the coordination of deployments, port visits, and military contacts to ensure no conflicts exist between combatant commands or with nonmilitary instruments of national power. **(N/A)** (JP 3-07, 3-07.2, 3-07.3)

M1	Percent	Of periodic deployment costs, provided by host-nation funding.
M2	Percent	Of port visit costs, provided by host-nation funding or services.
M3	Percent	Of rotational deployment costs, provided by host-nation funding.
M4	Percent	Of scheduled port visits, delayed or canceled because of a lack of coordination.
M5	Percent	Of host-nation's authority (over control and punishment of US forces under SOFA or like instruments) ceded to US.



**SN 3.1.3 Support Establishment of Access and Storage Agreements.**

To support the combatant commanders' efforts to obtain agreements for periodic access by US personnel and units and for the permanent stationing ashore or afloat of selected items of equipment and supplies. This task includes collaborating with other US departments and agencies, the US Congress, and foreign governments to develop treaties, executive agreements, and memorandums of understanding with host nations or international organizations. **(JP 3-08v1, 3-10)** (JP 3-10, 4-01.5)

M1	Percent	Of all AOR countries have treaties, executive agreements, and memoranda of understandings with US.
M2	Percent	Of stationing costs for selected US equipment and supplies, provided by host-nation funding.
M3	Percent	Of host-nation's authority (over control and punishment of US forces under SOFA or like instruments) ceded to US.

**SN 3.1.4 Coordinate Joint/Multinational Training Events.**

To coordinate, schedule, and conduct designated joint/multinational training events. This task includes arranging for the participation of forces from other nations and from international organizations, when obtaining such participation is beyond the purview of the combatant commander. It also includes the deconfliction of training events, both between combatant commands and with non-military instruments of national power. At times the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be the officer scheduling the joint training events, but will almost always delegate to the combatant commander the conduct of the training event or allow the CINC to further delegate conduct of the training event. **(JP 3-0)** (JP 1, 3-0, 3-07, 3-07.1, 3-07.5, 3-11, 3-57)

M1	Percent	Of exercise costs, provided through host-nation funding.
M2	Percent	Of exercise forces, provided by non-US forces.
M3	Percent	Of exercises conducted primarily for access purposes.
M4	Percent	Of exercises conducted primarily for training purposes.
M5	Percent	Of exercises including NBC tasks.
M6	Percent	Of exercises conducted as compared to those planned.

**SN 3.1.5 Acquire Host-Nation Support (HNS).**

Task moved to: SN 4.2.9 *Acquire Host-Nation Support*.

**SN 3.2 Manage National Strategic Firepower.**

To manage all aspects of national strategic firepower to include targeting and attack policy, target selection, planning applications, readiness, generate and

disperse forces, and maintain weapon stockpiles. Strategic firepower refers to any type of attack on targets of strategic value, to include nuclear and conventional, both lethal and nonlethal and drug trafficking targets. Examples include development of the forces committed to executing the Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP), nonstrategic nuclear strike plans, and antisatellite (ASAT) plans. **(JP 3-0)** (JP 3-0, 3-12, 3-55)

M1	Percent	Of enemy strategic space assets destroyed/degraded.
M2	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M3	Hours	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M4	Days	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M5	Days	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>

### SN 3.2.1 Process Strategic Targets.

To acquire, positively identify, select, and prioritize targets that are enemy strategic decisive points, critical nodes, and centers of gravity. This task includes apportioning resources to attack the selected strategic targets in either a deliberate or adaptive planning mode. **(JP 2-0, 3-0, 3-03, 3-12)** (JP 2-01, 3-01.1, 3-05, 3-05.3, 3-05.5, 3-12.1, 3-56.1)

M1	Percent	Of national strategic high priority targets (HPTs) discovered within execution cycle are reprioritized.
M2	Percent	Of selected HPTs have measured coordinates available.
M3	Percent	Of selected target components can be attacked (sufficient delivery systems and munitions available).
M4	Percent	Of selected targets have critical components identified.
M5	Hours	To develop a target for attack (after identification as a strategic decisive point).
M6	Percent	Of targets reviewed for collateral damage, DE, casualties and political ramifications.
M7	Percent	Planned casualties exceed guidance.
M8	Percent	Planned collateral damage exceeds guidance.
M9	Percent	Planned damage expectancy (DE) exceeds guidance.
M10	Hours	To construct an adaptive plan against one target.
M11	Days	To process, apportion, and integrate firepower resources based on <i>major</i> SIOP/JSCP doctrine, policy, or guidance changes.
M12	Days	To process, apportion, and integrate firepower resources based on <i>routine</i> SIOP/JSCP doctrine, policy, or guidance changes.
M13	Y/N	Identify, select, and prioritize targets for inclusion in the Theater Nuclear Planning Document and appropriate nuclear appendices to CONPLANS/OPLANS

### SN 3.2.2 Generate and Disperse Strategic Forces.

To notify, alert, and increase the readiness of forces capable of conducting strategic attack. This task also includes assembling, and/or dispersing forces capable of conducting/supporting strategic attack in a posture preparatory to attacking strategic targets as well as surviving forces on tactical threat warning. This task includes those forces assigned to supporting commands in support of the Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP) and other strategic plans. **(JP 3-0, 3-01.1)** (JP 3-0, 6-0)

M1	Hours	To disperse forces to ensure survivability.
M2	Hours	To achieve specified state of readiness for assigned forces.
M3	Minutes	To issue force dispersal/generation messages.
M4	Days	To achieve specific force generation level.
M5	Time	For last unit to reach safe separation distance from point of departure.
M6	Y/N	Decisions concerning force generation and timing constraints completed IAW applicable operating instructions.
M7	Hours	To assemble airlift forces for strategic intratheater deployment of forces.
M8	Percent	Of alert forces obtain directed LERTCON/Posture status within timelines specified in EAP-STRAT series publications.
M9	Percent	Of available forces generated and dispersed within planned time.
M10	Y/N	Present comprehensive nuclear option concepts, terminology, and procedures at the level of understanding of the decision maker.
M11	Y/N	Initiate generation of nuclear assets to meet CJCS or theater CINC timing requirements to support planned nuclear options.
M12	Days	Achieve alert or increased readiness of forces capable of conducting strategic/nonstrategic nuclear attack.
M13	Days	Plan and develop flexible deterrent options and force enhancements to allow for the rapid application of military forces.
M14	Hours	Process or relay a request for forces to establish the presence of strategic/nonstrategic nuclear weapon systems in theater.

### SN 3.2.3 Manage Strategic Force Readiness Levels.

To modify strategic forces responsiveness by directing them into lower/higher conditions of readiness and survivability. This task includes directing changes in aircraft and ICBM posture levels and submarine deployment/patrol condition, as well as dispersing these forces to increase survivability. **(JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 4-05)** (JP 3-01.1, 3-01.5, 3-11, 3-54, 5-0)

M1	Days	Longest maximum readiness can be maintained.
M2	Hours	To generate forces to new readiness level.
M3	Hours	To re-obtain readiness levels after a missile goes off alert unexpectedly.
M4	Hours	To re-obtain readiness levels after an aircraft goes off alert unexpectedly.

M5	Hours	To re-obtain readiness levels after an SSBN goes off alert unexpectedly.
M6	Y/N	Classified Measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M7	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M8	Days	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>

### SN 3.2.4 Manage Strategic Weapon Stockpile.

To monitor strategic asset current availability/reliability, maintain current status, and assess current capabilities of assets. This task includes coordinating with combatant commands to ascertain requirements and working with components, operational commands, and support agencies within DOD and DOE to ensure weapons availability in support of strategic objectives. **(JP 3-08v2, 3-12, 4-0)** (JP 3-15, 4-0)

M1	Months	Since formal review of worldwide nuclear asset availability.
M2	Weeks	Since update of geographic combatant command nuclear weapons requirements.
M3	Months	To reconstitute TLAM (N) capability at sea (assessed).
M4	Percent	Of nuclear capable systems which have firing circuitry which is current and certified.
M5	Percent	Of required crews which are nuclear certified by delivery system.
M6	Number	Of nuclear weapons in RED status by type and location.
M7	Percent	Of stockpile currently certified to not produce a nuclear yield if dropped or fired safe.
M8	Percent	Of reliability assessed for current nuclear weapons and delivery platforms.

### SN 3.2.5 Determine National Strategic Targeting Policy.

To determine national strategic targeting policy and provide advice to the NCA concerning all aspects of the use of strategic fires and information operations weapons. This task includes determining target priority, needed level of damage or as well as legal limitations and political constraints on targets of strategic importance. **(JP 3-08v2, 3-11, 3-12, 3-13)** (JP 3-11, 5-03.1)

M1	Percent	Of collateral damage (under proposed targeting policy) to non-military targets.
M2	Man-Months	To develop proposed targeting policy.
M3	Percent	Of enemy nuclear forces form a secure reserve after US retaliation under proposed targeting policy.
M4	Percent	Of nominated targets have weapons available (under proposed targeting policy).
M5	Percent	Probability of success for pre-emptive attacks on minor nuclear powers (under proposed targeting policy).
M6	Months	Since damage criteria study published.

M7	Percent	Success expected from proposed targeting policy.
M8	Percent	Success expected from published targeting policy.
M9	Months	To develop, coordinate, and publish proposed targeting policy.
M10	Y/N	Present a comprehensive description of nuclear option objectives and what is targeted to support the objectives at the level of understanding of the decision maker.
M11	Y/N	Present a comprehensive description of key aspects and procedures of nuclear adaptive planning at the level of understanding of the decision maker.
M12	Y/N	Present a comprehensive description of theater nuclear operations and support at the level of understanding of the decision maker.
M13	Y/N	Determine target priority, desired level of damage, and limitations and capabilities of nuclear delivery platforms.
M14	Percent	Of targets reviewed for compliance with US/international law and policy.

### **SN 3.2.6 Develop National Strategic Attack Policy.**

To determine national strategic attack policy. Strategic attack refers to the use of strategic firepower to create strategic nuclear, conventional, lethal, or nonlethal effects. The components to determine attack policy are situational dependent. Examples include development of policy pertaining to the Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP), nuclear strike plans, conventional strike plans, information operations (IO), and antisatellite (ASAT) plans. **(3-13)** (JP 3-0, 3-12)

M1	Months	To coordinate policy guidance for the employment of nuclear weapons (NUWEP).
M2	Months	To coordinate CJCS Instruction 3110.01, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).
M3	Months	To coordinate revision to Unified Command Plan (UCP).
M4	Months	To coordinate US Force for Unified Command Plan.

### **SN 3.3 Employ National Strategic Firepower.**

To employ all lawful means and systems of attack for strategic effect. This task includes series or parallel attack of selected enemy targets to instantly or progressively produce the desired effect (destroy, disintegrate, degrade, etc.) on the enemy's strategic forces. Targets may include national command and control facilities, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) production and delivery systems, warmaking capacity, economic or political centers of gravity. National strategic attack employs lethal (nuclear and conventional) and nonlethal assets in a manner consistent with national and International Law. **(JP 3-0, 3-03, 3-08v2, JP 3-12, 3-13)** (JP 3-0)

M1	Hours	Before targeted government responds.
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**SN 3.3.1 Employ National Lethal Capabilities.**

To employ national lethal capabilities to affect, modify, neutralize, or destroy enemy targets worldwide. **(JP 3-0, 3-03, 3-12, 3-12.1)** (JP 3-0, 3-11)

**Note:** For the decision to employ strategic attack as part of a national military strategic plan, see SN 5, *Provide Strategic Direction and Integration*.

M1	Percent	Of failed HPT attacks attributed to lack of integration.
M2	Percent	Of national strategic firepower missions flown/fired without requested theater support.
M3	Percent	Of SAPs cannot be integrated with non-SAP systems for security reasons.
M4	Percent	Of strategic SOF missions executed without notification of non-SOF operating forces.
M5	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M6	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M7	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M8	Minutes	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M9	Minutes	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>

**SN 3.3.2 Synchronize Strategic Attack.**

To synchronize attacks on all strategic targets with other operations through the coordinated employment of national level systems to maximize the combined effects and to minimize effects on friendly forces, neutrals, and noncombatants. Attack is conducted to destroy or neutralize strategic level targets worldwide using lethal and nonlethal means. Synchronization may take place at the ST level of war. **(JP 3-03, 3-12, 3-12.1, 3-56.1)** (JP 1, 2-0, 3-0, 3-05, 3-05.3)

M1	Percent	Of planned targets, hit on time.
M2	Percent	Of uncovered targets, attacked by regenerated forces.
M3	Percent	Of units receive execute order through primary system.
M4	Percent	Of friendly or neutral forces and noncombatants influenced by collateral effects from friendly attacks on WMD targets.
M5	Instances	Synchronized multiple attacks on targets using appropriate time-over-target or launch windows minimizing collateral damage, civilian casualties, and fratricide.

**SN 3.3.3 Demonstrate National Military Capabilities.**

To conduct exercises or other show of force demonstrations to display national strategic military capabilities or show resolve to influence world perceptions of US potential and resolve to meet NCA specified strategic end state. **(JP 3-0, 3-07, 3-07.1, 3-08v2, 3-12)** (JP 3-07.1)

M1	Hours	Before clear indications that target government has modified its position.
M2	Incidents	Involving loss of non-US life.
M3	Incidents	Involving loss of US life.

**SN 3.3.4 Apply National Nonlethal Capabilities.**

To apply national nonlethal capabilities to affect, modify, or neutralize strategic level enemy targets. **(JP 3-0, 3-13)** (JP 3-0, 3-05.5, 3-11, 3-13.1, 3-56.1, 3-57)

**Note:** For the decision to employ strategic firepower as part of a national military strategic plan, see SN 5, *Provide Strategic Direction and Integration*, SN 5.5, *Coordinate Worldwide Information Operations (IO)*, SN 5.6, *Provide Public Affairs (PA) Worldwide*, and SN 8.3, *Coordinate Military Activities within the Interagency Process*

M1	Percent	Of CINC's PSYOP effort focused on stabilizing and reinforcing allied forces and host-nation.
M2	Percent	Of PSYOP efforts beginning within first 1/3 of hours between warning order and H-hour.
M3	Hours	To provide JCS approval of CINC's PSYOP plan.

**SN 3.3.5 Conduct National Combat Assessment.**

To determine the overall effectiveness of force employment during national strategic military operations. The assessment will use battle damage assessment, munitions effects assessment, collateral effects, and reattack recommendations provided by the combatant commanders and intelligence organizations. **(JP 2-0, 3-0)** (JP 3-05.5, 3-12.1, 3-13.1, 3-56.1)

M1	Hours	For DIAC and other sources to provide attack assessment to combatant commander of his attacks.
M2	Percent	Of DGZs assessed in first 24 hours of nuclear response.
M3	Hours	To provide retargeting information to the combatant commander.
M4	Hours	To report to NCA on success of Direct Action mission.
M5	Hours	Determine when to request national level asset for reconnaissance (RECCE) for battle damage assessment (BDA).

**SN 3.3.6 Determine National Residual Capabilities.**

To determine the status of national forces and capabilities following a strategic attack. This task includes determining both the statuses of military forces as well as national infrastructure (logistics, communications, transportation, medical, etc.). **(N/A)** (DODD 3020.26, DODD 3020.36, DODD 3025.1M, MCM 93-91)

M1	Minutes	To determine number and locations of nuclear detonations/attacks after an attack.
M2	Minutes	To determine location of air and ground bursts and plot on chart.
M3	Minutes	To assess impact of attack on the NCA, primary military headquarters, and alternate military headquarters.
M4	Minutes	To assess impact of attack on US strategic forces, nuclear command and control nodes, and Survivable Mobile Command Center (SMCC) assets.
M5	Minutes	To assess damage to infrastructure at strategic interest locations (key military bases, critical infrastructure nodes; etc).
M6	Minutes	To identify safe routes/operational areas for strategic aircraft after an attack.
M7	Minutes	To estimate the range of fatalities, injuries, and population at risk resulting from an attack.

**SN 3.4 Protect Strategic Forces and Means.**

To safeguard friendly strategic center(s) of gravity, strategic force potential, and CONUS base (includes the civil populace and industrial capacity of the nation) by reducing or avoiding the effects of enemy strategic-level actions and unintentional friendly actions. This task includes protection during strategic deployment of forces. **(JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-11)** (JP 3-01.5, 3-52)

**Note:** See also SN 8.2.3, *Support Evacuation of Noncombatants from Theaters*, a Department of State responsibility.

M1	Visits	For staff assistance and liaison conducted each year to Federal and State Emergency Management Offices.
M2	Percent	Of enemy manned air-breathing vehicles successfully penetrate friendly airspace.
M3	Percent	Of attacking missiles successfully penetrated friendly defenses, culminating in warhead delivery or function on target.
M4	Percent	Of CONUS industrial assets defensible against ballistic missile threat.
M5	Percent	Of critical US Government command and control facilities, and strategic projection capabilities, hardened against nuclear, biological, and chemical attack.
M6	Percent	Of defense wide deception operations (in approved OPLANs) contradict deception operations in other plans or national deception operations.
M7	Percent	Of launched cruise missiles (of all types) destroyed before impact.
M8	Percent	Of national strategic operations have a deception plan.
M9	Percent	Of potentially hostile space platforms can be countered.



M10	Months	Since last update meeting between FEMA and DOD to review potential strategic threats to US.
M11	Percent	Of installations with current/valid vulnerability assessments.

#### **SN 3.4.1 Provide Strategic Air Defense.**

To protect all assets from air attack. This task involves integrating national and multinational surveillance, detection, identification, tracking, and interception systems. Strategic air defense includes the use of aircraft, air defense missiles, air defense artillery, nonair defense assets in an air defense role, electronic warfare, and other lethal and nonlethal capabilities against all air threats including aircraft, naval vessels, air-to-surface missiles, and cruise missiles. This task centers on the protection of national centers of gravity, critical facilities, strategic reserves, population centers, and industrial capacity and infrastructure. **(JP 3-01.1, 3-01.5, 3-52)**

M1	Percent	Of enemy attacks were successful.
M2	Percent	Of military casualties were from enemy attacks.
M3	Percent	Of penetrations of US airspace by enemy manned air-breathing vehicles were successful.
M4	Percent	Of US noncombatant casualties were from enemy attacks.

#### **SN 3.4.2 Provide Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment.**

To provide unambiguous, reliable, and survivable integrated tactical warning and attack assessment (ITW/AA) of atmospheric, space, and/or ballistic missile attack to National Command Authorities, top echelon defense staffs and combatant commanders. Integrated tactical warning (ITW) is a continuous, real-time process that provides warning after initiation of a threatening or hostile act based upon an evaluation of information from all available sources. Attack assessment (AA) is an evaluation of information to determine the potential or actual nature and objectives of an attack. AA also characterizes the attack as to origins, patterns, regions, sources, areas at risk, destruction potential, etc. ITW/AA provides information to support timely decisions during all phases of conflict. This task includes controlling ground and space based warning systems that provide data/information for ITW/AA of an atmospheric, space, and/or ballistic missile attack. **(JP 3-01.1, 3-01.5, 3-12)** (JP 3-01.5, 6-02)

M1	Minutes	After launch of ballistic missile attack on US, attack assessment issued.
M2	Minutes	After launch of ballistic missile attack on US forces, attack assessment issued to theater ballistic missile (TBM) forces.
M3	Minutes	After launch of ballistic missile attack on US forces, threat warning issued to TBM forces.
M4	Minutes	After launch of ballistic missile attack on US, threat warning issued.
M5	Percent	Of threat warnings to TBM forces are false.

M6	Incidents	Of false threat warnings.
M7	Minutes	To determine objectives of attack.
M8	Y/N	Operate and use the Command Center Process and Display Subsystem-Replacement (CCPDS-R), Missile Warning Teletype (MWTY), or comparable systems.
M9	Minutes	Provide critical information to decision makers from the nuclear CCPDS-R / warning systems or comparable system.
M10	Minutes	Provide assessments of nuclear attack to the NCA based on indications.
M11	Minutes	Provide critical information on "dual phenomenology" to decision makers with regard to nuclear attack.
M12	Minutes	Provide an assessment to decision makers on when there is a threat of nuclear attack against North America.
M13	Y/N	Present a comprehensive description of who is responsible for assessing nuclear threats to North America and other theaters.
M14	Y/N	Present a comprehensive description of the meaning of various nuclear threat assessments.

### SN 3.4.3 Coordinate Strategic Ballistic Missile Defense.

To coordinate the protection of strategic forces and national assets from ballistic missile attack. This task involves integrating national and multinational surveillance, detection, identification, tracking, and interception systems to counter a ballistic missile attack. This task centers on the protection of national centers of gravity, critical facilities, strategic reserves, population centers, and industrial capacity and infrastructure. **(JP 3-01.1, 3-01.5, 3-12)** (JP 3-01.1, 3-01.5, CJCSI 3141.01, CJCSI 6510.01B)

M1	Percent	Of attacking missiles successfully penetrated friendly defenses, culminating in warhead delivery or function on target.
M2	Percent	Of CONUS civil government command and control assets defensible against ballistic missile threat.
M3	Percent	Of CONUS industrial assets defensible against ballistic missile threat.
M4	Percent	Of CONUS military assets, including C2 assets, defensible against theater missile threat.
M5	Percent	Of detected ballistic missile launches, provide cueing for counterforce operations.

### SN 3.4.4 Safeguard National Strategic Capabilities.

To safeguard military forces, critical facilities (political, economic, informational, military), national strategic center(s) of gravity, and force potential by reducing or avoiding the effects of enemy strategic level actions (lethal or nonlethal). This task includes hardening or fortifying facilities or construction for forces, removing hazards affecting execution of the national military strategy, and ensuring friendly effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum. **(JP 3-01.1)** (JP 3-01.5, 3-10.1, 6-0)

M1	Percent	Of attacking missiles successfully penetrated friendly theater defenses, culminating in warhead delivery or function on target.
M2	Percent	Of CONUS civil government command and control assets are defensible against ballistic missile threat.
M3	Percent	Of CONUS industrial assets are defensible against a ballistic missile threat.
M4	Percent	Of CONUS military assets, including C2 assets, are defensible against theater missile threat.
M5	Incidents	Of critical friendly facilities (e.g., command posts, ports) destroyed or damaged.
M6	Percent	Of detected ballistic missile launches provided cueing for counterforce operations.
M7	Incidents	Of penetrations of US airspace by enemy manned air-breathing vehicles.
M8	Percent	Of potentially hostile space platforms can be countered.
M9	Incidents	Of US POE facilities (including POE) and installations being damaged or destroyed by enemy terrorist action.
M10	Casualties/ Week	To US noncombatants.
M11	Casualties/ Week	To US combatants.
M12	Facilities & Installations/ Week	Reconstructed following CBW attack.
M13	Strategic Forces/Day	Reconstituted following CBW attack.
M14	Casualties/ Day	Treated and released.

#### SN 3.4.5 Coordinate and Conduct Strategic Operations Security.

To take actions to minimize friendly indicators associated with national military strategy. This task includes signal security (communications security and electronic security) and protection of activities (e.g., patterns), strategic forces, and facilities from enemy observation and surveillance. **(JP 2-0, 3-01.1, 3-54, CJCSI 3213.01A)** (JP 3-0, 3-13.1, 3-55, 3-58, 3-61, CJCSM 3122.03)

**Note:** This task supports SN 5.5, *Coordinate Worldwide Information Operations (IO)*.

M1	Percent	Of key personnel change timing and route of their routine movements on a weekly basis.
M2	Percent	Of media reports described close-hold friendly actions.
M3	Percent	Of movements of critical units or equipment made even though threat reconnaissance systems overhead.

### SN 3.4.6 Coordinate Protection of National Strategic Information, Information-Based Processes, and Information Systems.

To coordinate the protection of information, information-based processes, and information systems by planning and implementing comprehensive defensive information operations (IO) measures. This is a broad task that may require a risk management approach to focus the effort. This task includes ensuring access to timely, accurate, and relevant information when and where needed, and to deny an adversary the opportunity to exploit friendly information and systems for their own purposes. **(JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-13.1, 3-54, 3-58, 6-0, 6-02)** (JP 3-02.1, 6-02, CJCSI 3210.01{SECRET})

**Note:** This task supports SN 5.5, *Coordinate Worldwide Information Operations (IO)*.

M1	Percent	Of commands have adequate information processing hardware and software.
M2	Percent	Of commands have current processes and programs to protect information systems, processes, and networks.
M3	Percent	Of commands have fully trained and manned information systems management and operating personnel.
M4	Instances	Of confirmed loss of classified data from penetrations.
M5	Instances	Of detected penetrations of command information systems.
M6	Percent	Of time, command joint information systems down.
M7	Instances	Of penetrations of multiple command information systems.
M8	Minutes	To detect attempted penetration of information system.
M9	Minutes	To restore major information system after attack.
M10	Minutes	To switch to an alternate system after attack on major information system.
M11	Minutes	To activate a change in information condition (INFOCON) in response to increased threats or actual activity.
M12	Minutes	To implement countermeasures in response to a confirmed intrusion.
M13	Y/N	Organization applies resources to protect against IO, detect and react to offensive IO, and restore capabilities should defensive measurers fail.

### SN 3.4.7 Coordinate Force Protection for Strategic Forces and Means.

To coordinate force protection for strategic forces and means to enhance freedom of strategic action by reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. This task includes antiterrorism measures and counterintelligence actions designed to protect friendly forces from surprise, observation, detection, interference, terrorism, espionage, sabotage, intelligence collection, and assassination. **(JP 1, 3-08v2, 3-11)** (JP 3-01.1, 3-07.4, 3-08v2)

**Note:** Determining counterintelligence requirements is included under SN 2.1, *Plan and Direct Strategic Intelligence Activities*.

M1	Hours	After CI EEI satisfied, collection asset retasked.
M2	Percent	Change in sabotage incidents, per month, after declaration of war, or C-Day, or national emergency.
M3	Percent	Change in terrorism incidents, per month, after declaration of war, or C-Day, or national emergency.
M4	Total	Facilities (e.g., command posts) destroyed.
M5	Hours	For a reaction force to reach an installation or facility under attack.
M6	Percent	Of CONUS-based aircraft and ships, damaged or destroyed on the ground/in port prior to declaration of war or C-Day.
M7	Percent	Of counterintelligence requirements covered by collection plan.
M8	Percent	Of critical CONUS facilities (e.g., command posts) destroyed or damaged.
M9	Percent	Of critical movements (e.g., nuclear weapons transfers) conducted under observation of nonfriendly overhead assets.
M10	Percent	Of critical movements conducted after declaration of war, C-Day, or national emergency under observation of nonfriendly overhead assets.
M11	Percent	Of DOD personnel assigned to counterintelligence.
M12	Instances	Of first strategic movements attacked by enemy lethal or nonlethal forces.
M13	Percent	Of personnel who receive level one antiterrorism/force protection (AT/FP) training prior to deployment or travel overseas.
M14	Instances	Of sabotage or terrorism, after declaration of war, or C-Day, or national emergency.
M15	Instances	Of strategic movements detected or attacked by enemy lethal/nonlethal means.
M16	Instances	Of terrorism, per month, in CONUS after declaration of war, or C-Day, or national emergency.
M17	Hours	Since most current intelligence information collected.
M18	Percent	Of personnel who receive annual security awareness training.
M19	Percent	Of missions or voyages into medium terrorist threat level or higher threat locations have an operational risk assessment conducted prior to mission start.
M20	Percent	Of the time FP enhancement actions have been taken to reduce risk from threats to acceptable levels based on FP operational risk assessment.

#### **SN 3.4.8 Coordinate Nuclear Surety.**

To coordinate the safety, security, and weapon level use and control of nuclear weapons, and for the confidence in the enduring nuclear weapon stockpile. This task includes monitoring and assessing current nuclear weapons programs and procedures and providing recommendations for improvements to current nuclear weapons programs and procedures. (**JP 3-08v2, 3-12, 3-12.1**) (JP 3-0, 4-01.1)

1 October 1999

M1	Months	Since last review of overall launch platforms firing circuit inspection program.
M2	Months	Since last review of overall SAS inspection program.
M3	Months	Since most recent DOD/DOE assessment of current nuclear weapons programs and procedures was conducted.
M4	Percent	Of recommendations from most recent DOD/DOE assessment implemented within 60 days.
M5	Percent	Of units all nuclear capable units which have received a DNSI within the last year.
M6	Percent	Of units receiving a Defense Nuclear Surety Inspection (DNSI) in last year receive a Satisfactory or better grade.
M7	Percent	Of units receiving a Nuclear Weapons Assessment Inspection (NWAII) pass on the first inspection.
M8	Percent	Of units receiving a Personnel Reliability Program inspection receive a Satisfactory or better grade.
M9	Percent	Of units receiving an NTPI receive a Satisfactory or better grade.
M10	Percent	Passed Defense Nuclear Agency inspections of the USSTRATCOM Personnel Reliability Program with a Satisfactory or better.
M11	Percent	Passed Nuclear Weapon Tech Inspections of Service Component Command capability to handle, store, and maintain nuclear weapons with a Sat or better.
M12	Percent	Passed Service Weapon Systems inspections with Satisfactory or better results.
M13	Days	Since last Annual report and certification of nuclear weapons stockpile.
M14	Months	Delay to initiate underground nuclear testing, if directed by the President.
M15	Percent	Of nuclear weapons components which can be tested through sub-critical tests.
M16	Percent	Of nuclear weapons deemed one point safe.
M17	Percent	Of US hydronuclear tests exceeding a yield of four pounds.
M18	Percent	Of sub-critical nuclear weapons tests result in a self-sustaining nuclear reaction.
M19	Percent	Of sub-critical nuclear weapons tests result in the release of nuclear materials to the atmosphere.
M20	Days	To train Nuclear Surety program managers after appointment.
M21	Y/N	Annually project future requirements (and attempt to secure external funding) for Nuclear Surety related training courses.
M22	Y/N	Annually assess existing Nuclear Surety directive for field application and supplement with major command mission unique guidance.
M23	Y/N	Annually develop and publish, functionally specific, Nuclear Surety program validation checklists.
M24	Y/N	Ensure changes in policies, procedures, and direction are transmitted to field units in time to prevent incidents due to lack of guidance.
M25	Instances	Use and control of nuclear weapons is not in accordance with national guidance in Nuclear Surety.

**SN 3.4.9 Support Personnel Recovery Worldwide.**

To provide national policy and support for the peacetime and wartime recovery of isolated personnel and to provide support to their families. This task includes reporting, locating, supporting the person and their family, recovery and return of the isolated person to their family or duty. This support includes developing national level policy, plans, and strategic direction to military support missions requiring national and interagency coordination, such as special operations support to unconventional assisted recovery mechanism (UARM) and other recovery methods. It also includes setting worldwide standards for survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) training. Included within this task are civil search and rescue, combat search and rescue (CSAR), and evasion and escape. DOD components provide search and rescue (SAR) facilities for their own operations. These facilities may be used for civil needs on the basis of not-to-interfere with military missions. **(JP 3-50, 3-50.2, 3-50.3)** (JP 3-07.5, 3-50.2)

**Note:** SAR area coordinators are discussed at ST 6.2.7, *Initiate and Coordinate Personnel Recovery in Theater*. Participation in the Interagency Committee on Search and Rescue is covered by SN 8.3, *Coordinate Military Activities Within the Interagency Process*.

M1	Percent	Of aircrews that transmit their location, rescued within 24 hours of being shot down.
M2	Percent	Of escapees, recovered.
M3	Percent	Of isolated personnel, enter UAR system.
M4	Percent	Of known POW/MIA families made aware of DOD support.
M5	Months	Since defense wide SERE training updated.
M6	Months	Since interagency operating agreements updated.
M7	Months	Since national policy supporting SERE requirements reviewed.

**SN 3.4.10 Protect the National Sea Frontiers.**

To protect the seaward approaches to the United States and ensure the safety of maritime operations and the environment. This task includes protecting coastal shipping from attack. It also includes developing and implementing measures to prevent marine pollution or toxic waste spills ashore with the potential to disrupt defense operations, adversely impact national economies, or do significant environmental damage. To ensure hazardous materials are removed and properly disposed of without further damage to the environment. The environmental portions of this task can be executed in support of combat operations in a theater of operations/joint operations area (JOA). **(JP 3-08v2, 3-15)** (JP 1, 3-10, 4-02.1)

M1	Days	Between hostile actions against strategic shipping.
M2	Days	Between pollution or toxic waste events that impact strategic shipping.

M3	Man-days /year	To cleanup marine pollution or toxic waste spills.
M4	Ship Days	Lost by commercial shipping because of marine pollution or toxic waste.
M5	Dollars	Negative impact on national economy because of marine pollution or toxic waste spills.
M6	Percent	Of strategic shipping lost because of hostile action.
M7	Instances /week	Of attacks on coastal shipping.
M8	Percent	Of fisheries closed because of marine pollution or toxic waste.
M9	Percent	Of military operations delayed or disrupted by explosive ordnance incidents.
M10	Percent	Of military operations delayed or disrupted by hostile action.
M11	Percent	Of military operations delayed or disrupted by marine pollution or toxic waste.
M12	Instances /week	Of significant damage to forces, materiel, or equipment.

### **SN 3.5 Provide National Space Capabilities.**

To plan (including integration and synchronization), initiate, and direct activities and operations associated with space combat operations, space support operations, and combat support operations. Such operations are conducted from earth to space, space to space, and space to earth. These operations include space control (enforcing space superiority through protection, prevention, negation, and surveillance); force enhancement (supporting the warfighter with communications, weather, navigation, ballistic missile attack warning, and intelligence products); and space support (placing systems in space and operating them). Strategic space capabilities include national DOD, civil and commercial space systems, and associated infrastructure. **(JP 3-01.1, 3-55, 3-56.1)** (JP 3-03, 6-02, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Months	Between loss of an on-orbit capability and its reconstitution from earth (peacetime).
M2	Percent	Decrease in support of combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander because of surge in national level requirements.
M3	Percent	Degradation of space capability over one year.
M4	Days	Delay in theater operations because of saturation of on-orbit capabilities.
M5	Percent	Of DOD required space capability, owned by DOD.
M6	Percent	Of DOD required space capability, owned by the US Federal Government.
M7	Percent	Of promised on-orbit capability provided to combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander.
M8	Percent	Of TENCAP capability used each year.
M9	Percent	Of TENCAP requests filled each year.



M10	Months	To design, produce, and constitute on-orbit a new generation of a particular existing space capability.
M11	Years	To design, produce, and constitute on-orbit a new space capability.
M12	Months	To reconstitute a space capability after loss through attack (wartime).
M13	Hours	To respond to a combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander request for change in support from on-orbit assets.
M14	Months	To restore to a combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander on-orbit capability lost because of system failure (peacetime).
M15	Weeks	To restore to a combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander on-orbit capability lost because of hostile action (crisis or war).

### SN 3.5.1 Provide Space Support.

To launch, sustain, (predicted or unforeseen), or augment orbiting DOD space assets. Launch tasks include booster assembly, mating the booster and payload, launching the vehicle, providing range support, notifying the appropriate agencies, and launch support analysis. Once in orbit, this task includes monitoring and controlling space systems to maintain their operational status. Task includes initialization activities after launch, routine control of all systems that support the payloads, contingency operations to recover from anomalous conditions, and relocating or reorienting space systems as directed to support national or theater requirements. This task also includes control of payloads as directed by other organizations responsible for the payload operation and management. **(JP 3-55)** (JP 3-03, 5-00.2)

M1	Days	To restack a launch platform to carry a new and different specific space platform.
M2	Hours	To move on-orbit assets from support of one theater to support of another.
M3	Minutes	For maximum ground facility operations capability "red" time (per 24-hour period).
M4	Minutes	To report the functional loss of a major space platform (mission loss).
M5	Minutes	To report the functional loss of a major system of a space platform (mission loss).
M6	Months	Between loss of an on-orbit capability and its reconstitution from earth.
M7	Months	Between loss of an on-orbit capability and its reconstitution from on-orbit (assuming on-orbit assets).
M8	Months	To produce a space platform for launch.
M9	Percent	Of a space platform's efficiency lost because too close to other platforms.
M10	Percent	Of a space platform's overall effectiveness lost because too close to other platforms.
M11	Percent	Of launches are delayed after preparations begin, due to scheduling conflicts.
M12	Percent	Of launches successfully place space platforms on-orbit.

M13	Percent	Of successful launches within seven days of original schedule ("Successful Launch" includes inserting satellite into proper orbit).
M14	Percent	Of successful satellite communications supports (each system).
M15	Total	Number (maximum) of emergency satellite supports (per 24-hour period).
M16	Weeks	To produce a launch platform.
M17	Percent	Of space platforms orbits must be adjusted from original orbit plans because of conflicts with other space objects.

### SN 3.5.2 Provide Space Control.

To assure freedom of action of US and multinational space assets in space, while denying adversaries such freedom of action. Space control includes protection of US space systems and negation of enemy space systems. In addition, this task also includes the necessary surveillance to track, assess and catalog all orbiting space objects, and to provide collision avoidance reports. **(N/A)** (JP 1, 3-0, 3-55, 6-02, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Percent	Of first contingency requirements for space support met.
M2	Percent	Of second contingency requirements for space support met.
M3	Hours	To deploy Joint Space Support Teams (JSSTs) (after initial request).
M4	Hours	For JSST to direct combatant commander's request for specific space support to appropriate USSPACECOM or component office.
M5	Percent	Of enemy space capability destroyed/degraded/disrupted (as ordered by NCA).
M6	Percent	Of space platforms orbits must be adjusted from original orbit plans because of conflicts with other space objects.

### SN 3.5.3 Provide Space Force Enhancement.

To provide direct support to combatant commanders, operational commanders, and land, sea and air forces through the use of space based sensors and payloads. Space force enhancements supports the warfighter with navigation, surveillance and reconnaissance, communications, weather/environmental, and theater ballistic missile warning products. In addition, this task includes deployment of Space Support Teams to ensure the responsive application of space assets for geographic combatant and subordinate joint force commanders. **(JP 2-01, 3-03, 3-07, 3-08v1)** (JP 6-02, CJCSM 3122.03)

**Note:** This task does not include tasks to maintain on-orbit space systems which support sensors and payloads (See SN 3.5.1, *Provide Space Support*). Management of space based communications is part of the overall worldwide C4 network and is at SN 5.1.2, *Establish and Direct National Military C4 Systems Worldwide for Communication Strategic Information*.

M1	Hours	To deploy Joint Space Support Teams (JSSTs) (after initial request).
M2	Percent	Of items in near space, fully catalogued.

M3	Percent	Of US military satellite communications capability destroyed/degraded.
M4	Percent	Of US satellite navigation capability destroyed/degraded.
M5	Percent	Of US space based environmental monitoring capability destroyed/degraded.
M6	Percent	Of US space based intelligence capability destroyed/degraded.
M7	Percent	Of US space based missile warning capability destroyed/degraded.
M8	Days	To fully analyze new space debris and determine its on-orbit characteristics.
M9	Days	To fully analyze new space platforms and determine their on-orbit characteristics.

### **SN 3.6 Conduct Survivable Mobile Command Center (SMCC) Operations and Planning Functions.**

M1	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M2	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M3	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M4	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M5	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M6	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M7	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M8	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M9	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M10	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M11	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M12	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M13	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M14	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M15	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M16	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M17	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M18	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M19	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M20	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>

M21	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M22	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M23	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M24	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M25	Minutes	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M26	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M27	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M28	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M29	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M30	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M31	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M32	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>

### SN 3.6.1 Conduct SMCC Central Management Duties.

M1	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M2	Instances	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M3	Percent of time	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M4	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M5	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M6	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M7	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M8	Instances	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M9	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M10	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M11	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M12	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M13	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>

### SN 3.6.2 Assume SMCC Central Manager Responsibilities.

M1	Percent of time	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M2	Percent of time	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M3	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M4	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>

M5	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M6	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>

### **SN 3.6.3 Maintain SMCC Connectivity with the NCA and Senior Military Authorities.**

M1	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M2	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M3	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>

### **SN 3.6.4 Maintain Communications with other SMCC Assets and National Military Command System (NMCS) Command Center.**

M1	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M2	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M3	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M4	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>

### **SN 3.6.5 Monitor Status of SMCC Assets, Senior Leadership (Military and Civilian), and Provide Command Center Status (CCSTAT) and Handover Reports.**

M1	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M2	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M3	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M4	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M5	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M6	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M7	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M8	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M9	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M10	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M11	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M12	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M13	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M14	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M15	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>

M16	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
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**SN 4 PROVIDE SUSTAINMENT.**

To maintain the necessary level and duration of military activity to achieve national and multinational objectives. This task includes providing, maintaining, transporting, or assisting/coordinating those levels of force, personnel, materiel, and consumables necessary to support the national and/or multinational military strategy. In military operations other than war, this task pertains to support of US forces and agencies and to provide advisory and training assistance to a host-nation. **(JP 0-2, 3-0, 3-07.1, 4-0, 4-01.1, 4-01.2, 5-0)** (JP 3-0, 4-01.1, 4-01.3, 4-01.7, 4-02.1, CJCSI 3100.01)

**Note:** Support to NGOs/PVOs is at SN 8.1.9, *Cooperate with and Support NGOs and PVOs*.

M1	Line Items	Backlogged.
M2	Percent	Of planned priority 1, 2, and 3 sustainment delivered to theater customer during operations.
M3	Percent	Of regional nations forces integrated into logistics plan.
M4	Percent	Of required logistics in place to support national objectives.
M5	Tons	Of POE, POD, and other backlogged support requirements by priority.
M6	Months	To fully establish new sustainment infrastructure.
M7	Percent	Of cargo booked and available that misses ship deployment.
M8	Percent	Of requirements for Defense Energy Supply Center documented in plans.
M9	Percent	Of sustainment movement requirements met by available sealift, airlift, ground transportation, and commercial means. (during execution).
M10	Percent	Of sustainment cargo booked on a ship and available at the SPOE is actually loaded on a ship.
M11	Percent	Of planned maximum cargo requirements become actual Defense Energy Supply Center requirements (during execution).
M12	Percent	Of replacement personnel who arrive at the correct POD NLT their LAD (during execution).
M13	Percent	Of sustainment cargo that arrives at the correct POD NLT its LAD (during execution).
M14	Y/N	Identifies nonunit cargo and replacement personnel requirements, coordinates their priorities with the supported CINC, and passes the requirements to the components for scheduling and movement (during planning and execution).
M15	Percent	Of supported CINC validated nonunit requirements (cargo increment numbers (CINs)/personnel increment numbers (PINs) if used) are scheduled to arrive at the TPFDD POD by their LAD.

M16	Percent	Of replacement personnel who arrive at the correct destination NLT their RDD during execution.
M17	Percent	Of sustainment cargo that arrives at the correct destination NLT its RDD during execution.
M18	Percent	Of supported CINC validated nonunit requirements (cargo increment numbers (CINs) if used) are scheduled to arrive at the TPFDD destination by RDD.

#### **SN 4.1 Procure and Distribute Personnel.**

To procure officers, warrant officers, enlisted personnel, and civilians for the force and to transport them to units and organizations of their Service and other DOD, governmental, and nongovernmental support agencies, according to policy and national military strategy. **(JP 0-2, 3-0, 3-08v2, 4-0)** (JP 1-05, 4-0, 4-01.1)

**Note:** For generation of forces (units/organizations) for theaters, see SN 7, *Conduct Force Development*.

M1	Days	From recruitment to commencement of basic training.
M2	Dollars	To recruit new service member.
M3	Percent	Of inductees have at least a high school diploma.
M4	Percent	Of inductees successfully complete basic training.
M5	Percent	Of military inductees qualify for security clearance.
M6	Percent	Of new DOD civilians qualify for security clearance.
M7	Percent	Of officer inductees have at least a bachelors degree.
M8	Percent	Of recruitment goals met during preceding year.
M9	Percent	Of recruits are female.
M10	Percent	Of recruits from racial or ethnic minority.

##### **SN 4.1.1 Determine Requirements and Allocate Human Resources.**

To determine manpower requirements and allocate the resources from approved positions in the force structure. This task includes determining which requirements will be supported with authorizations (*spaces*) by grade and skill level. **(JP 1-0, 4-0)** (JP 2-01, 4-02.1, 5-03.1)

M1	Days	To consider and approve change in manning document.
M2	Percent	Of total DOD civilians are SES.
M3	Percent	Of total DOD manning are civilians.
M4	Percent	Of total military personnel are officers.
M5	Percent	Of total officer manning are general/flag officers.
M6	Weeks	To approve manpower change requests (backlogged).
M7	Days	In advance of need manpower requirements identified.
M8	Percent	Of support provided by contractors.

**SN 4.1.2 Procure, Train, Supply, Transport, and Maintain Personnel.**

To procure, train, and assign personnel to authorized positions in the force structure. This task includes accountability of assigned forces and movement of trained personnel replacements to their unit assignments. **(JP 1-0,4-0)** (JP 3-0, 3-05, 3-61, 4-01.2, 4-02.1)

M1	Days	Between completion of training and arrival at unit of assignment.
M2	Dollars	For basic training per individual.
M3	Percent	Of Air Force personnel are college graduates.
M4	Percent	Of Army personnel are college graduates.
M5	Percent	Of civilian authorizations filled (have personnel assigned).
M6	Percent	Of Marine personnel are college graduates.
M7	Percent	Of military authorizations filled (have personnel assigned).
M8	Percent	Of Navy personnel are college graduates.
M9	Percent	Of personnel receive assignment to unit prior to completion of initial training.
M10	Weeks	Initial training rate achieved.
M11	Percent	Of newly assigned trained personnel that adequately perform their jobs without excessive additional training or supervision.

**SN 4.2 Provide for Base Support and Services.**

To provide and coordinate wholesale logistics and administrative support to combatant commanders and the Military Departments. This task includes the acquisition of materiel, facilities, and services. This support and these services can be provided directly to operational and tactical organizations as well as theater organizations. **(JP 3-10.1, 4-0, 4-01.1, 4-05)** (JP 3-07.5, 3-10.1, 4-01.1)

M1	Days	To let procurement contract valued from \$2,501 to \$500,000.
M2	Percent	Of commercial market costs paid for DOD Non-Developmental Items (NDI).
M3	Percent	Of prepositioned WRM required to support TPFDD, pending resupply.
M4	Weeks	To let procurement contract valued at over \$500,001.

**SN 4.2.1 Determine National Military Support Infrastructure.**

To determine, in conjunction with the combatant commanders (and Department of State and other government agencies), the lines of support and the locations for sustaining bases to best support the national military strategy and theater strategy and campaign plans **(JP 4-0)** (JP 2-01, 3-04.1, 3-08v2, 4-01, 4-02.1)

M1	Days	To determine necessary support infrastructure.
M2	Percent	Of actual operations worldwide for which sustainment base/infrastructure adequate.



M3	Percent	Of OPLANs have assigned logistic support responsibilities to Service components and other commands.
M4	Percent	Of required infrastructure in place prior to crisis.
M5	Percent	Of support infrastructure capable of supporting surge requirements.
M6	Percent	Of sustainment facilities relocated to support particular contingency.
M7	Days	To obtain percent of support infrastructure not in place before crisis.

#### SN 4.2.2 Provide Wholesale Supply and Maintenance.

To provide wholesale procurement and distribution of supplies and equipment. This includes receipt, classification, storage, accounting, issue, maintenance, procurement, manufacture, assembly, research, reutilization, salvage or disposal of material, as well as wholesale distribution, to supported retail echelons of supply and to collateral depot maintenance activities. It also includes the maintenance performed on materiel requiring major overhaul or a complete rebuild of parts, assemblies, subassemblies, and end items, including the manufacture of parts, modifications, testing, and reclamation as required. Depot maintenance supports lower categories of maintenance by providing technical assistance and performing that maintenance beyond their responsibility or capability. **(JP 4-0, 4-04)** (JP 4-01.7, 4-02.1)

M1	Days	For depot system to issue TCTO/MWO (after problem identified to depot system).
M2	Days	Of supply on hand at all levels of support to execute OPLAN.
M3	Months	To outfit below the line or new units with table of equipment allowance.
M4	Months	To respond to tasked-CINC's industrial activities.
M5	Percent	Of days when ammunition (Class V) distribution is adequate to support operations.
M6	Percent	Of days when ammunition (Class V) distribution is adequate to support operations in primary theater.
M7	Percent	Of days when fuel (Class III) distribution is adequate to support operations.
M8	Percent	Of major end items have surge repair capacity in CONUS.
M9	Percent	Of OPLAN's scheduled requirements for supplies provided to the customer.
M10	Percent	Of personnel in training with clothing and equipment they will need in their assigned units.
M11	Percent	Of planned ammunition (Class V) delivered to theater forces at execution.
M12	Percent	Of repair facility's capacity in operation.
M13	Percent	Of required work force available to perform overhaul.
M14	Percent	Of theater personnel have full issue of clothing and protective gear.
M15	Days	To complete major overhaul of equipment.
M16	Percent	Of authorized NBC equipment on hand and serviceable.

**SN 4.2.3 Control National Inventories and Movements.**

To integrate materiel inventory management of all groups of items within the overall supply system. It includes management of the administrative movement of materiel within and from the CONUS base or prepositioned stock locations to a combatant command or host-nation either in bulk or individual shipments tailored to the needs of the deployed forces. **(JP 4-0, 4-01.2, 4-03, 4-05)**  
(JP 4-01.2, 4-01.7, 4-02.1)

M1	Man-days	Lost per month because personnel in casual status (awaiting transportation).
M2	Percent	Of end items completely depleted under expected usage rates before industry reopens production.
M3	Percent	Of inventory items (valued from \$101 to \$5,000), lost.
M4	Percent	Of inventory items (valued under \$100 each), lost.
M5	Percent	Of inventory stock line items exceed expected five year usage.
M6	Percent	Of items intransit that have in-transit visibility (ITV).
M7	Percent	Of Service and CINC requirements in inventory stocks.
M8	Days	In advance of shortage possible shortage identified.

**SN 4.2.4 Develop Sustainment Base.**

To improve, expand, or contract the resources and facilities of an area or a location in the United States and its commonwealths or territories in response to changes in the national military strategy. **(JP 4-0, 4-04, 4-05)** (N/A)

M1	Dollars	To prepare CONUS base for return to civil use.
M2	Months	To expand CONUS port facilities to handle container or breakbulk ships.
M3	Percent	Of construction material acquired or produced locally.
M4	Percent	Of military confinement facilities meet standards.
M5	Weeks	To build CONUS sustainment base facility.
M6	Years	Average age of sustaining base facilities.
M7	Years	Average age of telecommunications infrastructure.
M8	Years	Average age of transportation infrastructure.
M9	Percent	Of total CONUS sustainment requirements met.

**SN 4.2.5 Coordinate Defensewide Base Operations Support.**

To coordinate the providing of local administrative and logistic services, including supply operations, maintenance of materiel, personnel support and services, base services, operation of utilities, maintenance of real property, minor construction, geospatial information and services support (formerly mapping, charting, and geodesy support), other engineering support, and administrative services (including network and computer security and services, which involves protection

of critical assets at both CONUS and deployed locations). This support is accomplished by or through activities of the supporting installation. Base services also include transportation and electronic (signal) communications and weather support. Personnel support and services include personnel administrative services, finances, and resource management. **(JP 4-0, 4-04, 4-05)** (JP 2-0, 3-07.5, 4-0, 4-05)

**Note:** Public affairs (PA) services are listed at SN 5.6, *Provide Public Affairs (PA) Worldwide*; religious support is listed at SN 4.3.2 *Coordinate Defensewide Religious Support*; and legal support is listed at SN 4.2.7, *Provide Legal Support*.

M1	Days	To identify and marshal forces to restore unused standard runway to full operations.
M2	Percent	Of total procurement costs in contract administrative costs.
M3	Dollars	In administrative cost for procurement contracts from \$100,001 to \$500,000.
M4	Dollars	In administrative cost for procurement contracts from \$2,501 to \$100,000.
M5	Dollars	In administrative cost for procurement contracts over \$500,001.
M6	Dollars	In administrative cost for procurement contracts under \$2500 (micro-purchases).
M7	Months	To let procurement contract valued at over \$500,001.
M8	Percent	Of planned administrative support services available.
M9	Percent	Of planned capacity to process and issue supplies available.
M10	Percent	Of planned electronic communications links available.
M11	Percent	Of planned air, sea, rail, water, and highway transportation available.
M12	Weeks	To identify and marshal forces to construct standard fighter/attack suitable runway.
M13	Weeks	To identify and marshal forces to construct standard intratheater airlift suitable runway.
M14	Weeks	To identify and marshal forces to construct standard runway.
M15	Weeks	To let procurement contract valued from \$2,501 to \$500,000.
M16	Percent	Of planned geospatial products available.
M17	Months	To generate new geospatial products.
M18	Percent	Of geospatial products meet user requirements.
M19	Percent	Of base operations supported protected against NBC.

#### **SN 4.2.6 Organize Management Headquarters.**

To organize headquarters that are primarily concerned with long-range planning, programming, and budgeting of resources; development of policy and procedures; coordination of effort; and evaluation. This task is to establish and operate departmental and major command-level headquarters and provide certain administrative services for non-DOD agencies. **(JP 0-2, 3-0)** (N/A)

M1	Dollars	To maintain combatant command HQ, including personnel, systems, and rent (annually).
M2	Percent	Of manpower assigned to HQ meet all personnel requirements.
M3	Percent	Of Joint Headquarters located within their theater.
M4	Percent	Of Joint Headquarters manpower positions participating in DOD PPBS process.
M5	Weeks	To establish joint force headquarters.
M6	Percent	Of theater force assigned to headquarters.

#### SN 4.2.7 Provide Legal Support.

To advise commanders and staff on all civil, acquisition, fiscal, military, international, and operational law issues. To review all rules of engagement, directives, and operational plans and all strategic targets, whether preplanned or adaptively planned, for consistency with US and international law; and to advise on the legal and political implications of restraints upon operations to include the right to employ force. **(JP 3-08v1, 3-57, 5-03.1)** (JP 3-0, 3-05, 3-05.3, 3-07.5, 3-10, 3-10.1, 3-15, 4-01.2)

M1	Days	To provide legal opinion on international agreements, MOU, LOA, executive agreements, acquisition actions, or ROE.
M2	Hours	For legal review of ROE change request.
M3	Percent	Of legal professionals are in deployable units.
M4	Percent	Of times lack of access to legal support caused delay in military operations.
M5	Days	To provide legal opinion on preplanned strategic target.
M6	Hours	To provide legal opinion on adaptively planned strategic target.
M7	Yes/No	Provide legal support on responses to attacks.
M8	Hours	To provide legal review of time-sensitive issues, including contingency acquisition action, fiscal law issues, and actions pertaining to the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF).

#### SN 4.2.8 Establish Prisoner Control Policy.

To establish the policy for internment of military personnel so ordered and the confinement of EPWs. **(JP 1-0, 3-10.1, CJCSM 3122.03)** (JP 3-10, 3-57, 4-01.3, 4-02)

**Note:** See SN 4.2.4, *Develop Sustainment Base*, for provision of confinement facilities for EPWs.

M1	Hours	To evacuate EPWs from initial capture to their final EPW compounds.
M2	Instances	Of law and order policy not covered by existing/established policy/SOP.
M3	Instances	Of shortfalls in EPW processing sites.

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M4	Months	Since EPW policy last reviewed by legal personnel.
M5	Instances	Of EPW compounds cited for serious deficiencies by International Red Cross.
M6	Percent	Of EPW compounds guarded by security forces (versus combat troops).
M7	Percent	Of military confinement facilities certified by civilian certifying agency.
M8	Percent	Of EPWs for whom prison control policy is clear.
M9	Percent	Of EPWs trained and equipped for NBC.
M10	Percent	Of security forces committed to EPW operations (versus combat support).
M11	Days	To provide medical support as needed or available.

#### SN 4.2.9 Acquire Host-Nation Support (HNS).

To negotiate and contract for support and services from a host nation for US forces in a theater. The scope of HNS is a function of US capabilities in theater, but can include any portion of the range of combat support and combat service support activities. **(JP 3-0, 3-08v1, 3-10.1, 4-0, 4-01, 4-01.5, 5-0)** (JP 3-07.5, 3-10, 3-10.1, 3-11, 4-02.1, 5-03.1)

M1	Dollars	Offset payment (in dollars or dollar value of equipment) for each host-nation support manpower position provided or promised.
M2	Percent	Of maintenance support provided by HNS.
M3	Day	Delay between requisitioning agreed support and receiving it.
M4	Percent	Of existing plans have fully negotiated provisions for host-nation support.
M5	Percent	Increase in availability of tactical forces through use of host-nation security and means in JF plans.
M6	Percent	Of JSCP assigned OPLANs identify or project host-nation support resources.
M7	Tons	Of material provided by HNS.
M8	Percent	Of materiel and consumables provided by HNS.
M9	Percent	Of peacetime support provided by host nation.
M10	Percent	Of specialized maintenance units, prepared to convert captured material to friendly use.
M11	Percent	Of stationing costs, paid by host nation.
M12	Percent	Of total combat service support, supplied by host nation.
M13	Percent	Of total combat support, supplied by host nation.
M14	Percent	Of total cost of an operation paid for by HN and third party nations.
M15	Percent	Of total cost of an operation paid for by third party nations.
M16	Percent	Reduction in combat service support personnel, because of host-nation support.
M17	Percent	Of total support, supplied by host nation.
M18	Percent	Of US plans have host-nation supporting plans.
M19	Days	Saved in closing TPFDD (relative to C-day) because of HNS.

M20	Percent	Of strategic deployment requirements reduced by HNS.
M21	Days	To obtain basing rights.
M22	Days	To obtain overflight authorization.

### **SN 4.3 Provide for Personnel Support.**

To ensure provision is made for the support of personnel, either in CONUS or overseas in a theater, to include personnel management and morale support, religious support, and health services support. **(JP 0-2, 1-0, 1-05, 4-02.1, CJCSM 3122.03)** (JP 0-2, 3-07.3)

M1	Percent	Difference between assigned strength and authorized strength (military and civilian).
M2	Percent	Of difference between assigned strength and present for duty strength.
M3	Percent	Of DOD positions filled by civilian employees or contractors.
M4	Days	To replace personnel and fill shortfalls.

#### **SN 4.3.1 Provide Personnel Management and Morale Support.**

To manage the military personnel and the civilian work force, including procurement, accountability, training, education, utilization, development, promotion, assignments, motivation, retention, and separation/retirement policy. To provide policy for the entertainment and recreational facilities and activities for troops, including motion pictures, libraries, sports, live entertainment shows, Service clubs, musical entertainment, crafts, and outdoor recreation. This activity includes providing resources, facilities, and support to CONUS and OCONUS commands for morale, welfare, and recreation activities, especially rest and relaxation for service members from the rigors of sustained combat, and support operations. **(JP 0-2, 1-0, 3-08v2, 3-61)** (JP 1-05, 3-04.1)

M1	Percent	Of personnel involved in educational programs.
M2	Percent	Of personnel who complete initial service/contract obligation.
M3	Percent	Of personnel retained beyond initial service/contract obligation.
M4	Percent	Of personnel, in critical/essential occupational areas retained in service (military and civilian).
M5	Percent	Of Service members participating in rest and recuperation program.
M6	Percent	Of Service members using MWR facilities.

#### **SN 4.3.2 Coordinate Defensewide Religious Support.**

To coordinate comprehensive, inter-Service religious ministry support within DOD. This task includes reviewing plans and providing guidance in the provision of religious ministry across the range of military operations. To advise on the ecclesiastical, religious, and moral implications of Joint operations to achieve

national security objectives; to advise on Joint religious ministry doctrine and policy, and coordinate chaplaincy issues with foreign military organizations.

**(JP 1-05) (N/A)**

M1	Percent	Of military member faith groups below DOD average for chaplain representation.
M2	Percent	Of religious faiths, accredited to minister to DOD, with no ministers on active duty.
M3	Percent	Of military personnel with access to religious services in their faith.

#### **SN 4.3.3 Coordinate Defensewide Health Services.**

To coordinate medical services that promote, improve, conserve, or restore the mental or physical well-being and performance of individuals or groups. This task is performed in support of all Services (and other nations as required), both in the field and in CONUS. This task includes: medical, dental, veterinary, optical, and ancillary services; health-related research; medical evacuation and patient transport; medical supply and maintenance; and humanitarian assistance and civic action to other nations. **(JP 4-0, 4-02)** (JP 3-0, 4-02.1)

**Note:** For humanitarian assistance and civic action see SN 8.1.5, *Coordinate Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Humanitarian and Civic Assistance*, and SN 8.1.6, *Provide Civil Affairs Support Policy*.

M1	Days	For CONUS hospital facilities to accommodate returning wounded and injured service members.
M2	Percent	Of military personnel, fit for duty.
M3	Percent	Personnel deployed meeting preparation for overseas movement requirements.
M4	Hours	For casualty to obtain "stabilizing" medical care.
M5	Days	For casualty to obtain "recuperative" medical care.

#### **SN 4.3.4 Develop and Maintain a Medical Surveillance Program.**

Developing and maintaining a comprehensive surveillance program is a critical force protection element. Program elements include: mechanism to identify health threats, systems to implement preventive medicine measures, pre- and post-deployment health assessment systems, and medical surveillance systems to monitor health threats during an operation. **(N/A)** (JP 4-02, CJCSM 3122.03, DODD 6490.1, DODI 6490.3)

M1	Days	To identify theater medical threats and develop countermeasures.
M2	Days	To develop system to conduct pre- and post-development screening procedures.
M3	Days	To deploy assets to conduct medical surveillance in theater.

**SN 4.4 Reconstitute National Forces and Means.**

To reconstitute the Armed Forces of the United States that will counter any emerging global threat. National reconstitution involves forming, training, and fielding new fighting units. This task includes initially drawing on cadre-type units and laid-up military assets, mobilizing previously trained or new manpower, and large-scale use or employment of the industrial base. This task also involves maintaining technology, doctrine, training, experienced manpower (military, DOD civilian, and contractors), and the innovative approach necessary to retain the competitive edge in decisive areas of potential military competition. This task includes providing the support required for reconstituting a host-nation's forces in military operations other than war. **(JP 4-01.2, 4-05)** (JP 4-0, 4-01.2, 4-05)

**Note:** Reconstitution is more than just logistical activity, it is a melding of personnel, training, and materiel with operational oversight and action throughout the process. For expanding the industrial base in a mobilization situation, especially for reconstituting the Armed Forces of the United States in the face of a developing global threat, see SN 6.6.7, *Plan and Maintain Industrial Base Capabilities*.

M1	Days	To develop post-SIOP plan to support NMS.
M2	Days	To reconstitute post-SIOP force.
M3	Months	From S/T/M-Day, for recalled Reserve Component combat support and combat service support units to be certified prepared for combat.
M4	Months	From S/T/M-Day, for recalled Reserve Component combat units to be certified prepared for combat.
M5	Months	From S/T/M-Day, to field cadre division.
M6	Months	From S/T/M-Day, to recommission naval vessels recalled from mothball fleet.
M7	Months	To field last Army combat unit (with laid-up military assets).
M8	Months	To field last US Air Force combat squadron (with laid-up military assets).
M9	Months	To field last US Marine Corps combat unit (with laid-up military assets).
M10	Percent	Of OPLANs with reconstitution provisions.

**SN 4.5 Set Sustainment Priorities.**

To establish or coordinate worldwide priorities to support a revised national military strategy and revised theater campaigns and strategies, to optimize the use of available resources. This task includes the analysis and evaluation of theater and Service logistic plans, procedures, capabilities, and systems for sustainment of special operations forces (SOF). **(JP 0-2, 4-0)** (JP 5-0, 5-03.1)

**Note:** See also SN 5.3.5, *Set Worldwide Priorities and Allocate Resources*.



M1	Days	To designate primary theater.
M2	Days	To provide combatant commanders apportionment of below the line forces.
M3	Percent	Of below the line forces dual apportioned in JSCP.
M4	Percent	Of CS and CSS assignments to primary theater match combat forces.
M5	Percent	Of reviewed theater OPLANs with major deficiencies in sustainment (during planning cycle OPLAN review).
M6	Percent	Of strategic lift dual apportioned in JSCP.

#### **SN 4.6 Acquire Materiel.**

To procure, produce, buy, lease, rent, or otherwise obtain equipment and supplies for the armed forces. To provide them to military units and other DOD, allied, US Government, and nongovernmental organizations according to established laws, statutes, regulation, DOD directives, policy, and national military strategy. **(N/A)**  
(JP 4-05)

M1	Months	From validation of new material requirement to acquisition.
M2	Days	From validation of standard material requirement to acquisition.
M3	Days	From acquisition of material to delivery to requesting organization.
M4	Percent	Of requirement fulfilled through acquisition.

#### **SN 4.6.1 Conduct Acquisition.**

To perform research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E), production, fielding, and support for weapon systems, management information systems, consumables, non-weapon and non-AIS items, and services. **(CJCSI 3170.01)**  
(N/A)

M1	Weeks	From validation of new materiel requirement to acquisition plan.
M2	Weeks	From approval of acquisition plan to sourcing.
M3	Days	From sourcing to procurement, production, or other acquisition.

#### **SN 4.6.1.1 Defense Acquisition.**

To plan and accomplish RDT&E to produce weapons and management information systems, processes, procedures, and end products for the Services and other DOD, Allied, US governmental, and nongovernmental support agencies. **(JP 4-01.2, 4-03, CJCSI 3170.01, CJCSI 5123.01)** (JP 0-2, 4-0, 4-01.2)

M1	Months	From validation of new material requirement to completion of RDT&E.
M2	Months	From validation of new system requirement to Milestone 0 (Approval to Conduct Concept Studies).
M3	Months	From completion of Concept Exploration to Milestone I (Approval to Begin a New Acquisition Program).

M4	Months	From completion of Program Definition to Milestone II (Engineering and Manufacturing Approval).
M5	Months	From completion of Engineering and Manufacturing Development to Milestone III (Production or Fielding/Deployment Approval).
M6	Dollars	Planned vs actual program costs through Fielding/Development.
M7	Percent	Of requirements fulfilled through acquisition.

#### **SN 4.6.1.2 Procurement.**

To plan and obtain consumables, non-weapon and non-AIS items, and associated services by DOD, such as studies, passenger vehicles, supplies, construction, and waste removal necessary to support the national military strategy. **(JP 4-0, 4-01.7)** (JP 0-2, 3-08v2, 4-0, 4-01.7, 4-03, CJCSI 3170.01, CJCSI 4310.01, CJCSI 6130.01A)

M1	Weeks	From validation annual/periodic supply and consumable item estimate to completion of procurement action.
M2	Days	From detecting deviation in procurement estimates to corrective procurement actions.
M3	Dollars	Deviations from planned procurement to actual procurement.

#### **SN 4.6.2 Assess Performance and Implementation Improvements.**

To assess capabilities of the current force structure (people and materiel) to meet projected threats, while taking into account opportunities for technological advancement, cost savings, procedural and technical efficiencies, and changes in national policy or doctrine. This task includes the requirements generation process to identify needs based on mission area assessments. **(JP 0-2, 5-0, CJCSI 3100.01)** (JP 5-0)

M1	Days	From identification of material deficiency to improvement plan.
M2	Weeks	From approval of improvement/modification plan to first item modification.
M3	Weeks	From plan approval to completion of improvement.

#### **SN 4.6.3 Support Logistic Processes.**

To enable, assist, and perform production, fielding/deployment, and operational support. Task includes the production and delivery of materiel, supplies, and equipment, including required support infrastructure, to the field for operational use and identifying, developing, and performing modifications to fielded systems throughout the life cycle. **(JP 4-05, CJCSI 3120.05)** (JP 4-03, 4-05, CJCSI 3120.05)

M1	Weeks	From decision to procure/produce to approval of plan.
M2	Weeks	From decision to improve/modify to approval of implementing plan.

**SN 4.6.4 Reutilization or Disposal of Materiel.**

To reuse, recycle, demilitarize, or otherwise dispose of materiel, equipment, supplies, systems, and products in the military inventory after they become surplus. This task includes use of recovered materials, reuse of products, recycling, and planning for disposal during system development. At the end of the system/product useful life, the task includes controlled demilitarization and disposal in a way that minimizes liability due to environmental, safety, security, and health issues. **(N/A)** (JP 4-02.1, 4-05)

M1	Days	From identification of surplus items to turn-in.
M2	Hours	From receipt of surplus items to request for disposition.
M3	Days	From receipt of disposition to reutilization/disposal action.

**SN 4.7 Acquire, Manage, and Distribute Funds.**

To perform the resource management function of estimating costs for specific operations and tracking and reporting actual costs to support requests to the US Congress for appropriation of funds for specific operations. It also includes identifying and managing funds that can be made available to theater and operational levels to pay for immediate expenses. Resource management includes planning, programming, and budgeting (PPBS) support, budget analysis, management services, and force management support. Finance and accounting functions include overall capturing of the costs of operations via standard accounting systems and other means and the management of the operating systems that pay personnel and providers (contractors, host-nation, suppliers, etc. **(JP 4-01.7, 4-03, 4-05, CJCSI 7401.01)** (JP 0-2, 3-07.4, 4-0, 4-02.1, CJCSI 5261.01, CJCSI 6211.03)

M1	Days	To evaluate size and duration of the operation to develop estimated cost to DOD for completing the operation.
M2	Weeks	To obtain congressional funding source for the operation.
M3	Number	Of data points to assemble all pertinent financial management issues for the operation.
M4	Days	To obtain NCA decision on whom exercises financial management executive agency in the area of operations.

**SN 5 PROVIDE STRATEGIC DIRECTION AND INTEGRATION.**

To develop and revise national and/or multinational military strategy. This task is based on national security strategy for the attainment of strategic security interests, objectives, and end states. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) (includes the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) derives strategic direction from national security strategy and policy directives. The Secretary of Defense, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provides strategic

guidance and direction to the combatant commanders. The combatant commanders subsequently provide strategic direction for the employment of joint, Service, supporting, special, and multinational forces through their unified action in theater strategies and campaign plans. This task includes providing clear command relationships and tasking authority through an appropriate JCS planning, warning, alert, or execute order. Theater operations are often in conjunction with interagency, nongovernmental, and private voluntary organizations and United Nations forces. These three strategies (national security, national military, and theater) and related strategic plans integrate the national ends, ways, and means. **(JP 0-2, 2-01, 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-08v1, 3-08v2, 5-0, CJCSI 3100.01)** (JP 2-01, 3-07.1, 3-07.4, 3-11, 4-01, 4-01.5, 4-05, CJCSI 3100.01)

M1	Days	To answer combatant command requests for guidance.
M2	Days	To revise and issue TPFDD after change in OPLAN at CINC level.
M3	Hours	To publish changes by executing units after changes in OPLAN at JFC level.
M4	Months	To update national (or multinational) published strategy after major shift in US midterm strategy.
M5	Months	To update national or multinational published strategy.
M6	Percent	Of national (or multinational) suggested changes to JSR, NMS, or other strategy development and strategy documents accepted.
M7	Hours	Task nuclear option development using appropriate EAP-CJCS.

### **SN 5.1 Operate and Manage Global Strategic Communications and Information Systems.**

To receive information and data on the strategic situation worldwide, including: combatant command, theater component command, and operational level command missions, disposition of friendly and enemy forces, strategic centers of gravity, and characteristics of the theater areas (worldwide). This task includes translating the information and decisions into a usable form and promulgating, retaining, and disseminating it. The task includes informing, advising, and obtaining information and decisions on the worldwide situation, national security and national military strategies, and theater strategies and campaigns. Information and decisions will be acquired from and communicated to the National Command Authorities and National Security Council advisory staff, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Military Departments and staffs, multinational commands and staffs, and other elements of the Department of Defense and government agencies as required. This task includes coordinating with friendly civilian government authorities as required. **(JP 2-0, 4-01, 5-0, 6-0, 6-02, CJCSI 3151.01)** (JP 2-0, 6-02, CJCSI 3151.01)

M1	Minutes	To begin decision making (DM) Conference.
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M2	Minutes	To begin transmitting force direction (FD) EAM to bombers, tankers (PCL only) (availability of individual NCCS C4I systems).
M3	Minutes	To begin transmitting FM messages to bombers/tankers/ICBM's (availability of NMCS and CINC C4I systems).
M4	Minutes	To begin transmitting FM messages to bombers/tankers/ICBMs (availability of bomber/tanker/ICBM NCCS C4I systems).
M5	Minutes	To begin transmitting situation monitoring (SM), threat warning (TW), and attack assessment (AA) messages (availability of NCCS C4I systems).
M6	Minutes	To process and authenticate EAM for execution of preplanned options against fixed SIOP targets (ICBM/SSBN/Bomber crews).
M7	Minutes	To process RECORD COPY emergency action message (EAM) for execution of preplanned options (against fixed SIOP targets).
M8	Minutes	To process VOICE emergency action message (EAM) for execution of preplanned options (against fixed SIOP targets).
M9	Minutes	To transmit EAM to bombers for execution of preplanned options (against fixed SIOP targets).
M10	Minutes	To transmit EAM to ICBMs for execution of preplanned options (against fixed SIOP targets).
M11	Minutes	To transmit EAM to SSBNs for execution of preplanned options (against fixed SIOP targets).
M12	Percent	Of addressees received messages.
M13	Minutes	Classified measures are locate at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M14	Seconds	Classified measures are locate at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M15	Y/N	Classified measures are locate at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M16	Y/N	Classified measures are locate at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M17	Y/N	Classified measures are locate at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M18	Y/N	Classified measures are locate at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M19	Y/N	Classified measures are locate at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M20	Minutes	Classified measures are locate at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M21	Y/N	Classified measures are locate at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M22	Y/N	Classified measures are locate at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M23	Minutes	Classified measures are locate at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M24	Seconds	Classified measures are locate at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M25	Minutes	Classified measures are locate at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M26	Minutes	Classified measures are locate at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M27	Y/N	Classified measures are locate at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M28	Y/N	Classified measures are locate at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M29	Seconds	Classified measures are locate at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M30	Minutes	Classified measures are locate at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M31	Seconds	Classified measures are locate at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>

**SN 5.1.1 Communicate Strategic Decisions/Information.**

To send and receive strategic decisions and data from one echelon of command, component, Military Department, ally, or other organization to another, by any means. **(JP 0-2, 3-08v2, 5-0, 6-0)** (JP 3-08v2, 6-0)

M1	Minutes	To begin sending messages (queuing time delay).
M2	Hours	To provide strategic direction to assigned or supporting forces after receipt of an order.
M3	Percent	Of addressees received messages.
M4	Percent	Of messages obtained outside normal communications channels.
M5	Percent	Of classified messages sent via channels with less than required level of security.
M6	Percent	Of data received (within established timelines).
M7	Hours	For C2 systems to transmit order worldwide.
M8	Y/N	During planning and execution no data transfer between networked stations is responsible for a supporting command failing to meet a request/requirement.
M9	Percent	Of involved units are listed addressees.
M10	Minutes	To begin transmitting FD EAMs to bombers/tankers (positive control launch only) and ICBMs (availability of individual NCCS C4I systems).
M11	Minutes	To begin transmitting force management (FM) messages to bombers/tankers and ICBMs (availability of bomber/tanker/ICBM NCCS C4I systems).
M12	Minutes	To begin transmitting force management (FM) messages to bombers/tankers and ICBMs (delay in availability of NMCS and CINC C4I systems).
M13	Minutes	To begin transmitting situation monitoring (SM) threat warning (TW)/attack assessment (AA) messages (availability of NCCS C4I systems).
M14	Minutes	To transmit FLASH message traffic to recipients.
M15	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M16	Hours	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M17	Hours	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M18	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M19	Minutes	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M20	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M21	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M22	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M23	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M24	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M25	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M26	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M27	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M28	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M29	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M30	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>

M31	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M32	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M33	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M34	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M35	Seconds	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M36	Minutes	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M37	Seconds	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>

### SN 5.1.2 Establish and Direct National Military C4 Systems Worldwide for Communicating Strategic Information.

To establish, direct, and control or interact with the networks and nodes (including space systems) used to send or receive strategic information (including data) and to use these systems to obtain or send strategic information. This activity includes requirements for command, control, communications, and computer systems to operate within the Global Command and Control System (GCCS), which includes the National Military Command System (NMCS), Global Transportation Network (GTN), combatant command C4 systems, the Service component C4 systems, USSOCOM C4I systems, or similar systems that may be established or required. This task includes repositioning of C4-related forces and systems. **(JP 2-01, 4-01, 5-0, 6-0) (JP 0-2, 2-01, 4-01.2)**

M1	Minutes	To begin decision making (DM) conference.
M2	Percent	Of articles on netted system available in heavy demand environment.
M3	Percent	Of essential C2 nodes have redundant communication paths for minimum required communication capabilities to ensure timely receipt of all record traffic.
M4	Percent	Of communications networks critical to operations fully operational.
M5	Percent	Of communications outages equipped with adequate redundant communications paths to ensure timely receipt of record traffic.
M6	Percent	Of communications systems provide access by intelligence personnel to consumers.
M7	Percent	Of communications systems remain operational during intelligence cycle.
M8	Percent	Of DOD long-haul communications channels saturated.
M9	Percent	Of information system interfaces require information scanning, retyping, reformatting, or other non-direct translation methods.
M10	Percent	Of operational C4 networks and nodes available.
M11	Percent	Of operational C4 networks and nodes reliable.
M12	Percent	Of surge capacity available in DOD long-haul communications.
M13	Percent	Of traffic sent on non-dedicated or non-DOD lines or channels.
M14	Hours	To restore information systems to fully operational status after a successful penetration and attack.

M15	Hours	Interact with the NMCS network and nodes to obtain or send strategic information.
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### SN 5.1.3 Maintain Global Strategic Military Information and Force Status.

To capture, screen, process, circulate, store, and display strategic data in a form that supports the decision making and planning processes for the NCA, National Military Command Center (NMCC), Services, and combatant commands. **(JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 5-0, 6-0)** (JP 3-05.3, CJCSI 2401.01A)

M1	Minutes	To access and display shared local data bases.
M2	Minutes	To access and display shared remote data bases.
M3	Minutes	To distribute reports to required organizations (after initial receipt).
M4	Minutes	To enter most current information on status-of-forces.
M5	Minutes	To process status information and disseminate (turnaround time).
M6	Percent	Of audited reports accurate.
M7	Percent	Of friendly units/organizations and personnel show current status.
M8	Percent	Of reports processed and disseminated to agencies within specified time limits.
M9	Percent	Percent of currency in generated movement information in GTN.
M10	Hours	Screen, circulate, store and display nuclear operations information in a format that supports the NMCS decision making process.
M11	Y/N	Examine existing nuclear appendices to operation plans and relevant CONPLANS to ensure compliance with NCA guidance concerning WMD deterrence, proliferation and use in response to a crisis.

### SN 5.1.4 Monitor Worldwide Strategic Situation.

To continuously observe and analyze events regionally and globally in the context of national and multinational security, military strategies, and other elements of national power (i.e., political, economic, informational). **(JP 2-0, 2-02, 5-0, 6-0)** (JP 3-0)

M1	Hours	To update information on other joint force, other military forces, and non-DOD agencies operating adjacent to crisis area.
M2	Instances	Of CJCS learning of emerging POL-Mil event from source outside Joint Staff.
M3	Minutes	To obtain information on changes to operational or strategic situation.
M4	Minutes	To respond to a request for background on emerging worldwide or theater strategic situation.
M5	Percent	Of Joint Staff POL-Mil specialists and subspecialists focus primarily on worldwide rather than theater strategic situations.
M6	Y/N	Develop and maintain a dynamic record of planned and actual unit deployment or redeployment status.



M7	Y/N	Develop and maintain strategic operations picture that includes threat information along LOCs and, when appropriate, status and location of enemy forces and operations.
M8	Y/N	Develop and maintain strategic operations picture that includes status and location information on friendly forces and operations.
M9	Hours	To update unit deployment or redeployment status during a crisis.
M10	Y/N	Strategic operations picture is updated on a cycle equal to the operations and intelligence situation reporting cycle.

#### **SN 5.1.5 Execute CJCS/CINC Emergency Action Procedures.**

To employ CJCS and CINC emergency action procedures to perform highly structured command and control activities. This task includes DEFCON, NATO, and NORAD emergency action procedures in addition to nuclear command and control procedures. **(JP 3-12.1)** (JP 6-0, CJCSI 5119.01, CJCSM 3122.03)

**Note:** This task supports SN 3.2.3 *Manage Strategic Force Readiness Levels*, SN 3.3 *Employ National Strategic Firepower*, SN 3.4.2 *Provide Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment*, SN 3.4.8 *Coordinate Nuclear Surety*, SN 5.1.1 *Communicate Strategic Decisions/Information*, SN 5.1.3 *Maintain Global Strategic Military Information and Force Status*, SN 5.4.4 *Prepare and Issue NCA Directives/CJCS Orders*, ST 3.2 *Attack Theater Strategic Targets/Target Sets*, ST 5.1.1 *Communicate Strategic and Operational Decisions and Information*, and ST 6.1 *Provide Theater Missile Defense*.

M1	Incidents	Of errors in crew force response when force execution directed by President.
M2	Incidents	Of errors in crew force validation and authentication.
M3	Incidents	Of errors in EAM preparation and transmission.
M4	Incidents	Of errors in EAM preparation and transmission; crew force validation and authentication; and crew force response when force execution directed by President.

#### **SN 5.1.6 Disseminate Presidential Nuclear Decision and Nuclear Command and Control Orders to the Forces.**

M1	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M2	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M3	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M4	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M5	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M6	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M7	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>

M8	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M9	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M10	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M11	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M12	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M13	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M14	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M15	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M16	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M17	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M18	Percent	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M19	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>

### **SN 5.2 Assess Worldwide and Regional Strategic Environment.**

To assess the global strategic environment and situation and to compare the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States and multinational forces with those of potential adversaries in a worldwide and regional context. To review the current national military strategy, forces, and operation plans. In particular, this task would decide whether actions required under the most recent orders are still appropriate. This task includes reassessing the national military strategy and plans and determining friendly strategic centers of gravity. **(JP 0-2, 3-0, 5-0)** (JP 3-0, 3-11, 5-0, CJCSI 2300.02A, CJCSI 3100.01)

M1	Days	To complete JSR after submission of combatant commander's input.
M2	Hours	To develop strategic options (after convening CAT).
M3	Instances	Of major deficiencies (from a theater perspective) in Defense Planning Guidance.
M4	Months	To complete review of strategic options.
M5	Months	To update regional security strategy.
M6	Percent	Of combatant commander's inputs to JSR accepted by The Joint Staff.
M7	Percent	Of international agreements expired in past year for failure to review.
M8	Percent	Of political events occur with available options.

#### **SN 5.2.1 Conduct Joint Military Net Assessments (JMNA).**

To compare the defense capabilities and programs of the Armed Forces of the United States and multinational forces to those of their potential adversaries. This task includes the joint military net assessment, CJCS net assessment for

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strategic planning, and CJCS program assessment. **(JP 0-2, 5-0)** (JP 3-0, 3-07.1, 5-0)

M1	Percent	Of above-the-line forces covered by JMNA.
M2	Percent	Of Joint Chiefs of Staff and CINCs concur in JMNA or NMS review.
M3	Months	To update the JMNA (when required).

### SN 5.2.2 Conduct National Military Strategy Review.

To review the strategic situation and strategy by gathering information, raising issues, and facilitating the integration of strategy, operation planning, and program assessments. Such a review supports the formulation of subsequent guidance for the development of a national military strategy statement. This task includes reviewing the objectives, concept, and resources associated with existing national military strategy, planning guidance, and national security documents; conducting a baseline intelligence threat assessment; receiving from combatant commanders inputs on priorities and preparedness; reviewing changes to the global national security environment; and evaluating the risk associated with various force levels for planning. **(JP 3-0, 5-0, CJCSI 3100.01)** (JP 1, 3-0, 5-03.1, CJCSI 3100.01, CJCSI 5123.01)

M1	Days	Delay publishing Defense Planning Guidance.
M2	Instances	Of crises where NMS guidance not adequate.
M3	Percent	Of CINC recommendations forwarded for additions to areas covered by NMS.
M4	Percent	Of enemy actions, operations, or campaigns accurately forecasted.
M5	Percent	Of identified strategic sequels had developed COAs.
M6	Percent	Of issues generated by CINCs in JSR.
M7	Percent	Of Joint Chiefs of Staff and CINCs concur in JMNA or NMS review.
M8	Percent	Of theater identified major deficiencies, corrected in national military strategy review.
M9	Weeks	To prepare and forward proposal to change strategic forces and force postures (after issuance of national intelligence estimate).
M10	Weeks	To review and respond to a JSR.
M11	Instances	Of National Military Strategy not adequately translating policy guidance into national military objectives.

### SN 5.2.3 Review Operation Plans.

To review existing strategic and operation plans, to include relevant CONPLANS and functional plans, in light of the existing global strategic environment and the results of the national military strategy review. This ensures compliance with NCA guidance and resource levels and with developing issues, such as risk associated with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) equipped enemy, that might suggest changes to the strategy or joint operation plans. **(JP 0-2, 2-01, 5-0, CJCSM 3141.01)** (JP 3-0, 3-07.5, 3-12.1, 3-54, 4-02.1, 5-0)

M1	Hours	To provide strategic options (after CJCS Warning Order).
M2	Percent	Of OPLANs have identified assets shortfalls.
M3	Weeks	To propose changes to strategic forces and force postures (after issuance of national intelligence estimate).
M4	Instances	Of enemy NBC capabilities not considered which impact strategy and/or plans.

#### **SN 5.2.4 Decide on Need for Military Action or Change.**

To decide whether strategic actions are required which are different from those that combatant commands and Service forces have already been directed to support. **(JP 0-2, 2-0, 5-0)** (JP 0-2, 1, 3-0, 3-07.5)

M1	Days	To promulgate Execute Order (after transmittal of CJCS Warning Order or Alert Order).
M2	Hours	To complete Phase II (crisis assessment) when combatant commander considers crisis time-sensitive.
M3	Instances	Of CAP returning to Phase I from Phase II or canceled, only to return to Phase II.
M4	Incidents	Of international events, soliciting US military response, occur without a preplanned option.
M5	Percent	Of expected (preplanned) I&W warning period available to combatant commander (after issuance of warning or alert order).
M6	Percent	Of political events occur with options available.

#### **SN 5.3 Determine National Military Strategic Direction.**

To assimilate various estimates, reviews, and NCA guidance; develop options and decisions on multinational and national military strategy recommendations to the NCA; and support theater strategies and campaign plans. **(JP 0-2, 3-0, 5-0, CJCSI 3100.01)** (JP 0-2, 1, 3-08v2, CJCSI 3100.01)

M1	Hours	To complete accepted Staff estimate (after receipt of mission).
M2	Percent	Of decision points have branches and sequels (during execution).

#### **SN 5.3.1 Issue Strategic Planning Guidance.**

To provide guidance on goals and objectives, resources, and planning tasks to Service staffs, Service major commands, and combatant command planners. This task includes providing guidance for developing recommendations for the national military strategy. It also includes providing guidance for Service forces to ensure they support multinational and theater strategies and campaigns in conformance with DOD, CJCS, and joint operation planning guidance. Guidance may include targeting policy, rules of engagement, levels of acceptable risks, and other

restrictions and constraints. **(JP 0-2, 3-0, 5-0)** (JP 1, 3-07.1, 3-07.5, 4-01.1, 5-0, CJCSI 3100.01, CJCSI 3110.14)

M1	Hours	To complete accepted staff estimates (after receipt of mission).
M2	Percent	Of decision points have branches and sequels available (during execution)(includes NBC).
M3	Hours	Respond to nuclear adaptive planning tasking.
M4	Hours	Develop options and provide information on nuclear options for senior military and civilian decision makers.
M5	Hours	Provide information regarding component commander forces to ensure they support nuclear theater strategies and campaigns and conform to planning guidance.
M6	Y/N	Present a comprehensive description of the capabilities of ICBMs, SLBMs, and bomber replanning methodologies at the level of understanding of the decision maker.

### SN 5.3.2 Develop and Analyze Multinational and National Military Strategy Options.

To identify and define multiple, feasible strategy options within the framework of guidance; to examine or war game each course of action; to determine advantages and disadvantages of each; and to compare the advantages and disadvantages of each course of action. This analysis is conducted in the context of combined CJCS and unilateral Service-related actions with OSD, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Congress, and the President during Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) and other activities. **(JP 0-2, 2-0, 2-02, 3-0, 5-0)** (JP 1, 2-01, 3-08v2, 5-0, CJCSI 3100.01)

M1	Hours	To approve or deny requests for changes to ROE.
M2	Incidents	Of misunderstood ROE.
M3	Days	To submit COAs (after receipt of national strategic direction).
M4	Percent	Of accepted COAs have feasible alternatives submitted.
M5	Hours	Analyze nuclear plans for impact with respect to objective tasking, collateral and population impact.
M6	Hours	Provide information concerning the advantages and disadvantages nuclear options supporting their respective courses of action (COAs).

### SN 5.3.3 Select or Modify Multinational and National Military Strategy, Plans, and Other Strategic Actions.

To decide on the strategic option that offers the best prospect for success or to modify a course of action previously selected. **(JP 0-2, 3-0, 5-0)** (JP 1, 3-0, 3-08v1, 4-01.2)

M1	Hours	To complete accepted staff estimates (after receipt of mission).
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M2	Percent	Of decision points have branches and sequels available (during execution).
M3	Hours	Determine eligible nuclear targets based on planning criteria in tasking messages.
M4	Instances	Select sorties for nuclear planning based on knowledge of planning force criteria and prioritization.
M5	Instances	Use nuclear adaptive planning tools.
M6	Hours	Prepare an EAM worksheet for use by the emergency action cell to promulgate nuclear adaptively planned options.
M7	Days	Incorporate planning data into the SIOP.
M8	Hours	Provide information on the nuclear option that best achieves desired COA.

#### **SN 5.3.4 Review Strategic Options and Recommendations with NCA and Other Officials and Adjust.**

To review strategic options and recommended strategies with the NCA and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (and Congress and foreign government officials, as required) to enable them to make a reasoned decision. To adjust the recommended strategy or action based on NCA or CJCS guidance. **(JP 5-0)** (JP 0-2, 1, 2-0, 2-01, 3-0, 4-01)

M1	Days	To submit COA's (after receipt of national strategic direction).
M2	Hours	To complete review of strategic options.
M3	Hours	To develop and provide strategic options (after CJCS Warning Order).
M4	Months	To complete review of strategic options.
M5	Percent	Of accepted COA's have feasible alternatives submitted.
M6	Hours	Provide information on strategic and theater nuclear options to assist senior leaders in making a decision.

#### **SN 5.3.5 Set Worldwide Priorities and Allocate Resources.**

To set multinational and national military (and Service) priorities and allocate national and Service resources worldwide to combatant commands based on the concept and intent of NCA/CJCS guidance. This task includes analyzing affordability issues. For special operations forces this includes planning, programming, and budgeting **(JP 5-0)** (JP 4-01.2)

M1	Number	Of alternatives provided to the President.
M2	Number	Of alternatives wargamed against projected threat(s).
M3	Months	To update SecDef "Forces For" Paper.
M4	Percent	Change in defense budget for most costly alternative.
M5	Percent	Difference between optimum support force structure and actual support structure.

M6	Percent	Of amendments attached to allocation of national and Service resources, respond to clarification requests.
M7	Percent	Of current budget, actually required to support least costly alternative.
M8	Percent	Of subordinate headquarters traffic to Joint Staff J-3 requested clarification of allocation guidance.
M9	Weeks	To allocate national and Service resources (after receipt of NCA/JCS guidance).
M10	Weeks	Delay in publishing JSCP.
M11	Weeks	Delay in publishing NMS.
M12	Years	To achieve capabilities being programmed.

#### **SN 5.3.5.1 Produce a National Military Strategy.**

To produce and publish a National Military Strategy (NMS), providing midterm guidance for force development and acquisition and combatant commander planning. This task includes developing constrained macro-force alternatives attainable within the program period and to develop preferred force alternatives. This task then includes selection of the objective force from the preferred alternatives and provide the optimum mid- and long-range force levels to guide program and extended planning period developments within projected resource constraints. **(JP 0-2, 1, 3-0, 3-07.1, 5-0)** (N/A)

M1	Number	Of alternatives provided to the President.
M2	Number	Of alternatives wargamed against projected threat(s).
M3	Percent	Change in defense budget for costliest alternative.
M4	Percent	Difference between optimum support force structure and actual support structure.
M5	Percent	Of combatant commander's strategic issues addressed in NMS.
M6	Percent	Of unclassified NMS in agreement with classified NMS.
M7	Percent	Of current budget, actually required to support least costly alternative.
M8	Weeks	Delay in publishing NMS.
M9	Months	To complete new draft of NMS (after receipt of NCA strategic guidance or Defense policy guidance).
M10	Years	To achieve capabilities being programmed.

#### **SN 5.3.5.2 Produce a Capabilities-Based National Strategic Plan and Assign Forces.**

To produce an overall national plan or set of plans which provides guidance to the combatant commanders and Combat Support Agencies on the application of available military capabilities in the event of war or crises short of war. This plan includes an apportionment of forces for planning. This task also includes the peacetime assignment of forces to combatant commanders. **(JP 0-2, 3-0, 5-0)** (JP 3-07.1,

## 4-01.1, 5-0)

M1	Days	To deliver draft "Forces For" Paper to OSD.
M2	Instances	Of error-based changes issued to SecDef "Forces For" Paper.
M3	Months	To produce final OPLANs based (on last JSCP).
M4	Months	To update SecDef "Forces For" Papers.
M5	Percent	Of JSCP forces dual apportioned to major planning tasks.
M6	Percent	Of JSCP tasked plans call for deterrent force option.
M7	Percent	Of JSCP tasked plans that require more than SELRES callup of RC.
M8	Weeks	Delay in publishing JSCP.

**SN 5.3.5.3 Allocate Forces and Resources at Execution.**

To decide on and provide the combatant commanders a decision on the allocation of forces and resources at execution. **(JP 5-0)** (JP 3-0, 3-08v1)

M1	Hours	To produce force allocation.
M2	Percent	Of amendments (attached to allocation of national and Service resources) respond to requests for clarification.
M3	Percent	Of initial combatant commander's force requests met.
M4	Percent	Of initial force allocation modified at end of first week.
M5	Percent	Of subordinate headquarters traffic to Joint Staff J-3, requested clarification of allocation guidance.
M6	Weeks	To allocate national and Service resources (after receipt of NCA/CJCS guidance).

**SN 5.4 Provide Strategic Direction to Forces Worldwide.**

To provide strategic direction to combatant commands, Military Departments and their subordinate commands, Service component commands, or combat support agencies. Such direction will facilitate their understanding of Service roles, the mission, and its contribution to the national military strategy and the multinational strategy. This task includes maximum decentralized conduct of Service support in the CONUS base or to combatant commanders' unified action and joint operations. **(JP 0-2, 3-0, 3-08v1, 3-08v2, 4-01, 5-0)** (JP 3-0, CJCSI 3100.01)

M1	Hours	To provide strategic direction to combatant commands, after receipt of warning order (in crisis planning).
M2	Percent	Of assigned and supporting forces commence operations on time.
M3	Percent	Of combatant commands request clarification of strategic direction.
M4	Percent	Of issued changes caused by missing or incorrect data or entries.
M5	Percent	Instances of enemy NBC capability not addressed which impact strategic direction.
M6	Hours	To provide strategic direction to subordinate organizations after receipt of tasking from the NCA.



### SN 5.4.1 Prepare and Issue Strategic Estimates, Priorities, and Joint Operation Plans.

To develop and issue the plans or directives, to include the Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP), that convey the concept and intent for worldwide support of the national military strategy and for multinational and theater strategies and campaigns. This task includes planning guidance, policy, and legal restrictions or constraints for any actions including targeting, force protection issues, and rules of engagement. **(JP 0-2, 3-0, 5-0, 5-03.1)** (JP 0-2, 1, 2-01, 3-54, CJCSI 3100.01)

M1	Days	To develop, coordinate, and promulgate guidance and policy complying with national guidance and Presidential directives.
M2	Hours	SOF conduct cross-border operations (prior to commencement of hostilities).
M3	Hours	To identify USTRANSCOM forces and issue warning order (following receipt of CJCS Warning Order).
M4	Hours	To issue USTRANSCOM Deployment Order to TCCs (following CJCS Warning Order).
M5	Hours	To issue USTRANSCOM Deployment Pre-Order to TCCs (following CJCS Warning Order).
M6	Hours	To submit strategic direction for approval (after receipt of warning order).
M7	Months	To develop combatant commander's OPLANs/OPORDs in accordance with Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES).
M8	Months	To develop emergency actions procedures (EAP)--USSTRATCOM in support of annual EAP-CJCS revision.
M9	Months	To develop theater support plans.
M10	Percent	Of operations in OPLAN conform to US and International Law.
M11	Percent	Of ROE conform to requirements.
M12	Percent	Of ROE consistent with current policy.
M13	Instances	Of ROE exceptions determined outside established procedures.

### SN 5.4.2 Coordinate Support for Unified, Joint, and Multinational Operations.

To coordinate strategic actions and information with US Military Services; US Service commands; US and allied government, civilian, and military officials; and other national and international headquarters and support agencies. **(JP 0-2, 3-0, 3-08v1, 3-08v2)** (JP 0-2, 1, 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-07.5, 4-0, 4-01.2, 5-0)

M1	Days	To refine TPFDD (in crisis action planning).
M2	Months	To complete OPLAN coordination, from draft OPLAN to final approval (in deliberate planning).
M3	Days	Coordinate nuclear weapons plan development and option generation with US Services, Unified Commands, and allies.

**SN 5.4.3 Synchronize and Manage Global Operations and Resources.**

To arrange worldwide sustainment operations in time, space, and purpose to ensure the provision of forces to combatant commands in accordance with the national and multinational military strategy and the combatant commander's needs. This task includes both the vertical and the horizontal integration of all activities. This task ensures that all joint and multinational resources are efficiently employed. It ensures that the sum of their effects worldwide is greater than the sum of their individual capabilities. This task includes providing oversights for sensitive activities; activities designed to emplace processes and/or systems to ensure propriety, legality, and accountability of sensitive activities. **(JP 3-0, 3-08v1, 5-0) (JP 3-0, 3-07.1)**

M1	Hours	To produce feasible TPFDD, after issuance of warning order.
M2	Months	To complete approved OPLAN with TPFDD on shelf, after issuance of JSCP.
M3	Months	To establish rotation policy.
M4	Percent	Of OPLANs, CONPLANs, FUNCPLANs reviewed within last 24 months.
M5	Percent	Of TPFDD units arrive IAW RDD.
M6	Instances	Provide nuclear forces to combatant commands in accordance with military strategy.
M7	Instances	Provide nuclear forces to Unified Commands in adequate amounts to integrate activities and ensure the efficient employment of nuclear forces.

**SN 5.4.4 Prepare and Issue NCA Directives/CJCS Orders.**

To promulgate national strategic execution decisions to subordinate headquarters as well as directly to executing and supporting forces. This includes planning, warning, alert, and execute orders. **(JP 3-08v1, 5-0, 5-03.1) (JP 0-2, 3-0, 3-07.5, 3-54, 6-02)**

M1	Hours	To promulgate alert order to subordinate headquarters.
M2	Hours	To promulgate CJCS Execute Orders to subordinate headquarters.
M3	Hours	To promulgate warning order to subordinate headquarters.
M4	Minutes	Promulgate national nuclear strategic execution decisions to subordinate headquarters and executing and supporting forces.

**SN 5.5 Coordinate Worldwide Information Operations (IO).**

To coordinate the elements of offensive and defensive IO. Offensive IO activities include, but not limited to, operations security military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare, electronic warfare, physical attack/destruction, and special information operations, and may include computer network attack.

Defensive IO integrate and coordinate policies and procedures, operations, personnel, and technology to protect and defend information and information systems. This task includes military support to attacking and defending information environment that supports national military, political, and economic power. **(JP 3-13.1, 3-54, 6-02, CJCSI 3210.01)** (JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-07.5, 3-54, 3-61)

**Note:** See also SN 3.3.4, *Apply National Nonlethal Capabilities*; SN 3.4, *Protect Strategic Forces and Means*; SN 3.4.5, *Coordinate and Conduct Strategic Operations Security*; SN 3.4.6, *Coordinate Protection of National Strategic Information, Information-Based Processes, and Information Systems*; SN 5.6, *Provide Public Affairs (PA) Worldwide*; and SN 8.3, *Coordinate Military Activities Within the Interagency Process*.

M1	Yes/No	National level IO coordination policies and procedures exist.
M2	Yes/No	National level IO planning/coordination cell exists.
M3	Yes/No	National level IO planners from all appropriate US departments, agencies and organizations are involved in development and coordination of national IO plans and actions.
M4	Hours	To identify qualified personnel from various elements and activities and augment national level IO planning cell after onset of planning requirement.
M5	Hours	To identify required national level IO information necessary for IO planning after onset of planning.
M6	Hours	To task intelligence community and other national level support organizations and agencies to fill information requirements for IO planning.
M7	Percent	Of identified national level IO information requirements unfilled at time-critical points in planning process.
M8	Yes/No	Are appropriate allied and coalition IO resources and capabilities factored into national level IO plans and actions?
M9	Days	To get interagency approval for proposed national or subordinate level IO plans and actions.
M10	Instances	Of uncoordinated IO actions at different levels (national, theater, AOR) or different theaters causing disruption or delay of US plans and objectives.
M11	Hours	To modify national level IO plans and actions due to operational contingencies.
M12	Instances	Of US national level IO plans or objectives being delayed, defeated, or disrupted due to adversary offensive IO actions.
M13	Percent	Of national level IO cell nominated "targets" struck with lethal or nonlethal means during the timeframe planned for in the IO appendix or other planning document.
M14	Hours	To conduct combat assessment of national IO "targets" struck with lethal and nonlethal means.
M15	Percent	Of national IO cell nominated "targets" attacked when called for after combat assessment of initial strike.
M16	Percent	Of national level IO objectives verifiably achieved.

**SN 5.6 Provide Public Affairs (PA) Worldwide.**

To advise and assist the NCA and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and combined chiefs in an alliance, in telling the military's story to both internal and external audiences. This task includes originating print and broadcast materials to communicate to military people, assisting civilian news media in educating and informing the American public through print and broadcast outlets, and developing positive relationships through community relations projects. Public affairs activities are coordinated with OPSEC, PSYOP, and military deception for continuity and consistency among the programs. Public affairs services apply across the range of military operations and are especially applicable in military operations other than war. For example, in a counterinsurgency situation, PA is the function that can educate and inform the population and facilitate media operations. **(JP 3-07.3, 3-61)** (JP 1, 3-0, 3-07.5, 3-11)

M1	Days	To provide public affairs guidance (PAG) for scheduled events.
M2	Hours	To prepare for and conduct first news conference on crisis or defense major newsworthy event.
M3	Hours	To provide public affairs guidance (PAG) after crisis event.
M4	Hours	To provide to media initial DOD or Service position on breaking news story.
M5	Instances	Of errors in released information.
M6	Percent	Of media requests for access to key senior officials accepted.
M7	Percent	Of media support requests answered.
M8	Percent	Of requests for information from organizations and private citizens answered.
M9	Hours	To answer requests for information from organizations, media, and private citizens.
M10	Hours	To answer requests for information from organizations.
M11	Hours	To answer requests for information from media.
M12	Days	To answer requests for information from private citizens.

**SN 5.7 Manage DOD Resources.**

To perform analysis, planning, administration, and control of human, fiscal, financial, material, and other DOD resources. The task includes control of national inventories, provision for personnel utilization, expansion of the transportation system, management of the industrial base, planning, programming, budgeting, budget execution, financial management, auditing, and accounting in accordance with DOD policy and the National Military Strategy (NMS). **(N/A)** (N/A)

M1	Dollars	Deviation from OMB/DOD fiscal/program guidance.
M2	Weeks	From receipt of OMB guidance to approval of Defense Planning Guidance (DPG).

M3	Weeks	From distribution of DPG to completion of Program Objective Memoranda (POM).
M4	Weeks	From receipt of DOD Component POMs to completion of Program Decision Memoranda (PDMs) following the issue cycle.
M5	Weeks	From receipt of PDMs and Amended PDMs to development of DOD component budget estimate submissions (BESs).
M6	Days	From receipt of BESs to completion of Program/Budget Decisions (PBDs) and amended PBDs.
M7	Months	From receipt of OMB guidance to submission of DOD budget.

#### SN 5.7.1 Provide Decision Support.

To provide near real-time data fusion in a easily understandable format. This task includes improving course of action (COA) analysis to aid in the planning, prioritization, and redirection of defense logistics operations in accordance with policy and objectives outlined in the NMS. **(N/A)** (N/A)

M1	Hours	From determination of need for a decision to provide of all relevant data to support a decision process.
M2	Days	From internal DOD component decisions to presentation of all relevant data for SecDef/OSD review.

#### SN 5.7.2 Determine Requirements.

To determine total force package requirements (personnel and material) for OSD, Military Departments, and Joint Staff to support the operational and support objectives of the NMS and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. **(N/A)** (CJCSI 3100.01)

M1	Weeks	From determination of forces to support national security strategy and national military strategy to formulation of personnel and material requirements.
M2	Days	From force planning decisions to completion of supporting personnel/materiel program packages for SecDef/OSD review.

#### SN 5.7.3 Plan, Program, and Budget.

To produce extended future year plans; associated programs and supporting budgets for DOD components in accordance with national and DOD policy guidance and the NMS. This task includes providing policy guidance (e.g. Policy Guidance for Contingency Planning, fiscal guidance, Defense Planning Guidance, Program Manager Guidance Memo, Director of Central Intelligence Strategic Intent) and national security objectives by the National Command Authorities. Program development, execution authority, and responsibility are generally delegated to the DOD Components **(JP 3-07.4, 5-0)** (JP 5-0, 5-03.1, CJCSI 5114.01, CJCSI 6721.01)

M1	Weeks	From distribution of DPG to completion of POMs.
M2	Weeks	From receipt of DOD Component POMs to completion of PDMs following the issue cycle.
M3	Weeks	From receipt of PDMs and Amended PDMs to development of DOD component PDMs.
M4	Days	From receipt of BESSs to completion of PBDs and amended PBDs.
M5	Months	From receipt of OMB guidance to submission of DOD budget.

#### **SN 5.7.3.1 Planning.**

To evaluate the threats to vital national interests and develop military strategy and force requirements to attain national security objectives. This task includes the preparation of the Chairman's Guidance, (CG), the Joint Planning Document (JPD), the Chairman's Program Recommendations (CPR), and the release of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). **(JP 5-0, 5-03.1, CJCSI 3100.01)** (JP 5-0, CJCSI 3100.01)

M1	Weeks	From identification of threats to development of proposed strategy and forces and sustainment to mitigate or respond to the threat.
M2	Weeks	From development of overall strategy and force requirements to development of Chairman's guidance, Joint Planning Document, Chairman's Program Recommendations, and DPG.

#### **SN 5.7.3.2 Programming.**

To establish the aggregate levels of fiscal support to be allocated and impose directed resource constraints. This task includes the determination of the constrained mix of assets which best satisfies the defense posture expressed in the NMS, DPG, CG and the JPD. This task is accomplished through DOD component preparation of Program Objective Memoranda (POMs) and Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) for complying with DPG objectives. Programming is culminated with the release of Program Decision Memoranda (PDMs) and amended PDMs. **(JP 5-0)** (JP 5-0, 5-03.1, CJCSI 3100.01, CJCSM 3500.03)

M1	Days	From receipt of CJCS program recommendations and CINC integrated priority lists (IPLs) to approval and distribution of DPG.
M2	Weeks	From distribution of DPG to completion of DOD component POMs.
M3	Weeks	From receipt of DOD component POMs to completion of PDMs following the issue cycle.

#### **SN 5.7.3.3 Budgeting.**

To develop DOD component budgets and a consolidated Defense budget from POMs as modified by PDMs. This task includes the preparation of budget estimate submissions (BESSs) by DOD components based on their PDMs, adjustment of budgets by the SecDef and Defense Resources Board through

Program Budget Decisions (PBDs), review and comment on PBDs by the Military Departments and other DOD components, preparation of Amended PBDs and the preparation of budget schedules by DOD components for incorporation into the President's budget. **(JP 5-0, CJCSI 3100.01)** (JP 0-2, 3-07.4, 5-0, 5-03.1, CJCSI 3100.01)

M1	Weeks	From receipt of PDMs and Amended PDMs to development of DOD component BESSs.
M2	Days	From receipt of BESSs to completion of PBDs and amended PBDs.
M3	Months	From receipt of OMB guidance to submission of DOD budget.

#### **SN 5.7.4 Accounting.**

To account for DOD real estate, equipment, supplies, personnel, other assets, and funds in accordance with established policy. **(N/A)** (JP 3-07, 3-07.4, 3-50.3, 4-03)

M1	Dollars	Continuous tracking of expenditures versus budget.
M2	Percent	Accuracy in accounting for real property, real estate, facilities, equipment, supplies, personnel, funds, and other assets.
M3	Hours	From obligation of funds by DOD components to accounting for future debits and verification of budget line item performance.
M4	Days	From expenditure of funds to accounting for debits and adjustment of program/budget line item resources.

#### **SN 5.8 Provide Direction and Coordination for Historical Documentation of Operations.**

Assure training of Service historians to perform joint missions and facilitate field collection efforts by determining proper staffing for field documentation operations. This includes actions to support field documentation collection efforts with personnel and equipment; establish standards for collection documentation; provide guidance on priorities for collection; assure return, preservation, and proper storage of documents; and transcription of interviews. **(CJCSI 5320.01)** (N/A)

M1	Percent	Of deploying historians properly trained and briefed on standards, procedures, and priorities for documentation of operations.
M2	Percent	Of deploying historians properly equipped for documentation of operations.

#### **SN 6 CONDUCT MOBILIZATION.**

To expand the Armed Services by assembling and organizing national resources to support national objectives in time of war or other emergencies. This task brings the Armed Services, or part of them, to a state of readiness for war or another national emergency. This task includes advising the NCA on mobilization. It

includes activating all or part of the Reserve Components (RC), as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel. This task is performed when the NCA initiates a selective, partial, full, or total mobilization. Mobilization tasks of combatant command components are included under this joint task. For example, US Army Pacific (USARPAC), a component command of US Pacific Command (USPACOM), has mobilization responsibilities. These mobilization responsibilities are analyzed under the national strategic level (rather than a theater strategic task) because USARPAC performs these responsibilities as a major Army command (MACOM). Thus, USARPAC is considered to be performing national military functions. However, USARPAC reports mobilization status through the combatant command as well as the Service. For demobilization, reverse SN 6.5, SN 6.6, and SN 6.7. **(JP 0-2, 3-0, 4-05, 5-0)** (JP 0-2, 1, 3-08v2, 4-0, 4-01, 4-01.1, 5-0, 5-03.1, CJCSI 3401.02, CJCSM 3141.01)

**Note:** See also SN 5.3, *Determine National Military Strategic Direction*.

M1	Days	Until MS/CRC ready to receive RC units (from M-Day).
M2	Days	To process RC units through MS/CRC.
M3	Percent	Of required initial mobilization reports submitted on time.
M4	Percent	Of units arrive at mobilization station by LAD.
M5	Percent	Of units arrive at mobilization station before EAD.
M6	Months	Since installation capability plans for mobilization reviewed.
M7	Percent	Increase in CONUS Replacement Centers achieved.
M8	Percent	Of selected reservists, called to active duty early, meet requirements (right people for job).
M9	Percent	Of key personnel report within planning timelines.
M10	Percent	Of alert and activation messages, dispatched within timelines.

### **SN 6.1 Prepare for Mobilization.**

Develop, coordinate, and evaluate mobilization doctrine, programs, and systems. Develop and maintain plans that identify requirements and capabilities of the mobilization base which support force and resource expansion to achieve military and national security objectives. Develop mobilization estimates and conduct mobilization studies. Direct, monitor, and assess the status and progress of the mobilization base to support the National Military Strategy in accordance with Defense Planning Guidance and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. Furnish mobilization-related information to the combatant commanders for incorporation into CINC OPLANs, CONPLANs, functional plans, OPORDs, and campaign plans. Review CINC OPLANs, CONPLANs, functional plans, OPORDs, and campaign plans to identify stated and implied mobilization requirements. **(JP 0-2, 3-0, 4-05, 5-0)** (JP 1, 2-01, 3-07.1, 4-0, 4-01.1, 4-01.2, 4-02.1, 4-05, 5-0)

M1	Percent	Of selected reservists, called to active duty early, meet established requirements (right people for job).
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M2	Percent	Of OPLANs have specific 200K breakout by uniformed Service and combatant commander.
M3	Percent	Of JSCP OPLANs, that requires partial mobilization, include breakdown of that mobilization by uniformed Service and combatant commander.
M4	Percent	Of selected reservists contacted.
M5	Percent	Of selected reservists not contacted because of incorrect or incomplete addresses.
M6	Percent	Of reservists report fit for duty.
M7	Months	Since review of installation capability plans for mobilization.
M8	Hours	To complete first Unit Status Report (after alert).
M9	Percent	Of real property maintenance and new construction, fully funded.
M10	Emergency Requisitions	Dropped at M-Day.
M11	Months	Since last test of alert notification plans.

#### **SN 6.1.1 Develop and Evaluate Installation Plans, Policies, Procedures, and Systems for Mobilization.**

To prepare and implement detailed installation capability plans to support mobilization and deployment requirements. Activities include support and processing units mobilizing at mobilization stations (MS); support of Service major command activities and requirements; operation of Service schools and centers; provisions for real property maintenance, new construction, space management, use of state property and nonindustrial facilities, base expansion, training base expansion; and support for CONUS replacement center (CRC) operations where applicable. **(JP 0-2)** (JP 0-2, 4-0, 4-01.2, 4-02.1, 4-05, 5-03.1)

M1	Months	Since review of installation capability plans for mobilization.
M2	Percent	Of real property maintenance and new construction, fully funded.
M3	Percent	Increase in CONUS base needed to support emergency and mobilization requirements.

#### **SN 6.1.2 Develop and Exercise RC Unit and Individual Mobilization Plans.**

To prepare and implement plans for mobilizing RC units and individual reservists, to include peacetime preparation, alert notification, mobilization at home station, CRCs, and movement to mobilization stations or ports of embarkation (POE). **(JP 4-05)** (JP 4-05)

M1	Months	Since last test of alert notification plans.
M2	Percent	Of mobilized personnel report within established criteria.
M3	Percent	Of personnel are knowledgeable about own mobilization and reporting requirements.

**SN 6.1.3 Participate in Joint Operation Planning to Support Mobilization.**

To participate with the Joint Staff, other Services, and the combatant commands in joint operation planning to establish forces and the requirements for their augmentation. Joint planning and execution is accomplished through the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPEs) and the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS), resulting in combatant command operation plans (OPLANs). Each OPLAN is supported by a time-phased force and deployment data listing of units, non-unit personnel, and resources required to support the plan. Service headquarters and CONUS major commands interact with the planning process through their mobilization and planning system (e.g., Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System (AMOPS) or Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan (NCMP) or USAF War Mobilization Plan (WMP) or Marine Corps Mobility Management Plan (MPLAN)) and component commanders provide input to the combatant commander's OPLAN and thus the Service's requirements for forces and resources. These requirements provide the basis for Service mobilization planning, for example, Mobilization Planning System on the Global Command and Control System during deliberate planning and crisis action planning. This task includes reconstitution mobilization planning. **(JP 0-2, 4-01.1, 4-05, 5-0, 5-03.1)** (JP 4-02.1, 4-05)

M1	Percent	Of JSCP OPLANs requiring partial mobilization include breakdown of mobilization by uniformed Service and combatant commander.
M2	Percent	Of JSCP OPLANs requiring 200K callup include breakdown of mobilization by uniformed Service and combatant commander.
M3	Hours	To identify RC UTC/units to be mobilized (Presidential Selected Reserve Callup Authority (PSRC)).
M4	Hours	To identify RC UTC/units to be mobilized (PSRC) after RC ceiling has been determined.

**SN 6.1.4 Increase Readiness of Key Mobilization Personnel.**

To increase readiness levels of active component (AC) units in theater, in CONUS, or both. To initiate premobilization actions to increase readiness of RC units and individuals. To augment active forces by ordering to active duty selected reservists. **(JP 4-0, 4-05)** (JP 1-05, 3-0, 3-07.3, 4-01, 4-05, 5-0)

M1	Percent	Of selected reservists ordered to active duty report on time.
M2	Percent	Of selected reservists, contacted.
M3	Percent	Of selected reservists, not contacted because of incorrect or incomplete addresses.
M4	Percent	Of reservists report fit for duty.
M5	Hours	For selected USTRANSCOM staff members to be prepared (to Service standards) for deployment to meet supported CINC request.
M6	Hours	For component commands to identify and assess readiness of units selected for mobilization.

**SN 6.1.5 Maintain Current Operational Readiness Status of Units.**

To prepare recurring status of resources and training systems joint reports (SORTSREP) in peacetime and when alerted for mobilization. A commander determines a unit's status by comparing personnel, equipment, and training factors to mission requirements. This task also involves maintaining unit status data in the SORTS data base, a data file that contains the identity of worldwide resources keyed to a unit's identification code. **(JP 1-03.3, 4-05)** (N/A)

M1	Percent	Difference between last peacetime unit status report (USR) and alert USR.
M2	Percent	Difference between most recent peacetime USR and current evaluation by higher authorities.
M3	Hours	To complete first USR (after alert).

**SN 6.2 Alert Forces for Mobilization.**

To transition the force from Reserve component to Active duty status with available personnel and facilities, and to complete all administrative and processing actions. The alert phase begins when units or individuals receive notice of pending order to active duty and ends when the unit enters active Federal service. **(JP 4-05)** (JP 4-05)

M1	Days	Until MS/CRC ready to receive RC units (from M-Day).
M2	Days	To process RC units through MS/CRC.
M3	Percent	Of required initial mobilization reports, submitted on time.
M4	Hours	To submit initial mobilization reports.
M5	Percent	Of key personnel report within planning timelines.
M6	Percent	Of alert and activation messages, dispatched within timelines.
M7	Percent	Of notified units, able to alert all personnel within 24 hours.
M8	Percent	Of units, notified by non-DOD communications links.
M9	Hours	To notify Joint Transportation Reserve Unit (JTRU) members selected for activation (from time of activation decision).

**SN 6.2.1 Alert Units and Individuals of Pending Mobilization.**

To provide readiness for action—the period of time during which troops standby in response to an alarm. This task includes any form of communication used by Service headquarters or other competent authority to notify National Guard and Reserve unit commanders that orders to active duty are pending. **(N/A)** (JP 4-05)

M1	Percent	Of units, notified by non-DOD communications links.
M2	Percent	Of key personnel reported within planning timelines.
M3	Percent	Of alert messages dispatched within timelines.
M4	Percent	Of alert messages returned for incomplete or inaccurate addresses.

M5	Percent	Of notified units able to alert all of their personnel within 24 hours.
M6	Hours	To alert JTRU members of possible recall (from time of initial force list determination).
M7	Hours	For notified units to identify and report preliminary list of deployable and non-deployable personnel.

### **SN 6.2.2 Prepare Home Station and Mobilization Station/CONUS Replacement Center for Reception of Activated Units and Individuals.**

To screen personnel and medical records, notify finance of unit status, prepare for activities at home station, review postmobilization training support requirements (PTSR), inventory unit property, coordinate retrieval of equipment, verify billeting and subsistence support, and finalize supply and equipment shortages. **(JP 4-05)** (JP 4-05)

M1	Days	Until mobilization station (MS)/CONUS replacement center (CRC) ready to receive RC units (from M-Day).
M2	Hours	Until HS ready to receive RC units (from M-Day).
M3	Days	To process RC units and individuals through MS/CRC.
M4	Hours	To initiate and process orders to activate JTRU members (from time of notification).
M5	Percent	Of personnel in deployable health (medical and dental).

### **SN 6.2.3 Activate Key Personnel.**

To order key personnel to active duty. **(JP 4-05)** (JP 4-05)

M1	Percent	Of key personnel reported within planning timelines.
M2	Percent	Of activation messages dispatched within timelines.
M3	Percent	Of activation messages returned for incomplete or inaccurate addresses.
M4	Hours	To notify JTRU members selected for activation (from time of activation decision).
M5	Hours	To notify Transportation Component Command reservists selected for activation (from time of activation decision).

### **SN 6.2.4 Conduct Preparatory Administrative, Logistic, Medical, and Readiness Activities.**

To begin activities required at mobilization. These include PTSR, command readiness inspection reports, operational tests and evaluations, readiness reports, POM processing, the unit training readiness status, and informal evaluation and observations for determining unit training shortfalls. Also, combatant commander evaluations of joint training are considered, as appropriate. **(JP 4-0, 4-05)** (N/A)

M1	Percent	Of initial mobilization reports, submitted on time.
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M2	Hours	To submit initial mobilization reports.
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### **SN 6.3 Mobilize at Home Station.**

To bring units to active Federal duty, transition those RC units to Active duty status, and prepare them for departure to their mobilization station. **(JP 4-05)**  
(N/A)

M1	Percent	Of required training programs have qualified and sufficient training personnel (at mobilization).
M2	Emergency Requisitions	Dropped at M-Day.
M3	Months	Since last review of training and support plans.
M4	Days	To complete inventory.
M5	Percent	Of required inventory items NOB.
M6	Percent	Of mobilized units ready to move to MS upon callup.
M7	Days	To assemble forces.
M8	Hours	To report readiness status of personnel, equipment, and training.
M9	Percent	Of units report training deficiencies.
M10	Percent	Of identified training deficiencies, covered by established training plans.

### **SN 6.3.1 Assemble Forces and Report Status.**

To assemble unit members and resources at home station and provide readiness status of personnel, equipment, and training. **(JP 4-05, 5-0)** (N/A)

M1	Days	To assemble forces.
M2	Percent	Of OPLANs contain RC personnel to support plan.
M3	Percent	Of OPLANs identify RC personnel to move force (i.e., AMC, MTMC, MSC and HQ USTRANSCOM requirements).
M4	Percent	Of OPLANs identify RC personnel for mobilization and deployment (e.g., medical, dental, security, mob station staff).
M5	Percent	Of OPLANs identify RC personnel to deploy (e.g., units and individuals required by supported and supporting CINCs and included in TPFDD).
M6	Percent	Of OPLANs identify number of RC personnel to backfill (i.e., units and individuals to replace deployers to continue essential services in CONUS and OCONUS).
M7	Hours	To report readiness status of personnel, equipment, and training.
M8	Percent	Of personnel report fully equipped and trained.
M9	Percent	Of activated JTRU report within recall criteria.
M10	Percent	Of activated members report within recall criteria.
M11	Hours	For sufficient activated members to report to allow expanded operations to begin.

M12	Hours	For sufficient activated members to report to allow expanded operations to be sustained.
M13	Percent	Of activated members reported for duty within individual unit designated operational capability standards.
M14	Days	For activated members to report for duty.
M15	Percent	Of activated JTRU physically fit and current in job qualification based on unit manning document (UMD).
M16	Percent	Of activated members physically fit and current in job qualification based on unit manning document (UMD).

### SN 6.3.2 Conduct Specified Training.

To train personnel and units on designated subjects, to identify training deficiencies, and to begin training to be completed at MS. **(JP 4-05)** (JP 0-2, 4-0)

**Note:** For training, see SN 7.4, *Educate and Train the Force*.

M1	Percent	Of required training programs have qualified and sufficient training personnel (at mobilization).
M2	Percent	Of units report training deficiencies.
M3	Percent	Of identified training deficiencies, covered by established training plans.
M4	Percent	Of activated JTRU meet minimal mobilization task within recall criteria.
M5	Hours	For activated JTRU to meet minimal mobilization task.
M6	Percent	Of reserve units meet minimal mobilization task within recall criteria.
M7	Hours	For reserve unit to meet minimal mobilization task.

### SN 6.3.3 Requisition MS Training and Support Requirements.

To review and request mobilization station training, training ammunition, and MS support requirements. **(JP 4-0, 4-05)** (N/A)

M1	Emergency Requisitions	Dropped at M-Day.
M2	Months	Since review of training and support plans.

### SN 6.3.4 Transfer HS Property and Prepare for Movement to MS.

To complete inventory and to turn over facilities and equipment not accompanying the unit to MS. To conduct inspection and make units ready for movement to mobilization station. **(JP 4-05)** (JP 4-05)

M1	Hours	To complete inventory.
M2	Percent	Of inventoried items, NOB.
M3	Percent	Of mobilized units, ready to move to MS upon callup.

M4	Percent	Of units depart for MS on time.
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#### **SN 6.4 Move to Mobilization Station.**

To move or transport a unit and its equipment from HS to MS by any transportation means. **(JP 4-05)** (N/A)

M1	Percent	Of units arrive at mobilization station by LAD.
M2	Percent	Of units arrive at mobilization station before EAD.
M3	Percent	Of TPFDD planned transportation, actually required.

#### **SN 6.4.1 Develop Requirements/Movement Plans from HS to MS (or POE).**

To prepare plans, including loading plans, routes, convoy organization, C2, guides, and advance parties for movement by any mode to MS. Plan includes requirements beyond organic capabilities to move to the mobilization station. **(JP 4-05)** (JP 0-2)

M1	Days	To develop movement plans from HS to MS or POE.
M2	Percent	Of deployment requests have missing information.
M3	Percent	Of deployment requests, adjusted at execution.
M4	Percent	Of deployment requests, furnished in timely manner.
M5	Percent	Of requests for non-organic transportation assets, provided during planning.
M6	Percent	Of unit lift requirements from HS to POE exceed established TPFDD.
M7	Hours	For receipt of information on unit movement requirements.
M8	Percent	Of deployment requests have fatal errors.

#### **SN 6.4.2 Provide Transportation for Mobilized Units and Individuals.**

To provide mobilized units and individuals the transportation (common carrier or organic) required to move to MS. **(JP 4-05)** (JP 4-01.3)

M1	Hours	To complete movement.
M2	Percent	Of unit equipment, planned to be moved by organic transport that had to be shifted from organization transport to common carrier.
M3	Percent	Of units requested additional transportation in order to arrive at MS or POE IAW planned arrival dates and times.
M4	Percent	Of units using programmed (non-organic) transportation to move to mobilization station or POE arrived IAW planned arrival dates and times (during execution).

#### **SN 6.4.3 Provide Mobilization Movements Control.**

To collect and analyze personnel and materiel movement information to plan, prioritize, allocate, capture and process in-transit visibility (ITV) data, and control

movements. Includes prioritization of use for the US domestic transportation system (all modes and terminals). To establish a point of contact in each state for information management and coordination. **(JP 4-05)** (JP 4-05)

M1	Percent	Of surface movements delayed due to traffic bottlenecks.
M2	Percent	Of movement lack information input from state transited.

### **SN 6.5 Prepare Units and Individuals at Mobilization Station (MS) or CONUS Replacement Center (CRC) for Deployment.**

To determine the operational readiness of a unit at MS, validate the unit for deployment, and to take necessary action to correct shortages and deficiencies in training, manning levels, and equipment. The function includes marshaling RC units (RCU) and preparing vehicles and equipment (weighing, marking, tiedown, inspection, etc.) for deployment. It includes processing non-unit personnel for overseas movement. **(JP 4-0, 4-05)** (N/A)

M1	Percent	Of administrative services, provided within planned timelines.
M2	Percent	Of chaplain services, provided within planned timelines.
M3	Percent	Of RCU, retirees, and IRR fillers, processed within planned timelines.
M4	Percent	Of health services, provided within planned timelines.
M5	Percent	Of legal services, provided within planned timelines.
M6	Percent	Of financial services, provided within planned timelines.

### **SN 6.5.1 Receive and Provide Base and Operations Support for Units and Individuals.**

To in/out process Reserve component unit (RCU), retirees, and individual ready reserve (IRR) fillers and to provide base operations support, PAR/POM processing, ammunition, reports, coordination/ control for deployment, and other support (e.g., administrative, legal, health services, chaplain, finance). **(JP 4-0, 4-05)** (JP 4-05)

M1	Percent	Of units, fully ready and validated for deployment.
M2	Percent	Of units, not validated because of logistics shortages.
M3	Percent	Of units, not validated because of personnel shortages.
M4	Percent	Of units, not validated because of training deficiencies.
M5	Percent	Of units require operational readiness training in order to meet minimum readiness for deployment criteria.
M6	Percent	Of units with training shortfalls, trained in time to meet deployment timelines.
M7	Percent	Of individuals fully ready and validated for deployment.
M8	Days	Individuals require to complete processing.



**SN 6.5.2 Evaluate RC Units for Deployment.**

To evaluate all deploying RC units in the areas of personnel, logistics, and training. This task provides a last-minute check to determine the unit's capability to perform its assigned mission when deployed. **(JP 4-05)** (CJCSI 3401.02)

M1	Percent	Of units require reallocation or reassignment of personnel to meet minimum readiness for deployment criteria.
M2	Percent	Of units not validated because of materiel shortages.
M3	Percent	Of units not validated for training shortfalls.

**SN 6.5.3 Cross-Level and Redistribute Personnel and Equipment.**

To reallocate or reassign personnel, or effect transfer in control, utilization, or location of materiel at an installation to meet minimum readiness validation criteria for deploying units. **(JP 4-05)** (JP 4-05)

M1	Percent	Of units, with personnel shortfalls, cross-leveled to meet deployment timelines.
M2	Percent	Of units, with equipment shortfalls, cross-leveled to meet deployment timelines.
M3	Days	Units remain in a deficiency status awaiting personnel or equipment.
M4	Percent	Of units deploy with excess personnel or equipment.
M5	Percent	Of units, not validated because of manning shortages.
M6	Percent	Of units, not validated because of equipment shortages.
M7	Percent	Of units, not validated because of personnel shortages.
M8	Percent	Of units, not validated because of training deficiencies.

**SN 6.5.4 Train Units and Individuals to Minimum Operationally Ready/POR Status.**

To plan and conduct operational readiness training at MS to have all units and personnel ready to deploy. **(JP 4-0, 4-05)** (JP 3-0)

**Note:** For training, see SN 7.4, *Educate and Train the Force*.

M1	Percent	Of units require operational readiness training to meet minimum readiness for deployment criteria.
M2	Percent	Of units, with training shortfalls, trained in time to meet deployment timelines.
M3	Percent	Of units, fully ready and validated for deployment.
M4	Percent	Of units, not validated because of training deficiencies.
M5	Percent	Of individuals requiring operational readiness training to meet minimum readiness for deployment criteria.

**SN 6.5.5 Secure Clearance for Deploying Nonvalidated Units.**

To obtain gaining combatant commander's approval to deploy nonvalidated units. **(JP 3-05.3, 4-01.3)** (JP 4-0, 4-01.3, 5-03.1)

M1	Percent	Of nonvalidated units receive combatant commander's approval for deployment in time to meet deployment timelines.
M2	Percent	Of units fail to meet gaining combatant commander's validation requirements.

**SN 6.6 Mobilize CONUS Sustaining Base.**

To expand the CONUS base to support emergency and mobilization requirements. The sustaining base consists of those elements that are oriented primarily toward sustaining and reinforcing the theater force. Included are mobilization stations/CONUS Replacement Centers, training bases, logistic support, health services support, transportation support, and C2. **(JP 4-0, 4-05)** (N/A)

M1	Percent	Of existing posts, camps, and stations, sufficient to receive, house, supply, and train deploying units.
M2	Days	To correct shortfall in mobilization stations.
M3	Percent	Increase in training base, achieved.
M4	Percent	Increase in CONUS Replacement Centers, achieved.
M5	Percent	Increase in logistics support, achieved.
M6	Percent	Increase in health services support.
M7	Percent	Increase in transportation support.
M8	Percent	Increase in C2, was achieved.
M9	Percent	Of shortfall in mobilization, corrected within 30 days.
M10	Percent	Of shortfall in mobilization, corrected within 45 days.
M11	Percent	Of shortfall in mobilization, corrected within 90 days.
M12	Percent	Of shortfall in mobilization, corrected within 12 months.

**SN 6.6.1 Expand Mobilization Stations.**

To ensure the orderly expansion of posts, camps, and stations and their ability to receive, house, supply, train, and prepare units for deployment. **(JP 4-0, 4-05)** (JP 4-05)

M1	Percent	Of existing induction centers, reception centers, training centers, and schools, sufficient to train deploying forces.
M2	Days	To correct shortfall in mobilization stations.
M3	Percent	Increase in CONUS Replacement Centers, achieved.
M4	Percent	Of shortfall in mobilization stations, corrected within 30 days.
M5	Percent	Of shortfall in mobilization stations, corrected within 45 days.
M6	Percent	Of shortfall in mobilization stations, corrected within 60 days.

### SN 6.6.2 Expand Training Base.

To expand training base support to ensure the orderly and timely availability of trained manpower to mobilize for CONUS base support and theater force requirements. The training base includes induction centers, reception centers, training centers, and schools. It also includes Reserve augmentation to man the expanded training base. **(JP 4-0, 4-05)** (JP 4-05)

**Note:** For training, see SN 7.4, *Educate and Train the Force*.

M1	Percent	Of existing induction centers, reception centers, training centers, and schools, sufficient to train mobilizing forces.
M2	Percent	Increase in training base, achieved without new acquisition or construction.
M3	Percent	Increase in training base, achieved.
M4	Weeks	Before existing training base can absorb additional recruits.
M5	Months	Before expanded training base can absorb additional recruits.
M6	Months	To correct shortfall in training base.
M7	Percent	Of shortfall in training base, corrected within 30 days.
M8	Percent	Of shortfall in training base, corrected within 6 months.
M9	Percent	Of shortfall in training base, corrected within 12 months.

### SN 6.6.3 Expand Logistic Support.

To expand logistic support to meet the mobilization and deployment/employment requirements of the total force. The expanded support includes maintenance systems, facilities (e.g., military production base, national industrial base, military construction), supply (e.g., storage, handling, procurement, production capability), and service support. **(JP 4-0, 4-05)** (N/A)

M1	Percent	Of maintenance systems, facilities, supply, and service support, sufficient to meet deployment/employment requirements of total force.
M2	Days	To correct initial shortfall in logistics support.
M3	Months	To correct shortfall in logistics support of AC/RC force at mobilization.
M4	Years	To correct shortfall in logistics support of mobilized force.
M5	Percent	Of shortfall in logistics support, corrected within 30 days.
M6	Percent	Of shortfall in logistics support, corrected within 60 days.
M7	Percent	Of shortfall in logistics support, corrected within 90 days.
M8	Percent	Of shortfall in logistics support, corrected within 6 months.
M9	Percent	Of shortfall in logistics support, corrected within 12 months.

**SN 6.6.4 Expand Health Service Support.**

To maintain and/or expand essential health services including: medical, dental, optometry, veterinary, ancillary services, and preventive medical support. Health service support is provided in Service hospitals, Veteran's Administration hospitals, and civilian hospitals. Patient population distribution will be based on projected casualties, force strength, and medical evacuation policy. **(JP 4-05)**  
(JP 4-0, 4-02.1)

M1	Percent	Of existing medical, dental, optometry, veterinary, and preventive medical support, sufficient to meet deployment/employment requirements of force.
M2	Days	To correct shortfall in health service support.
M3	Percent	Of shortfall in health service support, corrected within 30 days.
M4	Percent	Of shortfall in health service support, corrected within 45 days.
M5	Percent	Of shortfall in health service support, corrected within 60 days.

**SN 6.6.5 Expand Transportation System.**

To expand the transportation system capability to move units, personnel, and materiel within CONUS and between combatant commands. These functions include traffic management (CONUS land transportation, common-user ocean terminals, and intermodal movement), operation and management of common-user ocean shipping and port authorities, worldwide operation of common-user airlift resources and aerial ports. It also includes Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA), Foreign Carrier Programs, and Ready Reserve Force (RRF). **(JP 4-01, 4-01.1, 4-01.2, 4-05)** (JP 4-0, 4-01.3)

M1	Percent	Of FSS ships met activation schedule.
M2	Percent	Of MPF ships met activation schedule.
M3	Percent	Of RRF ships met activation schedule.
M4	Percent	Of CRAF airframes with aircrews, available within required time limits.
M5	Days	To obtain rail cars, trucks, and buses from commercial sources (at S-Day, T-Day or M-Day).
M6	Percent	Of required domestic port stevedore service, in place.
M7	Months	Since industrial preparedness transportation objectives, reviewed.
M8	Months	Since Service transportation preparedness programs, reviewed.
M9	Percent	Of activated RRF ships that are delayed in being placed into service because of late MSC acceptance actions.
M10	Percent	Of properly configured DOD organic transport assets, augmented by appropriate commercial carriers capabilities, meet RLD/ALDs during execution.
M11	Percent	Of required seaport capability, including stevedore services, available to meet TPFDD ALDs based upon contracting of port handling services as required (during execution).
M12	Hours	To publish CRAF activation message after activation of CRAF stage.

M13	Hours	To notify CRAF carriers of the specific aircraft within the activated CRAF stage that are not required.
M14	Hours	To notify VISA participants of activation of VISA stages after SecDef and Secretary of Transportation (SECTRANS) approval, whichever is last.
M15	Hours	To notify CORE participants of program activation after SecDef approval.
M16	Percent	Of commercial carriers that arrive at the POE on time and in proper configuration (commercial carriers are provided accurate schedule and vehicle configuration information to meet transportation requirement specifications).

#### SN 6.6.6 Expand Other Support.

To expand other support requirements in accordance with the expansion of the force. This support includes family assistance, legal, security/law enforcement, chaplain, finance, and public affairs. **(JP 4-0, 4-05)** (JP 4-06)

M1	Percent	Of family assistance, legal, security/law enforcement, chaplain, finance, and public affairs support meet deployment requirements.
M2	Days	To correct shortfall in other support.
M3	Percent	Of C2 traffic, sent on non-dedicated or non-DOD lines or channels.
M4	Percent	Of DOD long-haul communications channels, saturated.
M5	Percent	Of forces, under C2 from callup to departure from MS.
M6	Percent	Of shortfall in other support, corrected within 30 days.
M7	Percent	Of shortfall in other support, corrected within 45 days.
M8	Percent	Of shortfall in other support, corrected within 60 days.

#### SN 6.6.7 Plan and Maintain Industrial Base Capabilities.

To plan and maintain a viable industrial base that can sustain ongoing production requirements and respond adequately to force mobilization and sustainment requirements. This task includes DOD/Services working with private industry to ensure continued capability to produce, maintain, and repair material for meeting requirements. Activities include industrial base capability assessments; establishing Service industrial preparedness programs (such as preparing critical items and planning lists, and conducting production base analysis); and implementing industrial base and or government measures where required to preserve or protect a critical capability. This task includes actions to provide incentives to the industrial base to maintain technological capabilities and to support reconstituting the Armed Forces of the United States in the face of a developing global threat. **(JP 4-0, 4-05)** (CJCSM 3141.01)

**Note:** This task is related to SN 4.4, *Reconstitute National Forces and Means*.

M1	Percent	Of existing industrial base prepared to reconstitute US armed forces.
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M2	Days	To correct shortfall in industrial base.
M3	Months	Since industrial preparedness objectives, reviewed.
M4	Months	Since Service preparedness programs, reviewed.
M5	Percent	Of shortfall in industrial base, corrected within 30 days.
M6	Percent	Of shortfall in industrial base, corrected within 45 days.
M7	Percent	Of shortfall in industrial base, corrected within 60 days.
M8	Percent	Of shortfall in industrial base, corrected within 12 months.
M9	Percent	Of shortfall in industrial base, corrected within 24 months.

### **SN 6.7 Provide Command and Control over Mobilized Forces.**

To provide C2 over mobilized forces from the time they are called to active duty until they depart their mobilization station (MS) or CRC. This task includes providing the necessary communications to support C2 and in-transit visibility (ITV) data. It also includes the transitioning of C2 from premobilization to postmobilization for any level of mobilization. Reserve component (RC) units are assigned to a designated major command when mobilized at home station. Command of RC units passes to the MS commander (tenant major command activities in the case of nondeploying units) when the unit reports to the MS. C2 is then passed to the gaining command at POE departure. **(JP 4-05)** (JP 4-01.1, 4-05)

**Note:** See SN 5, *Provide Strategic Direction and Integration*, for tasks that apply to this activity.

M1	Percent	Of forces, under C2 from callup to departure from MS.
M2	Days	For IMA to come under command and control of gaining unit.
M3	Hours	To change combatant command assignment of mobilizing units upon callup.
M4	Percent	Of mobilized units called to active duty without their common RC command headquarters.

### **SN 7 CONDUCT FORCE DEVELOPMENT.**

To translate projected Military Department, Service, and USCINCSOC resources—manpower, fiscal, and materiel—into time-phased programs and structure (expressed in dollars, equipment, and units) needed to accomplish national security, national military, multinational (alliance and coalition), and theater strategy, and Service-assigned missions, core competencies, and functions. **(JP 0-2, 3-0, 5-0)** (JP 3-0, 4-05, 5-0)

**Note:** The actual acquisition of personnel, materiel, facilities, and services is covered in SN 4, *Provide Sustainment*.

M1	Percent	Of multinational strategy force apportionment requests, met in the JSCP.
M2	Percent	Of national military force apportionment requests, met in the JSCP.
M3	Percent	Of national security strategy force apportionment requests, met in the JSCP.
M4	Percent	Of officers assigned to joint commands/HQs who completed recommended education courses.
M5	Months	To revise and approve joint doctrine/concepts.
M6	Years	To develop new major systems.

### **SN 7.1 Formulate Joint and Service Concepts, Doctrine, and Requirements.**

To formulate concepts, doctrine, and tactics, techniques, and procedures in accordance with guidance, the threat, technology, and projected capabilities and resource constraints. Formulation is consistent with approved joint doctrine or provides innovative concepts across the range of military operations. This task also includes the development of joint and Service requirements (including a prioritized needs assessment and cost benefit analysis) through the identification of deficiencies and opportunities for improvement, and the highlighting of preplanned modernization and other potential solutions. The methodology provides bottom-up feedback on doctrine, concepts and requirements. These requirements provide the basis for R&D. **(JP 0-2, 3-0)** (JP 0-2, 1, 5-0, CJCSI 2700.01)

M1	Months	To develop and submit a Mission Needs Statement.
M2	Percent	Of changes to joint, combined, or multinational doctrine originate at national level.
M3	Percent	Of new concepts, tested in national level exercises.
M4	Percent	Of prioritized solution sets accepted by Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).
M5	Percent	Of proposed new concepts, accepted by CJCS and Services without major changes.
M6	Weeks	From submission of a Service needs statement of approval or rejection by the JROC.
M7	Weeks	To categorize combatant command, joint, and Service needs.
M8	Weeks	To coordinate integrated and prioritized list.
M9	Weeks	To develop and provide new solution sets to the CJCS.
M10	Months	Since top down guidance reviewed.

#### **SN 7.1.1 Develop Top-down Strategic Planning Guidance.**

To derive top-down planning guidance from various high-level authorities to form joint and Service guidance concerning priorities, warfighting concerns, and areas of emphasis for doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, and materiel. It may include guidance to direct concept development efforts toward

particular objectives. It includes a summary of warfighting and other concepts. **(JP 0-2, 3-0, 5-0)** (JP 3-07.1, 5-0)

M1	Weeks	Between Chairman's submission of roles and missions and issuance of revised top-down guidance.
M2	Years	Out planning guidance that identifies materiel changes.

### **SN 7.1.2 Develop Joint and Service Warfighting and Other Concepts, Doctrine, and TTP.**

To describe how future military operations may be conducted in light of past experience, current and evolving doctrine and TTP, future capabilities, future or evolving threats, and future technology. Warfighting concepts describe specific capabilities for joint and Service, inter-Service, and functional concepts and systems. **(JP 0-2, 1, 3-0)** (JP 2-01, 5-0)

M1	Percent	Of new concepts, tested in national level exercises.
M2	Percent	Of proposed new concepts, accepted by CJCS and Services without major changes.
M3	Percent	Of approved concepts for which current doctrine exists.
M4	Months	To develop and approve new doctrine.

### **SN 7.1.3 Determine Needs and Solutions.**

To determine needs (i.e., deficiencies, opportunities, and obsolescence issues) for warfighting and military operations other than war, to develop solution sets, and to prioritize solutions based on military judgment, cost benefit analyses, new technology, and tradeoff considerations. **(JP 0-2, 4-0, 5-0)** (JP 0-2, 3-0, 5-0, 5-03.1, CJCSI 5123.01)

M1	Months	Since cost benefit analysis of existing solution sets.
M2	Months	To develop and provide new solution sets to CJCS.
M3	Months	After exercise/operation to analyze lessons learned.
M4	Percent	Of prioritized solution sets, accepted by JROC.
M5	Percent	Of submitted new solution sets, accepted.
M6	Weeks	To develop and submit a Mission Needs Statement.

### **SN 7.1.4 Document Requirements and Solutions.**

To categorize joint and Service needs and to consolidate, integrate, and prioritize capability issues into modernization plans. **(JP 5-0)** (JP 3-0)

M1	Percent	Of combatant command commanders' inputs, integrated and prioritized.
M2	Percent	Of line numbers/line items changed during coordination process.



M3	Percent	Of Service Mission Needs Statements, not accepted or rejected within 12 months.
M4	Weeks	To categorize combatant command, joint, and Service needs.
M5	Weeks	To coordinate integrated priority list (IPL).
M6	Weeks	To receive approval or rejection by the JROC, after submission of a Service Mission Needs Statement

## **SN 7.2 Conduct Research and Development.**

To conduct studies and experiments in those fields related to national security needs, to provide fundamental knowledge to solve identified military problems, and to produce exploratory and advanced developments in technologies of new or improved military functional capabilities. This task also includes evaluating test results of advanced concept technology demonstrations. Incorporated in this task is the authority to establish RDT&E and procurement programs that support modernization. **(JP 0-2, 4-0)** (JP 0-2, 3-07.1, 3-08v2, 3-11, 4-01, 4-01.2, CJCSI 7401.01)

M1	Percent	Of approved R&D projects backlogged for funding.
M2	Percent	Of basic research projects linked to operational concepts or needs.
M3	Percent	Of nation's systems and technology production capacity (at all tiers) subject to assessment and tracking systems.
M4	Percent	Of projects, transition from basic research to technology development.
M5	Percent	Of projects, transition from technology development to advanced engineering demonstration.
M6	Percent	Of R & D projects, transition to developmental implementation.
M7	Percent	Of R & D funding, spent on evaluation of non-US end items.
M8	Percent	Of DOD R&D funding spent on evaluation of NDI products.
M9	Percent	Of DOD R&D programs duplicative of other government or private research.
M10	Percent	Of R&D represents a coordinated effort between and among various resource sources: DOD Labs; National Labs; Industry; Academe.
M11	Percent	Of T & E projects joint.
M12	Years	To fielding from initiation of R & D program.
M13	Percent	Of R & D projects coming from private sector.
M14	Percent	Of R & D projects with non-DOD applications.

### **SN 7.2.1 Conduct Basic Research.**

To conduct scientific studies and experiments directed toward increasing knowledge and understanding in those scientific fields related to national security needs. Basic research provides fundamental knowledge for solution of identified military problems. Within the DOD acquisition community, this task covers budget activities 6.1 through 6.3. **(JP 0-2, 4-0)** (JP 3-08v2, 3-11)

M1	Months	To develop critical enabling technology.
M2	Percent	Improvement in desired capability.
M3	Percent	Of 6.1 account programs, continued after management review.
M4	Percent	Of 6.2 account programs, continued after management review.
M5	Percent	Of 6.3 account programs, continued after management review.
M6	Percent	Of basic research conducted in a cooperative manner (between and among DOD Labs; National Labs; Industrial, and Academic Sources).
M7	Percent	Of critical enabling technologies with established DOD processes to track and assess their development.
M8	Percent	Of critical enabling technology development dependent on foreign sources (for business proprietary or national critical technology policy reasons).
M9	Percent	Of DOD 6.1 programs, carried out in universities.
M10	Percent	Of DOD 6.1 programs, carried out in-house.
M11	Percent	Of DOD 6.1 programs pay off within ten years.
M12	Percent	Of DOD 6.1 programs pay off within twenty years.
M13	Percent	Of Federal investment in basic research, DOD 6.1 funded.
M14	Percent	Of projects ultimately improve capability needed in fleet/field forces.
M15	Percent	Of critical enabling technologies that have identified development constraints.
M16	Years	For DOD 6.1 program to pay off.
M17	Years	To achieve stated objectives.
M18	Percent	Of R & D projects with non-DOD applications.

### SN 7.2.2 Integrate Capabilities and Prioritize R&D and Acquisition Programs.

To provide operational and technical integration of current and projected systems. This task includes the process to determine which systems should be pursued into demonstration and eventual production. This task includes the activities of the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) and Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). **(JP 0-2, 5-0)** (JP 3-11, 5-0)

M1	Dollars	Annual investment in Foreign Comparative Testing.
M2	Instances	Of Defense Technology Objectives identified for a given year.
M3	Instances	Of problems (constraints) in timely development of required and validated systems and technologies.
M4	Instances	Of Strategic Research Objectives identified for given year.
M5	Percent	Of DARPA funding, focuses on critical technologies underpinning the 20-year military vision.
M6	Percent	Of DARPA projects, directly track to combatant command warfighting needs.
M7	Percent	Of DOD systems and processes that have procedures to map down to (and validate) mission area analysis needs.
M8	Percent	Of FFRDCs and UARCs work centers on institution's core concept.

M9	Percent	Of programs directly tied to Defense Technology Objectives.
M10	Percent	Of programs directly tied to Strategic Research Objectives.
M11	Percent	Of systems and technology development centers, assessed by DOD systems and processes to minimize program duplication.

### SN 7.2.3 Conduct Demonstration, Engineering Development, and Production (Life Cycle Management).

To take available scientific information and use it to develop concepts for meeting military needs and to take such concepts to production. This task includes concept exploration, program definition and risk reduction, and engineering and manufacturing development. It also includes production of the product, major modifications, demilitarization, and disposal. This task is Department of Defense acquisition Phases II through III. **(JP 0-2)** (CJCSI 6211.02A)

M1	Percent	Of Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) that have active combatant command participation.
M2	Percent	Of Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs), taken to production.
M3	Years	For Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) to enter production.
M4	Percent	Of DOD major acquisition programs that use Commercial Technology Insertion Program.
M5	Percent	Of foreign produced technologies, components, and systems under DOD consideration, subject to processes to establish, validate, and justify funding profiles.
M6	Percent	Of major procurements that are firm fixed price.
M7	Percent	Of major procurements, competed.
M8	Percent	Of NEPA, RCRA, and CERCLA requirements for technology development, production, life cycle maintenance, and demil/disposal (for all DOD systems) that have assessment systems and processes.
M9	Percent	Of new major acquisitions that apply commercial practices.
M10	Percent	Of projects meet stated Service or Joint Mission or support area requirements.
M11	Percent	Of systems development programs that make use of all available (all Service) development and production capabilities.
M12	Years	To progress from concept exploration through EMD and production.

### SN 7.2.4 Conduct Testing.

To evaluate and assess system or materiel performance appropriate to each phase and milestone of development. This task includes developmental test and evaluation (DT&E) of alternative concepts and identification of risk. As operational test and evaluation (OT&E), this task is to determine the operational effectiveness and suitability of a system under realistic conditions. Also included in this task is live fire test and evaluation (LFT&E). **(N/A)** (JP 3-08v2, 3-11, 6-0)

M1	Instances	Of coordination problems (constraints) to effective and efficient planning and use of Joint testing (vice Service peculiar testing).
M2	Instances	Of problems (constraints) in coordination of range and test facilities used for Joint and Service DT&E/OT&E programs.
M3	Months	To compare Joint and Service acquisition test programs' lessons learned between DOD agencies.
M4	Percent	Of DT&E/OT&E programs, conducted using combined processes and methodologies.
M5	Percent	Of potential major acquisition programs that feature significant OT&E early involvement in acquisition program development.
M6	Percent	Of programs that fail testing and are canceled.
M7	Percent	Of projects that meet stated requirement to pass milestone approval.
M8	Percent	Of Joint and Service OT&E test programs (for validated mission area requirements), validated using existing systems and processes.
M9	Percent	Of Service DT&E/OT&E test facility, simulation, and modeling capabilities subject to systems and processes to minimize duplication.
M10	Percent	Of Service DT&E/OT&E modeling capabilities duplicate other Service capabilities.
M11	Percent	Of Service DT&E/OT&E modeling capabilities duplicate other Federal capabilities.
M12	Percent	Of Service DT&E/OT&E simulation facilities duplicate other Service capabilities.
M13	Percent	Of Service DT&E/OT&E simulation facilities duplicate other Federal capabilities.
M14	Percent	Of Service DT&E/OT&E test facilities duplicate other Service capabilities.
M15	Percent	Of acquisition programs that pass testing that are successfully fielded.
M16	Months	That program development is delayed for testing.

### **SN 7.3 Structure the Force.**

To develop and document new or revised joint and Service organizations, or design unit models, in response to an approved requirement. To prescribe the mission, organization, and equipment requirements of such organizations or units.

**(JP 0-2, 3-0, 3-08v2, 5-0)** (JP 4-05, 5-0)

M1	Months	To review and approve design change to unit or organization.
M2	Percent	Of organization and unit designs current with respect to operational concepts, personnel and equipment.
M3	Months	From approval of new unit/organization design to standing up new unit.

**SN 7.3.1 Develop Combat Force Structure.**

To determine the size and composition of the major combat formations of each Service, individually and as a whole, based on consideration of the national security strategy, defense planning guidance, national military and theater strategies, threat, and resource constraints. Where appropriate, the capability of our allies should be considered in this task. **(JP 0-2, 3-07.1, 4-01.2)** (JP 4-01.7, 4-05, 4-06, 5-0)

M1	Items	Of exception by the combatant commands (major).
M2	Items	Of exception by the Services (major).
M3	Percent	Difference between optimum combat force structure and actual combat structure.
M4	Percent	Of OPLANs fully resourced with combat forces without restoring to dual apportionment.
M5	Month	To complete review of combat force structure.

**SN 7.3.2 Develop Support Force Structure**

To determine the support structure for combat forces. This support structure includes combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) manning, equipment, and modernization levels required to support the major combat formations, to include special operations forces established in the objective force. This task compares requirements for support forces to the availability of such forces. The comparison identifies the total shortages of personnel by specialty, command, and the total force worldwide for war and military operations other than war. This task includes determining resource requirements (dollars, personnel, materiel, programs) required to correct deficiencies in the program, budget, and current force. Weigh risks against benefits to set priorities for the support structure. Analyses are normally separate for the programmed and budgeted forces. **(JP 0-2, 4-0, 5-0)** (JP 3-07)

M1	Days	To move an LRC force 6000 miles with active duty strategic lift assets.
M2	Days	To move an MRC force 7000 miles with fully mobilized strategic lift assets.
M3	Hours	To move an LRC force 2000 miles with active duty strategic lift assets.
M4	Months	Since complete comparison of forces and requirements conducted.
M5	Months	Since determination of resources required to correct program deficiencies.
M6	Months	Since full analysis of base force against existing OPLANs.
M7	Percent	Difference between optimum force structure and actual support structure.
M8	Percent	Of OPLAN wargame analyses included examination of mobilization base.
M9	Weeks	To conduct determination of resources requirements.

M10	Weeks	To conduct force requirements comparison.
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**SN 7.3.3 Design Units and Organizations.**

To design units and organizations and determine the personnel and equipment to be assigned. This task includes determining equipment and personnel changes required to introduce new/modified items into the inventory; to determine the need to develop or revise military and civilian occupational specialties; and to prepare plans for the personnel and training needed to operate and maintain new or improved items. This task includes prescribing the required structure, manpower, and equipment for several organizational options for a particular type of unit or vessel. Finally, this task provides a model for fielding an organization or unit. A documented organizational design, such as an Army table of organization and equipment (TOE) or an Air Force unit manning document (UMD), specifies the tasks the unit is designed to perform and its capabilities. **(N/A)** (JP 0-2)

M1	Months	To change unit or organization design.
M2	Percent	Of units or organizations whose designs are current.
M3	Months	From concept to unit or organization design approval.
M4	Months	To review and adjust unit manning document to reflect new or modified weapons systems or equipment items.
M5	Percent	Agreement between unit task documented in organizational design and unit task per assigned OPLAN.
M6	Percent	Of changes in personnel quantity, quality, or training, accomplished by time of fielding new or modified weapons system or equipment items.
M7	Percent	Of joint headquarters organizational design and manning, reviewed in last 24 months.
M8	Percent	Of Service organization design efforts that include inputs from other Services.
M9	Percent	Of unit personnel that have more than two weeks casual status (awaiting training).
M10	Weeks	To transition a given unit to new or modified weapons systems or equipment.

**SN 7.3.4 Integrate Unit Design.**

To develop unit or organization designs jointly with other Services, combatant commands, Joint Staff, and elements of own Service. **(N/A)** (JP 0-2, 3-0)

M1	Percent	Of joint headquarters organizational design and manning, reviewed in last 24 months.
M2	Percent	Of Service organization design efforts including inputs from other Services.
M3	Months	To coordinate unit or organization design change with Joint Staff/other Service.

**SN 7.3.5 Authorize Units and Organizations.**

To develop authorization documents which integrate the output of the force design and force structuring functions. Force structuring documents the number of each required unit the Military Departments can afford to buy and maintain. Force structuring tracks changes in the force as the Departments introduce new equipment, implement new doctrine, and field new organizations. This activity includes employing automated information systems to facilitate recording, maintaining, and retrieving data necessary for force structuring, force planning, and accounting for units of the Active and Reserve Components. It also includes developing an authoritative record of force structure decisions. **(N/A)** (JP 2-01)

M1	Days	C-2 or below for personnel and equipment, because of insufficient trained personnel or support equipment (during transition).
M2	Days	Not operationally ready, because unit has insufficient trained personnel or support equipment (during transition).
M3	Months	To review and adjust unit-manning document to reflect new or modified weapons systems or equipment items.
M4	Percent	Of changes in personnel quantity, quality, or training, accomplished by time of fielding of new or modified weapons system or equipment items.
M5	Percent	Of changes in support equipment delivered, accomplished by time of fielding of new or modified weapons system or equipment items.
M6	Percent	Of unit personnel that have more than two weeks casual status (awaiting training).
M7	Days	Since database updated.
M8	Percent	Of unit/organization design AC records maintained in an automated format.
M9	Percent	Of force design information automated.

**SN 7.4 Educate and Train the Force.**

To prepare individuals, leaders, and units to fight and win in war as Service, joint, special, and supporting forces, in coordination with multinational, interagency, nongovernmental, private voluntary and United Nations agencies/forces/organizations, and to do the same in military operations other than war. This task applies to providing fully educated and trained personnel and units to combatant commands in either a mobilization or nonmobilization operation. This task also applies to training provided through nation assistance to a host-nation in war or military operations other than war. For the host-nation this task can serve as the model for evaluating and developing its education and training requirements. **(JP 0-2, 3-0, 3-07, 3-08v2, CJCSI 1800.01, CJCSI 3500.02A)** (JP 0-2, 1, 1-05, 3-05, 3-07.1, 3-61, 4-0, 4-01.1, 4-01.2, 4-02.1, CJCSI 3213.01A, CJCSI 3500.02A)

M1	Months	Since organization's JMETL or Service METL updated.
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M2	Months	Since training policy guidance issued.
M3	Percent	Of a combatant command's combat force structure, trained to meet JMETL requirements.
M4	Percent	Of a combatant command's combat support force structure, trained to meet JMETL requirements.
M5	Percent	Of a combatant command's combat support units, evaluated against an OPLAN during the past year.
M6	Percent	Of a combatant command's combat units, evaluated against an OPLAN mission during the past year.
M7	Percent	Of combatant commander JMETL tasks covered by annual training events.
M8	Percent	Of combatant commander JMETL tasks covered by annual training.
M9	Percent	Of joint PME graduates who fill joint billets within five years of graduation.
M10	Percent	Of linguists, needed to train host-nation personnel during MOOTW, are available.
M11	Percent	Of officers assigned to joint billets that have JPME appropriate to their experience and level of responsibility.
M12	Percent	Of OPLANs have associated JMETL.
M13	Percent	Of PME includes a joint block within its curriculum.
M14	Percent	Of training data current at execution.
M15	Percent	Of units evaluated each year to determine their proficiency in JMETL tasks.
M16	Instances	Of Joint exercises or operations carried out per year.
M17	Percent	Of MTW JF Common Operational Joint Tasks, fully trained.
M18	Percent	Of MTW tactical level interoperability tasks, fully trained.
M19	Percent	Of missions for which assigned forces are fully trained.
M20	Percent	Of missions for which assigned forces are partially trained.
M21	Percent	Of missions for which assigned forces are untrained.

#### **SN 7.4.1 Coordinate Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL) or Agency Mission Essential Task List (AMETL) Development.**

To provide methodology and policy for establishing combatant commander JMETL and Combat Support AMETL. This activity includes integrating the CJCS Exercise Program. This task also includes review of combatant command JMETL. For Services, this activity may involve establishing Service METL. For combat support agencies, this task involves establishing an AMETL. **(CJCSI 3500.01, CJCSI 3500.02A, CJCSI 3500.04A, CJCSM 3500.03)** (JP 3-0, 3-05, CJCSM 3500.03)

M1	Months	Since combatant commander's JMETL has been reviewed.
M2	Months	Since methodology and policy guidance issued.
M3	Months	Since Service METL updated.
M4	Percent	Of JCS exercise program based on JMETL/AMETL process.
M5	Percent	Of OPLANs have associated JMETL/AMETL.



M6	Months	Since CINC JMETL or agency METL updated.
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#### **SN 7.4.2 Establish Education and Training Programs and Allocate Resources.**

To link joint and component JMETL/AMETL requirements and joint doctrine/JTTP with the subsequent execution and evaluation of education and training. This activity includes conducting training assessment of proficiency (current vs. desired), articulating a Service and joint professional military education and training vision, issuing education and training guidance, applying a risk management process associated with the training, performing time management, establishing training events, and allocating training resources. Joint Force Providers use the JMETL based requirements from combatant commanders' subordinate components to develop a common training program. **(JP 0-2, CJCSI 1800.01, CJCSI 3500.02A, CJCSI 3500.03)** (JP 0-2, 4-0, 6-02, CJCSI 3500.02A)

M1	Months	Since Service and joint policy, education, and training vision reviewed.
M2	Months	Since update of combatant commander's assessment of theater training risk.
M3	Percent	Of combatant commander JMETL tasks covered by annual training.
M4	Percent	Of OPLAN, CONPLAN, FUNCPLAN requirements identified in JMETL.
M5	Percent	Of total training hours devoted to training management.

#### **SN 7.4.3 Conduct Professional Education and Training.**

To provide adequate preparation, effective presentation and practice, and thorough evaluation of joint, Service, collective, and individual tasks being executed. It includes educating officers and enlisted personnel in established military education institutions, such as ROTC, Service academies, senior joint and Service colleges, staff colleges, noncommissioned officer academies, and technical schools. Close cooperation between the educational and training communities is required to focus training and educational objectives on common goals and reduce redundancy. A key link between the educational and training communities and the UJTL. Graduates of both Professional Military Education (PME) and Joint PME should understand the concept and intent of the UJTL. The concept of continuing education is then required at every echelon to reinforce the CJCS Joint Professional Military Education Program (JPME) by planning and conducting professional development. **(JP 0-2, CJCSI 1800.01, CJCSI 3500.02A)** (JP 0-2, 1, 1-05, 2-01, 3-07.1, 3-07.2)

M1	Percent	Of joint billets filled by joint PME graduates within five years of graduation.
M2	Percent	Of officers assigned to joint billets who have completed JPME.
M3	Percent	Of PME programs include joint blocks of instruction.

#### **SN 7.4.4 Assess Training and Education Effectiveness.**

Task moved to: ST 7.2.4 Assess Training and Education Effectiveness.

#### **SN 7.5 Ensure Interoperability.**

To ensure that systems, units, or forces can provide services to, and accept services from, other systems, units, or forces and use the exchanged services.

**(JP 0-2, 2-01, 3-08v1, 4-0, 4-02.1, 6-02)** (JP 1-05, 2-0, 4-01.7, 4-02.1, 4-03)

M1	Percent	Improvement in each theater's communications equipment in last five years.
M2	Percent	Improvement in each theater's fuel interoperability in last five years.
M3	Percent	Of agreement between US doctrine and agreed Alliance doctrine.
M4	Percent	Of ammunition can be cross-serviced to each theater's apportioned aircraft.
M5	Percent	Of each theater's ammunition is HERO compatible.
M6	Percent	Of each theater's apportioned vehicles interoperable for fuel.
M7	Percent	Of each theater's communications equipment is interoperable.
M8	Percent	Of each theater's forces use same Geodetic Reference.
M9	Percent	Of US rations acceptable to multinational partners.
M10	Percent	Of US rations acceptable to recipients of humanitarian assistance.
M11	Percent	Of units/organizations with doctrine consistent with unit design, training and materiel.
M12	Percent	Of all transportation ADP systems interface or have established work-arounds.

#### **SN 8 FOSTER MULTINATIONAL AND INTERAGENCY RELATIONS.**

To work within the Interagency process and with representatives of other nations and regional organizations. This task ensures the accomplishment of US politico-military objectives through the combined action of different US organizations and friends, allies, neutrals, and other nations overseas. **(JP 0-2, 2-02, 3-0, 3-07, 3-08v1, 3-08v2, 3-13.1)** (JP 0-2, 3-07.1, 3-07.4, 3-08v2, 3-11, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Percent	Of weapons and major systems transfers to foreign nations, funded by grants.
M2	Percent	Of weapons and major system transfers to foreign nations, funded by loans.
M3	Percent	Of weapons and major systems transfers to foreign nations, provided through FMS.
M4	Percent	Of major weapons and other defense systems transfers to foreign nations, provided through private sales between corporations and foreign agents.
M5	Weeks	To provide assistance to other nations (upon request).
M6	Percent	Of US security deployments, made to nations with treaty ties to US.

M7	Percent	Of scheduled US overseas deployments, met.
M8	Months	To prepare USG position on major security related issue.
M9	Percent	Of USG overseas operations with approved consequence management plans.
M10	Percent	Of actions forwarded with hedges against failure, previously coordinated within interagency process.
M11	Percent	Of proposed weapons transfers, gain congressional approval.
M12	Percent	Of operations support non-DOD authorities (e.g. NGO/PVO).
M13	Percent	Casualty rate in NEO operation (for friendly forces).
M14	Casualties	In NEO operation (among evacuees).
M15	Percent	Of NGOs and PVOs have formal agreements with USG.

### **SN 8.1 Support Other Nations or Groups.**

To provide assistance to other nations or groups (counterinsurgencies or insurgencies) in support of the national security, national military, and theater strategies across the range of military operations. This task includes security assistance, coalition support to multinational operations, counterproliferation and counterforce programs and activities, combating terrorism, counterdrug operations, countermine activities, humanitarian assistance, and civil-military operations (CMO). CMO activities involve the relationship between military forces, civilian authorities, and the population. CMO activities include assisting the host-nation's development, undermining insurgent grievances, gaining support for national government, and attaining national objectives without combat. These include medical, engineer, communications, transportation and logistic activities undertaken incident to the combined exercises and operations. **(JP 0-2, 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-08v1, 4-04)** (JP 3-07.1, 3-07.4, 3-13.1, 3-57, 3-61, 5-0, CJCSI 2700.01)

M1	Days	To respond to Country Team requests for assistance.
M2	Percent	Of Country Team's foreign military students nominated for training, complete training.
M3	Percent	Of Allied forces and equipment, moved by USCINCTRANS.
M4	Percent	Of cooperative agreements, updated within last two years (nations with US treaty commitment).
M5	Percent	Of nations in theater that have politico-military agreements with US.
M6	Percent	Of Country Teams' requests for military goods/services, fulfilled.
M7	Percent	Of supported nation's movement requirements, translated to meet RDD.
M8	Instances	Of nations declining military assistance.
M9	Hours	To provide cost estimate to requesting agency.
M10	Hours	To validate incoming short notice common-user lift requirements and pass to appropriate component(s).
M11	Percent	Of requested support/assistance requirements meet LAD or timeline.

M12	Hours	For USTRANSCOM to secure required clearances and approval for Defense Courier Service movement of materiel within hours.
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### SN 8.1.1 Provide Security Assistance.

To provide defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, credit, or cash sales to further national policies and objectives. To coordinate the actions of Services and combatant commands in the provision of security assistance from their own resources. This task includes military assistance programs, advisory and training assistance, and security assistance surges. **(JP 0-2, 3-0, 3-07, 3-07.1, 3-08v1)** (JP 3-0, 3-05, 3-07.1, 3-07.5, 4-0, CJCSI 2700.01, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.04A)

M1	Percent	Of new allied air weapons systems are US systems.
M2	Percent	Of new allied naval ships and weapons systems are US systems.
M3	Percent	Of new allied ground force major end items are US systems.
M4	Months	To obtain approval for security assistance from US authorities.
M5	Months	To obtain agreement and approval for security assistance from host nation.
M6	Months	To deliver services or equipment (upon approval).
M7	Percent	Of Country Team proposals for Security Assistance Programs that are implemented.
M8	Percent	Of ground systems supported by US logistic support agreements.

### SN 8.1.2 Support Nation Assistance.

To support and assist in developing other nations, normally in conjunction with the Department of State and/or a multinational force, and, ideally, through the use of host-nation resources. Interagency orchestration of all the elements of national power is essential, and it must be supportive of both the ambassador's country plan and the combatant commander's regional plan. **(JP 0-2, 3-0, 3-07, 3-07.1, 4-04)** (JP 3-0, 3-57, 4-02.1)

M1	Weeks	To deliver assistance (upon approval).
M2	Months	Since update of US ambassador's country plan.
M3	Months	Since update of CINC's regional plan.
M4	Percent	Of requested assistance actually provided.

### SN 8.1.3 Support Peace Operations.

To support peace operations through national level coordination of the three general areas; diplomatic action, traditional peacekeeping, and forceful military actions. This task can include coordination with international organizations and regional groupings. This task may include support to non-US forces, including training and the providing of equipment and transportation. This can include

action under the UN Charter, Chapters VI and VII. **(JP 3-07, 3-07.3)** (JP 0-2, 3-0, 3-08v1, 3-53, 3-57, 4-02.1, CJCSI 3110.14)

M1	Percent	Of peace operations requested equipment support, provided.
M2	Percent	Of peace operations requested transportation support, provided.
M3	Percent	Of appropriate international agencies have information sharing memorandums/letters of agreement with CINCs.
M4	Weeks	To initiate training support for peace operations.
M5	Weeks	To commit US forces to support peace operations (upon request).

#### **SN 8.1.4 Support Military Civic Action.**

To support the use of predominantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local populace (of a host-nation) in fields contributing to economic and social development such as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, and sanitation. Such actions serve to improve the standing of the local military forces with the population. **(JP 3-0, 3-07, 3-07.1, 3-57, 3-08v1, 4-04)** (JP 3-07.4)

M1	Percent	Of civic action projects include participation from local populace.
M2	Percent	Of civic action projects completed.
M3	Percent	Of population supportive of civic action projects.
M4	Weeks	To initiate a coordinated response for support of military civic action.
M5	Percent	Of civic action projects initiated by local population.
M6	Percent	Of civic action projects located in secure zones.

#### **SN 8.1.5 Conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Humanitarian and Civic Assistance.**

To conduct assistance to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Foreign humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is generally limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of host-nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing relief, dislocated civilian support, security, and technical assistance.

Humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) is a specific and distinct program, which is also included in this task. HCA generally includes activities such as medical, dental, and veterinary care; construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. HCA activities are authorized in legislation and are controlled in accordance with title 10, US Code, section 401. **(JP 0-2, 3-0, 3-05, 3-07, 3-07.1, 3-08v1, 3-08v2, 4-04)** (JP 3-08v1, 3-08v2, 3-57, 4-01.1, 4-01.2, 4-02, 4-02.1, 4-06, CJCSM 3500.04A)

M1	Hours	To develop plan for providing assistance.
M2	Days	For military forces/supplies to arrive in theater.
M3	Percent	Of requested personnel, provided.
M4	Percent	Of requested supplies, provided.
M5	Y/N	USTRANSCOM provides initial feasibility analysis NLT the time coordinated with the supported CINC.
M6	Hours	To provide initial feasibility analysis to supported CINC for CINC's commander's estimate.
M7	Percent	Of supported nation movement requirements transported to meet their LAD or time lines.

#### **SN 8.1.6 Provide Civil Affairs Support Policy.**

To provide policy on activities that embrace the relationship between a nation's military forces and its civil authorities and people in a friendly country or area or occupied country or area, when military forces are present. **(JP 0-2, 3-07, 3-57)** (JP 0-2, 3-0, 3-05, 3-07.1, 3-07.5, 3-08v1, 3-08v2, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Weeks	To develop policy that addresses civil affairs needs of subject nation.
M2	Months	To develop plan/procedure for transition, continuation, or termination of CA functions.
M3	Weeks	To identify HNS contractor resources.
M4	Weeks	To assess HN government, including economic conditions and attitudes of civilians.
M5	Percent	Of subject nation civil population supporting US civil affairs policy.

#### **SN 8.1.7 Coordinate Information Sharing Arrangements.**

To arrange for the selected release and disclosure of unclassified and classified information in support of multinational operations and exercises. This task may involve coordination with national intelligence agencies, law enforcement agencies, and the Department of State. **(JP 0-2, 2-0, 2-01, 2-02, 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-08v2)** (JP 2-01, 3-01.5, 3-07.1, 3-07.4, 3-08v2, 3-10.1, 3-13.1, 6-0)

**Note:** This task applies to SN 5.4.2, *Coordinate Support for Unified, Joint, and Multinational Operations*.

M1	Percent	Of appropriate international agencies have information sharing MOAs or LOAs with CINCs (right agency/right agreement).
M2	Percent	Of appropriate US national level agencies have information sharing MOAs or LOAs with CINCs (right agency/right agreement).
M3	Weeks	To develop information sharing arrangements with multinational partners.
M4	Percent	Of multinational partners, allowed access to all required information.

M5	Instances	Of requests to change existing intelligence disclosure/release policy.
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### **SN 8.1.8 Provide Support to Foreign Internal Defense in Theater.**

To work with US agencies and the representatives of foreign governments to provide programs, through the combatant commander and the Country Team, to support action programs to free and protect the foreign nation's society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. **(JP 3-0, 3-07, 3-07.1, 3-08v1)** (JP 0-2, 3-05, 3-05.5, 3-07.1, 3-57)

M1	Months	To initiate FID support (upon request).
M2	Months	To achieve FID objectives (after initiating FID support).
M3	Percent	Of FID issues entering interagency system, resolved by Board for Low-Intensity Conflict.
M4	Percent	Of FID cases have special management programs.
M5	Percent	Of FID programs conform to DOD and NSC guidance.
M6	Percent	Of worldwide FID activities, funded by DOD O&M or other authorized DOD funding vehicles.
M7	Instances	Of subversive acts, lawlessness or insurgent attack in target nation.

### **SN 8.1.9 Cooperate with and Support NGOs and PVOs.**

To work with and arrange for a mutually beneficial relationship between the Department of Defense and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). This task includes developing the basis for cooperation of combatant commanders or their subordinates in their operational areas with the field activities of NGOs. This task also includes arranging for cooperation between the field activities of US-based private voluntary organizations (PVOs) and combatant commanders or their subordinate commanders with humanitarian assistance responsibilities. **(JP 0-2, 3-0, 3-08v1, 3-57)** (JP 0-2, 3-0, 3-05, 3-07, 3-07.5)

M1	Days	For NGO to obtain approval to provide support.
M2	Days	For PVO to obtain approval to provide support.
M3	Percent	Of concerned NGOs and PVOs able to obtain arrangement for cooperation with joint force commander.
M4	Percent	Of NGOs have agreements (formal or informal) with DOD on crisis response.
M5	Percent	Of PVOs have agreements (formal or informal) with DOD on crisis response.
M6	Days	For approval of NGO request for support.
M7	Days	For approval of PVO request for support.

**SN 8.1.10 Coordinate Actions to Combat Terrorism.**

To coordinate action to preclude, preempt, and resolve terrorist actions throughout the threat spectrum, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism). **(JP 3-05, 3-07, 3-07.2, 3-10)** (JP 3-07.2, 3-07.4)

M1	Hours	To complete staff estimates (after mission receipt).
M2	Hours	To provide strategic intelligence data in support of operational commander (from receipt of request).
M3	Percent	Of essential elements of information are collected.
M4	Percent	Of aircraft loaded within specified time.
M5	Percent	Of planned targets hit on time.
M6	Hours	To submit COAs (after receipt of national strategic direction).
M7	Percent	Of ROE consistent with current policy.
M8	Percent	Of offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.
M9	Percent	Of defensive measures taken to endure the physical security of personas, facilities, and events.

**SN 8.1.11 Support Countermining Activities.**

To support the elimination of the threat to noncombatants and friendly military forces from mines, booby traps, and other explosives devices. **(JP 3-15)** (N/A)

M1	Days	To develop plan for providing assistance.
M2	Weeks	To initiate training support for countermining operations.
M3	Weeks	To commit SOF to support countermining operations.
M4	Percent	Of requested assistance actually provided.
M5	Weeks	To deliver assistance (upon approval)
M6	Days	For forces to arrive in theater.
M7	Weeks	To deliver information sharing arrangements with multinational partners.
M8	Hours	To establish liaison with country team, host nation and other USG agencies, PVO/NGO/IO, and coalition forces.
M9	Percent	Of approved projects completed.
M10	Weeks	To establish a National Demining Office with the host nation.

**SN 8.1.12 Coordinate Counterproliferation Programs and Activities.**

To coordinate US counterproliferation programs and activities with allies and friends. Task includes actions to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and encouraging allies and friends self-improvement and bilateral strategic cooperation in the functional areas of counterproliferation activity. **(CJCSI 6510.01B)** (JP 3-05, CJCSI 3141.01)



M1	Annual Visits	With allies and friends to discuss mutual state of NBC defense programs, training, exercises, and doctrine within the counterproliferation functional areas.
M2	Annual Incidents	Of new bilateral strategic cooperation in R&D of counterproliferation projects (e.g., active and passive defenses, counterforce).
M3	Percent	Of improvement each year in allies and friends counterproliferation capabilities.

## **SN 8.2 Provide DOD/Government-Wide Support.**

To provide specified support to other DOD/government agencies. Support to combatant commanders includes supporting the combatant commanders' unique personnel and equipment requirements. This support could be to government agencies responsible for supporting and assisting US states and citizens or, in accordance with US laws, foreign states requiring assistance. Types of support include intelligence, logistic, C4 systems, and security. **(JP 0-2, 2-0, 2-01, 3-0, 3-08v1, 3-08v2, 4-0, 4-04)** (JP 3-07, 3-08v2, 3-57, 6-02)

**Note:** See also SN 8.1, *Support Other Nations or Groups*; and SN 8.1.5, *Conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Humanitarian and Civic Assistance* for more details of the types of support provided.

M1	Hours	For DOD forces (active and RC), to respond to request from domestic civil authorities.
M2	Hours	For DOD to contact all relevant agencies.
M3	Percent	Of military manning requirements for other government agencies met.
M4	Percent	Of military manning requirements for DOD and Joint Agencies met.
M5	Percent	Of US agencies have established communication links to DOD.
M6	Percent	Of requested agencies participating in joint exercise.
M7	Percent	Of combatant commands to which combat support agency provides LNOs.
M8	Hours	To validate incoming short notice requirements (lift or courier) and pass to appropriate component(s).
M9	Hours	To provide feasibility analysis to supported agency, if USTRANSCOM controlled assets required.
M10	Days	For USTRANSCOM to provide feasibility analysis to supported agency, if commercial lift required.
M11	Percent	Of requested support/assistance requirements meet LAD or timeline.

### **SN 8.2.1 Support DOD and Joint Agencies.**

To support DOD/joint agencies, (e.g., Joint Staff, DIA, DISA, DLA, DTRA, etc.). This task includes supporting the CJCS Exercise Program. **(JP 0-2, 2-0, 2-02, 3-0)** (N/A)

M1	Percent	Of officers assigned to Joint Agencies, OSD, and Unified and Specified Commands, meeting standards established by law.
M2	Percent	Of military manning requirements of DOD and Joint Agencies, met.
M3	Weeks	To fill gap between departing and incoming personnel.
M4	Days	To initiate support to requesting agency.
M5	Days	Prior to first day of month of execution, USTRANSCOM provides lift schedules for CJCS exercise program.
M6	Percent	Of requested support/assistance meet LAD or timeline.
M7	Hours	To validate incoming short-notice requirements and pass to appropriate component.
M8	Y/N	Provides feasibility analysis to support agency NLT the time coordinated with that agency.

### SN 8.2.2 Support Other Government Agencies.

To support non-DOD agencies (e.g., DOS, USAID, USIA, FEMA). Support includes military support to civil authorities and civilian law enforcement agencies, counterdrug operations, combating terrorism, noncombatant evacuation, and building a science and technology base. **(JP 0-2, 3-0, 3-07, 3-08v1, 3-08v2, 4-04)** (JP 3-57, 4-02.1, CJCSI 3031.01)

M1	Hours	To send DOD forces (active and RC), when called to aid domestic civil authorities.
M2	Percent	Of required agency support provided.
M3	Percent	Of US agencies have intelligence sharing agreements with combatant command.
M4	Days	To initiate support to requesting agency.
M5	Hours	To provide cost estimate to the requesting agency.
M6	Percent	Of requested support/assistance requirements meet LAD or timeline.
M7	Hours	To validate incoming short-notice requirements and pass to appropriate component.

### SN 8.2.3 Support Evacuation of Noncombatants from Theaters.

To provide for the use of military and civil, including HNS, resources for the evacuation of US dependents and US Government civilian employees and private citizens (US and third nation). Noncombatant evacuation includes providing various support (e.g., health services, transportation, security) to the noncombatants. **(JP 3-0, 3-07, 3-07.5, 3-08v2, 3-11, 5-03.1)** (JP 1-05, 3-10, 4-01.1, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Percent	Of noncombatant injured or ill evacuees evacuated by medical system.
M2	Hours	To deploy Coordination Liaison Team to work with ambassador.
M3	Hours	To assess situation and present it to CINC.
M4	Hours	To evacuate noncombatants (after CINC notified).

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M5	Percent	Of NEOs have a fully operational JTF.
M6	Percent	Of American citizens and designated foreign nationals authorized and requesting evacuation safely.
M7	Percent	Of countries in AOR that have plans for NEO.
M8	Percent	Of evacuees received shelter and food equivalent to safe haven levels.
M9	Hours	To have forces available to evacuate noncombatants.
M10	Y/N	For USTRANSCOM provides noncombatant evacuation operation feasibility estimate NLT the time coordinated with the supported commander.
M11	Percent	Of missions in support of NEO operations meet required POE departure timelines (during execution).
M12	Hours	To provide cost estimate to requesting agency.
M13	Hours	To validate incoming short notice common-user lift requirements and pass to appropriate component(s).
M14	Percent	Of requested support/assistance requirements meet ALD or timeline.
M15	Hours	To secure required clearances and approval for Defense Courier Service movement of materiel.
M16	Y/N	During execution, NEO passengers arrive at their POE NLT their ALD or according to the supported CINC's time line.
M17	Percent	Of noncombatants using health support system, including veterinary support.
M18	Percent	During execution, NEO passengers arrive at their POD NLT their LAD or according to the supported CINC's time line.

#### SN 8.2.4 Assist Civil Defense.

To assist other Federal agencies and State governments in mobilizing, organizing, and directing the civil population in order to minimize the effects of enemy action or natural and technological disasters on all aspects of civil life. This task includes passive measures, such as moving into shelters. **(JP 3-0, 3-07, 3-57, 4-04)** (JP 4-02)

M1	Instances	Of staff assistance and liaison visits to Federal and State Emergency Management Offices.
M2	Minutes	To establish links to FEMA and State Emergency Management Offices to support civil defense.
M3	Percent	Of FEMA and State Emergency Management Offices, maintain on-line communications with DOD communications centers.
M4	Percent	Of victims have some form of shelter within 24 hours of disaster.
M5	Percent	Of victims have access to potable water within 24 hours of disaster.
M6	Percent	Of victims that have one warm meal each day within 24 hours of disaster.
M7	Instances	Of DOD forces (active and/or RC) conducting humanitarian assistance in support of domestic civil authorities.

M8	Hours	For DOD personnel or equipment to arrive at scene of a natural disaster (after receiving a request).
M9	Hours	For DOD personnel or equipment to arrive at scene of a natural disaster (after occurrence).

### **SN 8.3 Coordinate Military Activities Within the Interagency Process.**

To work with representatives of the other Executive departments and agencies to resolve issues involving operations both overseas and domestic. This task includes working within the interagency process and establishing informal liaisons to ensure the resolution of differences and the shaping of issues for presentation within the National Security Council System (NSCS). **(JP 0-2, 3-0, 3-07, 3-08v1, 3-08v2)** (JP 3-07.1, 3-07.4, 3-07.5, 3-57)

M1	Hours	To respond to requests for humanitarian assistance.
M2	Percent	Of Congressional oversight foreign deployments approved.
M3	Percent	Of intelligence and security operations (requiring notification of select committees), considered favorably.
M4	Percent	Of agencies have permanent Joint Staff or OSD LNOs in place.
M5	Percent	Of interagency visits have special badge (e.g. escort) procedures.
M6	Percent	Of actions, forwarded with Joint Staff developed hedges against failure.
M7	Percent	Of actions, forwarded with DOD coordinated hedges against failure.
M8	Percent	Of actions, forwarded with interagency process coordinated hedges against failure.
M9	Percent	Of interagency meetings include CJCS/JS representatives.
M10	Percent	Of instances of interagency actions not integrating NBC requirements.

#### **SN 8.3.1 Coordinate and Control Policy for the Conduct of Operations.**

To work with the other partners in the interagency process to ensure that all ideas going forward to the President have been fully understood by all interagency participants. To also ensure that decisions taken within the interagency process are passed to those who must execute those decisions and to ensure the proper execution of those decisions, within the intent of the President **(JP 0-2, 3-0, 3-08v1, 3-08v2)** (N/A)

M1	Percent	Of DOD decisions, involving deployment of US forces, made with interagency coordination.
M2	Percent	Of DOD decisions, involving employment of US forces, made with interagency coordination.
M3	Percent	Of Non-DOD decisions, involving employment of US forces made with interagency coordination.
M4	Hours	To pass a Presidential Decision to combatant commands.
M5	Hours	To execute a Presidential Decision by a combatant commander.

M6	Percent	Of DOD actions have other interagency actors take appropriate supporting actions.
M7	Percent	Of DOD positions have other interagency participants take appropriate supporting positions (at Presidential level).

### SN 8.3.2 Conduct Information Management in the Interagency Process.

To ensure that the maximum information is made available to all participants in the interagency process. This task includes protecting sources of information outside the normal government information processes and ensuring that the flow of information does not overwhelm the process, thus hiding important facts within a flood of data. **(JP 2-0)** (JP 3-07.5, 3-08v1, 3-57)

M1	Hours	To prepare and disseminate information packages to Non-DOD players for interagency meetings.
M2	Hours	To initiate implementing action for NSC decisions.
M3	Hours	To complete debriefing interagency meetings to DOD and Joint officials.
M4	Percent	Of concerned agencies participating in interagency process.

### SN 8.3.3 Establish Interagency Cooperation Structures.

To work within the interagency process, ensuring knowledgeable personnel represent the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders. This task includes participating within the process of those Departments and Agencies not normally represented in the interagency process, to ensure full coordination within the Executive Branch. This task also includes the establishment, where needed, of informal processes of liaison **(JP 0-2, 3-08v1, 3-57)** (JP 0-2, 3-07.5, 3-08v2, 4-02.1, CJCSI 3110.14)

M1	Hours	To coordinate action/option with agency.
M2	Percent	Of involved agencies have permanent Joint Staff LNOs in place.
M3	Percent	Of involved agencies have permanent Joint Staff or OSD LNOs in place.
M4	Percent	Of interagency visits have special badge (e.g. escort) procedures.

### SN 8.3.4 Perform Consequence Management (CM) in the Interagency Arena.

To work with the representatives of other Executive departments and agencies to respond to CONUS/OCONUS incidents involving nuclear, biological, chemical, conventional high explosive weapons, and/or their contaminants. This task includes developing policy, positions, and strategy that support DOD CM operational planning for CONUS/OCONUS incidents as part of the interagency process. **(JP 3-08v1)** (JP 0-2)

M1	Percent	Of actions, forwarded with developed hedges against failure.
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M2	Hours	To develop hedging options for decision makers.
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**SN 8.3.5 Coordinate DOD/Government Information Operations (IO).**

To work with the Services, combatant commands, and civil/military agencies on issues involving offensive and defensive IO. This task involves coordinating judicial, law enforcement, and military efforts to affect adversary information and information systems and in protecting DOD information and information systems. **(JP 3-13, CJCSI 3210.01, CJCSI 6510.01B)** (JP 3-05, 3-07.2)

M1	Yes/No	Identifications and organization of appropriate agencies and organizations to support interagency process.
M2	Yes/No	Development and approval of information operations.
M3	Percent	Recommended versus approved DOD capabilities and activities employed in support of information operations tasks.
M4	Percent	Recommended versus approved non-DOD capabilities and activities employed in support of information operations tasks.

## STRATEGIC THEATER TASKS, MEASURES, AND CRITERIA

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## **ST 1 DEPLOY, CONCENTRATE, AND MANEUVER THEATER FORCES.**

To place and dispose assigned and allocated US forces, as well as forces of other friendly nations or groups, within a theater. To create a relative strategic advantage, to control the politico-military situation, and to execute a theater campaign for achieving national and multinational policy and objectives. This task includes deploying and concentrating forces for strategic advantage within a theater. **(JP 3-0, 3-09, 4-01, 4-01.1, 4-01.3, 4-01.8)** (JP 3-0, 3-07.5, 3-10.1, 4-0, 4-01, 4-01.1, 4-02.1)

M1	Percent	Of allocated theater forces in place (at campaign plan execution).
M2	Percent	Of TPFDD generated theater surface transportation requirements met (at execution).
M3	Percent	Of TPFDD transportation airlift requirements met (at execution).
M4	Percent	Of TPFDD transportation sealift requirements met (at execution).

### **ST 1.1 Conduct Intratheater Strategic Deployment.**

To deploy, shift, or move Service, joint, or multinational forces within the theater to designated areas by any means or mode. This movement can be from within the theater, into a theater of war or joint operations area or from one joint operations area to another joint operations area. **(JP 3-0, 3-02, 4-01, 4-01.1, 4-01.3)** (JP 3-0, 3-07.5, 3-17, 4-01, 4-01.1, 4-01.2, 4-01.3, CJCSM 3122.03)

**Note:** For providing augmentation transportation for intratheater movement from sources not organic to a combatant command, see ST 4, *Sustain Theater Forces*.

M1	Days	To assemble airlift for strategic intratheater deployment of forces.
M2	Days	To assemble sealift for strategic intratheater deployment of forces.
M3	Hours	To locate specific ULN deploying within theater.
M4	Hours	To locate specific unit deploying within theater.
M5	Minutes	To locate units during intratheater strategic deployment.
M6	Percent	Of cargo visible during transit (ITV).
M7	Percent	Of intratheater airlift asset requirements considered in deployment planning.
M8	Percent	Of lift requested, actually used.
M9	Percent	Of ULNs arrived within JFC LADs.
M10	Percent	Of units arrived within JFC LADs.
M11	Percent	Of units closed at destination by RDD.
M12	Days	For force closure into JOA (from receipt of EXORD).

**ST 1.1.1 Process Requests for Forces to be Deployed.**

To review and approve a subordinate commander's (to include CJTFs) request for forces to be deployed into a joint operations area. A combatant commander may make an intratheater deployment without a request from a subordinate commander, but normally will coordinate the deployment with the subordinate command. **(JP 3-17, 4-01, 4-01.1, 4-01.3)** (JP 3-08v1, 3-17, 4-01, 4-01.3)

M1	Hours	To process movement requirements.
M2	Hours	To review request and decision by combatant commander.
M3	Percent	Of requests filled as worded.
M4	Percent	Of requests returned by combatant commander for additional information.

**ST 1.1.2 Coordinate Theater Strategic Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (JRSOI).**

To coordinate the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of units, personnel, equipment and materiel in theater and to process them and move them to the point at which they are transferred to the responsible operational commander, available for battle. This task includes bed down activities at airfields, ports, and joint logistics over-the-shore (JLOTS) and in-transit visibility (ITV). **(JP 4-01, 4-01.2, 4-01.3, 4-01.5, 4-04)** (JP 3-07.5, 4-01, 4-01.1, 4-01.3, 4-01.6, 4-02.1, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Days	For JLOTS to be operational in theater.
M2	Days	For sealift vessels to be returned to USTRANSCOM control after arrival in theater.
M3	Hours	Delay in opening of APOD or SPOD.
M4	Hours	For combat squadrons to be prepared for combat sorties (after arrival at bed down airfields).
M5	Hours	For unit personnel to link-up with unit equipment and move to gaining command's staging area.
M6	Hours	From unit's arrival in port until moved to gaining command's assembly area.
M7	Hours	To determine status of arriving unit.
M8	Hours	To offload ship.
M9	Hours	To load/offload railcars.
M10	Minutes	To offload airlift aircraft.
M11	Percent	Of time the airfield has been in the maximum on ground (MOG) category.
M12	Percent	Of unit personnel and equipment arrive at destination by RDD.
M13	Tons	Offloaded per day using existing terminals.
M14	Percent	Of combat units having arrived by CINC's required delivery date (RDD and 5 days).
M15	Percent	Of equipment at JRSOI locations requiring maintenance.

### ST 1.1.2.1 Provide Theater Strategic Reception.

To provide air, ground and seaport reception in theaters. This task applies to both single user ports of discharge and common-user ports. Reception must be coordinated with the combatant commander who has overall JRSOI responsibility. Reception can be provided by a Service component, USTRANSCOM, a host nation, or a contractor. Reception also includes documenting necessary information to provide intransit visibility. This task includes offloading of aircraft, rail cars, and ships, including discharge at pier side and in stream (to include JLOTS). **(JP 4-01, 4-01.2, 4-01.3, 4-01.5)** (JP 3-07.5, 3-10, 4-01, 4-01.1, 4-01.3, 4-01.5, 4-02.1, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Days	For strategic sealift vessels to be returned to USTRANSCOM after arrival in theater.
M2	Days	Personnel retained in reception area.
M3	Days	Units retained in reception area.
M4	Hours	For combat squadrons to be prepared for combat sorties (after arrival at bed down airfields).
M5	Hours	To offload airlift aircraft.
M6	Hours	To offload ship.
M7	Hours	To offload railcars.
M8	Percent	Of time the airfield is in the maximum on ground (MOG) category.
M9	Percent	Of personnel processed per day by the JRC, relative to the daily processing capacity.
M10	Tons	Offloaded per day using JLOTS.
M11	Hours	To determine status of arriving unit.
M12	Percent	Of personnel arriving in theater housed in barracks or suitable cantonment areas while being processed.
M13	Percent	Of planned POD throughput used.
M14	Percent	Of throughput capability available on arrival of aircraft/ship at POD.
M15	Percent	Of TPFDD throughput achieved.

### ST 1.1.2.2 Provide Theater Strategic Staging.

To clear ports, combine personnel and equipment in a controlled area, and prepare for onward movement. It also includes materiel segregation, scheduling for movement and preparation for transport. This task includes port services in the THEATER. **(JP 4-01, 4-01.5)** (JP 3-07.5, 3-17, 4-01, 4-01.2, 4-01.6, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Hours	For unit equipment arriving by sea to be moved from reception area.
M2	Hours	For unit personnel to link-up with unit equipment and move to gaining command's staging area.
M3	Hours	For units arriving by air to move from reception area.
M4	Hours	From unit's arrival in port until moved to gaining command's assembly area.

### ST 1.1.2.3 Provide Onward Movement in the Theater.

To flow forces from PODs/staging areas to their final destinations by highway (common-user or convoy), rail, watercraft, or fly away. This task also includes transitioning command and control of units and personnel during onward movement and providing in-transit visibility (ITV) data. **(JP 4-01.3, 4-01.5)** (JP 3-07.5, 3-10, 4-01.1, 4-01.2, 4-01.3, 4-02.1, CJCSM 3122.03)

**Note:** Movement Control is provided under ST 4.3.1, *Establish and Coordinate Movement Services Within Theater*.

M1	Days	Forces are en route to final destination (from POD staging areas).
M2	kph	Average speed of convoys en route to final destination (from staging areas/POD).
M3	Percent	Of vehicles become misrouted en route to final destination (from POD staging areas).
M4	Percent	Of units move in accordance with movement and security instructions.
M5	Percent	Of external movement requirements identified and request submitted.
M6	Hours	To position movement control assets for controlling movement.

### ST 1.1.2.4 Provide Theater Strategic Integration of Deploying Forces.

To conduct seamless flow between phases and the synchronized hand-off of mission capable units into an operational commander's force prior to mission execution. **(JP 3-0, 4-0)** (JP 4-0, 4-01.1, 4-01.3)

M1	Hours	It takes for arriving air units to be ready to conduct operations.
M2	Hours	It takes for units to be ready to support the operational commander after arrival at the gaining command's staging area.
M3	Percent	Of units arrive at gaining command's staging area prepared to conduct operations.
M4	Hours	It takes for arriving units to integrate into C2 process of its higher hqs.

### ST 1.1.2.5 Estimate Theater Closure Time.

Determine the arrival date for units, passengers, or cargo at POEs or determine the arrival date at theater destinations from POD. Service or Service components provide estimates of the ability of their assets (units, contracted capability) and resources (materiel handling equipment, facilities, fuel, etc.) to transport units, passengers, and cargo to the POE or from the POD. **(JP 4-0, 4-01, 5-0, 5-00.2, 5-03.1)** (JP 4-0, 4-01.2, 4-01.7 5-0, 5-00.2, 5-03.1, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Days	Deviation between ALD and EDD for self-deploying Service and component forces.
M2	Percent	Of transportation assets meet ALD/RLD.
M3	Days	Deviation from LAD in airlift.
M4	Days	Deviation from LAD in sealift.
M5	Percent	Of ULNs arrive NLT LAD in airlift.
M6	Percent	Of units closed NLT RDD.
M7	Percent	Of ULNs close after RDD.
M8	Percent	Of ULNs arrive NLT LAD in sealift.
M9	Days	Needed to determine aerial port requirements.
M10	Percent	Of POE/POD capacity employed.
M11	Percent	Of estimated rail capacity from POD to destination is actually in place.
M12	Percent	Of TPFDD estimated throughput capacity for POE/POD is actually in place.
M13	Days	To position port support activities at POEs/PODs.
M14	Days	APODs/SPODs to reach full operating capability.
M15	Percent	Of intratheater airlift, ground transportation, or sealift available for onward movement.

### ST 1.1.3 Conduct Intratheater Deployment of Forces.

To deploy or move a joint or multinational force by any means or mode of transportation from its position within the theater to another position within the theater or theater of war in support of the geographic combatant commander's strategic plan. This task includes providing in-transit visibility (ITV) data. (JP 3-17, 4-01.3) (JP 3-02, 3-17, 4-01.1, 4-01.2)

M1	Hours	To locate specific personnel or cargo en route.
M2	Percent	Of cargo closed before JFC EAD without any place to offload or store.
M3	Percent	Of cargo, visible during transit (ITV).
M4	Percent	Of cargo requested, delivered.
M5	Percent	Of force moved by means designated in commander's TPFDD.
M6	Percent	Of intratheater and (where available) HNS lift assets effectively integrated into intratheater deployment plan.
M7	Percent	Of required assets/resources, provided to JFC to complete operational movement by RDD.
M8	Percent	Of ULNs, visible during transit (ITV).
M9	Percent	Of units closed within JFC RDDs.

### ST 1.1.4 Provide Command and Control of Deploying Units.

To provide for authority and direction of deploying units as they transit through the phases of deployment to the point they come under the COCOM of the supported combatant commander, or other command arrangement, as specified.



This task includes determining appropriate circumstances and procedures for transfer of authority (TOA) from the supporting force to the supported combatant commander. **(JP 3-0, 4-01.1, 4-01.3)** (JP 3-17, 4-01.3)

M1	Hours	For a unit or major cargo in transit to be located (upon request).
M2	Hours	For transfer of authority messages to be exchanged after units cross JFC boundaries.
M3	Minutes	Or less for transfer of authority message to be exchanged after unit crosses JFC boundary.
M4	Minutes	Or less to locate a deploying unit or major cargo item (upon request).
M5	Minutes	To establish connectivity with aircrew or command element of an active mission.
M6	Hours	For deployed commander to establish 100% accountability of deployed forces.
M7	Hours	For deployed commander to transmit required casualty report to Service headquarters to allow for timely notification of NOK.

#### ST 1.1.5 Provide Intratheater Refueling.

To provide refueling for the deployment or strategic employment of air, land, and sea forces within a theater. Refueling will allow forces to reach their destination without dependence on foreign nations while in-transit. **(JP 4-01.1)** (JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-04.1, 3-05, 3-09.3, 3-17, 4-01, 4-01.1, 4-01.2)

M1	Percent	Of accepted air-to-air refueling requests met.
M2	Percent	Of air-to-air refueling sorties delivered fragged offload.
M3	Percent	Of receivers take full offload at appropriate time and location (inbound).
M4	Percent	Of receivers take full offload at appropriate time and location (outbound).
M5	Percent	Of requests for emergency tanker support (e.g., CSAR, battle damage), met.
M6	Percent	Of tanker tracks (servicing both type receivers) flown by boom and drogue capable tankers.
M7	Pounds	Of fuel per day offloaded in air-to-air refueling.
M8	Percent	Of receiver aircraft divert (due to tankers missing ARCTs during execution).
M9	Hours	To validate short notice request for air refueling support (from receipt).
M10	Hours	To source air refueling resources for validated short notice air refueling requests (from receipt).
M11	Hours	To provide feasibility analysis for short notice requests for additional apportioned strategic air refueling assets to support the air-bridge (from receipt).

**ST 1.1.6 Coordinate/Provide Prepositioned Assets/Equipment.**

To provide long-term prepositioning and short-term deployment/redeployment of unit equipment and supplies in support of designated elements. These include afloat prepositioning shipping (APS) and expeditionary prepositioning shipping (maritime prepositioning forces (MPF)). **(JP 4-01, 4-01.1, 4-01.2, 4-01.6)**  
(JP 3-02.1, 3-02.2, 4-01.6, 4-01.7)

TBD		
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**ST 1.2 Assemble Forces.**

To assemble designated theater forces in areas from which they are best disposed to initiate the combatant commander's campaign plan and achieve strategic advantage. Forces are assembled based upon the commander's concept of operations. **(JP 3-0)** (JP 3-02, 3-17)

M1	Days	To move support bases for concentrating forces.
M2	Days	To concentrate forces.
M3	Percent	Of concentrating forces must road march.

**ST 1.3 Conduct Theater Strategic Maneuver and Force Positioning.**

To conduct theater strategic maneuver and force positioning of Service, joint, or multinational forces to achieve a position of strategic advantage over the enemy. Successful strategic concentration may be either offensive or defensive. **(JP 3-0, 3-09)** (JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-02, 3-17, 4-0)

M1	Hours	From acceptance of allied forces (when required) until assigned to strategic formations.
M2	Hours	To request apportioned reinforcing forces (following warning order).
M3	Hours	Until unit theater forces are postured to deal with an attack (following warning order or strategic warning of attack).
M4	Instances	Enemy forces withdraw or redeploy.
M5	Instances	Strategic deployment achieves a strategic advantage.

**ST 1.3.1 Posture Forces for Strategic Maneuver.**

To plan and order the grouping of forces and means into strategic formations for executing theater war or strategic plans or campaigns. Strategic formations support the theater strategic concept and intent and provide for the effective use of all elements of assigned forces, a capability for maneuvering and increasing the strength of forces and means during the joint operation, a rapid transformation from strategic offensive to strategic defensive operations without the loss of momentum or effectiveness, the conduct of continuous operations, and the protection of the joint force. A strategic formation could be the combatant

command, a subordinate joint force, or even a single service organization assigned a strategic mission. **(JP 0-2, 3-0)** (JP 3-0, 3-09)

M1	Hours	From acceptance of allied forces (when required) until assigned to strategic formations.
M2	Hours	To designate JFACC (following warning order).
M3	Hours	To request apportioned reinforcing forces (following warning order).
M4	Hours	Until unit theater forces postured to deal with attack (following warning order or strategic warning of attack).
M5	Hours	Until unit assigned to specific component command (following warning order).
M6	Instances	Enemy forces withdraw or redeploy.

### ST 1.3.2 Designate Strategic Reserves.

To establish an external reinforcing force that is not committed in advance to a specific major subordinate command. This force can be deployed to any region for a mission designated at the time by the combatant commander. **(JP 3-0)** (JP 3-0, 3-17)

M1	Days	To close designated strategic reserve into assigned location.
M2	Hours	For strategic reserve to respond.
M3	Percent	Of strategic reserve allocated to a single joint/combined commander.
M4	Percent	Of strategic reserve specified in campaign plan, available.
M5	Percent	Of strategic reserve not tasked with another mission.
M6	Percent	Of strategic reserve previously designated in campaign plan.

### ST 1.3.3 Synchronize Forcible Entry in Theater.

To synchronize the seizing and holding of a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition. This task requires tailoring forces for the mission and ensuring they are scheduled for simultaneous deployment and employment. This activity is often the only method for gaining access into the joint operations area or for introducing decisive forces into the region. Synchronized forcible entry, with any combination of airborne, amphibious, and air assault operations, is designed to horizontally escalate the operation to exceed the enemy's capability to respond. **(JP 3-0, 3-17, 4-01.1)** (JP 3-0, 3-02, 3-03)

M1	Hours	For forcible entry force to achieve planned objectives (after entry).
M2	Hours	To secure bridgehead from direct fire and observed indirect fire to permit deployment of follow-on forces (after initial forced entry).
M3	Percent	Of entry forces available for follow-on missions.
M4	Percent	Of the joint operations area infrastructure supports introduction of follow-on forces (IAW theater campaign plan).

**ST 1.3.4 Integrate Direct Action in Theater.**

To integrate short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions by special operations forces in order to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or materiel, with strategic results. This task includes the integration and synchronization of SOF in coordinated raids, ambushes, or direct assaults; the emplacement of mines and other munitions; standoff attacks; support for the employment of precision guided weapons; independent sabotage; antiship operations, and information operations.

**(JP 3-05, 3-05.3)** (JP 3-03, 3-05.3, 3-50.0)

**Note:** This task includes the integration of SOF actions to support ST 6.2.7, *Initiate and Conduct Personnel Recovery in Theater*.

M1	Hours	Between desired and actual time in position.
M2	Hours	Between planned and actual infiltration.
M3	Percent	Of direct action missions result in loss of all or most of engaged friendly forces.
M4	Percent	Of operations conducted complete rehearsal (prior to infiltration).
M5	Percent	Of operations ensured full coordination and deconfliction (prior to execution).
M6	Percent	Of proposed DA missions rejected because of insufficient preparation time.
M7	Percent	Of Theater DA recovery missions successfully withdraw from immediate objective area.
M8	Percent	Of Theater DA recovery missions recover target and mission personnel to friendly control, alive.
M9	Percent	Of theater direct action missions achieve their aim.
M10	Percent	Of theater direct action missions are deliberately planned.
M11	Percent	Of time-sensitive theater direct action mission achieve their aim.

**ST 1.3.5 Conduct Show of Force/Demonstration.**

To conduct show of force operations or demonstrations. Demonstrations are designed to display resolve and capability to affect regional politico-military decision making, to support the other instruments of national power or to draw the attention of an enemy. Show of force operations are those demonstrations conducted to exhibit military power, but with the intention of not becoming engaged in combat. Activities could include amphibious demonstrations, aircraft and ship visits or concentrations, combined training exercises, forward deployments, and the introduction or buildup of a military force in a region.

**(JP 3-02, 3-07)** (JP 3-0, 3-02, 3-07.1, 3-08v2, 3-58)

M1	Days	Until show of force elicits diplomatic response from target nation.
M2	Days	Until show of force mentioned in target nation's press.

M3	Days	Demonstration holds attention of targeted enemy forces.
M4	Days	Until show of force elicits change in conduct of target nation.
M5	Percent	Of enemy forces drawn away from main thrust by demonstration.
M6	Percent	Of force conducting show of force/demo become decisively engaged in combat.
M7	Percent	Of force in place (at execution).
M8	Percent	Of targeted enemy forces displace toward demonstration after start.
M9	Percent	Relationship between show of force/demo and theater deception plan.

### ST 1.3.6 Conduct Theater of War Operations in Depth.

To conduct various types of actions across the depth and breadth of the theater of war. Such operations achieve a position of advantage or defeat/destroy enemy forces or capabilities. Theater strategic operations in depth can be conducted by theater assigned forces and/or by external supporting forces. Operations in depth may be joint, coalition, or single Service or nation, but in all cases support theater strategic objectives. **(JP 1, 3-0)** (JP 2-0, 3-0, 3-08v1, 4-0)

M1	Percent	Of supporting forces correctly linkup with forces in depth (e.g., for resupply).
M2	Kilometers	Deviation in position of forces at required check points.
M3	Kilometers	Deep into enemy area, actively conducting operations in depth.
M4	Minutes	Between requested and actual delivery of fires by external supporting fires.
M5	Percent	Of projected LOC capacity actually available.
M6	Percent	Of assigned targets destroyed (within time allotted).
M7	Percent	Of enemy strategic centers of gravity covered by operations in depth.
M8	Percent	Of forces operating in depth, within range of friendly supporting firepower.
M9	Percent	Of multinational force integrated into theater campaign.
M10	Percent	Of projected noncombatant casualties, actually incurred.
M11	Percent	Of operations in depth, fully coordinated prior to initiation.
M12	Percent	Of operations in depth, meet planned time lines for positioning.
M13	Percent	Of target attacks by external supporting forces, aborted.
M14	Percent	Of theater actions achieve strategic position of advantage over enemy forces.
M15	Percent	Of theater operations achieve national and theater strategic objectives.
M16	Percent	Of theater strategic operations, adequately supported and contribute to successful campaign.
M17	Percent	Of time during theater campaign, significant operations in depth are active.
M18	Weeks	To plan and position forces deep in enemy area.

**ST 1.3.7 Conduct Unconventional Warfare Across Joint Operations Areas.**

To conduct military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration across joint operations areas. This task integrates and synchronizes indigenous or surrogate forces that are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert or clandestine operations, as well as indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape. **(JP 3-05)** (JP 3-50.3)

M1	Percent	Of assets shared among theaters of operation.
M2	Percent	Of indigenous population recruited to support friendly UW plan/campaign.
M3	Percent	Of isolation phase required time available.
M4	Percent	Of linkups at infiltration, successful.
M5	Percent	Of operational and strategic objectives successfully achieved by friendly force UW action.
M6	Percent	Of theater deep zone, has active UW conducting operations.
M7	Percent	Of UW cadre fully trained in UW (including area language).
M8	Percent	Of UW forces remain clandestine or covert.
M9	Percent	Of UW operations include a fully executed PSYOP preparation.

**ST 1.3.8 Establish Water Space Management.**

To provide for safe transit and direction of submarines and other underwater vessels and equipment, and the prevention of mutual interference between subsurface, surface, and other force elements. Other force elements include items such as towed array sonar, mine countermeasures, or other towed objects at subsurface depths, torpedoes, ordnance, fuel tanks, etc. **(N/A)** (N/A)

M1	Incidents	Where proper water space management inadequate.
M2	Incidents	Where proper coordination of movement not adequate.
M3	Percent	Of Notices to Mariners published in timely fashion to ALCON agencies.
M4	Incidents	Of collision at sea.

**ST 1.3.9 Establish Airspace Control Measures.**

To establish safe, efficient, and flexible airspace control measures for the coordination, integration, and regulation of airspace of defined dimensions. This task includes procedures to facilitate routing and recognition of friendly aircraft, establishment of identification zones and weapons engagement zones, and the direction of noncombat air resources. It offers the least inhibition to offensive counterair and other operations penetrating and returning from enemy territory. This task includes employing both positive and procedural control measures. **(N/A)** (JP 3-09, 3-52, 3-55.1, 3-56.1)

**Note:** See ST 2.2.1, *Collect Information on Theater Strategic Situation*, and ST 6.2.5, *Establish and Coordinate Positive Identification Procedures for Friendly Forces in Theater*, for identification of friend or foe (IFF) to establish hostile criteria for early separation of friend and foe in order to permit maximum beyond-visual-range engagement and avoid fratricide.

M1	Percent	Of fixed wing sorties unable to complete mission because of lack of clearance.
M2	Percent	Of friendly aircraft sorties engaged by friendly weapons systems.
M3	Percent	Of friendly sorties experiencing blue on blue air-to-air engagements.
M4	Percent	Of OA has complete air picture available.
M5	Percent	Of rotary wing sorties unable to complete mission because of lack of clearance.
M6	Percent	Of sorties interfered with by friendly ground fire.
M7	Percent	Of time, procedural control allowed positive control to be suspended for EMCON reasons.
M8	Percent	Of time, system outages forces use of procedural control.
M9	Percent	Of tracks cannot be cross told.

#### **ST 1.4 Enhance Strategic Mobility.**

To facilitate the movement of joint or multinational formations in a theater campaign or joint operation that overcome delays due to strategically significant terrain or sea location. This task pertains to the capability of military forces to move into or between a theater of war or operations and achieve concentration for strategic advantage. This activity includes overcoming strategically significant obstacles and actions to enhance movement of theater forces (e.g., the building of the Burma Road or Alaskan Highway during World War II). **(JP 3-0, 4-01, 4-01.6)** (JP 1, 3-0, 3-02, 3-02.2, 3-17, 4-01.2)

M1	Percent	Of deploying forces delayed by enemy strategic counter mobility efforts.
M2	Instances	Of theater operations delayed, diverted, changed, or canceled.
M3	Percent	Of mine countermeasures operations enhance freedom of movement.
M4	Percent	Of mines impacting on freedom of movement, countered.

#### **ST 1.5 Conduct Strategic Counter mobility.**

To delay, channel, or stop offensive air, land, space, and sea movement by an enemy formation attempting to achieve concentration for strategic advantage. It also includes actions to shape, at the strategic level, enemy retrograde operations to allow friendly exploitation. **(JP 3-0)** (JP 3-02, 3-15)

M1	Days	Delay in enemy operations and movement because of friendly systems of barriers, obstacles and mines.
M2	Percent	Of designated forces actually assigned to monitor and enforce friendly strategic barriers to enemy mobility.
M3	Percent	Of enemy force channeled into an unfavorable avenue of approach by friendly system of obstacles or barriers.
M4	Percent	Reduction in enemy's logistics flow (to below requirements for offensive action).

### ST 1.5.1 Establish Strategic System of Barriers, Obstacles, and Mines.

To channelize, delay, disrupt or attrite the enemy and protect friendly forces relative to employment of barriers, obstacles, and mines in support of land, maritime, and air operations. Strategic barriers, obstacles, and minefields normally are emplaced around an existing terrain feature (e.g., mountain chain or strait) or a manmade structure (e.g., air base, canal, highway, or bridge). Selecting locations and emplacing strategic land and maritime obstacles should be coordinated among multinational forces at all levels. This will preclude limiting friendly operational maneuver; conflicting, duplicative, or divergent operations, and possible fratricide among multinational forces. Plans that could impact on other theaters should be coordinated to prevent potential mutual interference. This is particularly important for maritime minelaying that could affect strategic movement to or from other theaters. **(JP 3-03, 3-15)** (JP 3-05, 3-07.2, 3-10.1, 3-15)

M1	Days	Delay in construction of strategic systems of barriers, obstacles, and mines.
M2	Percent	Of systems of friendly obstacles and barriers successful in delaying, channeling, or stopping enemy offensive action.
M3	Percent	Of locations for strategic systems of barriers, obstacles, and mines surveyed before crisis.

### ST 1.5.2 Establish Sanctions, Embargo, or Blockade.

To isolate a place, especially a port, harbor, or part of a coast, by ships or troops and aircraft to prevent entrance or exit and deny an enemy support, commerce, reinforcement, or mobility, and/or reduce an adversary's internal political legitimacy. This task strips away as much of the enemy's support and freedom of action as possible, while limiting potential for horizontal or vertical escalation. It interferes with the enemy's ability to mass, maneuver, withdraw, supply, command, and reinforce combat power while it weakens the enemy economically, materially, and psychologically. This task serves to deny the enemy both physical and psychological support and may separate the enemy leadership and military from public support. **(JP 3-07)** (JP 3-0, 3-03)

M1	Days	Before clear indications target government modified its position.
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M2	Days	Before target nation begins to modify their targeted behavior.
M3	Percent	Of designated high interest transiting commercial vessels, kept under continuous surveillance.
M4	Percent	Of pre-action trade maintained through alternative routes.
M5	Percent	Reduction in flow of all supplies to (or from) a target nation.

### **ST 1.6 Control or Dominate Strategically Significant Area(s).**

To control or dominate the theater physical and information environments whose possession or command provides either side a strategic advantage. To control is to deny the area to the enemy by either occupation of the strategically key area or by limiting use or access to the environment or combat area by the enemy. For an environment to be strategically key, its control must achieve strategic results or deny same to the enemy. In military operations other than war, this activity pertains to a friendly country conducting populace and resources control. **(JP 1, 3-0, 3-02)** (JP 2-0, 3-0)

**Note:** For attack of theater strategic targets in conjunction with this task see ST 3.2.1, *Conduct Attack on Theater Strategic Targets/Target Sets using Lethal Means*, and ST 3.2.2, *Conduct Attack on Theater Strategic Targets using Nonlethal Means*.

M1	Days	To achieve air superiority.
M2	Percent	Of forces have operations delayed because key strategic terrain is not under control of friendly ground forces.
M3	Percent	Of forces have operations delayed for lack of air superiority.
M4	Percent	Of forces have operations delayed for lack of maritime superiority.
M5	Percent	Of Joint Force are casualties.
M6	Percent	Of logistics support not available because friendly forces lack maritime superiority.
M7	Percent	Of population under friendly control in MOOTW.
M8	Percent	Of theater strategic activities requiring access to space (e.g. reconnaissance, surveillance, communications), not conducted.
M9	Percent	Of villages under friendly administrative control (e.g., taxes collected in MOOTW).
M10	Weeks	To achieve maritime superiority.
M11	Weeks	To achieve information superiority after crisis onset.
M12	Days	Delay to operations because of the lack of information security.

#### **ST 1.6.1 Control Strategically Significant Land Area.**

To control strategically significant land area in order to facilitate the freedom of movement and action of forces. The objective is to allow land, sea, air, space, and special operations forces to conduct operations free from major interference from enemy forces based upon land areas. This task includes identifying and prioritizing critical areas and focusing efforts, during specific periods of time,

when superiority must be established to ensure freedom of action for critical operations and protection of key assets. **(JP 3-0)** (JP 3-0)

M1	Incidents/Day	Of enemy fires or direct assault on friendly support facilities in rear areas.
M2	Incidents	Of attacks by enemy fires on friendly airfields/seaports.
M3	Percent	Of areas identified as decisive points or enemy geographic centers of gravity, under friendly control at strategic end state.
M4	Percent	Of operations, delayed until key strategic areas controlled by friendly ground forces.
M5	Percent	Of population under friendly control in MOOTW.
M6	Percent	Of theater forces operating in areas under control of friendly ground forces.
M7	Percent	Of theater free from air attack from enemy controlled land areas.
M8	Percent	Of villages, where no leaders, teachers, policemen, or medical personnel assassinated within last three months in MOOTW.
M9	Percent	Of villages under friendly administrative control (e.g., taxes collected).

### ST 1.6.2 Gain and Maintain Air Superiority in Theater.

To conduct counterair operations sufficient to provide air superiority at the proper place and time to provide freedom of action for critical operations and protection of key assets. JFCs normally seek to secure air superiority early in the conduct of joint operations. This task attacks the enemy's warfighting capabilities in the air through offensive counterair (OCA), defensive counterair (DCA), antiair warfare (AAW), air interdiction (AI) as well as strategic attack on enemy airpower capability. **(JP 1, 3-0, 3-03)** (JP 3-0)

**Note:** Defensive counter air is covered under ST 6.1, *Provide Theater Missile Defense*.

M1	Incidents/Day	Of attacks by enemy air forces on commercial and military airlift aircraft.
M2	Days	To achieve air superiority.
M3	Incidents	Of major operations delayed, disrupted, or canceled.
M4	Percent	Friendly attrition rate per sortie.
M5	Percent	Of air transport departed on time.
M6	Percent	Of critical operations area in theater under an air superiority umbrella.
M7	Percent	Of lesser operations (and no major operations) delayed or disrupted.

### ST 1.6.3 Gain and Maintain Maritime Superiority in Theater.

To conduct the employment of forces for decisive engagement, attrition, containment, neutralization, or destruction of enemy maritime surface, subsurface, and air forces and their means of support in order to secure the desired degree of maritime superiority. This task attacks the enemy's warfighting capabilities in the maritime environment through antisubmarine warfare (ASW), anti-air warfare (AAW), defensive counterair (DCA), air interdiction (AI), and traditional surface and subsurface warfare. Additionally, this task requires the coordination of barrier and blockade operations to deny enemy maritime forces access to open ocean areas and other maritime areas; offensive and defensive mining operations to restrict the freedom of movement of enemy maritime forces in areas such as harbors and chokepoints; and mine countermeasures to permit freedom of movement of friendly maritime forces. **(JP 1, 3-0, 3-03)** (JP 3-0)

**Note:** For conduct of a blockade, please see ST 1.5.2, *Establish Sanctions, Embargo, or Blockade*.

M1	Incidents/Day	Of attacks on commercial or military strategic lift vessels by enemy combatants.
M2	Percent	Of friendly shipping suffering significant disruption or delays.
M3	Percent	Of major operations delayed or disrupted.
M4	Percent	Of major operations delayed, disrupted, or canceled.
M5	Casualties	Suffered by force in achieving maritime superiority.
M6	Percent	Of enemy naval forces gain access to friendly mined/blockaded harbors and chokepoints (within JOA).
M7	Percent	Of enemy naval forces gain access to open ocean areas (within JOA).
M8	Percent	Of enemy naval forces regaining access to their mined/blockaded harbors and choke points (within JOA).
M9	Percent	Of equipment and supplies coming through SLOCs, delayed, disrupted, or canceled (because of enemy naval action).
M10	Percent	Of major operations, delayed, disrupted, or canceled (because of enemy air or naval actions).
M11	Weeks	To achieve maritime superiority.

### ST 1.6.4 Gain and Maintain Information Superiority in Theater.

To achieve information superiority by affecting an adversary's information, information-based processes, and information systems, while defending one's own information, information-based processes, and information systems. This task is accomplished by integrating and exploiting the mutually beneficial effects of offensive and defensive information operations. **(JP 3-0, 3-13.1)** (JP 3-03, CJCSI 3110.09, CCSI 3210.01)

M1	Percent	Decrease in significant enemy communications traffic on significant communications systems after 1 week of IW/C2W attack.
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M2	Percent	Decrease in significant enemy communications traffic on significant communications systems after IW/C2W attack.
M3	Percent	Of indigenous mass media outlets accepting US forces information for dissemination.
M4	Percent	Of adversary information conduits penetrated, corrupted, or monitored.
M5	Percent	Of friendly communications traffic delayed, disrupted, or corrupted by adversary IW/C2W.
M6	Percent	Of selected access programs employed with intended effect.
M7	Percent	Of selected access programs have a coordinated employment plan before hostilities.
M8	Weeks	Delay in operation because of delay in deception operation execution.
M9	Weeks	To achieve information superiority in theater.
M10	Weeks	Without significant security breach.

## **ST 2 CONDUCT THEATER STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE.**

To produce the intelligence required for the planning, development, and conduct of theater strategy, campaigns, and other actions. This task addresses the threat across the range of military operations including military operations other than war. Theater strategic intelligence includes determining when, where, with what, and in what strength the enemy will stage and conduct theater level campaigns and strategic unified operations. It includes providing intelligence support for friendly IO. This task also includes providing theater strategic surveillance and reconnaissance and operating and managing the theater intelligence system.  
(JP 2-0, 2-01) (JP 2-0, 3-01.1, 3-07.4, 3-11)

M1	Days	Less of actual warning than expected warning.
M2	Percent	Of PIRs have required intelligence data.
M3	Days	Warning time of enemy action.
M4	Hours	Since high priority PIRs last collected against (in crisis or war).
M5	Days	Since high priority PIRs last collected against (in peacetime).
M6	Hours	For critical new intelligence information to be passed to components/JTF and allied/coalition commands.
M7	Percent	Of intelligence estimates disseminated within 12 hour cycle.
M8	Hours	To develop and disseminate comprehensive intelligence estimate.
M9	Hours	To verify first use of an NBC weapon.
M10	Hours	To synchronize and exploit all theater and national intelligence collection efforts.

### **ST 2.1 Manage Theater Strategic Intelligence Activities.**

To assist geographic combatant commanders in determining their intelligence requirements, then planning the theater strategic collection effort and issuing the

necessary orders and requests to intelligence organizations. This task includes reviewing, validating, and prioritizing requirements and taskings. Requirements include intelligence for US forces and for host nations or groups in supporting the deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment phases of war and military operations other than war **(JP 2-0, 2-01)** (JP 2-0, 3-10.1)

**Note:** To manage intelligence systems requirements, please see ST 5.1.2 *Determine and Manage Theater C4I Systems Requirements*.

M1	Percent	Of PIRs have required intelligence data.
M2	Percent	Of requirements resulting from liaison with allied nations.
M3	Days	To develop list of PIRs.
M4	Hours	Until PIRs identified, based on customer requirement.
M5	Percent	Of critical pieces or types of information operations staff or commander required to make decisions, identified by J-2 during execution, but not identified during planning process.
M6	Y/N	Command PIRs published in applicable plans to satisfy identified information shortfalls.
M7	Percent	Of command PIRs published in applicable plans.
M8	Hours	Since J-2 reviewed and updated command Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs).

### ST 2.1.1 Determine and Prioritize Theater Strategic Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR).

To assist geographic combatant commanders in determining and prioritizing their priority intelligence requirements. In military operations other than war, it includes helping and training host nations to determine their intelligence requirements, such as in a counterinsurgency. **(JP 2-0)** (JP 2-01, 3-10.1, 3-58)

M1	Hours	Before collection begins, intelligence requirements identified.
M2	Percent	Of identified intelligence requirements solicited from allied nations.
M3	Instances	Of PIRs open at any one time.
M4	Percent	Of PIRs incorporated into submitted RFI or collection requests (by JIC).
M5	Percent	Of SOF Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) addressed by theater PIRs.
M6	Percent	Of SOF requirements addressed by PIRs.
M7	Percent	Of unanswered priority one and two PIRs submitted as RFIs or collection requests (JIC ensured).
M8	Percent	Of validated PIRs, not collected against.
M9	Hours	To prioritize requirements.

### ST 2.1.2 Determine and Prioritize Theater Strategic Information Requirements (IR).

To identify those items of information that must be collected and processed to develop the intelligence required by the commander's PIR. **(JP 2-0)** (JP 2-01, 3-10.1, 3-54, 6-0)

M1	Hours	Before collection begins, information requirements identified.
M2	Percent	Of identified intelligence requirements allocated to allied nations.
M3	Percent	Of unanswered priority one and two PIRs, submitted as RFIs or collection requests (JIC ensured).
M4	Percent	Of validated PIRs, not collected against.
M5	Hours	To prioritize requirements.
M6	Percent	Of applicable components J-2 queried to assist in development of intelligence requirements.
M7	Percent	Of shortfalls, identified by J-2, in required intelligence data.
M8	Y/N	J-2 has articulated what type and amounts of intelligence information exists, what is knowable or obtainable, and what elements of information may never be known.
M9	Percent	Of information later identified as not knowable identified by J-2 at beginning of operation.
M10	Y/N	Mechanisms in place for alleviating identified intelligence shortfalls.
M11	Percent	Of identified intelligence shortfalls with alleviating mechanisms in place.
M12	Hours	After identification, PIRs are submitted.
M13	Percent	Of PIR shortfalls addressed by collection plan.

### ST 2.1.3 Prepare Theater Strategic Collection Plan.

To develop a collection plan that will satisfy the commander's intelligence requirements. Collection planning includes assigning the appropriate collection capabilities to fulfilling specific intelligence requirements. **(JP 2-0, 2-01)** (JP 2-0, 3-09, 3-55, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Hours	Before collection begins, collection plan distributed.
M2	Hours	For JIC to prepare collection plan for PIRs (after CJCS Warning Order).
M3	Hours	For JIC to streamline collection plan (after CJCS Warning Order).
M4	Percent	Of collection requirements satisfied by existing information.
M5	Percent	Of PIRs collected.
M6	Percent	Of PIRs or RFIs covered by collection plan.
M7	Percent	Of PIRs covered by collection plan or RFIs.
M8	Percent	Of PIRs, not satisfied by RFIs, tasked to multiple intelligence gathering assets or resources.
M9	Percent	Of validated PIRs not met.

M10	Hours	To ensure collection plan for PIRs integrated with JFC's campaign plan concept of operation/intent (after CJCS Warning Order issued).
M11	Hours	Create collection plan.
M12	Hours	Revise collection plan.

#### **ST 2.1.4 Allocate Intelligence Resources in Theater.**

To allocate adequate resources to theater intelligence organizations to accomplish assigned intelligence tasks. This task includes requesting support and the reallocation of additional assets from national intelligence agencies and from allied countries. **(JP 2-0, 2-01)** (JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-09)

**Note:** The provisioning of C4 resources to support intelligence collection, storage, processing, analysis, and dissemination systems is covered by ST 5.1.2, *Determine and Manage Theater C4I Systems Requirements*.

M1	Percent	Of information passed to national agencies or organizations for processing and exploitation due to work overload.
M2	Percent	Of time, processing, exploitation or production assets idle in one JOA while another JOA over tasked.
M3	Percent	Of time, processing, exploitation or production assets of one component idle while another component over tasked.
M4	Hours	To request support and the reallocation of additional assets from national or allied nations when combatant command assets not available.
M5	Hours	Until combatant command J-2 receives report of organic collection assets from newly stood up joint force.

#### **ST 2.2 Collect Theater Strategic Information.**

To gather information from US and multinational strategic, operational, and tactical sources on strategic and operational centers of gravity threat forces and their strategic decisive points (and related high-payoff targets such as WMD production, infrastructure, and delivery systems). It also includes collection of information on the nature and characteristics of the assigned area of responsibility (including area of interest). Locating and reporting captured or isolated personnel falls under this task. This task applies in peace and war and those military operations other than war. **(JP 2-0, 2-01)** (JP 2-0, 3-0, 3-07.5, 3-55)

M1	Hours	To revise collection tasking (after PIR satisfied).
M2	Percent	Of information collected from multiple sources.
M3	Percent	Of PIRs satisfied.
M4	Hours	Since intelligence report on PIRs issued (in crisis or war).
M5	Days	Since intelligence report on PIRs issued (in peacetime).
M6	Days	Since most current information collected.

M7	Hours	Since oldest PIRs last collected against (in crisis or war).
M8	Days	Since PIRs collected against (in peacetime).

**ST 2.2.1 Collect Information on Theater Strategic Situation.**

To obtain strategically significant information on enemy (and friendly) force strengths and vulnerabilities, threat operational doctrine, and forces. This task includes collecting critical information on threats to and status of inter/intra-theater transportation infrastructures and PODs that could affect planning and execution of strategic airlift, sealift, and land movement. It also includes collecting information on the nature and characteristics of the area of interest. This task includes collecting battlefield damage assessment, munitions effects, medical assessments, and hazards such as NBC contamination, in order to conduct mission assessment. This task includes collecting counterintelligence information. The nature and characteristics of the area include significant political, economic, industrial, geospatial (e.g., aeronautical, hydrographic, geodetic, topographic), demographic, medical, climatic, and cultural, as well as psychological profiles of the resident populations. Threat from opposing coalitions includes allies and, in military operations other than war, threat includes insurgents, terrorists, illegal drug traffickers, belligerents in peacekeeping or peace enforcement situations, and other opponents. **(JP 2-0, 2-03, 3-0)** (JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-55)

M1	Hours	To revise collection tasking (after PIR satisfied).
M2	Days	To incorporate collection plan in campaign plan (after approval of COA).
M3	Hours	To retask collection asset (after CI PIR satisfied).
M4	Hours	For CRM to retask collection asset on new HPTs (after HPT detected, identified, and located).
M5	Hours	To retask collection asset retasked against outstanding PIR or PIP (after PIR satisfied).
M6	Hours	Until reconnaissance or surveillance assets respond (from receipt of tasking).
M7	Minutes	Maximum DMSP ground facility operations capability "red" time (per 24-hours).
M8	Percent	Of aircraft or SOF attacks on theater strategic targets requiring current imagery have such imagery.
M9	Percent	Of commander's geographic area has required reconnaissance and surveillance coverage.
M10	Percent	Of counterintelligence requirements covered by collection plan.
M11	Percent	Of disease nonbattle injury (DNBI) incurred in first month of deployment (due to unanticipated medical threat).
M12	Instances	Of failure to respond to commander's requirements for reconnaissance or surveillance assets.
M13	Percent	Of high-payoff targets accurately located.



M14	Percent	Of intelligence related PIRs, identified during crisis action planning process, covered by collection asset or RFI by CAP Phase IV.
M15	Percent	Of manned sorties requiring imagery have current imagery for aircrews before flight briefing.
M16	Percent	Of non-aviation missions requiring imagery have current imagery prior to their execution.
M17	Percent	Of PIRs covered by collection plan or RFIs.
M18	Percent	Of PIRs have at least one source yield intelligence information.
M19	Percent	Of PIRs have more than one collection source.
M20	Percent	Of PIRs have more than one source yield intelligence information.
M21	Percent	Of validated PIRs lack collection assets.
M22	Percent	Of potential targets dropped for lack of adequate information.
M23	Percent	Of priority targeting-related intelligence PIRs (identified during CAP process) covered by collection request or RFI by CAP Phase IV.
M24	Percent	Of reconnaissance and surveillance assets fully tasked.
M25	Percent	Of targets accurately identified.
M26	Percent	Of targets accurately located.
M27	Percent	Of validated PIRs denied collection effort by national level.
M28	Percent	Of validated PIRs inadvertently tasked to two or more reconnaissance or surveillance systems.
M29	Percent	Of validated PIRs lack appropriate collection assets.
M30	Percent	Of validated PIRs tasked to at least one collection source.
M31	Percent	Of validated PIRs tasked to two or more different reconnaissance or surveillance systems.
M32	Percent	Of PIR collection includes open sources.
M33	Hours	Since commander last made decision without requested information.
M34	Hours	Since high priority targets detected, identified and located.
M35	Years	Since last update of geospatial data.
M36	Hours	Since most current information collected.
M37	Hours	To fill requests for information on new HPTs.
M38	Hours	To prepare CI requirement after becoming aware of threat CI collection effort.
M39	Minutes	To determine raid size.
M40	Minutes	For ballistic missile to be detected (after launch).
M41	NM	Beyond engagement range, aircraft detected.
M42	NM	Difference between plotted and actual position of target.
M43	NM	From sensor, enemy air raids detected.
M44	Percent	Of enemy aircraft detected in time to allow weapons employment.
M45	Percent	Of raids detected.
M46	Percent	Of unsatisfied (i.e., do not exist or not adequate) priority one geospatial information and services generated or made adequate within required timeframe.

M47	Percent	Of unsatisfied (i.e., do not exist or not adequate) priority two geospatial information and services generated or made adequate within required timeframe.
M48	Percent	Of unsatisfied (i.e., do not exist or not adequate) priority three geospatial information and services generated or made adequate within required timeframe.

### ST 2.2.2 Support National and JTF Surveillance Reconnaissance Requirements.

To provide surveillance and reconnaissance support to subordinate commanders and to designated national agencies. To provide, either on a time-share or dedicated basis, assets or asset production to meet the needs of subordinate unified commanders, commanders of joint task forces, or other subordinate commanders and designated national agencies. **(JP 2-0, 3-55)** (JP 2-01, 3-01.1, 3-05, 3-09)

M1	Percent	Of joint force commander and national level collection requirements satisfied by piggybacking on existing collection mission on non-interference basis.
M2	Percent	Of unused capability fenced to meet anticipated theater of operations/joint operations area or national requirements.
M3	Hours	To provide collected data to analysts.
M4	Hours	To redirect surveillance or reconnaissance assets to meet overriding joint force commander or national level collection requirement.

### ST 2.2.3 Collect and Assess Meteorological and Oceanographic (METOC) Information.

To collect and assess significant METOC information on friendly and enemy force strengths and vulnerabilities and forces. This includes collecting climatic and hydrographic information necessary to understand the nature and characteristics of the area. It also includes the production and assessment of decision aids and weather effects matrices for the planning and execution of operations. **(JP 3-59)** (JP 2-01, 3-05, 3-08v1, CJCSI 3810.01A, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Hours	To provide significant climatic and hydrographic assessments products to operational planners.
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### ST 2.2.4 Obtain Logistic Intelligence of the Theater.

To collect data on host nations within the theater to determine and evaluate capabilities to procure, receive, store, maintain, distribute, and control the flow of military materiel between the point of reception into the military system and the point of issue. This task includes a detailed analysis of a host-nation's road, rail, air networks, port and harbor facilities, storage, maintenance, health services,

warehousing capabilities, and other logistical supply and field service activities.  
(N/A) (CJCSI 3110.02, CJCSM 3150.21)

TBD	
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### **ST 2.3 Process and Exploit Collected Theater Strategic Information.**

To convert collected theater strategic information into forms that can be readily used by intelligence analysts during production. (JP 2-0, 2-01) (JP 3-0, 3-05.3)

M1	Hours	To complete initial analysis (from receipt of raw information).
M2	Hours	To complete initial analysis for national strategic planners and decision makers (from receipt of raw information).
M3	Percent	Of multiple sources integrated and deconflicted.
M4	Percent	Of work of analysts, with limited experience in theater, reviewed for effective collation and correlation.
M5	Hours	To pass new intelligence to combatant commanders or subordinate joint forces.
M6	Hours	To pass new intelligence to components or joint force (after processing).
M7	Instances	Of production schedule delay affecting dissemination.
M8	Percent	Of documents/products produced caused customers to request clarification.
M9	Time	To integrate/fuse and tailor intelligence information to satisfy JTF and component needs.
M10	Time	To develop and disseminate a comprehensive intelligence estimate.
M11	Time	To define, submit, and manage collection requirements to satisfy CINC PIRs and JTF requests for information.
M12	Time	To conduct critical node targeting analysis and weaponeering in a process that matches concise CINC and CJTF objectives and guidance.
M13	Time	Of initial battle assessment responsiveness.
M14	Time	Threat indications developed and updated.
M15	Time	To analyze threat indicators and all source information to appraise commander of threat capabilities and vulnerabilities.
M16	Time	To provide comprehensive analysis of physical, climatic, economic, political, and military characteristics in commander's area of interest.
M17	Percent	Of intelligence data systems effectively operational and available to JTF.
M18	Percent	Of intelligence communications systems effectively operational and available to JTF.

**ST 2.3.1 Conduct Technical Processing and Exploitation.**

To perform activities such as imagery development and interpretation, document translation, data conversion, technical analysis of captured enemy material, and decryption of encoded material. **(JP 2-0, 2-01)** (JP 2-0)

M1	Percent	Decrease in processing time when exploitation concurrent with processing in theater.
M2	Percent	Of collected information processed in 24 hour period.
M3	Percent	Of collected information processed in theater.
M4	Percent	Of collected materiel processed in theater.
M5	Hours	To provide hard copy formal report to intelligence analysts in production phase.
M6	Minutes	To provide voice or electronic mail report to intelligence analysts in production phase.
M7	Minutes	To read wet film (after recovery of aircraft or other photo system).

**ST 2.3.2 Collate Theater Strategic Information.**

To identify and group together related items of information for critical comparison. **(JP 2-0)** (JP 2-0, 2-01)

M1	Percent	Of packages, returned by combatant command all source analyst for additional items of information.
M2	Percent	Of time combatant commander intelligence products updated with information not previously correlated.
M3	Hours	To correlate new intelligence data.
M4	Percent	Of operations delayed, disrupted, canceled, or modified (due to incorrect intelligence during operation execution).
M5	Percent	Of mission area related items accurately identified and grouped for comparison.

**ST 2.3.3 Correlate Theater Strategic Information.**

To associate and combine data on a single subject to improve the reliability or credibility of the information. **(JP 2-0, 2-01)** (JP 2-0)

M1	Data Points	Assembled by combatant command J-2 analysts on single subject.
M2	Data Points	Assembled by combatant command J-2 analysts on all subjects.
M3	Percent	Of combatant command reported information graded credible.
M4	Percent	Of combatant command reported information graded highly reliable.
M5	Sources	Used by combatant command's J-2 analysts to increase credibility of information.
M6	Percent	Of mission area related items accurately associated and combined.

**ST 2.4 Analyze and Produce Theater Strategic Intelligence and Prepare Intelligence Products.**

To convert processed and exploited information into intelligence that satisfies a geographic combatant commander's PIR. **(JP 2-0, 2-01)** (JP 2-0, 3-0, 3-07.5, 3-54)

M1	Hours	From receipt of raw information to complete initial analysis.
M2	Percent	Of work of analysts not experienced in area reviewed by fully experienced analysts.
M3	Hours	To pass new intelligence to components or joint force (after processing).
M4	Hours	To integrate/fuse and tailor intelligence information to satisfy JTF and component needs.
M5	Percent	Of recipients received information in timely manner (as defined by customer requirements).

**ST 2.4.1 Evaluate, Integrate, Analyze, and Interpret Theater Information.**

This task includes appraising information for credibility, reliability, pertinency, and accuracy (Evaluate). It also includes forming patterns through the selection and combination of processed information. This includes integrating strategic, operational, and tactical information (Integrate). The task further includes reviewing information to identify significant facts for subsequent interpretation (Analyze). Finally, the task is to judge the significance of information in relation to the current body of knowledge (Interpret). **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 2-03)** (JP 2-0, 3-07.2, 3-54, 4-02.1)

M1	Weeks	Since intelligence data on high priority theater areas of interest last updated.
M2	Percent	Of centers of gravity and decisive points identified during COA development.
M3	Percent	Of civil unrest activities (beyond control of local police) accurately forecasted.
M4	Percent	Of election results (or other assumptions of power) accurately forecasted.
M5	Percent	Of emerging political or religious groups (of political significance) accurately forecasted.
M6	Percent	Of enemy theater strategic high-payoff targets identified in OPLAN.
M7	Percent	Of exploitable information analyzed.
M8	Percent	Of high-payoff targets found during initial planning.
M9	Percent	Of identified enemy centers of gravity, decisive points, and high-payoff targets, monitored by combatant command's JIC.
M10	Percent	Of time-sensitive information analyzed within 24 hours.
M11	Percent	Of medical threats identified in time to provide medical treatment to infected personnel.
M12	Percent	Of medical threats identified in time to provide prophylactic treatment to US forces, DOD civilians, and dependents.

M13	Percent	Of multiple sources, integrated and deconflicted.
M14	Percent	Of OPLANs and CONPLANs identify enemy strategic center of gravity.
M15	Percent	Of OPLANs and CONPLANs include list of enemy strategic high-payoff targets.
M16	Percent	Of OPLANs include list of enemy theater strategic high-payoff targets.
M17	Percent	Of PIRs have completed analysis.
M18	Percent	Of strategic high-payoff targets identified in OPLAN or CONPLAN.
M19	Percent	Of theater assessments integrate National Intelligence.
M20	Months	Since available geospatial data last updated for theater.
M21	Hours	To report changes in enemy disposition, order of battle, etc.

#### ST 2.4.1.1 Identify Theater Issues and Threats.

To assess threats to the United States, US military forces, and the countries and forces of multinational partners. This task includes assessing potential issues and situations that could impact US national security interests and objectives within the theater. This task includes analyzing the nature and characteristics of the theater to determine the types and scale of operations the theater will support and the impact of significant regional features and hazards on the conduct of both friendly and enemy theater strategy and campaigns or joint operations.

Significant regional features include political, economic, industrial, geospatial (e.g., aeronautical, hydrographic, geodetic, topographic), meteorological, demographic, climatic populace, cultural, medical, lingual, historical, and psychological features of the area. The analysis includes the impact of limiting factors (for example, rules of engagement) and determination of the combatant commander's area of interest. Further, the task involves conducting analyses to determine the affect of social, political, economic, and health considerations in the joint operations area on the theater strategy to include deployment, campaign plans, and joint operations. It also includes an analysis of opportunities for obtaining local resources, facilities, and support in the theater and ways of minimizing interference with military operations. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 2-03)** (JP 2-0, 3-07.2)

M1	Hours	Between critical intelligence data reviews.
M2	Months	Between identification of newly forming units or developing weapons systems and their deployment.
M3	Days	Between intelligence data reviews.
M4	Percent	Of theater geospatial database for newly activated joint operations area accurate.
M5	Percent	Of theater geospatial database accurate.
M6	Percent	Of sustainment capability deployed, redundant with capability readily available on local economy.
M7	Percent	Of theater nations covered by current assessments.

M8	Months	Since update of biographical or psychological profiles of enemy leaders.
M9	Hours	To begin evaluation after indication of contingency change of mission.
M10	Hours	To report changes in enemy dispositions, order of battle, etc.

#### **ST 2.4.1.2 Determine Enemy's Theater Strategic Capabilities and Intentions.**

To identify, at the theater strategic level, what an enemy (or potential enemy) can do, as well as when, where, and with what strength. This task addresses both military and nonmilitary capabilities to include identifying the enemy's theater strategic centers of gravity. Further, this task addresses the enemy in terms of its mobilization potential; military strategic and operational organization (including alliance forces); and dispositions, doctrine, military capabilities, C2 structure, and decision making processes. This evaluation includes continuous refinement of the orders of battle for the entire array of joint and multinational forces available to the enemy commander in the theater. Also included are the personalities and history of performance of key leaders and the doctrine for employment of forces on a strategic and operational level. In military operations other than war, this activity also includes evaluation of developing insurgencies. Assessment of enemy capabilities to conduct IO (psychological operations, military deception, physical destruction, computer network attack, and other means) is included here.

Important to this task is identifying all theater strategic courses of action open to the enemy, the relative order of probability of each course of action, and any factors that may influence the enemy to adopt each course of action. The task also involves determining the susceptibility of the enemy's centers of gravity to the potential actions of another nation. **(JP 2-0, 2-01)** (JP 2-0, 2-01, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Hours	Lag in noting enemy shifted to new campaign phase (sequel or branch).
M2	Percent	Of enemy critical targets identified as vulnerable.
M3	Percent	Of enemy high priority targets accurately located.
M4	Percent	Of enemy operational and tactical centers of gravity, correctly identified (prior to selection of COA).
M5	Percent	Of enemy vulnerabilities have exploitation analysis.
M6	Percent	Of joint force theater operations delayed, disrupted, canceled, or significantly changed (due to unforeseen information about joint operations area).
M7	Percent	Of target attacks delayed, disrupted, canceled, or significantly changed (due to unforeseen information about the joint operations area).
M8	Percent	Of vulnerabilities communicated to operational and strategic planners.
M9	Weeks	Since last review and update of strategic and operational centers of gravity for all nations in region.

M10	Hours	To communicate vulnerabilities to operational and strategic planners.
M11	Hours	To identify enemy strategic center of gravity.
M12	Hours	To identify relevant, attainable military objectives by assessing enemy exploitable vulnerabilities (after warning order).
M13	Hours	To provide insights for exploitation of enemy and for defining desired end state (after warning order).
M14	Hours	To update and confirm selected enemy strategic center of gravity.
M15	Hours	To identify enemy NBC production, storage, and delivery systems.

#### **ST 2.4.2 Prepare Intelligence for Theater Strategic Use.**

To prepare intelligence which meet the needs of theater strategic planners and decision makers. **(JP 2-0, 2-01)** (JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-54)

M1	Months	Between updates to threat estimates for potential threat nations not involved in crisis.
M2	Percent	Of theater recurring reports reviewed within last year.
M3	Months	Since last assessment of overall threat.
M4	Hours	Since last intelligence report on PIRs.
M5	Hours	To prepare, publish, and disseminate intelligence report.
M6	Minutes	To publish intelligence advisories to components and subordinate commands (after significant change in threat).
M7	Percent	Of required priority one geospatial information and services that exist as standard/substitute products/information.
M8	Percent	Of priority one geospatial information and services that exist as interim products/information.
M9	Percent	Of priority two geospatial information and services that exist as standard/substitute products/information.
M10	Percent	Of priority two geospatial information and services that exist as interim products/information.
M11	Percent	Of priority three geospatial information and services that exist as standard/substitute products/information.
M12	Percent	Of priority three geospatial information and services that exist as interim products/information.

##### **ST 2.4.2.1 Provide Theater Strategic Indications and Warning.**

To report time-sensitive intelligence on foreign developments that could threaten the United States, its citizens abroad, or allied military, political, or economic interests. This task also includes identifying hostile reactions to US reconnaissance activities and indications of impending terrorist attacks. **(JP 2-0, 2-01)** (JP 2-0, 3-0, 3-07.5, CJCSI 6510.01B)

M1	Days	Between quality/utility assessments (scores outside average).
M2	Days	Between quality/utility assessments (scores within average).



M3	Hours	Difference between actual warning time and expected warning time.
M4	Percent	Of intelligence products produced IAW Intelligence Planning/Programming Analysis Tool.
M5	Percent	Of nations in theater, have updated indicators.
M6	Percent	Of quality scores on quality/utility assessments fall within the average.
M7	Percent	Of CINC's warning problems have fully developed indicators.
M8	Days	Since indicator lists developed or updated for enemy nation and its allies.
M9	Minutes	Between obtaining indications of enemy missile launch and dissemination of warning to friendly forces.

#### ST 2.4.2.2 Provide Theater Current Intelligence.

To report theater strategic intelligence of immediate value relating to the theater. This task includes the preparation of intelligence estimates and assessments and periodic intelligence briefings and reports. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-0)** (JP 2-0)

M1	Minutes	For combatant command's J-2 Senior Watch Officer to brief J-3 Command Duty Officer (after issuing advisory report).
M2	Hours	For combatant command components to produce INTSUMs.
M3	Percent	Of CAT attend daily intelligence briefing.
M4	Percent	Of CAT visit J-2 posted current intelligence data.
M5	Percent	Of combatant command staff visit J-2 posted current intelligence data.
M6	Minutes	To produce intelligence update briefing.
M7	Hours	To produce daily intelligence update for CAT chief.
M8	Hours	To produce daily intelligence update for CINC.
M9	Hours	To produce DISUM.
M10	Hours	Between threat capabilities presentations to commander.
M11	Percent	Of affected nations have threat indicators developed after identification and analysis.
M12	Hours	To apprise commander of threat capabilities.
M13	Hours	To develop and update threat indicators.

#### ST 2.4.2.3 Provide Theater General Military Intelligence.

To report intelligence relating to the theater strategic military capabilities of foreign countries and organizations. This task includes creating and maintaining data bases relating to the military capabilities of current and potential adversaries. **(JP 2-0, 2-01)** (JP 2-0, 3-05.5)

M1	Hours	Between electronic updates of combatant command reports on enemy military capabilities.
M2	Days	Between hard copy updates of combatant command reports on enemy military capabilities (crisis or wartime).

M3	Weeks	Between hard copy updates of combatant command reports on enemy military capabilities (peacetime).
M4	Percent	Difference between actual enemy military strength (number of people, equipment or sustainment) and enemy strength reported by combatant command's J-2 prior to operations.
M5	Percent	Difference between actual enemy units (ships, squadrons, battalions) engaged and units identified and reported by combatant command's J-2 or component's intelligence organizations.
M7	Percent	Of friendly forces incapacitated by disease for which there was no advance warning.
M8	Percent	Of questions on enemy military forces, answered by data in combatant command's J-2 data bases or component's intelligence data bases.
M9	Hours	To generate a comprehensive analysis of characteristics of commander's area of interest.

#### **ST 2.4.2.4 Provide Target Intelligence for Theater Planning and Execution.**

To report intelligence of theater strategic targeting value. This includes supporting the theater targeting process as well as target battle damage assessment. This task also includes providing data to support offensive IO. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-05.5)** (JP 2-0, 3-05.5, 3-56.1, CJCSM 3122.03)

**Note:** This task supports ST 3.2.3, *Synchronize Theater Strategic Firepower*.

M1	Percent	Of enemy targets correctly identified by combatant command's targeteers.
M2	Percent	Of failed attacks on theater strategic high priority targets (HPTs) attributed to incorrect enemy location data.
M3	Percent	Of selected combatant command's High Priority Targets (HPTs) have mensurated coordinates available.
M4	Percent	Of target locations verified by combatant command's J-2 or component's intelligence before next targeting cycle.
M5	Percent	Of theater strategic high priority targets (HPTs) have correct location data.
M6	Percent	Of nodal targeting analysis and weaponeering within ATO cycle.
M7	Hours	To conduct nodal targeting analysis and weaponeering.
M8	Hours	To provide battle damage assessment following execution on enemy targets.

#### **ST 2.4.2.5 Provide Scientific and Technical Intelligence for Planning and Execution.**

To report intelligence on foreign developments in basic and applied sciences and technology. This includes reporting on the development of foreign theater strategic weapons systems. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-56.1)** (JP 2-0, 4-02, CJCSM 3122.03)

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M1	Percent	Difference between estimate of foreign weapons systems deployed and actual numbers.
M2	Percent	Difference between combatant command's J-2 prediction of enemy weapons system's performance capabilities and actual capability encountered.
M3	Percent	Difference between combatant command's J-2 prediction of enemy weapons system's characteristics and actual characteristics.
M4	Months	Lead time provided by combatant command's J-2 on foreign developments in basic research.
M5	Months	Lead time provided by combatant command's J-2 on foreign developments in applied research.
M6	Months	Lead time provided by combatant command's J-2 on IOC of non-US weapons systems deployed in theater.
M7	Months	Lead time provided by combatant commander on IOC of non-US theater strategic weapons systems deployed in theater.

### **ST 2.5 Disseminate and Integrate Theater Strategic Intelligence.**

To provide theater strategic intelligence, in a timely way, in an appropriate form, and by any suitable means, to the theater users and to ensure that the intelligence is understood by the commander. **(JP 2-0, 2-01)** (JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-01.5, 3-55)

M1	Percent	Of questions asked during briefing answered immediately or personally by briefer within asker's shift period.
M2	Hours	To disseminate initial and subsequent PIRs to all components.
M3	Instances	Of commander making decision without requested information.
M4	Percent	Of required priority one geospatial information and services provided within required timeframe.
M5	Percent	Of required priority two geospatial information and services provided within required timeframe.
M6	Percent	Of recipients receiving information in specified time as defined by customer requirements (for event/operation).
M7	Percent	Of required priority three geospatial information and services provided within required timeframe.

#### **ST 2.5.1 Provide Theater Strategic Intelligence.**

To take actions within the theater to ensure the prompt and comprehensive transmission, in peace and war, of theater-produced intelligence products. This task requires the transmission of intelligence products to all organizations and individuals within the theater having a need to know. **(JP 2-0, 2-01)** (JP 2-0, 2-01, CJCSI 5221.01)

**Note:** The transmission of intelligence products by message, hard copy or other method is provided for by ST 5.1.1, *Communicate Strategic and Operational Decisions and Information*.

M1	Percent	Of intelligence summaries disseminated on time.
M2	Hours	To disseminate initial and subsequent PIRs to all components.
M3	Minutes	For intelligence updates to reach components and subordinate commands (after major change in threat).
M4	Percent	Of theater recurring reports published on time.
M5	Percent	Of strategic intelligence data disseminated to user in support of the operational commander.
M6	Hours	To disseminate strategic intelligence data to user in support of the operational commander.
M7	Percent	Of recipients receiving information in a timely manner (as defined by customer requirements).

### **ST 2.5.2 Provide Follow-on Intelligence Support to Theater Strategic Planners and Decision Makers.**

To participate in theater strategic planning and execution and to provide intelligence inputs in response to queries based upon furnished intelligence products or the evolution of events. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-0)** (JP 2-0)

M1	Percent	Of planner questions, personally answered by analyst or briefer during operational planning or execution.
M2	Percent	Of reader survey cards returned.
M3	Minutes	To provide follow-up to question asked during briefing to JPG or equivalent.

### **ST 2.6 Evaluate Intelligence Activities in Theater.**

To determine how well intelligence operations are being performed and to recommend any necessary improvements. The primary factor to be considered is the consumer's intelligence requirement being satisfied on time. **(JP 2-0, 2-01)** (JP 2-0)

M1	Hours	Age of comments passed to combatant command J-2 organizations and personnel by DJ-2 or J-2 inspectors.
M2	Percent	Of combatant command's J-2 offices have self inspection program.
M3	Percent	Of combatant command intelligence production programs include customer survey.
M4	Percent	Of comments critical of combatant command's J-2 performance represent repeat comments.
M5	Percent	Of customer complaints result in change within combatant command's J-2 or explanation to customer of why no change.
M6	Percent	Of deficiencies noted in combatant command's strategic intelligence activities, incorporated in joint lessons learned system.

M7	Percent	Of evaluator observations validated combatant command joint intelligence activities.
M8	Percent	Of evaluator recommendations for improvement, implemented by combatant command's J-2 within 120 days.
M9	Percent	Of evaluator recommendations, specifically directed to combatant command individuals responsible for implementing any changes.
M10	Percent	Of subordinate joint force intelligence evaluations reviewed for applicability to theater strategic level intelligence activities.
M11	Percent	Of time dedicated to combatant command's intelligence evaluation, evaluated staff spends in interviews and data collection.
M12	Weeks	To provide final feedback, commendations, and recommended corrective actions after evaluation of combatant command intelligence activities.
M13	Hours	To provide initial feedback after evaluation of combatant command intelligence activities.

### ST 3 EMPLOY THEATER STRATEGIC FIREPOWER.

To deliver firepower through available theater positions, units, or weapons systems. Theater firepower is the application of lethal and nonlethal means to achieve the desired impact in the conduct of theater strategy, theater campaigns, and joint operations. Theater strategic firepower may involve Service, joint, or multinational forces. Theater strategic firepower would be coordinated with maneuver in a campaign as a coequal component. Such firepower may be independent of land or sea maneuver. **(JP 3-0, 3-03, 3-09.3, 3-52)** (JP 1, 3-0, 3-05)

M1	Percent	Of HPTs attacked by forces from outside theater.
M2	Percent	Of HPTs receive desired damage levels on initial attack.

#### ST 3.1 Process Theater Strategic Targets.

To positively identify and select land, sea, air and space (e.g., ground stations, launch capability) targets that have a major and possibly decisive impact on achieving strategic objectives, such as WMD systems. It includes matching appropriate joint or multinational firepower to such targets. These targets include, but are not limited to, those found in nonstrategic nuclear strike plans. Theater targeting should be coordinated with national level targeting. In military operations other than war, the employment of theater strategic firepower may be restricted. **(JP 2-01, 2-03, 3-0, 3-03)** (JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-03, 3-09, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Hours	For issuance of CINC's apportionment guidance (after CJCS Warning Order).
M2	Hours	For identification of enemy's center of gravity (after CJCS Warning Order).
M3	Hours	For issuance of CINC's HPT categories (after CJCS Warning Order).

M4	Hours	For issuance of CINC's prohibited target guidance (after CJCS Warning Order).
M5	Hours	For issuance of FSC measures guidance (after CJCS Warning Order).
M6	Hours	To develop plan to attack target, after identification as HPT.
M7	Percent	Difference between JTCB target priorities and those in CINC and NCA guidance.
M8	Percent	Of desired results, achieved by theater strategic firepower within specified time/phase.
M9	Percent	Of mobile targets, passed to attack assets quickly enough to allow effective ordnance delivery.
M10	Percent	Of selected targets have DMPs identified.
M11	Percent	Of selected targets have suitable munitions available in theater.
M12	Percent	Of selected targets have vital areas identified.
M13	Percent	Of targets selected by JTCB, reviewed for political ramifications.
M14	Percent	Of targets best served by nonlethal means, allocated to attack by nonlethal systems.
M15	Percent	Of time, JTCB guidance passed to targeting agencies (e.g., JFACC), before ATO cycle begins.
M16	Hours	To construct a theater option consisting of one weapon against one target (TDD available).
M17	Hours	To construct a theater option consisting of one weapon against one target (TDD not available).
M18	Hours	To construct a theater option consisting of one weapon (ALCM/ACM/Gravity/ICBM/SLBM) against one target (TDD available).
M19	Hours	To construct a theater option consisting of one weapon (ALCM/ACM/Gravity/ICBM/SLBM) against one target (TDD not available).
M20	Hours	Identify and select targets that have a major and possibly decisive impact on achieving nuclear strategic objectives as contained in approved guidance.
M21	Percent	Of targets selected by JTCB, reviewed for compliance with ROE, law, and policy.

### ST 3.1.1 Select Strategic Targets in the Theater for Attack.

To evaluate each strategic target to determine if and when it should be attacked for optimum effect on enemy centers of gravity, strategic decisive points, and in conformance with the combatant commander's strategic concept and intent. Included here are the destruction and degradation of enemy IO means and WMD production, infrastructure, and delivery systems. **(JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-03)**  
(JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-56.1, CJCSM 3122.03)

**Note:** Important associated activities are found under ST 2, *Conduct Theater Strategic Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance* and ST 5, *Provide Theater Strategic Command and Control, Communications, and Computers (C4)*. Air targets

include offensive counterair but do not include air defense or defensive counterair targets; these are covered under ST 6, *Coordinate Theater Force Protection*.

M1	Days	Until phased theater strategic attack plan available for execution.
M2	Hours	To revise phased theater strategic attack plan.
M3	Percent	Of enemy decisive points have developed strategic targets.
M4	Percent	Of enemy decisive points, translated into HPTs.
M5	Percent	Of known enemy IO capability, targeted for strategic attack.
M6	Percent	Of known enemy NBC capability, targeted for strategic attack.
M7	Percent	Of attacks on selected targets, had desired effect on enemy Center of Gravity.
M8	Percent	Of target sequence reflects JTCB priorities.
M9	Percent	Of targets, reviewed for collateral damage and political ramifications.
M10	Percent	Of targets selected, deemed illegal for attack.
M11	Percent	Of attacks on selected targets, cause political consequences outweighing strategic benefits.
M12	Percent	Of targets selected reflect NCA and combatant commander's guidance.
M13	Percent	Of theater strategic HPTs (discovered within execution cycle) reprioritized.
M14	Weeks	To initially prepare theater strategic target list (during deliberate planning).
M15	Percent	Comply with guidance concerning selection of nuclear targets and their inclusion in respective CONPLANS/OPLANS; evaluate each target to determine if and when it should be attacked with nuclear weapons for optimum effect on enemy centers of gravity, strategic decisive points, and conformance with the combatant commander's intent.
M16	Hours	Request a Theater Planning Response Cell (TPRC)
M17	Instances	Brief and explain the Theater Nuclear Planning Document (TNPD), if available, and the advantages and disadvantages of the nuclear weapons systems available for each target in accordance with CJCSI 3110.04.

### ST 3.1.2 Assign Joint/Multinational Theater Firepower to Targets/Target Sets.

To assign theater strategic firepower resources to classes or types of strategic targets, or targets themselves, in accordance with the theater combatant commander's strategic plan and intent. Task includes assigning targets/target sets to the appropriate joint force component. **(JP 3-0, 3-03)** (JP 3-0, 3-56.1, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Days	To complete targeting cycle.
M2	Hours	To complete targeting cycle.

M3	Hours	To reattack theater strategic objective not neutralized (from original TOT).
M4	Instances	Of theater strategic firepower assignments, appealed to JFC.
M5	Percent	Mismatch between target sets and assigned strike assets.
M6	Percent	Of joint force operations, delayed, disrupted, canceled, or modified because of improper firepower allocation.
M7	Percent	Of land, air, and sea delivery systems' targets (not targets of opportunity), coordinated by JTCCB.

### ST 3.1.3 Conduct Theater Combat Assessment.

To determine the overall effectiveness of Service, joint, and multinational attacks employed in the theater, as it relates to the joint force commander's (JFC) campaign objectives. This task includes assessing theater battle damage, munitions effects, consequence analysis for WMD targets (as necessary), reassessing mission requirements (e.g., reattack the target), and analyzing/reporting the effects of combat missions in achieving the JFC's campaign objectives. It includes an evaluation of all force employment's tasked with supporting the theater campaign plan. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-0, 3-03, 3-56.1)** (JP 2-0, 3-05.5, 3-13.1, 3-56.1)

M1	Hours	To establish coordination process between collection elements and targeting elements (after CJCS Warning Order).
M2	Hours	To provide integrated national and theater assets combat assessments (after execution of first combat fires TOT).
M3	Hours	From receipt of imagery until BDA report.
M4	Hours	To conduct theater BDA (from time attack completed).
M5	Hours	To submit recommendations for reattack (from original TOT).
M6	Percent	Difference between theater and national BDA estimates.
M7	Percent	Of available operational sources (e.g., HUD video), integrated with intelligence sources for combat assessment.
M8	Percent	Of reconnaissance assets, employed in theater BDA.
M9	Percent	Of targets correctly assessed as destroyed, neutralized, or suppressed.
M10	Percent	Of targets have applicable operational sources (e.g., HUD video) integrated with intelligence sources for combat assessment.
M11	Percent	Of targets, restructed unnecessarily.
M12	Hours	To prepare estimates of collateral effects from attacks on WMD targets.

### ST 3.2 Attack Theater Strategic Targets/Target Sets.

To attack the enemy to destroy or neutralize strategic level targets/target sets and to shape and control the tempo of theater campaigns and joint operations, using all available Service, joint, and allied/coalition firepower assets against land, air (including space), and maritime (surface and subsurface) targets having strategic significance. **(JP 3-0, 3-03, 3-56.1)** (JP 3-0)



M1	Percent	Of missions that violate the ROE.
M2	Days	Until arrival of first PSYOPs units in theater (after initial landings).
M3	Hours	To complete targeting cycle.
M4	Percent	More time than allocated in campaign plan, needed to achieve desired damage levels on HPTs.
M5	Percent	Of air sorties, covered by EW, support requests unfilled.
M6	Percent	Of all available joint and allied firepower assets, considered for use in development of master attack plan.
M7	Percent	Of attacking systems penetrate to target and deliver ordnance.
M8	Percent	Of friendly attacking manned weapons systems, lost during mission.
M9	Percent	Of friendly operations employ nonlethal systems.
M10	Percent	Of operations and operational phases, covered by deception plan.
M11	Percent	Of reattacked targets destroyed by reattacking mission.
M12	Percent	Of target sets assigned to inappropriate strike assets.
M13	Percent	Of targets destroyed by first assigned friendly mission.

### ST 3.2.1 Conduct Attack on Theater Strategic Targets/Target Sets using Lethal Means.

To engage strategic targets (other than air defense or defensive counter air targets) with available Service, joint, and allied/coalition delivery systems, delivering lethal ordnance. Lethal means may include among other operations forcible entry, direct action, unconventional warfare, information, and theater of war operations in depth. Paramount consideration must be given to how best to hold at risk what the enemy values most. The objective of such attacks may be to delay, disrupt, defeat, destroy, or degrade enemy forces and to affect the enemy's will to fight for strategic results. Alternatively, the objective may be to damage or destroy critical facilities (including C4I and WMD targets) or to delay, disrupt or degrade critical tasks, achieving strategic results. Means may include surface and subsurface land and sea based joint and multinational theater systems and air and space forces (aircraft, missiles, helicopters, UAV, space vehicles). This activity includes the attack of offensive counterair targets. **(JP 3-0, 3-03, 3-56.1)** (JP 3-0, 3-05, 3-05.3)

**Note:** This task may support ST 1.6, *Control or Dominate Strategically Significant Area(s)* and ST 5.5, *Conduct Theater-Wide Information Operations (IO)*.

M1	Percent	Loss rate for attacking systems (of total sorties).
M2	Percent	Of attacking systems penetrate to target to deliver ordnance.
M3	Percent	Of attacked targets incurring desired damage levels.
M4	Percent	Of scheduled time, used for execution of strategic target program.
M5	Percent	Of enemy WMD capability destroyed.

M6	Y/N	Engage targets with available nuclear delivery systems to delay, disrupt, destroy, or degrade enemy forces and the enemy's will to fight or overcome a critical enemy advantage gained as the result of enemy use of WMD.
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### ST 3.2.2 Conduct Nonlethal Attack on Theater Strategic Targets/Target Sets using Nonlethal Means.

To engage strategic land, sea, air, and space (less air defense) targets with joint and multinational means designed to impair, disrupt, or delay the performance of enemy forces, activities, and facilities to achieve strategic results. These means include the use of electronic warfare, military deception, OPSEC, computer network, psychological operations, and special operations forces. Nonlethal means also includes employment of PSYOP activities as part of counterinsurgency efforts in military operations other than war. In these cases the objective is to foster favorable attitudes toward the host nation and modifies insurgent behavior. **(JP 3-0, 3-03, 3-11, 3-13.1, 3-56.1)** (JP 3-03, 3-05, 3-53, 3-54, CJCSI 3110.09, CJCSI 3210.01)

**Note:** This task may support ST 1.6, *Control or Dominate Strategically Significant Area(s)*, ST 1.6.4, *Gain and Maintain Information Superiority in Theater*, and ST 5.5, *Conduct Theater-Wide Information Operations (IO)*.

M1	Days	Until arrival of first PSYOP units in theater (after initial landings).
M2	Hours	To establish Joint PSYOP Task Force (JPOTF) (after CJCS Warning Order).
M3	Hours	To establish and integrate IO cell into planning process (after CJCS Warning Order).
M4	Hours	Until combatant commander requests and coordinates PSYOP, EW, and deception appropriate element, activity and joint agency support to JTF components IO cells (after establishment of JTF).
M5	Instances	Of information warfare (IW) IO planners, not being included in campaign planning inner circle (from warning order).
M6	Percent	Of increase in support for US activity in country of operation resulting from PSYOP efforts.
M7	Percent	Of theater strategy, OPLANs, OPORDs, and component plans, have integrated theater PSYOP plan.
M8	Percent	Of air sorties, covered by EW, support requests unfilled.
M9	Percent	Of all targets, evaluated by JTCCB as candidates for attack using nonlethal means.
M10	Percent	Of attacks using nonlethal means on selected targets, achieve desired damage criteria.
M11	Percent	Of attacks using nonlethal means on selected targets, achieve desired nonlethal effect.
M12	Percent	Of time nonlethal means are integrated into daily ATO.

M13	Instances	Of uncoordinated IO element or activity actions causing disruption or delay of theater plans and objectives.
M14	Percent	Of theater IO objectives verifiably achieved.

### ST 3.2.2.1 Conduct Theater Psychological Activities.

To conduct theater-wide psychological activities to gain the support and cooperation of friendly and neutral countries and to reduce the will and the capacity of hostile or potentially hostile countries or groups to wage war (or insurgencies). Psychological operations (PSYOP) in support of theater strategic operations exploit vulnerabilities of foreign governments, military forces, and populations to advance broad or long-term national and theater strategic objectives. This task includes ensuring theater conformance with national military and theater PSYOP policy and programs. **(JP 3-0, 3-53)** (JP 3-05, 3-05.3, 3-07, 3-07.1, 3-07.5, 3-13.1, 3-54, 3-61, CJCSI 3110.05, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Days	To devise PSYOP plan (when none exists).
M2	Hours	From warning order until PSYOP efforts begin in JOA (in crisis).
M3	Hours	To revise/confirm PSYOP plan (after warning order in crisis).
M4	Hours	Until arrival of first PSYOP units in theater (from C-Day and L-Hour).
M5	Percent	Of PSYOP effort focused on stabilizing and reinforcing allied forces and host nation.
M6	Instances	Of PSYOP effort failing to portray forces as NBC trained and ready.
M7	Y/N	Target information-gathering interests and activities identified.
M8	Y/N	Use of host-nation resources and non-PSYOP military assets for media production of PSYOP products.
M9	Y/N	Use host nation and US Country Teams to gain local support.
M10	Y/N	Impact of the effects of terrain, weather, and NBC environment on forces, equipment, and planned method of dissemination of PSYOP products.
M11	Y/N	Establish a PSYOP reporting system to provide relevant information to support unit operations officers and other PSYOP planners. (1) Enemy PSYOP activity. (2) Apparent impact of friendly PSYOP activities. (3) Any anticipated changes to ongoing activity.

### ST 3.2.2.2 Conduct Theater Electronic Attack (EA).

To conduct attacks involving the use of electromagnetic or directed energy, to impair, disrupt, or delay the performance of enemy forces, activities, and facilities, to achieve strategic results. **(JP 3-0)** (JP 3-01.4, 3-03, 3-09, 3-13.1, 3-51, 3-54, 3-58, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Days	To create frequency deconfliction plan.
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M2	Hours	Delay in enemy action at theater or strategic level because of EA attack.
M3	Percent	Of overall effort, devoted to EA.
M4	Percent	Of tasked electronic attacks, actually conducted.

### ST 3.2.2.3 Attack Theater Information Systems.

To employ offensive information warfare capabilities to achieve theater objectives. (JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-03) (JP 3-13.1, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Percent	Of decrease in enemy message traffic on command nets after one week of IW/C2W attack.
M2	Percent	Of decrease in significant enemy message traffic on command nets after initial IW/C2W attack.
M3	Percent	Of adversary information conduits, penetrated, corrupted, or monitored.
M4	Percent	Of enemy C2 facilities, attacked.
M5	Percent	Of enemy C2 facilities, in HPT category.
M6	Percent	Of fixed location enemy C2 facilities, destroyed within one hour.
M7	Percent	Of selected access programs, employed with intended effect.
M8	Weeks	To achieve information superiority in theater.

### ST 3.2.3 Synchronize Theater Strategic Firepower.

To synchronize theater attacks on single or multiple theater targets of strategic significance at the decisive time and place. Synchronization is simultaneously across strategic targets and to strategic depths. This synchronization includes lethal and nonlethal means, to include friendly information operations, and the minimizing of their effect on friendly forces, neutrals, and noncombatants. It also includes integrating theater strategic firepower with national military strategic firepower and operational firepower within the theater to ensure unity of effort, and not to disrupt supporting campaigns and major operations, or to reveal friendly force intentions at any level. (JP 3-0) (JP 3-0, 3-03, 3-09.3, 3-56.1)

**Note:** Full synchronization requires consideration of actions under SN 3.2, *Manage National Strategic Firepower*, ST 5.5, *Conduct Theater-Wide Information Operations (IO)*, and OP 3.2.7, *Synchronize Operational Firepower*

M1	Casualties	Caused by friendly fires.
M2	Hours	To reattack theater strategic objective (from original TOT).
M3	Hours	To reattack theater strategic target (from original TOT).
M4	Instances	Of national strategic missions aborted because lack of necessary theater/JOA support.
M5	Instances	Of operational, strategic theater, and strategic national fires, not integrated into attack plan.

M6	Instances	Of SAPs cannot be integrated with non-SAP systems for security reasons.
M7	Instances	Of strategic attacks originating from out of theater, not synchronized with those tasked from within theater.
M8	Percent	Of attacks, deconflicted with friendly forces operating in AO.
M9	Percent	Of enemy offensive capability, diverted to defensive reaction.
M10	Percent	Of failed attacks on HPTs, attributed to lack of integration of fires assets.
M11	Percent	Of friendly casualties, caused by friendly fires.
M12	Percent	Of HPTs, attacked by joint force as non-ATO targets.
M13	Percent	Of operational attacks, aborted because of planned, but unavailable theater support.
M14	Percent	Of SOF missions, executed without notification of non-SOF operating forces in area.
M15	Percent	Of strategic national assets, used to attack targets suited to available theater assets.
M16	Percent	Of strategic national missions, aborted because of lack of necessary theater support.
M17	Percent	Of theater assets, used to attack targets better suited to available operational assets.
M18	Y/N	Integrate theater attacks on single or multiple theater targets of strategic significance.
M19	Instances	Provide support to combatant CINCs in fulfilling supported CINC nuclear requests as identified in the EAP-CJCS.
M20	Days	Request nuclear planning in accordance with CJCSI 3110.04 and EAP-CJCS.
M21	Hours	Request a theater nuclear strike in accordance with CJCSI 3110.04 and EAP-CJCS.
M22	Y/N	Present a comprehensive description of USCINCEUR's relationship with NATO with respect to EAMs that result from a NATO involved conflict at the level of understanding of the decision maker.
M23	Instances	Minimize collateral damage, civilian casualties, and fratricide using STRIKEWARN messages or other communications to notify intent of attack.

#### ST 4 SUSTAIN THEATER FORCES.

To perform logistical support activities in the theater required to sustain the force. Logistical support activities will aid in the execution of theater strategy, campaigns, joint and multinational operations, using all available resources (Service, civilian, host nation). Obtaining sustainment can also refer to support from sources other than Service components combat service support (CSS) organizations and includes obtaining the following: host-nation support, civil logistical augmentation, Service headquarters civilian support, and captured materials. This task includes sustaining the tempo and continuity of operations in a theater of war during theater campaigns and joint operations; sustaining military operations to support US forces and agencies during military operations

other than war (MOOTW) using non-service support resources; and sustaining forces using geographic combatant command resources. **(JP 0-2, 3-0, 3-07, 4-0, 4-01, 4-01.4)** (JP 3-05, 3-50.21, 4-0, 4-01, 4-01.2, 4-01.3, 4-01.5, 4-01.6, 5-0, CJCSI 3110.03, CJCSI 3110.14, CJCSM 3122.03)

**Note:** See also ST 8, *Develop and Maintain Alliance and Regional Relations*. There are activities related to sustainment that are included under ST 5, *Provide Theater Strategic Command and Control, Communications, and Computers (C4)* for example, setting theater of war priorities; establishing theater stock levels; managing critical materials; and obtaining US national, multinational, or joint support. Support for NGOs/PVOs is at ST 8.2.11, *Cooperate with and Support Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) in Theater* and ST 8.2.12, *Cooperate with and Support Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) in Theater*.

M1	Tons	Of backlogged support requirements at designated logistic nodes in theater (at execution).
M2	Tons	Of backlogged high-value line items at designated logistic nodes in theater (at execution).
M3	Percent	Of required logistics, in place to support campaign (at execution).
M4	Percent	Of planned sustainment delivered to theater customers (during execution).
M5	Days	Delay in operations because of logistic shortfalls.
M6	Percent	Of personnel and military animals, provided field and health services.
M7	Percent	Of required supplies and equipment, delivered daily.
M8	Days	Of supplies, stocked in theater.
M9	Days	To achieve minimum theater supply stock levels.
M10	Days	To provide field and health services to all personnel.
M11	Percent	Visibility of units/cargo/personnel transiting the PODs.
M12	Percent	Of maintenance support to be provided to deployed forces.
M13	Percent	Of visibility of units/cargo/personnel from POD to final destination.

#### **ST 4.1 Coordinate the Fixing and Maintaining of Equipment.**

To coordinate efforts between the Service components for establishing facilities in rear areas to repair and replace materiel in support of theater campaigns or joint operations. This task also includes the establishment of policies on repair and evacuation of equipment. This activity includes the concentration and provision of maintenance services (including recovery, battle damage assessment, and repair), and Class IX supplies for maintaining theater of war forces in, or restoring them to, a high state of materiel readiness in preparing to sustain the tempo of strategic operations. However, Service peculiar item maintenance support normally remains the responsibility of Service component commanders. This task applies to the communications zone (COMMZ) as well as actions in the combat area.

(JP 4-0) (JP 3-07.1, 4-02.1, 4-03, CJCSM 3122.03)

**Note:** ST 4.3, *Establish and Coordinate Distribution of Supplies/Services for Theater Campaign and COMMZ*, applies to this task. ST 4.3 provides maintenance services and Class IX supplies in support of theater forces in joint operations and theater campaigns and routine COMMZ maintenance activities by employing transportation and supply services.

M1	Days	To establish a theater maintenance depot system.
M2	Days	Delay for items in theater repair system awaiting repair.
M3	Days	Delay for items in theater awaiting evacuation.
M4	Percent	Of repair items, identified in theater fix-or-evacuate policy.
M5	Percent	Of repair facilities capacity, in operation.
M6	Percent	Of major end items can be repaired in theater.
M7	Days	Items remain in theater repair system.
M8	Days	Delay in initiating operations because of late upgrades to weapons systems or equipment items.

#### **ST 4.2 Coordinate Support for Forces in Theater.**

To coordinate the provision of trained and organizationally sound units and replacements and to provide necessary personnel administration, supply, field, and health services to support theater strategy, campaigns, and routine COMMZ support. (N/A) (JP 1-05, 3-08v1, 4-0, 4-01, 4-01.3, 4-02, 5-03.1)

**Note:** See ST 4.4 *Develop and Maintain Sustainment Bases*, for providing essential facilities to house, sustain, and support normal or contingency operations from a garrison, base, or bare base site.

M1	Minutes	From wound or injury until surgery.
M2	Minutes	Awaiting surgery (in theater).
M3	Minutes	Awaiting routine medical services (in theater).
M4	Percent	Of support forces, trained and equipped for salvage and battle damage repair.
M5	Percent	Of OPLANs have reconstitution provisions.
M6	Personnel	Maximum handling capacity of reception areas.
M7	Percent	Of personnel have viable rotation policy.
M8	Percent	Of personnel support can be contracted.
M9	Shortfalls	Identified for personnel.
M10	Constraints	Identified for personnel.
M11	Hours	Delay for replacements at theater base before joining a unit.
M12	Percent	Of personnel receive at least one hot meal per day.
M13	Percent	Of forces supplied by theater commander, rated C1 for readiness and no forces supplied by theater commander, below C2.

M14	Percent	Of major units remain <i>untrained</i> in at least one of their METL tasks.
M15	Percent	Manning level for deployed units during operation.
M16	Percent	Of individual personnel augmentation requirements, validated by appropriate CINC approval authority.
M17	Percent	Of personal daily water requirement provided.
M18	Percent	Of OPLANs have medical force protection programs and guidelines.
M19	Personnel	Per assigned legal officer in theater.
M20	Days	To establish personnel policies for all deployed forces.

#### ST 4.2.1 Integrate Supply and Services.

To provide field service and supply in support of Service personnel (includes food, water, personal welfare, comfort items, clothing and individual equipment, laundry, bath, renovation, and mortuary affairs). Also, to provide personnel service support and accountability (includes administration (includes education, development, promotion, assignment, retention), finance, legal services and personnel support activities, to include morale and welfare activities in the theater (for example, rest and relaxation)) in preparing theater forces for joint operations and theater level campaigns and routine COMMZ support and for the sustainment of the tempo of operations once begun. **(JP 4-0, 4-06)** (JP 1-05, 3-05.3, 4-0, 4-02)

M1	Percent	Of required aerial mail terminals and military post offices, established within planned timelines.
M2	Percent	Of OPLANs include tasks to establish a joint mortuary affairs office (JMAO).
M3	Percent	Of OPLANs include establishment of mortuary collection points, field processing centers, personal effects depots, and US cemeteries in theater.
M4	Percent	Of personnel provided with required individual clothing and equipment.
M5	Days	Delay from standard in distributing mail to unit level.
M6	Percent	Of personnel receive at least one hot meal per day.
M7	Percent	Of personal daily water requirement provided.
M8	Days	Delay in search, recovery, identification, care, and evacuation or disposition of deceased personnel because of lack of graves registration system units.
M9	Personnel	Per assigned chaplain in theater.
M10	Personnel	Per assigned legal officer in theater.
M11	Personnel	Per assigned MWR person in theater.
M12	Months	To establish R&R facilities in a protracted operation.
M13	Percent	Of protracted operations have a theater or JFC established R&R policy.



#### ST 4.2.2 Coordinate Health Service Support.

To coordinate health service support (including, but not limited to, preventive medicine, inpatient/outpatient care, ancillary support, medical logistics, patient evacuation, hospitalization, dental support, return to duty, and veterinary services) in preparing and sustaining theater forces. Task includes ensuring that programs are in place to identify health threats, apply risk management, and abate such risk. **(JP 3-0, 4-01)** (JP 3-07.5, 3-09.3, 3-57, 4-06, 5-00.2, CJCSM 3122.03)

**Note:** For patient evacuation see ST 4.3.1, *Establish and Coordinate Movement Services within Theater* and SN 1, *Conduct Strategic Deployment and Redeployment*.

M1	Percent	Accountability of personnel entering health services treatment pipeline.
M2	Hours	From wound or injury until surgery.
M3	Days	Awaiting routine medical services (in theater).
M4	Percent	Of casualties, returned to duty.
M5	Percent	Of casualties die.
M6	Patients/day	Returned to duty.
M7	Patients/day	Provided medical treatment.
M8	Percent	Of health services customers are active duty personnel.
M9	Percent	Of total casualties treated per day are noncombatants.
M10	Percent	Of in-theater procured fresh meat, inspected by a US inspector.
M11	Percentage	Of required dental personnel, in theater.
M12	Percent	Of required nursing personnel, in theater.
M13	Percent	Shortfall in health services support personnel (in theater).
M14	Hours	Turnaround for medical lab serology and other technical lab testing results.
M15	Days	Supply of whole blood held (in theater).
M16	Percent	Of minimal casualties, returned to duty within 72 hours.
M17	Percent	Of immediate casualties evacuated to further care within 24 hours (without mortality incidence).
M18	Percent	Of total patient count were NBIs.
M19	Percent	Of mortality results from nonavailability of blood products.
M20	Percent	Of mortality results from delay in regulation of patient to further care.
M21	Percent	Of loss of limb resulted from delay in regulation of patients to further care.
M22	Percent	Of patients regulated to facilities with required capability.
M23	Minutes	For casualty to obtain "stabilizing" medical care.
M24	Days	For casualty to obtain "recuperative" medical care.
M25	Y/N	Medical force protection guidance published.
M26	Percent	Of force completed pre and post deployment medical programs.

M27	Days	To conduct preliminary investigation for endemic diseases, arthropod and rodent infestations, and water quality in the joint operations area.
M28	Days	To coordinate preventive medicine procedures with allied forces and/or host nation in theater of operation/JOA.
M29	Days	Since inspection of local sources of subsistence items in the operations area.

**ST 4.2.2.1 Manage Theater Joint Blood Program.**

Provide an orderly system for collection, storage, and distribution of blood products under peacetime and/or wartime conditions. This task is normally executed through the supported command Surgeon responsible for coordinating and integrating plans, policies, and procedures for effective management of component and area joint blood programs. **(JP 4-02, 4-02.1)** (JP 4-0, 4-02, 4-02.1, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Days	To establish Blood Transshipment Center(s) in the joint operations area.
M2	Days	To coordinate activities between theater Joint Blood Program Office and Armed Services Blood Program Office.
M3	Percent	Accuracy in submitting Blood Reports to ASBPO based on daily estimates of theater requirements.
M4	Hours	Delay in submitting daily Blood Reports from JBPO to ASBPO.
M5	Days	To establish Area Joint Blood Program Office(s) (AJBPO) in joint operations area.
M6	Percent	Difference in blood product supply levels between theaters of operations/JOAs.
M7	Weeks	Since JBPO conducted on-site inspection of subordinate JBPOs, AJBPOs, and units in the joint operations area.
M8	Percent	Of blood products available to support patients' needs.

**ST 4.2.2.2 Coordinate Patient Evacuation from Theater.**

To coordinate the movement of patients within and from theater. This task includes designating medical treatment facilities (MTFs) by matching existing medical capabilities with reported patient needs; scheduling and arranging movement of DOD patients and authorized beneficiaries; establishing procedures regulating the evacuation of patients; determining eligibility for others, such as UN personnel and foreign national; and making special arrangements for Enemy Prisoners of War. This task includes operating a Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center (TPMRC) under operational control of the combatant commander's surgeon. This task includes designating Joint Patient Movement Requirements Centers (JPMRC) where appropriate or needed. The TPMRC coordinates with other agencies such as the Defense Medical Systems Support Center (DMSSC), Electronic Data Services USTRANSCOM, and the Global Patient

Movement Requirements Center (GPMRC). (**JP 4-02, 4-02.2**) (JP 3-05, 4-0, 4-02, 4-02.1, 4-02.2, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Days	To establish procedures for regulating evacuation of patients within and from theater of war, including decontaminating casualties prior to evacuation.
M2	Hours	To determine policy for eligibility for treatment of non-DOD personnel, such as UN personnel and foreign nationals.
M3	Days	To establish Theater Patient Movement Requirement Center (TPMRC) in the joint operations area.
M4	Days	To coordinate patient evacuation activities between TPMRC and Global Patient Movement Requirement Center (GPMRC).
M5	Days	To establish liaison and coordination with USTRANSCOM and Defense Medical Systems Support Center.
M6	Percent	Of GPMRC generated schedules must be modified for the joint operations area.
M7	Percent	Difference between projected bed capacities of designated MTFs and actual patient population in the joint operations area.
M8	Percent	Of patients, processed at ASF and passed on first time.

#### **ST 4.2.2.3 Manage Medical, Dental, and Veterinary Services and Laboratories and Supply.**

To ensure an effective and consistent program, in peacetime and war, of medical and dental services, across the area of responsibility, including the provision of laboratory support and medical supply. This task also covers responsibility for ensuring preventive medicine and veterinary services for all Services on a theater - wide basis. (**JP 4-0, 4-02**) (JP 4-0, 4-02, 4-02.1, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Days	To establish preventive medicine policy including appropriate countermeasures for identified medical threats for the joint operations area (JOA) (after C-day)
M2	Days	To establish medical laboratories in the joint operations area (after organizational C-Day).
M3	Days	To inspect all facilities supplying, storing, and issuing subsistence items in the joint operations area.
M4	Hours	To inspect subsistence items contaminated by NBC attack in the joint operations area.
M5	Days	To evaluate size and duration of operation and project levels of dental care required for the joint operations area.
M6	Percent	Difference between projected and actual levels of dental care required for the JOA.
M7	Percent	Of personnel, incapacitated by disease and non-battle injury in the joint operations area.
M8	Hours	To verify first use and identify type(s) of agents used.

**ST 4.2.2.4 Coordinate Joint Comprehensive Medical Surveillance.**

When directed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, implement a comprehensive military medical surveillance program that includes collection and analysis of health status and threat information before, during, and after deployment. Minimum required elements are identification of the population at risk, continuous surveillance of health status and disease/injury events, and implementation of protective countermeasures based on analysis of data at all levels of command. **(N/A)** (CJCSM 3122.03, DODD 6490.1, DODI 6490.3)

M1	Days	To establish preventive medicine policy including appropriate countermeasures for identified medical threats for the joint operations area (JOA) (after C-Day).
M2	Percent	Of personnel incapacitated by disease and non-battle injury in the JOA.
M3	Y/N	Predeployment guidance, including health risk, published.
M4	Percent	Of force completed predeployment screening.
M5	Percent	Of force completed postdeployment screening.
M6	Percent	Of force completed deployment medical training and preparation.

**ST 4.2.3 Reconstitute Theater Forces.**

To restore combat-attrited units in the theater to a desired level of combat effectiveness. Reconstitution is a melding of personnel, training, and logistics. It is a series of operational decisions and actions that begin with removing a unit from the battlefield/space, allocating and establishing priorities and resources, and making the decision to re-employ once a readiness standard is achieved. The two types of reconstitution activities are reorganization and regeneration. On a broader scale, this task includes planning for and being prepared to execute operations for deploying and employing reconstituted forces to counter the emergence of a global threat. **(JP 3-0)** (JP 3-02.2)

M1	Percent	Of OPLANs have reconstitution provisions.
M2	Percent	Of all assigned aircraft in theater, from Backup Aircraft Inventory (BAI).
M3	Days	Of major end items in theater, war reserve stocks.
M4	Percent	Of support forces trained and equipped for salvage and battle damage repair.
M5	Percent	Of plans with requirements for decontamination as part of restoration in branches or sequels.

**ST 4.2.4 Establish and Coordinate Training of Joint and Combined Forces.**

To establish joint and combined training programs, execute joint training events and exercises, and assess joint training effectiveness. Such activities include organizing and conducting joint exercises and training, and evaluating joint

training events. This task also includes coordinating interoperability training among the Service components. **(JP 1-05, 3-0, 4-0)** (JP 0-2, 1-05, 3-0, 3-05 3-07.4, 3-10.1, 4-06, CJCSI 3500.01A, CJCSI 3500.03)

**Note:** Joint training programs derive from JMETL. The development of a command JMETL is addressed by ST 7.1.7, *Establish Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL)*

M1	Weeks	From mission change until required training program established.
M2	Percent	Of JMETs trained per year.
M3	Percent	Of exercises include JMETs.
M4	Percent	Of OPLAN, CONPLAN, FUNCPLAN requirements, identified in JMETL.
M5	Percent	Of required linguists, available to train host-nation personnel during MOOTW.
M6	Months	Since commander's JMETL, updated.
M7	Months	Since policy, education, and training vision, reviewed.
M8	Percent	Of designated and alternate JTF headquarters receive at least one JCS exercise, with after-action review (AAR) each year.
M9	Percent	Of JTF headquarters (conducting major joint exercises), receive augmentation by JTF augmentation cell from theater command.
M10	Percent	Of JTF headquarters receiving at least one academic training exercise in crisis action planning procedures (each year).
M11	Percent	Of joint exercises training objectives reflect participating units' JMETL assessment.
M12	Hours	For major theater units (major commands/Corps/Fleet/NAF-level headquarters) to provide an assessment to CINC of capability to accomplish each JMET.
M13	Percent	Of primary and alternate JTF headquarters receive at least one JCS exercise with AAR (each theater training cycle).
M14	Percent	Of JTF headquarters conducting joint exercises receive required theater Joint Staff augmentation.
M15	Percent	Of contingency JTF headquarters receiving periodic academic training in crisis action planning procedures and joint procedures.
M16	Percent	Of JMETL tasks trained under NBC conditions.
M17	Percent	Of CINC-designated component functional responsibilities trained/exercised during a two-year training cycle.
M18	Annually	Conduct a CINC's staff major staff training exercise that is JMETL based to train the CINC's boards, bureaus, centers, and offices (BBCOs).
M19	Annually	Conduct a CINC's staff training exercise to train internal training requirements, i.e., crisis action team, crisis response team, etc.
M20	Biennially	All CINC's BBCOs are trained/exercised
M21	Biennially	All CINC's internal staff are trained/exercised.

M22	Biennially	Components exercise PREPO stocks in theater.
M23	Biennially	Combatant command subregions conduct an exercise.
M24	Biennially	Combatant command friendly countries conduct an exercise.
M25	Annually	CINC's staff conducts a major coalition staff training exercise.
M26	Percent	Of training events that involve formal or informal collection of observations, lessons learned, and conducting an after-action review or joint after-action report as part of the evaluation process.

#### ST 4.2.5 Provide Religious Ministry Support within Theater.

To provide religious ministry support throughout the theater; develop plans and guidance for religious activities for the full range of military operations; and ensure effective use of chaplain personnel and resources. This task includes recommending policy concerning provision of ministry and religious ministry support activities, developing religious support annexes, coordinating religious ministry with Service component commands, determining personnel and faith group requirements within theater and maintaining liaison between command and HN religious leaders (when appropriate) to support commander's mission. Finally, this task includes providing advice to the commander on local religious customs that may impact planning or execution of an operation or campaign. **(JP 1-05)** (JP 3-05.3, 3-07.5, 3-17, CJCDM 3122.03)

M1	Percent	Of major military locations have services for all major denominations available weekly.
M2	Percent	Of chapels have active lay-personnel advisory groups.
M3	Percent	Of chaplain's time spent with military personnel and families outside the religious facility.
M4	Instances	Of hospital death without chaplain presence.
M5	Percent	Of hospital patients seen at least weekly by chaplains.
M6	Percent	Of installations/locations without chaplains have weekly religious services.
M7	Percent	Of major installations or commands have religious education and study programs.
M8	Percent	Of major military locations have services for all major denominations available weekly.
M9	Percent	Of NGOs have joint force chaplain established liaison.
M10	Percent	Of personnel have weekly opportunity for contact with a chaplain.
M11	Percent	Of PVOs have joint force chaplain established liaison.
M12	Percent	Of religious faith groups in joint force receive balanced coverage throughout theater.
M13	Days	Since last chaplain visit to isolated location or unit.
M14	Months	Since last command chaplain survey of morale within joint force in theater.
M15	Hours	To receive counseling, support and comfort from time of request.

#### **ST 4.2.6 Determine Theater Residual Capabilities.**

To determine the status of theater forces and capabilities following a theater strategic attack. Strategic attack operations target centers of gravity and such other vital target systems as government and military leadership C2, C4I networks, weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them, critical materiel stockpiles, and other war-sustaining capabilities. Strategic attack may include both WMD (NBC weapons) and/or conventional weapons. This task includes determining both the status of military forces (joint and multinational) as well as theater infrastructure (logistic, communications, transportation, medical, etc.). (N/A) (MCM 93-91)

**Note:** ST 4.2.6 is tied to tasks performed in ST 4.2.3 *Reconstitute Theater Forces*.

M1	Hours	To assess damage to infrastructure at strategic interest locations (key military bases, critical infrastructure nodes, etc.).
M2	Minutes	To estimate the range of fatalities, injuries, and population at risk resulting from an attack.

#### **ST 4.2.7 Provide Legal Services in Theater.**

To provide legal services throughout the theater; develop plans and guidance for legal services for the full range of military operations; and ensure effective use of legal personnel and resources. This task includes recommending policy concerning provision of legal support activities and developing legal annexes to plans. This task also includes providing legal advice to the commander on local legal issues that may impact planning or execution of an operation or campaign. (N/A) (JP 3-07.2, CJCSI 3110.14, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Hours	To provide legal advice in time-sensitive areas, including ROE, targeting, and contingency contracting.
M2	Percent	Of legal services provided within planned timelines.
M3	Percent	Of times lack of access to legal support caused delay in military operations.
M4	Days	To provide legal advice in less time-sensitive areas, such as ordinary acquisitions and legal assistance.

#### **ST 4.3 Establish and Coordinate Distribution of Supplies/Services for Theater Campaign and COMMZ.**

To maintain the timely flow of stocks (all classes of supply in large and small quantities) and services (through Service component logistics organizations) to the joint operations area operational forces, in support of theater strategy and theater campaigns and normal theater COMMZ support operations. This task includes establishing a responsive distribution network using theater joint, multinational, or commercial transportation means (over ground, air, and sea lines of

communications) that accommodates bulk movement, individual shipment of high-value class VIIx (aircraft engines), and class IX repair parts. This task includes the use of the Global Transportation Network (GTN) for in-transit visibility (ITV), C2, and business operational distribution of war reserve stocks in sufficient quantity, type, and location in depth throughout the theater to support combatant commander warfighting strategies. This activity includes distributing supplies and services in military operations other than war, including supported agencies and a host nation. **(JP 4-0, 4-01, 4-01.1, 4-01.6)** (JP 3-07.1, 4-0, 4-01.2, 4-01.3, 4-01.6, 4-01.7, 4-02.1)

M1	Days	Operational delay because of fuel shortages.
M2	Percent	Of planned fuel deliveries, destroyed by enemy action.
M3	Percent	Of planned fuel, delivered to theater forces.
M4	Percent	Of required fuel, in place to support campaign.
M5	Incidents	Of fire support missions not fired or not completed because of ammunition shortfall.
M6	Days	Operational delay because of late redistribution of ammunition (Class V) from less affected area in theater.
M7	Percent	Of required munitions, in place to support campaign.
M8	Percent	Of total munitions, delivered but not fired by conflict end.
M9	Ship days	Lost while tankers held in theater before unloading begins (floating storage).
M10	Days	To begin unloading ships (upon arrival in theater).
M11	Days	To begin unloading fuel tankers (upon arrival in theater).
M12	Percent	Of classes of supplies/services in theater identified and sourced within first 30 days of operation.
M13	Percent	Of active acquisition and cross-servicing agreements, confirmed by combatant command within five days of CJCS Warning Order.
M14	Hours	For combatant command to confirm all active acquisition and cross-servicing agreements.
M15	Days	To inventory and report all war reserve stocks.
M16	Days	To establish a JTF supply-servicing reporting system (from establishment of JTF).
M17	Hours	For combatant command staff to identify potential sources for classes of supplies sufficient to meet operational requirements (after CJCS Warning Order).
M18	Hours	For all pertinent host-nation legal and support arrangements to be identified and reviewed (after CJCS Warning Order).
M19	Hours	For all relevant acquisition and cross-servicing agreements (ACSA) to be identified and reviewed (after CJCS Warning Order).
M20	Hours	For estimates of potential subordinate command (e.g., JTF) sustainment requirements to be reviewed (after CJCS Warning Order).
M21	Percent	Of supply classes go <i>red</i> or become <i>show stoppers</i> (during execution).
M22	Days	Delay in attacks because of lack of adequate munitions in theater.



M23	Percent	Of support cargo and equipment arrived at customer destination by RDD.
M24	Percent	Of required sustainment supplies arrived at customer destination by RDD.

#### **ST 4.3.1 Establish and Coordinate Movement Services Within Theater.**

To move personnel, equipment, and supplies to sustain theater strategy, geographic combatant commander's campaigns, and joint operations. Also, to allocate transportation resources for moving forces into a position to execute campaigns and joint operations. This activity includes transportation mode operations, and movement management and control. Transportation mode operations includes preparing, submitting, and processing ITV data; moving cargo, equipment, and personnel by various modes and within various levels of service (includes express movement of high-value items); and providing transportation resources to support theater strategy, campaigns, and joint operations. Movement control includes movement control for onward movement. Terminal operations include loading, unloading, and documentation at air, water, rail, and truck terminals. **(JP 3-17, 4-0, 4-01.3)** (JP 3-07.5, 4-0, 4-01, 4-01.3, 4-01.7)

**Note:** This task is differentiated from ST 1.1.3, *Conduct Intratheater Deployment of Forces*, and ST 1.1.2.3, *Provide Onward Movement in the Theater*, which are the end of the strategic deployment process. This task involves movement after units, personnel, materiel, and equipment are integrated into combat, maintenance, or support units.

M1	Hours	For priority cargo to move from reception in theater to customer.
M2	Days	For general cargo to move from reception in theater to customer.
M3	Instances	Of changes in transportation mode from theater reception until end-delivery.
M4	Passenger -miles	Provided per day.
M5	Percent	Of key movement facilities (such as POEs, ISBs, and PODs) involved in theater movement plans, identified during COA development.
M6	Hours	For a passenger to move from reception in theater to closure.
M7	Tons	By category of supply held at reception awaiting movement to final destination in theater.
M8	Hours	By category of supply awaiting movement from reception to theater destination.
M9	Hours	To unload materiel and supplies at receiving air, shipping, and ground terminals.

#### **ST 4.3.2 Provide Supplies and Services for Theater Forces.**

To provide, in the quantities and at the time and place needed, trained manpower, classes of supply, geospatial information and services (formerly mapping, charting,

and geodesy), and related field services for sustaining theater forces throughout a theater campaign or joint operation. Field services include water production, storage and distribution, mortuary affairs, laundry and bath, maintenance and recovery, contracting, and disposal of hazardous and non-hazardous material. This activity includes requesting, receiving, producing, procuring, storing, protecting, relocating, and issuing supplies; creating, processing, submitting, and capturing ITV data; and providing personnel and logistic services. It also includes coordinating the building up of the necessary stockage levels in forward staging areas for conducting a theater campaign or joint operation. **(JP 2-03, 4-0, 4-01, 4-01.1, 4-01.3, 4-03, 4-04)** (JP 3-07.5, 4-0, 4-01, 4-01.1, 4-02.1, 4-05)

M1	Days	Delay in operations because of late redistribution of ammunition (Class V) from less affected area in theater.
M2	Percent	Of required ammunition (Class V), in place to support campaign (at execution).
M3	Percent	Of planned ammunition (Class V), delivered to theater forces (during execution).
M4	Percent	Of total munitions, delivered but not fired by conflict end.
M5	Percent	Of required fuel (Class III), in place to support campaign (at execution).
M6	Percent	Of planned fuel (Class III), delivered to theater forces (during execution).
M7	Days	Delay in operations because of fuel (Class III) shortages.
M8	Percent	Of constraints/shortfalls in supply have alternatives.
M9	Shortfalls	Have been identified for supply.
M10	Constraints	Have been identified for supply.
M11	Days	Of supply, in place to support campaign (at execution).
M12	Tons/Day	Capacity to process and issue supplies.
M13	Percent	Of planned supply deliveries, actually delivered (at execution) to customer in theater.
M14	Percent	Of priority one geospatial information and services stored in right quantities and right location(s).
M15	Percent	Of priority two geospatial information and services stored in right quantities and right location(s).
M16	Percent	Of priority three geospatial information and services stored in right quantities and right location(s).

#### **ST 4.3.2.1 Allocate All Classes of Supply per Theater Strategic Plan.**

To allocate supplies to ensure the relative combat power that theater military forces can bring to bear against an enemy is not constrained by the combatant commander's capability to deliver materiel to the required points of application across the range of military operations. This task includes the design, development, and maintenance of a system to allocate the storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel. **(JP 4-0)** (JP 4-0, 4-02.1)

M1	Percent	Of required ammunition (Class V), in place to support campaign.
M2	Percent	Of planned ammunition (Class V), delivered to theater forces during operations.
M3	Percent	Of total munitions, delivered but not fired by conflict end.
M4	Percent	Of required fuel (Class III), in place to support campaign.
M5	Percent	Of planned fuel (Class III), delivered to theater forces.
M6	Days	Of supply, in place to support campaign.
M7	Tons/Day	Capacity to process and issue supplies.
M8	Days	Delay in operations because of late redistribution of ammunition (Class V) from less affected area in theater.
M9	Percent	Of required materiel and supplies by category in place to support a campaign.
M10	Percent	Of planned materiel and supplies by category delivered to customer in theater during operation.

#### ST 4.3.2.2 Build Up Stockage Levels for Theater Campaign.

To build up stockage levels, the combatant commander is responsible for effectively coordinating supply support between the Service components, establishing supply buildup rates, and establishing required theater stockage levels. This task includes identifying the command's capability to acquire, manage, receive, store, and issue the materiel required by the operating forces to equip and sustain them from deployment through combat operations and their redeployment. **(JP 4-0)** (JP 3-0, 4-01.3, 4-03)

M1	Percent	Of OPLANs address time-phased operating and safety levels (of supply).
M2	Hours	For determination of availability of suitable munitions within theater (after CJCS Warning Order).
M3	Percent	Of end items in operational maintenance.

#### ST 4.3.2.3 Coordinate Maintenance Services and Parts for Theater Campaign.

To coordinate and integrate maintenance and salvage within the theater, to encompass all actions taken to keep materiel in a serviceable condition. This task includes actions to return materiel to service, or to update and upgrade its capability. Where practical, the combatant commander should establish integrated maintenance facilities for joint or cross-Service use and should coordinate inter-Service use of salvage assets. However, Service peculiar item maintenance support normally remains the responsibility of Service component commanders. This task includes establishing theater-wide maintenance priorities that emphasize those mission-essential weapons systems that can be rapidly returned to combat readiness. **(JP 4-0)** (JP 3-17, 4-01.7, 4-02.1, 6-02)

M1	Days	Delay in operations because of late updates or upgrades to systems.
M2	Percent	Of items can be repaired in theater.
M3	Percent	Of non-US coalition items can be maintained in theater.
M4	Hours	To process requisitions for items from out of theater.
M5	Days	Awaiting repair for items in theater repair system.
M6	Days	To comply with technical orders.
M7	Days	For system updates or upgrades to systems in theater.

#### **ST 4.4 Develop and Maintain Sustainment Bases.**

To plan, develop, and coordinate construction and maintenance of principal and supplementary bases of support. These bases function as theater sustainment activities to support theater strategy and to conform with national and multinational military policy, strategy, and war plans. This task also includes coordinating common administrative and interservice support for the minimum essential facilities to house, sustain, and support normal or contingency operations from a garrison, base, or bare base site. It may include, if required, a stabilized runway, taxiways, and aircraft parking areas. Lead or dominant Service component assigned by the combatant commander provides common servicing or cross servicing (reimbursable or otherwise) as required. **(JP 4-0)** (JP 3-0, 3-10.1, 3-17, 4-04)

**Note:** See also ST 8.3.3, Arrange Sustainment Support for Theater Forces.

M1	Hours	To reestablish damaged theater LOCs.
M2	Days	To construct a standard runway.
M3	Weeks	To build a base facility within theater base.
M4	Weeks	To construct theater level field hospitals.
M5	Percent	Of construction material acquired or produced locally.
M6	Percent	Of total engineering manpower supplied by host nation.
M7	Percent	Of theater base engineering work, allocated to dismantling fortifications and obstacle systems.
M8	Weeks	Before sustainment facilities, operational.
M9	Percent	Of sustainment facilities, relocated in course of supporting a series of campaigns.
M10	Percent	More theater support base construction was needed than identified in OPLAN (after OPLAN C-Day).

##### **ST 4.4.1 Determine Number and Location of Sustaining Bases.**

To establish theater of war lines of communication and determine the location and number of sustaining bases to best support the geographic combatant commander's strategy and plans and the subordinate operational commanders' campaign plans. **(JP 4-0, 4-04)** (JP 4-01.5, 4-01.6, 4-02)

**Note:** A related task is to allocate space and facilities, as available, in the theater rear (to include theater of war, theaters (and areas) of operations, and the combat zone) for sustainment operations in conformance with the theater strategic concept and national/multinational objectives. This task is found at ST 5, *Provide Theater Strategic Command and Control, Communications, and Computers (C4)*. See also ST 1.4, *Enhance Strategic Mobility*.

M1	Percent	Of OPLANs address main and alternate supply depots.
M2	Weeks	Before sustainment facilities, operational.
M3	Percent	Of sustainment facilities had to be relocated to support a particular campaign.
M4	Kilometers	Backhaul distance for equipment requiring theater level repair or evacuation.
M5	Percent	Of theater level sustainment, not under weather shelters.
M6	Percent	Of theater level sustainment, protected from the elements.
M7	Percent	Of sustainment facilities, capable of being relocated.
M8	Percent	Of operations in theater have adequate sustainment base/infrastructure.

#### ST 4.4.2 Coordinate Civil-Military Engineering in Theater.

To coordinate the construction and maintenance of facilities and communications networks establishing the capacity of CSS organizations to provide materiel and services to subordinate commanders. This activity includes: dismantling fortifications, construction, support and maintenance of theater forward staging bases; rear area restoration; LOC sustainment; construction support; and acquisition or production of construction material for the theater. **(JP 4-0)**  
(JP 4-04, CJCSM 3122.03)

**Note:** See also ST 4.3.2, *Provide Supplies and Services for Theater Forces* and ST 4.4.4, *Manage and Integrate Third Party Logistics*.

M1	Days	To identify and marshal forces to construct a standard fighter/attack suitable runway.
M2	Days	To identify and marshal forces to construct field hospitals (in theater).
M3	Days	To identify and marshal forces to construct a base facility (in theater).
M4	Hours	To restore essential utilities (in rear areas).
M5	Hours	To reestablish damaged LOCs.
M6	Days	To restore POD/APOD to handle required shipping.
M7	Percent	Of main supply routes, pipelines, airfields, and maintenance facilities in JOA that have accurate condition assessments.
M8	Hours	To respond to a request for real estate coordination by JTF or other subordinate command.

M9	Hours	To respond to a request for assistance by JTF or other subordinate command for facilities contracting requirements external to the JOA.
M10	Percent	Of tasks correctly assigned (right engineers/location/time).
M11	Percent	Of engineering requests, satisfied by contractor assets from outside theater.
M12	Percent	Of engineering requests, satisfied by theater assets.
M13	Percent	Of total procurement costs in contract administrative costs.
M14	Dollars	Administrative cost for procurement contracts from \$100,001 to \$500,000.
M15	Dollars	Administrative cost for procurement contracts from \$2,501 to \$100,000.
M16	Dollars	Administrative cost for procurement contracts over \$500,001.
M17	Dollars	Administrative cost for procurement contracts under \$2500 (micro-purchases).
M18	Weeks	To let a procurement contract valued at over \$500,001.
M19	Days	To let a procurement contract valued from \$2,501 to \$500,000.
M20	Percent	Of construction material, acquired or produced locally.
M21	Percent	Of supplies, under weatherproof cover at theater sustainment bases.
M22	Percent	Of planned administrative support services, available.
M23	Percent	Of planned capacity to process and issue supplies, available.
M24	Percent	Of planned transportation, available.
M25	Percent	Of theater base engineering work, allocated to dismantling fortifications and obstacle systems.
M26	Days	To identify and marshal forces to construct a standard runway.
M27	Days	To identify and marshal forces to restore a standard runway to full operation.
M28	Days	To identify and marshal forces to construct a standard intratheater airlift suitable runway.

#### ST 4.4.3 Coordinate Law Enforcement and Prisoner Control.

To enforce military law and order and collect, process, evacuate, and intern prisoners of war. **(JP 3-0, 3-10)** (JP 3-10, 3-10.1, 3-11, 3-57, 5-00.2, CJCSM 3122.03)

**Note:** Combat area circulation control is covered under transportation activities, ST 1, *Deploy, Concentrate, and Maneuver Theater Forces*.

M1	Casualties/day	Among EPWs detained by friendly forces.
M2	EPWs	Detained by friendly forces, awaiting final disposition.
M3	Percent	Of EPW compounds, guarded by security forces versus combat troops.
M4	Percent	Of EPW compounds, cited for serious deficiencies by International Red Cross.

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M5	Hours	To evacuate EPWs from initial capture to their final EPW compounds.
M6	Casualties/week	Among prisoners.
M7	Incidents/week	Involving off-duty US military personnel, local nationals, alcohol, or drugs.
M8	Percent	Of requests for rail and road movement escorts, met.
M9	Weeks	Since EPW policy reviewed by legal personnel.
M10	Incidents/month	Of accidents involving military vehicles.
M11	Percent	Of felony cases in theater, cleared within first month.
M12	Incidents	Of shortfalls in security forces to meet operational requirements.
M13	Requests	For construction of new EPW facilities.
M14	Incidents	Of shortfalls in EPW processing sites.
M15	Incidents	Of law and order policy not covered by existing/established policy/SOP.
M16	Percent	Of EPW trained and equipped for NBC defense.
M17	Percent	Of security forces committed to EPW operations (versus combat support).

#### ST 4.4.4 Manage and Integrate Third Party Logistics.

To manage contracts for the delivery of sustainment services. This task applies to vetted contractors providing services under contracts issued by the designated DOD Executive Agent. Part of this task is ensuring contractor representatives are included in the planning process and ensuring services delivered are required and within the scope of the contract. Also, this task includes ensuring contractor personnel are properly prepared for conducting their work within a theater of war or the joint operations area. The scope of the contract could include, among other things, providing field services, supplies/materiel, in-transit visibility through Global Transportation Network (GTN), engineering, and transportation support. This task does not apply to services provided under HNS. **(JP 4-0, 4-04)** (JP 3-07.3, 4-0, 4-01, 4-01.5, CJCSM 3122.03

M1	Personnel	To oversee and manage contractors' performance in providing on-schedule sustainment services in the joint operations area.
M2	Days	Delay between CJCS Warning Order and briefing of contractor representatives.
M3	Percent	Of theater sustainment services, provided by third party logistics (contractor services).
M4	Percent	Of contractor personnel have equipment to allow them to deploy forward to the joint operations area.
M5	Days	Delay in contract performance because of lack of specialized training.
M6	Personnel	From RC, activated to replace contractor personnel not prepared to deploy to the joint operations area.
M7	Days	For contractor review of draft OPLAN.

M8	Hours	To receive contractor comments on proposed courses of action (during a crisis).
M9	Percent	Of contractor's available capacity used in the joint operations area (if military support forces also employed).
M10	Days	To select contractors to deliver sustainment services in the joint operations area.
M11	Months	To develop, advertise, and let contracts for sustainment services in the joint operations area.
M12	Percent	Of personnel support contracted.

**ST 4.5 Acquire, Manage, and Distribute Funds.**

To perform the resource management function of estimating costs for operations and tracking and reporting actual costs to support requests to higher levels for funding. It also includes identifying and managing funds that can be made available to theater and operational levels to pay for immediate expenses. Finance and accounting functions include overall capturing of the costs of operations via standard accounting systems and other means, and the management of the operating systems that pay personnel and providers (contractors, host-nation suppliers, etc.). **(N/A)** (CJCSI 5261.01, CJCSI 7401.01)

M1	Days	Issue financial management support annex after receipt of CINC's strategic concept for deliberate plan.
M2	Days	To develop intertheater financial management policies for supporting finance, accounting, resource management and procurement personnel.
M3	Hours	To determine the location of the theater central currency fund support operation.
M4	Days	To secure sources for bringing funds into theater and procuring funds within theater (intertheater banking support).

**ST 4.6 Minimize Safety Risks.**

To ensure that programs are in place to identify potential safety threats, to apply risk management, and to take action to abate such risks. **(JP 3-0, 4-01.6)** (JP 3-07.5, 3-09.3, 3-57, 4-06, 5-00.2, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Incidents	Of Class A accidents (last 12 months).
M2	Incidents	Of Class B accidents (last 12 months).
M3	Days	To complete accident investigation and report.
M4	Fatalities	In last 12 months.
M5	Hours	To report Class A mishaps to combatant commander.
M6	Man-hours	Lost because of accidents (last 6 months).
M7	Percent	Of accidents attributed to human error (last 12 months).
M8	Percent	Of combat assets (by \$ value), lost to accidents (last 12 months).
M9	Percent	Of flying accidents attributed to human error (last 12 months).



M10	Percent	Of force lost to nonbattle injury or disease in theater of operation/JOA.
M11	Percent	Of people with lost time, because of contact with hazardous materials.
M12	Percent	Of people with lost time, because of non-work related accidents.
M13	Percent	Of people with lost time, because of work related accidents.
M14	Incidents	Of Class A flying mishaps per 100,000 flying hours.

## **ST 5 PROVIDE THEATER STRATEGIC COMMAND AND CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND COMPUTERS (C4).**

To exercise authority and direction by a combatant commander over assigned and attached joint and multinational forces. For combatant commanders this is the exercise of combatant command (command authority). This task includes the development and revision of theater strategy, based upon national security strategy and national military strategy. A theater strategy is designed to link strategic and operational strategies to attain a desired strategic end state by matching objectives, threats, and opportunities in light of resource constraints. The geographic combatant commander provides strategic guidance and direction for the employment of single service, joint, and multinational forces through both the theater strategy and campaign plans. The result of the three levels of strategy (and related strategic plans) is an integration of national and military ends, ways, and means as well as theater ends, ways, and means. The combatant commander provides C4 policy, plans, programs, and systems to shape the environment and ensure information superiority and interoperable C4 systems. These activities pertain across the range of military operations. **(JP 0-2, 1, 3-0, 4-01.1)** (JP 0-2, 3-07.5, 3-10.1, 4-01.1, 4-01.2, 6-0, 6-02, CJCSI 3110.10, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Days	To issue Letter of Instruction (LOI) for plan development (after receipt of CINC's strategic concept for deliberate plan).
M2	Days	To submit COAs (after receipt of national strategy direction).
M3	Hours	To provide combatant command's execute order to components (after receipt of a CJCS Execute Order).
M4	Months	To complete CINC's strategic concept (after publication of JSCP).
M5	Months	To update combatant command published strategy (after major shift in US midterm strategy).
M6	Months	To update combatant command published strategy.
M7	Percent	Of combatant command orders, properly executed by command and supporting components.
M8	Percent	Of combatant command's suggested changes to JSR, NMS, and other strategy development and strategy documents are accepted.
M9	Percent	Of selected COAs, agreed to by CJCS.

### **ST 5.1 Operate and Manage Theater C4I Environment.**

To operate and manage the theater C4I systems to receive and relay strategic direction or orders from national levels. These systems are used to obtain

information for the combatant commander or staff, maintain that information, and communicate it to those who need it to accomplish combatant commander objectives. Such information can include national security strategy and national military strategy; theater missions and military objectives; enemy theater forces and centers of gravity; friendly forces and vulnerabilities, in-transit visibility of forces and supply; and terrain and weather. This task includes informing and advising the NCA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, multinational heads of state, defense ministers, and multinational chiefs of staff, and developing an understanding of strategic guidance or an understanding of national and multinational policies, objectives, strategic aims, and other elements of national and multinational power (political, economic, informational). In addition, this task should ensure interoperability, anticipate information requirements, and program future C4 designs/architecture to best support information requirements. This activity includes interfacing with friendly and enemy (in occupied territory) civilian government authorities in the theater. It includes the translation, retention, and dissemination of all types of information. **(JP 6-0, 6-02)** (JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-07.5, 3-13.1, 6-02, CJCSI 3110.10)

**Note:** Protection is covered by ST 6.3, *Secure Theater Systems and Capabilities*

M1	Instances/ month	Of NBC Warning and Reporting System down and antiterrorism/force protection.
M2	Percent	Of requirements for DOD and other government agency support identified and forwarded for resolution.
M3	Percent	Of C4 nodes that are established with required equipment to maintain the network.
M4	Percent	Of communications outages having redundant communication paths adequate to ensure timely receipt of information.
M5	Percent	Of commander's critical communications systems that are fully operational (external).
M6	Percent	Of critical C4I architecture nodes that are identified in planning.

#### **ST 5.1.1 Communicate Strategic and Operational Decisions and Information.**

To send and receive strategic orders, significant information, and data by any means. **(JP 6-0, 6-02)** (JP 2-01, 6-0, CJCSI 3110.10)

M1	Minutes	Of queuing time for critical-high precedence messages being sent.
M2	Minutes	To deliver FLASH message to action addressee (after receipt in servicing communication center/facility).
M3	Minutes	To receive FLASH message in working spaces (from release at originating communication center).
M4	Minutes	To receive IMMEDIATE message in working spaces (from release at originating communication center).

M5	Percent	Of action addressees received strategic orders and significant information by any means.
M6	Percent	Of addressees received message.
M7	Percent	Of AUTODIN messages transmitted FLASH or IMMEDIATE.
M8	Percent	Of DSN/DRSN/TASS calls completed.
M9	Percent	Of messages go outside normal communications channels.
M10	Percent	Of messages queued in AUTODIN backlog (each week).
M11	Percent	Of messages sent outside doctrinal/Service channels for message classification.
M12	Percent	Of messages transmitted emergency FLASH precedence.
M13	Percent	Of messages transmitted IMMEDIATE precedence.
M14	Percent	Of traffic sent in DOD or dedicated commercial lines or channels.
M15	Percent	Of strategic orders and significant information received by addressees in time to allow appropriate action in required time frame.
M16	Instances	Send and receive strategic orders, significant information, and data pertaining to nuclear operations by all appropriate means.

#### ST 5.1.2 Determine and Manage Theater C4I Systems Requirements.

To determine theater C4I systems requirements and provide for oversight of theater transmission, message, and switching systems that are used to send or receive strategic (or operational) orders and information. This task may include establishing theater unique communications requirements such as telemedicine, C2 networks with allies or coalition forces, etc. This task includes establishing the requirement for joint C4I systems to operate within the GCCS, to include the NMCS. This task addresses C4I systems required to support friendly nations and groups in military operations other than war. This task includes the integration of various means, such as DOD, commercial, and host-nation communications. This task includes employment of theater C4I tactics, techniques, and procedures for contingency operations and the restoration of C4I systems. **(JP 6-0, 6-02)** (JP 3-05.3, 6-0, CJCSI 3110.10)

M1	Days	To define theater communications requirements for military operations other than war (after CJCS Warning Order).
M2	Days	To integrate new headquarters into existing Global Command and Control System (GCCS).
M3	Hours	To identify surge capacity requirements in DOD long-haul communications channels (after CJCS Warning Order).
M4	Hours	To provide C4I planning guidance and assistance to forces on joint telecommunications/data systems (after receipt of warning order).
M5	Minutes	To report critical theater C4 outages to CJCS.
M6	Minutes	To update status of critical circuits to commander.
M7	Percent	Of C2 nodes have all required communications capabilities.

M8	Percent	Of C4I planning guidance and assistance, provided to supporting, apportioned, allocated, and assigned forces on joint telecommunications and data systems during planning process.
M9	Percent	Of C4I resources (required to support force redeployment), identified.
M10	Percent	Of communication outages have redundant communication paths adequate to ensure timely receipt of record traffic.
M11	Percent	Of communications networks (critical to operations), fully operational.
M12	Percent	Of critical C4I architecture nodes identified in OPLAN.
M13	Percent	Of DOD DISN long-haul communications channels saturated.
M14	Percent	Of joint force classified systems can be networked.
M15	Percent	Of joint force headquarters LANs, authorized to interoperate, capable of interoperating (e.g., GCCS, JDISS).
M16	Percent	Of joint force voice and data communications (secure and unsecured) have unified command functional.
M17	Percent	Of joint force voice and data communications (unsecure and secure) have National Command Authorities functional.
M18	Percent	Of JOPES available (via GCCS).
M19	Percent	Of potential crisis areas, where existing terminals and lines of communications throughput capability, are known or estimated.
M20	Percent	Of requirements for support from DOD agencies identified and forwarded for resolution (prior to execution).
M21	Percent	Of surge capacity, available (DOD DISN long-haul communications).
M22	Percent	Of theater C4 outages reported to CJCS within standards established in CJCS initiating directive.
M23	Percent	Of traffic sent on commercial, host-nations support non-dedicated or non-DOD circuits or channels.
M24	Percent	Of communications systems, available to JTF.
M25	Percent	Of intelligence communications systems, available to JTF.
M26	Instances	Integrate national and theater communications to provide critical information to decision makers regarding employment of nuclear weapons.
M27	Instances	Of delays in receiving, processing, and transmitting/relaying messages over established communications systems.

### ST 5.1.3 Maintain Strategic Information, Data, and Force Status.

To provide, capture, screen, process, circulate, store, and display strategic and operational information, data, and force status in a form suitable for the decision making and planning processes of the combatant commander and staff and for supporting friendly nations (e.g., in-transit visibility data for the Global Transportation Network). **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 6-0, 6-02)** (JP 2-01, 3-05.3)

M1	Hours	To update and confirm data reported to CINC (after daily briefing).
M2	Minutes	To access and display shared local databases.
M3	Minutes	To access and display shared remote databases.

M4	Minutes	To post unit data to appropriate databases or pass to work centers (after receipt of reports).
M5	Minutes	To process and disseminate status information.
M6	Minutes	To update current information on status-of-forces.
M7	Percent	Of appropriate data provided to CINC, prior to decisions being made.
M8	Percent	Of audited reports contained no errors.
M9	Percent	Of friendly units/organizations and personnel with current status known.
M10	Percent	Of reports processed and disseminated to agencies within specified time limits.
M11	Percent	Of reports/messages delivered to designated recipient within specified time limits.
M12	Percent	Of intelligence data base systems, available to JTF.
M13	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M14	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>
M15	Y/N	Classified measures are located at <a href="http://www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/">www.jtasc.acom.smil.mil/ujtl/</a>

#### ST 5.1.4 Monitor Worldwide and Theater Strategic Situation.

To continuously screen and analyze national and multinational objectives, policies, goals, other elements of national and multinational power (political, economic, informational), political aims, and national military strategy. This activity includes staying current on and projecting events throughout the theater and in other theaters. **(JP 3-0, 6-0)** (JP 2-0, 6-0)

**Note:** This task differs from ST 5.2.1, *Review Current Situation*, in that this task looks beyond the theater and ST 5.2.1 looks within the theater.

M1	Hours	Since CINC updated on overall theater strategy.
M2	Hours	Since update of information on other joint force, other military forces, and non-DOD agencies operating adjacent to joint force operating area.
M3	Hours	To obtain information on changes to operational or strategic situation.
M4	Hours	To respond to request for background on emerging theater strategic situation.
M5	Hours	To respond to request for background on emerging worldwide or theater strategic situation.
M6	Instances	Of information of critical/emerging event provided to commander by staff prior to commander notification by source outside staff.
M7	Instances	Of information on critical/emerging event provided to commander by source outside of staff (prior to being notified by staff).
M8	Instances	Where commander surprised by critical/emerging political or military event (not briefed).
M9	Months	To review overall theater strategy.

M10	Percent	Of CINC staff POL-Mil specialists and subspecialists primarily focusing on worldwide rather than theater strategic situation.
M11	Percent	Of concurrence between ambassador and CINC inputs for security assistance.
M12	Percent	Of enemy actions or operations, that affected course of campaign, forecast.
M13	Percent	Of information (regarding emerging political events) provided to commander by staff.
M14	Percent	Of POL-Mil specialists and subspecialists on staff, focus on worldwide and theater strategic situation.
M15	Percent	Of staff possess current knowledge of strategic intent and plans.
M16	Percent	Of commander's or senior staff member's knowledge of emerging political events (which could impact theater), come from sources outside staff.
M17	Weeks	To review strategic options in deliberate planning.

#### ST 5.1.5 Provide for Combat Camera in Theater.

To manage, train, equip, and source combat camera forces. These forces support a combatant commander's information operations (IO), public affairs (PA), and civil affairs (CA) objectives to include intelligence, battlefield damage assessment, IO, PA, CA, deception training, legal, and history functions. **(CJCSM 3122.03)** (JP 3-61, 5-03.1, DODD 5040.4)

M1	Hours	To dual hat combat camera detachment commander as member of JIB.
M2	Hours	To process media and produce imagery for short notice tasking (within theater).
M3	Hours	To provide finished imagery products to customers in theater.
M4	Hours	To provide finished imagery products to customers in US.
M5	Hours	To respond to and be on scene for short notice tasking (within joint operations area).
M6	Hours	To review selected combat camera materials for release (until approval).
M7	Percent	Of presented coverage deemed suitable by customer (i.e., audience attention and share).
M8	Percent	Of subject coverage requests, filled.
M9	Hours	To size, source, and task combat camera for contingency operations upon notification.
M10	Minutes	To place unit standby personnel on alert, when necessary.
M11	Hours	For air mobility tasking order processing.
M12	Percent	Of contingency operation taskings filled.
M13	Percent	Of two major theater war OPLAN requirements sourced.

#### ST 5.1.6 Establish Information Assurance (IA) Procedures.

To establish information assurance procedures for deployed operations. This task includes developing information operations (IO) appendices including defensive IO and IA for all deliberate plans and operations orders as required. IA may be used to ensure information and information systems availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. **(JP 3-13)** (CJCSI 6510.01B)

M1	Yes/No	Do commands responsible for design, operation, and maintenance of theater strategic C4 systems have IA and defensive IO policies and procedures?
M2	Yes/No	IA included in the command's plans and orders.
M3	Minutes	To appropriately respond to indications of hostile (domestic or foreign) information attack.

#### ST 5.1.7 Develop and Manage Theater Spectrum Use.

To develop a theater frequency management plan that supports the theater strategy and is adaptable to support contingency operations. To manage the theater electromagnetic spectrum use; process frequency, satellite access use, and host-nation support requests; and anticipate contingency frequency requirements. This task includes coordinating with the components to ensure effective frequency management and providing input to the production of Annex K for operation orders. **(N/A)** (JP 3-51, 6-0, CJCSI 3220.01)

M1	Yes/No	Do theater level policies and procedures exist for managing use of the electromagnetic spectrum?
M2	Yes/No	Do host country agreements and other appropriate support documentation identify and address electromagnetic spectrum use by joint forces?
M3	Yes/No	Do theater level policies and procedures exist for resolving electromagnetic spectrum use conflicts?
M4	Hours	To resolve electromagnetic spectrum use conflicts."

#### ST 5.1.8 Provide for Historical Documentation in Theater.

To assure preservation of historically important documentation for after-action analysis, public affairs purposes, to assist in future decision making processes, and to support creation of histories of the operation. **(N/A)** (CJCSI 5320.01)

M1	Months	Before documents are organized and available for DOD analysis or research.
M2	Percent	Of significant documents returned, organized, and available for DOD analysis and research.
M3	Months	Before all key unified command personnel are interviewed.

M4	Percent	Of key unified command personnel for whom after-action interviews are completed, transcribed, and available for use.
M5	Percent	Of key meetings, briefings, and significant events that are visually documented.
M6	Months	Before operational chronology is completed.
M7	Months	Before operational chronology is posted and available on the SIPRNET.
M8	Percent	Of theater personnel strength achieved.

### ST 5.1.9 Establish and Coordinate Positive Identification Procedures for Friendly Forces in Theater.

To establish and coordinate a theater strategic system using electromagnetic transmission, to which equipment carried by friendly forces automatically responds, for example, by emitting electromagnetic pulses, thereby distinguishing themselves from enemy forces. This task also includes the use of other systems that provide, at a distance, a positive identification of friendly forces. **(JP 3-07.3, 3-09.3, 3-52, 3-56.1)** (JP 3-01.1, 3-09.3, 3-52)

M1	Incidents	Of friendly air forces, not following established procedures to identify themselves.
M2	Incidents	Of friendly forces, not following established procedures to identify themselves.
M3	Incidents	Of friendly subsurface forces, not following established procedures to identify themselves.
M4	Incidents	Of friendly surface forces, not following established procedures to identify themselves.
M5	Percent	Of allied nations and potential coalition partners in theater have agreements on positive identification of friendly forces.
M6	Percent	Of friendly forces, inadvertently attacked by friendly fire.
M7	Percent	Of joint and Service forces, trained in theater combat identification procedures.
M8	Percent	Of multinational forces in theater that have mutual agreements on aircraft identification.
M9	Percent	Of multinational forces in theater that have mutual agreements on force identification.
M10	Percent	Of nations in theater that have mutual agreements on aircraft identification.
M11	Percent	Of aircrews know identification procedures for potential theater recovery bases.
M12	Percent	Of SOF in theater of war/JSOA have systems to identify themselves to friendly attacking forces.
M13	Percent	Of submarines operating in theater of war have systems or procedures to identify themselves to friendly ASW forces.
M14	Percent	Of theater of war friendly force combat casualties, because of friendly fire.
M15	Percent	Of villages, misidentified as friendly or hostile in MOOTW.



M16	Percent	Of friendly casualties caused by friendly weapon systems.
M17	Incidents	Of noncombatants inadvertently attacked by friendly fire.

### **ST 5.2 Assess Theater Strategic Environment.**

To evaluate the factors peculiar to the areas in which the combatant command operates. The theater strategic environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences in the theater that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the chain of command. Of particular importance are national and international security considerations. To continuously evaluate information received through reports or through the personal observations of the combatant commander and subordinate commanders on the general situation in the theater and in the conduct of the theater strategy, campaigns, or joint operations. In particular, this task includes deciding whether the most recent orders issued need to be changed. **(JP 3-0, 5-0)** (JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-0)

M1	Months	To review Regional Security Strategy (RSS).
M2	Months	To review strategic options.
M3	Months	To update Regional Security Strategy (RSS).
M4	Percent	Of international agreements renewed before expiration.
M5	Percent	Of theater significant political events occur with options available.
M6	Weeks	To prepare and submit combatant command inputs to JSR.

#### **ST 5.2.1 Review Current Situation.**

To review on hand strategic information. This activity includes analyzing the assigned theater missions (includes assigned strategic military and politico-military objectives) and related tasks, in the context of national military strategy and war plans. It also includes combining on hand information with incoming information and separating that which is critical from that which is not critical. **(JP 3-0, 5-0)** (JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-0, 3-07.5)

**Note:** This task differs from ST 5.1.4, *Monitor Worldwide and Theater Strategic Situation*, in that this task examines the situation within the theater and ST 5.1.4 looks beyond the theater to the larger world situation.

M1	Hours	To complete review of current situation (from request or crisis event).
M2	Hours	To develop and provide CINC's strategic options IAW CJCS Warning Order (in crisis action planning).
M3	Hours	To obtain information on changes to operational or strategic situation.

M4	Hours	To respond to request for background on emerging theater strategic crisis.
M5	Hours	To respond to request for background on emerging worldwide or theater strategic situation.
M6	Hours	To update CINC on overall theater strategy.
M7	Hours	To update information on other joint forces, other military forces, and non-DOD agencies operating adjacent to joint force operating area.
M8	Incidents	Of enemy actions or operations affecting course of campaign, correctly forecast.
M9	Incidents	Of commander being surprised by critical/emerging political or military events.
M10	Months	To review strategic options completed in deliberate planning cycle.
M11	Percent	Of emerging political events (could impact OA) briefed to commander or senior staff member.
M12	Percent	Of staff have current knowledge of strategic intent and plans.

### ST 5.2.2 Assess National and Multinational Strategy.

To take the product of strategic reviews, to raise issues, and to integrate theater strategies, joint operation planning, defense capabilities, and combatant commander's inputs, and to examine risks and program assessments. The product is part of a theater reassessment or an input to the CJCS review process. The strategy review will provide the principal guidance and support for developing the next Chairman's guidance, national military strategy document, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, and Chairman's Program Assessment. **(JP 3-0)** (JP 3-08v1, 3-54, 5-0)

M1	Percent	Of deficiencies in NSS and NMS, identified by combatant commander.
M2	Percent	Of issues generated by combatant commander in JSR.
M3	Months	To review/update Regional Security Strategy (RSS).
M4	Percent	Of above-the-line forces covered by JMNA.
M5	Percent	Of Joint Chiefs of Staff and CINCs concur in JMNA or NMS review.
M6	Percent	Of theater identified major deficiencies corrected in National Military Strategy review.

### ST 5.2.3 Review National Security Considerations.

To review established command relationships, national security policies, strategic direction, resources to be allocated, and the effects of the other elements and instruments of national power and policy. This task includes a review of the most recent NCA and CJCS planning guidance. **(JP 2-0, 3-0, 5-0)** (JP 3-0)

M1	Percent	Of deficiencies in NSS and NMS, identified by CINC.
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M2	Percent	Of identified major deficiencies, corrected in most recent published NCA/CJCS planning guidance.
M3	Months	To review/update RSS.
M4	Weeks	To prepare and forward proposed change to theater forces or force posture (after receipt of theater national intelligence estimate).
M5	Months	Since staff review of US national political and military security objectives.

#### ST 5.2.4 Review International Security Considerations.

To review international security agreements, including arms control treaties and agreements, the state-of-play of ongoing negotiations, command relationships within alliances and coalitions, collective security strategies, global and regional stability, and regional interrelationships. **(JP 3-0)** (JP 2-0, 2-01, 5-0)

M1	Hours	To respond to request for background on emerging worldwide or theater strategic situation.
M2	Instances	Of issues and shortcomings identified by combatant commander in international agreements, command relationships, or collective strategies.
M3	Percent	Of emerging political events, commander's information came from source outside the staff.
M4	Percent	Of international agreements reviewed and or modified before expiration.
M5	Percent	Of international security arrangements reviewed for impact on theater relationships.
M6	Percent	Of theater political events of interest occur without options being available.

#### ST 5.2.5 Project Future Combatant Command Campaigns or Strategic Operations.

To look beyond campaign phases and major operations to estimate the enemy's future actions and to anticipate friendly actions for employment of combatant command military forces after each phase of a current campaign or strategic operation. This task includes considering possible local reversals, operational and tactical failures, or taking advantage of success and opportunities. **(JP 2-01, 3-0)** (JP 2-01, 3-0, 5-0)

M1	Days	Beyond current plan's execution phase, covered by follow-on planning.
M2	Days	Of completed follow-on planning (beyond current plan's execution phase).
M3	Phases	Planned beyond current plan's execution phase.
M4	Percent	Of decision points that have branches and sequels available (during execution).

M5	Percent	Of decision points that have branches and sequels available (in formal plans).
M6	Percent	Of decision points that have branches and sequels.
M7	Percent	Of identified sequels have developed COAs.
M8	Percent	Of possible follow-on operations, preplanned.
M9	Weeks	Covered by follow-on planning (beyond current plan's execution phase).

**ST 5.3 Determine Strategic Direction.**

To make detailed staff estimates and decisions for implementing, at the theater level, the NCA's national military strategy, policy, objectives, and operation plans. **(JP 2-0, 3-0, 5-0)** (JP 3-0, 3-08v1, 5-0, CJCSI 3100.01)

M1	Hours	To complete plan/order.
M2	Hours	To issue combatant commander's intent (after CJCS Warning Order).

**ST 5.3.1 Conduct Strategic Estimates.**

To develop and modify strategic estimates based on assigned missions. Estimates are developed in light of and after reviewing the theater strategic environment, the various threats, the nature of anticipated operations, national and multinational strategic direction, and forces available. Functionally oriented combatant commanders develop strategic estimates for each theater they support. Operations in one theater often affect other theaters. The interrelationships among theaters, therefore, are important in the assessment of a theater's strategic environment and development of the strategic estimate. The strategic estimate itself acts as the basis for combatant command strategy, plans, and actions that occur in response to deliberate taskings or crises. The combatant commander's strategic estimate results in strategic concepts and courses of action—broad statements of what is to be accomplished. One of the critical parts of the estimate process is defining the strategic end state to be achieved. **(JP 2-01, 3-0, 5-0)** (JP 2-01, 3-0, 4-02.1)

M1	Days	To develop theater strategic estimate (after receipt of JSCP).
M2	Days	To produce a CINC-approved strategic estimate (after receipt of JSR instructions).
M3	Days	To obtain commitment to provide support for Allies (after receipt of request).
M4	Hours	To complete strategic estimate (after convening OPT).
M5	Hours	To produce initial strategic estimate (after convening OPT during crisis).
M6	Percent	Of critical intelligence reports and theater related intelligence estimates reviewed prior to mission analysis/end state assessment.

M7	Percent	Of available planning time allowed for subordinate planning (after selecting COA).
M8	Weeks	To approve theater strategic estimate (after receipt of JSCP).
M9	Days	Provide a comprehensive description of how the use of nuclear weapons can be used to achieve the desired strategic end state at the level of understanding of the decision maker.

#### **ST 5.3.1.1 Develop Theater Courses of Action and Prepare Staff Estimates.**

In conjunction with an analysis of the geostrategic context and of the enemy situation (including capabilities and vulnerabilities), define multiple, feasible employment options to carry out the NCA's concept to include relevant initial response options. These options should be formulated in light of the friendly situation, restrictions, assumptions, and estimates of relative combat power. Each COA should be adequate, feasible, and acceptable. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-0, 5-0)**  
(JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-08v1, 3-09, 5-0)

M1	Percent	Of COAs provided an estimate of time required to reach termination objectives.
M2	Percent	Of essential tasks derived during mission analysis and used in theater planning.
M3	Percent	Of essential tasks included in geographic combatant commander's mission statement.
M4	Percent	Of implied tasks derived during mission analysis and used in theater planning.
M5	Percent	Of planning time, during crisis action planning (CAP), made available by geographic combatant commander to components for planning.
M6	Percent	Of potential COAs open to commander, if successful, will accomplish the mission.
M7	Percent	Of stated tasks derived during mission analysis and used in theater planning.
M8	Percent	Of theater COAs that include concept for maintaining theater reserve.
M9	Percent	Of theater developed COAs, acceptable.
M10	Percent	Of theater developed COAs, distinguishable.
M11	Percent	Of theater developed COAs, feasible.
M12	Percent	Of theater developed COAs, suitable.

#### **ST 5.3.1.2 Analyze and Compare Theater Courses of Action.**

Each COA must be analyzed to ensure major strategic and operational tasks are accomplished in the proper order, and the following are outlined: required forces, logistic concept, and deployment concept, estimate of time to reach termination objectives, and concept for maintaining a theater reserve. COA analysis should include a thorough examination of opposing COAs including the effect of possible enemy COAs on the success of each friendly COA. COA comparisons should be

made in the light of governing factors which include fixed values such as the principles of war; other critical factors, such as political constraints and specific factors from the commander's guidance; and mission accomplishment. If appropriate, elements of various COAs may be merged into one. **(JP 2-01, 3-0, 5-0)** (JP 3-08v1, 5-0)

M1	Hours	To conduct theater COA analysis.
M2	Percent	Of COA assumptions tested for sensitivity.
M3	Percent	Of COA wargaming options (available to theater planners) considered for theater COA analysis.
M4	Percent	Of identified enemy COAs compared to (or wargamed against) each friendly theater COA.
M5	Percent	Of critical problems with theater COA, identified during COA analysis.
M6	Percent	Of theater COA expenses have identified funds against them.
M7	Percent	Of theater COA wargaming assessment criteria selected before analysis began.
M8	Percent	Of theater COAs modified or discarded during COA analysis (after critical problems identified).
M9	Percent	Of theater logistics problems encountered, anticipated during or before COA analysis.
M10	Days	Analyze nuclear COAs to ensure major strategic and operational tasks are accomplished in accordance with governing factors, principles of war, joint doctrine and political constraints.

#### **ST 5.3.1.3 Select/Modify Theater Course of Action and Prepare Commander's Estimate.**

To decide on the course of action (to include an initial response option) that offers the best prospect for success. This is a cyclical process. The courses of action not selected potentially become branches or sequels and contingencies to phases of the operation as the situation evolves. This enables the commander to respond rapidly to changing situations. The product of this task, the commander's estimate, contains the combatant commander's chosen COA (to include an initial response option) along with his rationale for choosing that COA. **(JP 3-0, 5-0)** (JP 2-01, 3-0, 5-0, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Hours	To produce commander's estimate.
M2	Hours	To synthesize theater COA analysis and present recommendation to commander.
M3	Percent	Of branches experienced at theater level, anticipated during or before COA analysis.
M4	Percent	Of sequels experienced at theater level, anticipated during or before COA analysis.
M5	Percent	Of geographic combatant commander recommended COAs, approved by NCA.

M6	Percent	Of geographic combatant commander recommended COAs, recommended for approval by JCS.
M7	Percent	Of geographic combatant commander recommended COAs, recommended for approval by SecDef.
M8	Days	Select the best COAs for employment of nuclear weapons.

#### **ST 5.3.1.4 Conduct Mission Analysis and Prepare Mission Statement.**

To analyze the NCA's national military strategy, policy, objectives, and operations plans for specified and implied tasks, and translate these tasks into mission statements for subordinates. Mission analysis is used to determine the NCA's purpose through analysis of national security and national military strategic direction as well as appropriate guidance in alliance and coalition directions, including long- and short-term objectives for mission termination. Mission analysis leads to the identification of specified and implied tasks, selection of priorities for multiple tasks, and creation of mission statements. The mission statement is the impetus for detailed planning and is the JFC's expression of what the joint force must accomplish and why. It is framed as a clear, concise statement of the essential tasks to be accomplished and the purpose to be achieved. It is expressed in terms of who, what, when, where (task parameters), and why (purpose). (JP 2-0, 3-0, 3-07.1, 5-0, CJCSM 3122.03) (JP 3-02, 3-05.5, 3-07.4, 3-08v1, 3-15, 5-03.1, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Hours	To create mission statements.
M2	Hours	To identify long- and short-term objectives for mission termination.
M3	Hours	To identify specified and implied tasks.
M4	Hours	To select priorities for multiple tasks.
M5	Percent	Of implied tasks derived during mission analysis.
M6	Percent	Of mission statement expressed in terms of who, what, where, when and why.
M7	Percent	Of specified tasks derived during mission analysis.
M8	Percent	Of stated and implied tasks translated into mission statements for subordinates.

#### **ST 5.3.2 Develop Theater Strategic Concepts.**

To develop the collective strategic concepts directed toward securing the objectives of national and multinational policy. Such concepts can be for the use of force or threatened use of force within the theater. Theater strategic concepts included in the strategy are statements of what, where, and how operations are to be conducted in broad, flexible terms. Theater strategic concepts must relate ends, ways, and means, that is, to consider assigned objectives, the threat, and opportunities available in light of available resources. Included is an examination of risks involved in each proposed course of action. In the theater strategy, geographic combatant commanders translate the strategic direction contained

within the national strategy into theater strategy and subsequent plans. (**JP 3-0, 5-0**) (JP 5-0)

M1	Days	To publish planning guidance (after receipt of mission).
M2	Days	To submit COAs, in crisis or wartime, after receipt of national military strategic direction.
M3	Days	To submit COAs, in crisis or wartime, after receipt of national strategy direction.
M4	Instances	Of CJCS rejection of combatant commander's recommended strategy.
M5	Months	To complete CINCs strategic concept (after receipt of JSCP).
M6	Percent	Of accepted COAs have feasible alternatives.
M7	Percent	Of COAs currently developed IAW JSCP requirement.
M8	Percent	Of comparison criteria eliminated before comparison as redundant.
M9	Percent	Of comparison criteria used, defined or weighted before comparison began.
M10	Percent	Of FDOs have adequate follow-on forces.
M11	Percent	Of functional areas covered by guidance.
M12	Percent	Of selected COAs have CJCS concurrence.
M13	Percent	Of shortfall after comparing requirements and assets estimated to be available during JSCP period.

### ST 5.3.3 Issue Planning Guidance.

To establish and issue guidance for planning tasks to be accomplished by the combatant commander's staff and subordinate commands in theater strategy and plans development. Planning guidance would include constraints and restrictions such as rules of engagement. This activity includes initial and subsequent planning guidance. (**JP 3-54, 5-0**) (JP 3-0, 3-07.1, 4-01.1, 5-0, 5-03.1)

M1	Days	To publish planning guidance (after receipt of mission).
M2	Hours	To approve/deny request for change to ROE.
M3	Instances	Of amendments issued to planning guidance.
M4	Instances	Of misunderstood ROE.
M5	Instances	Of requests for clarification of planning guidance/commander's guidance received from subordinate headquarters.

### ST 5.3.4 Prepare and Coordinate Theater Strategy, Campaign Plans or Operation Plans, and Orders.

To develop a plan or order that promulgates the theater strategic concept and intent of the geographic combatant commander and the NCA's national military strategy (and multinational military strategy where appropriate) and plans. This task includes coordinating component command supporting plans and obtaining NCA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and multinational (as appropriate)



approval of the plans and orders. Further, it involves developing for the NCA and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a menu of preplanned options from which to choose, across a wide range of crises. Plans are developed in conjunction with the components, the Joint Staff, the Services, allies, and coalitions partners. It also includes coordination with other combatant commands (including tasks by or for supported or supporting combatant commanders), ambassadors (and Country Teams), leaders of supported nations, and other US agencies. Plans and orders include rules of engagement and other restrictions and constraints. This task includes coordinating host-nation support. **(JP 4-01, 5-0, CJCSM 3122.03)** (JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-07.5, 3-54, 4-0, 4-01, 4-02.1, 5-0, CJCSI 3100.01)

**Note:** See ST 8.5, *Coordinate and Integrate Regional Interagency Activities*, for coordination with other US agencies. See ST 8.3.3, *Arrange Sustainment Support for Theater Forces*, for obtaining host-nation support.

M1	Days	To submit COAs (after receipt of national strategic direction).
M2	Hours	To develop and provide strategic options (after CINC receives warning order).
M3	Hours	To submit operation order for approval (after receipt of Planning Guidance).
M4	Months	To submit OPLAN for approval (after receipt of LOI for plan development).
M5	Percent	Of anticipated mortuary requirements (e.g., collection points, field processing centers, US cemeteries in theater) addressed in planning.
M6	Percent	Of COAs developed deemed executable by CJCS or NCA.
M7	Percent	Of critical C4I architecture nodes identified in planning.
M8	Percent	Of existing terminals and lines of communications and known or estimated throughput capability, addressed during planning.
M9	Percent	Of local customs, laws, and policies impacting presence of media, addressed in planning.
M10	Percent	Of logistic support responsibilities allocated to Service components and other commands during planning.
M11	Percent	Of operation plans and orders receiving a legal review for compliance with ROE, US/international law, and the Law of Armed Conflict.
M12	Percent	Of prepositioned WRM required to support TPFDD pending resupply.
M13	Percent	Of RC personnel backfill requirements for CONUS & OCONUS, identified in planning.
M14	Percent	Of reserve personnel designated to move the force (i.e., AMC, MTMC, MSC and HQ USTRANSCOM), addressed in planning.
M15	Percent	Of reserve personnel designated to support the force, (e.g., medical, dental, security, mob station staff), identified in planning.
M16	Percent	Of unit requirements in OPLAN sourced without dual apportionment.
M17	Percent	Of mission area requirements addressed in planning.

**ST 5.4 Provide Strategic Direction to Theater Forces.**

To provide strategic intent and direction, with clear articulation of desired strategic end state, to subordinates. A key aspect of this task is the degree to which conduct of an operation is decentralized or centralized. It includes the establishment of an operational climate, which places emphasis on understanding and following the commander's intent when the situation changes and revised orders are not available. Where appropriate, this task includes strategic direction to multinational forces in the theater. **(JP 0-2, 3-0, 5-0)** (JP 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-08v1, 5-0, CJCSI 3100.01)

M1	Hours	To deploy joint task force staff augmentation (e.g. DJTFAC).
M2	Hours	To report Joint Staff operational (after receipt of activation order).
M3	Hours	To submit operations order for approval (after receipt of planning guidance).
M4	Minutes	To prepare message of strategic intent (after completion by combatant commander).
M5	Percent	Of changes issued, caused by missing or incorrect data or entries.
M6	Percent	Of CINC's assigned and supporting forces commence operation on time.
M7	Percent	Of joint task force staff deploying augmentation (e.g. DJTFAC) members, have previous training.
M8	Percent	Of proposed OPLANs or campaign plans, accepted by CJCS or NCA without major changes.
M9	Instances	Of misunderstanding commander's intent, missions, and tasks.
M10	Percent	Of time (from receipt of planning guidance until written instructions), available to subordinate and supporting commands.
M11	Percent	Of critical communications systems effectively operational and available to the JTF.
M12	Percent	Of authorizations obtained to pass NOFORN sensitive/classified information to multinational forces in time for those forces to conduct their own planning.

**ST 5.4.1 Issue Theater Strategic Operation Plans, Orders, and ROE.**

To issue plans, orders, and reports to subordinate or supporting organizations for execution. This task includes issuing or forwarding rules of engagement (ROE) to subordinate units and adjacent organizations for coordination. **(JP 5-0)** (JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-07.5, 3-10.1, 4-01.2, 5-0, CJCSI 3121.01, CJCSM 3122.03)

**Note:** Obtaining necessary approval for plans, orders, ROE is covered by task ST 5.3.4, *Prepare and Coordinate Theater Strategy, Campaign Plans or Operation Plans, and Orders*. See ST 8.5, *Coordinate and Integrate Regional Interagency Activities*, for coordination with other US agencies. See ST 8.3.3, *Arrange Sustainment Support for Theater Forces*, for obtaining host-nation support.

M1	Minutes	To transmit an operation order (after approval by CINC).
M2	Percent	Of COAs developed, deemed executable by CJCS or NCA.
M3	Percent	Of operations in OPLAN, conform to US and International Law.
M4	Percent	Of requests for exceptions to ROE, determined according to policy.
M5	Percent	Of ROE conforms to requirements.
M6	Percent	Of ROE requests consistent with current policy.

#### **ST 5.4.2 Synchronize Joint Operations and Subordinate Campaign Plans.**

To combine, sequence, and synchronize the operations of the theater's assigned, attached, or supporting forces or supporting commands. The purpose is to exploit those forces' capabilities in ways that attain the command's objectives by making the best use of their integrated capabilities. The joint force commander apportions firepower resources by priority or region and then disseminates them to joint force component commands. This activity includes the vertical and horizontal integration of tasks in time and space, to maximize a unified effort. **(JP 3-0, 5-0) (JP 3-0, 3-07.1, 5-0)**

M1	Hours	To obtain commitment to support allies (after receipt of request).
M2	Hours	To complete feasible TPFDD (after receipt of warning order).
M3	Hours	To conduct SOF cross-border operations, prior to commencement of hostilities.
M4	Hours	To designate the joint operations area boundaries (after decision to stand up joint force).
M5	Instances	Of operational missions (e.g., UW, DA, PSYOP, Deception), executed without coordinating with operating forces in target area.
M6	Instances	Of requests for support sent directly to CINC's Service component.
M7	Months	To publish approved OPLAN with TPFDD (after receipt of JSCP).
M8	Percent	Of CINC assigned and supporting in-place-forces commence operation on time (right people, right place, right time).
M9	Percent	Of execution taskings to coalition partners or agencies, accepted.
M10	Percent	Of joint force accommodated within boundaries.
M11	Percent	Of joint force missions or component missions, completed as planned.
M12	Percent	Of joint force operations accomplished without exceeding the joint operations area boundaries.
M13	Percent	Of OPLANs, CONPLANs, FUNCPLANs, reviewed within last 24 months.
M14	Percent	Of special technical Operations included in planning.
M15	Percent	Of subordinate missions executed without requested joint force or component support.
M16	Percent	Of TPFDD units arrive IAW RDD.
M17	Percent	Of TPFDD units arrive in operational sequence.

**ST 5.4.3 Establish or Participate in a Joint, Combined, or Multinational Force.**

To establish, or participate in, a force, which is composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single commander authorized to exercise operational control over such joint forces. The term joint force commander includes combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, and joint task forces. This task includes organizing the subordinate command and headquarters, staffing the headquarters, designating the commander, issuing mission guidance, and other activities associated with establishing such a command. This task also applies to establishing a multinational force. A joint force, when a combatant command, would virtually consider all theater strategic level tasks; if a subordinate joint task force, it would focus on the operational level tasks; or, if a designated subunified command, a combination of theater strategic and operational tasks. In all cases, the theater strategic environment and mission of the force will determine the relevant tasks. **(JP 3-08v1, 5-0)** (JP 2-01, 3-07.5, 3-08v1, 4-02.1)

M1	Hours	To appoint joint force commander.
M2	Hours	To define joint operations area.
M3	Hours	To deploy forward and establish in theater a joint force headquarters element.
M4	Hours	To establish initial communication with host nation and US DOS representatives (after CINC establishes joint force headquarters).
M5	Hours	To form the joint force staff.
M6	Hours	To fully augment joint force headquarters staff and commence operations (after receipt of alert order).
M7	Hours	To issue tasking to initial augmentees for newly formed joint task force.
M8	Hours	To provide CJCS a copy of activation (after approval by combatant commander).
M9	Instances	Of friendly forces orders/taskings, significantly delayed because of unclear command relationships with HQ.
M10	Minutes	To notify joint force core staff (after receipt of alert order).
M11	Percent	Of designated staff positions filled.
M12	Percent	Of DOD components and involved foreign governments, adequately represented on designated joint force staff.
M13	Percent	Of joint force headquarters staff composed of augmentees.
M14	Percent	Of joint force staff augmentees have previously trained as augmentees.
M15	Percent	Of nations (with allocated or apportioned forces) represented on combined force staff.
M16	Percent	Of necessary augmentees identified in joint force SOP by rank and duty position.
M17	Percent	Of operational missions coordinated with theater and coalition command structure.

M18	Percent	Of joint force actions or operations, affected by late arrival of augmentees to staff.
M19	Percent	Of theater assigned joint force missions fail, because of improper integration with joint force staff.

#### ST 5.4.3.1 Augment the Joint Force Staff.

To augment the supported joint force commander's staff with trained knowledgeable personnel to add specific capabilities to that staff. This augmentation may be in the form of a joint force augmentation cell or special, ad hoc augmentation on request of the joint force commander. This task is separate and distinct from the exchange of liaison officers. **(JP 3-0, 4-05, 5-00.2, CJCSM 3122.03)** (JP 2-0, 3-08v1, 3-09, 4-05)

M1	Hours	To augment subordinate joint force headquarters staff and commence operations (after receipt of alert order).
M2	Hours	To deploy DJTFAC upon standing up a joint task force.
M3	Hours	To provide specialized equipment (after request from JFC received by CINC).
M4	Hours	To provide specialized staff personnel (after request from JFC received by CINC).
M5	Percent	Of augmentees required identified in combatant command HQ SOP by at least rank and duty position.
M6	Percent	Of subordinate joint force actions or operations affected by late arrival of augmentees to staff.
M7	Percent	Of joint force staff augmentees previously trained as augmentees.
M8	Percent	Of required subordinate joint force staff positions filled.
M9	Hours	To transmit mission critical information to subordinate and superior units.

#### ST 5.4.3.2 Activate Combatant Command Boards, Centers, Cells, and Bureaus.

To transition the combatant command headquarters from peacetime to a crisis or wartime configuration by the activation of those organizations which allow for a more rapid coordination of headquarters responses. Such entities can include a crisis action team, Joint Transportation Board, joint visitor's bureau, and a joint targeting coordination board. **(JP 3-61, 4-0, 4-01)** (JP 3-0, 3-03, 4-01, 4-01.2)

M1	Hours	To establish initial communication with opposite numbers on the Joint Staff and in supporting combatant commands (after CINC HQ organized for crisis or war).
M2	Hours	To form combatant command staff.
M3	Percent	Of sections and boards within combatant command established specifically to deal with crisis or war.
M4	Hours	To establish appropriate boards, cells and bureaus activated.

**ST 5.4.3.3 Develop Joint Force Liaison Structure.**

To establish a structure to maintain contact or intercommunication between elements of the joint force, combat support agencies, joint organizations, functional combatant commands, and multinational forces to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. **(N/A)** (JP 3-0, 3-05, 5-00.2)

TBD

**ST 5.5 Conduct Theater-Wide Information Operations (IO).**

To conduct offensive and defensive information operations for implementing the NCA's national military strategy, policy, objectives and operations at the theater level. This task includes planning, synchronization and use of operations security, information security (INFOSEC), military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare, computer network attack and defense; and physical destruction, mutually supported by intelligence, to deny, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary information and information systems; and to protect friendly information and information systems. **(JP 2-01, 3-13, 3-13.1)** (JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-03, 3-05, 3-07.5, 3-54, 6-02, CJCSI 3210.01, CJCSI 6510.01B)

**Note:** See also ST 3.1.1, *Select Strategic Targets in the Theater for Attack*, ST 3.2.1, *Conduct Attack on Theater Strategic Targets/Target Sets using Lethal Means*, ST 3.2.2, *Conduct Attack on Theater Strategic Targets/Target Sets using Nonlethal Means*, ST 5.6, *Develop and Provide Public Affairs in Theater*, ST 6.3, *Secure Theater Systems and Capabilities*, and ST 8.5, *Coordinate and Integrate Regional Interagency Activities*. For C2-protect, see ST 6.2.3, *Protect Use of Electromagnetic Spectrum* and ST 6.3.2, *Employ Theater Electronic Security*. For selecting targets and means of engagement see ST 3.1, *Process Theater Strategic Targets*, and for deception see ST 6.4, *Conduct Deception in Support of Theater Strategy and Campaigns*. For camouflage and other survivability measures see ST 6.3.4, *Coordinate Concealment of Theater Forces/Facilities*, and for minimizing the effect of friendly IO on friendly C4I see ST 3.2.3, *Synchronize Theater Strategic Firepower*. For intelligence support of IO see ST 2, *Conduct Theater Strategic Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance*. Information, information-based processes, and information systems includes the nodes (system that collect, store, or process information), the link (means to transmit information), and the human factor (decision makers, operators, mass audiences).

M1	Yes/No	Do theater level IO coordination policies and procedures exist?
M2	Yes/No	Does a theater level IO cell exist?
M3	Yes/No	Are theater IO planners involved in development of all plans?
M4	Hours	To identify qualified personnel from various elements and activities and augment theater level IO planning cell after onset of planning requirement.

M5	Hours	To identify required theater level IO information necessary for IO planning after onset of planning.
M6	Hours	To task intelligence community and other theater level support organizations and agencies (including those of allies where appropriate) to fill information requirements for IO planning.
M7	Percent	Of identified theater level IO information requirements unfilled at time-critical points in planning process.
M8	Yes/No	Are appropriate allied and coalition IO resources and capabilities factored into theater IO plans?
M9	Hours	To get theater level approval for proposed IO plan.
M10	Hours	To respond to subordinate command requests for IO support or coordination.
M11	Instances	Of uncoordinated IO element or activity actions within theater causing disruption or delay of US or allied plans and objectives.
M12	Hours	To modify theater level IO plans and actions due to operational contingencies.
M13	Instances	Of US or allied plans or objectives in theater being delayed, defeated, or disrupted due to adversary offensive IO actions.
M14	Percent	Of theater level IO cell nominated "targets" struck with lethal or nonlethal means during the timeframe planned for in the IO appendix or other planning document.
M15	Hours	To conduct combat assessment of IO "targets" struck with lethal and nonlethal means.
M16	Percent	Of theater IO cell nominated "targets" restructured when called for after combat assessment of initial strike.
M17	Percent	Of theater level IO objectives verifiably achieved.
M18	Days	Delay to operations because of the lack of information security.
M19	Hours	To identify IO targets that support the commander's plan.
M20	Days	To achieve information superiority after crisis onset.
M21	Percent	Of adversary operations delayed, disrupted, canceled, or modified due to IO plan.

#### ST 5.5.1 Plan and Integrate Theater-Wide Information Operation (IO).

To plan theater-wide IO operations, integrating military operations and non-DOD US government activities. Theater level IO planning and execution must also be coordinated and integrated with allied and coalition governments within the joint operations area. IO has applicability throughout the spectrum of conflict and supports the full range of military operations. **(JP 3-13, 3-13.1)** (JP 3-05, 3-07.5, 3-13.1, CJCSI 3210.01, CJCSI 6510.01B)

**Note:** The IO target set include the nodes, links, and human factor. A number of ST tasks apply to this task. Offensive IO activities are covered under ST 3.2.2, *Conduct Attack on Theater Strategic Targets/Target Sets using Nonlethal Means*. For defensive IO activities, see ST 6.3.5, *Protect Theater Information Systems* and ST 6.3.2, *Employ Theater Electronic Security*. For selecting targets and means of engagement see ST 3.1, *Process Theater Strategic Targets*, and for deception see ST

6.4, *Conduct Deception in Support of Theater Strategy and Campaigns*. For intelligence support of IW see ST 2, *Conduct Theater Strategic Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance*.

M1	Yes/No	Does a theater level IO cell exist?
M2	Yes/No	Are theater IO planners involved in development of all plans?
M3	Hours	To identify qualified personnel from various elements and activities and augment theater level IO planning cell after onset of planning requirement.
M4	Hours	To identify required theater level IO information necessary for IO planning after onset of planning.
M5	Hours	To task intelligence community and other theater level support organizations and agencies (including those of allies where appropriate) to fill information requirements for IO planning.
M6	Percent	Of identified theater level IO information requirements unfilled at time-critical points in planning process.
M7	Yes/No	Are appropriate allied and coalition IO resources and capabilities factored into theater IO plans?
M8	Hours	To get theater level approval for proposed IO plan.
M9	Hours	To respond to subordinate command requests for IO support or coordination.

#### ST 5.5.2 Control Theater Information Operations (IO).

To monitor and adjust the theater IO efforts during execution. (JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-13, 3-13.1) (JP 3-13, 3-13.1, 3-58, 6-02, CJCSI 3110.09, CJCSI 3210.01, CJCSI 6510.01B)

M1	Instances	Of uncoordinated IO element or activity actions within theater causing disruption or delay of US or allied plans and objectives.
M2	Hours	To modify theater level IO plans and actions due to operational contingencies.
M3	Instances	Of US or allied plans or objectives in theater being delayed, defeated, or disrupted due to adversary offensive IO actions.
M4	Percent	Of theater level IO cell nominated "targets" struck with lethal or nonlethal means during the timeframe planned for in the IO appendix or other planning document.
M5	Hours	To conduct combat assessment of IO "targets" struck with lethal and nonlethal means.
M6	Percent	Of theater IO cell nominated "targets" restruck when called for after combat assessment of initial strike.
M7	Percent	Of theater level IO objectives verifiably achieved.
M8	Days	To exploit significant enemy HUMINT Sources and use information for friendly IO.



### **ST 5.5.3 Establish and Monitor Theater Information Security Policy, Plans, Programs, and Direction.**

To establish and monitor theater information security policy, develop plans, and monitor programs and their direction. This task includes support to daily C4ISR and the development of theater programs and guidance for information security. **(N/A)** (JP 3-13.1, DODD 5200.1)

**Note:** Task is related to ST 6.3.5, *Protect Theater Information Systems*.

M1	Yes/No	Conduct research and analysis to determine competing and complementary US and other-party goals, and possible strategies and courses of action to achieve goals.
M2	Yes/No	Evaluate the perceptions, knowledge, and factors that influence particular targets.
M3	Yes/No	Identify target information-gathering interests and activities.
M4	Yes/No	Select means to convey or deny information and indicators. Develop plan for general phasing of those means.
M5	Yes/No	Identify tasks required to prepare and execute implementing actions and to supervise overall execution.
M6	Yes/No	Develop themes and actions to be stressed or avoided.
M7	Yes/No	Identify the assets necessary to execute plan.
M8	Yes/No	Identify production requirements for PSYOP products.
M9	Yes/No	Develop dissemination plan taking into account type of PSYOP product and the means to deliver the product.
M10	Yes/No	Establish a PSYOP reporting system to provide information about enemy PSYOP activity, apparent impact of friendly PSYOP activities, and any anticipated changes to ongoing activities.

### **ST 5.6 Develop and Provide Public Affairs in Theater.**

To develop and provide to the combatant commander and allied partners a program for telling the theater and combined command's story to audiences both internal (US military and allied military and civilian) and external (including US citizens at home). This task includes preparing information for internal and external release, and facilitating access to deployed units and personnel for civilian news media (both broadcast and print). This task further includes developing PA advice for the combatant commander and country ambassador to provide to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and NCA. Related tasks include providing media support, assisting in the deployment and operation of the DOD National Media Pool, and establishing an allied press information center (APIC), combined information bureau (CIB) or, at a minimum, Joint Information Bureau (JIB) and sub-JIBs in theater of war. This task also includes recommending public affairs guidance for submission to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) and promulgating approved DOD guidance to theater forces for execution. **(JP 3-07, 3-07.2, 3-08v1, 3-61)** (JP 3-0, 3-05, 3-07.5, 3-08v1, 3-13.1, 5-03.1, CJCSM 3122.03)

**Note:** Public affairs assistance to civil affairs personnel with community relations in theater and working with PSYOP personnel to counter enemy disinformation program are covered under ST 3.2.2 *Conduct Attack on Theater Strategic Targets/Target Sets using Nonlethal Means*, ST 5.5 *Coordinate Theater-Wide Information Operations (IO)*, and ST 8.2.2 *Coordinate Civil Affairs in Theater*.

M1	Days	To provide PAG for scheduled events.
M2	Hours	To accredit news pool correspondent.
M3	Hours	To coordinate PAG with National Command level and non-DOD agencies and other coalition forces with whom joint force works.
M4	Hours	To establish a Joint Information Bureau (after execute order).
M5	Hours	To prepare for and conduct the first news conference on a crisis or major newsworthy event in theater.
M6	Hours	To provide PAG (after crisis event).
M7	Hours	To provide to media an initial theater position on a breaking news story.
M8	Hours	To release news to media (after event).
M9	Hours	To transmit print journalist stories, from receipt (during crisis or combat).
M10	Minutes	To prepare for and conduct first news conference on a crisis or major newsworthy event in theater.
M11	Minutes	To provide to CINC or senior staff officer, initial theater position on breaking news story.
M12	Minutes	To provide to media initial theater position on a breaking news story.
M13	Instances	Of national level internal information assets not being used.
M14	Percent	Of local customs, laws, and policies concerning presence of media in theater nations, known and addressed.
M15	Percent	Of media requests for access to key senior officials, accepted.
M16	Percent	Of media support requests that are answered.
M17	Percent	Of news released found to contain inaccurate information.
M18	Percent	Of planning, addresses local customs, laws, and policies concerning presence of media in theater nations.
M19	Percent	Of press operational access rules and security procedures incorporated in planning.
M20	Percent	Of procedures are current for obtaining DOS support for early entry of reporters into the joint operations area.
M21	Percent	Of releases of information, coordinated in a timely manner with appropriate commands, staffs, and agencies within chain of command.
M22	Percent	Of requests for information from organizations and private citizens, answered.
M23	Percent	Of phases of plan that incorporate public affairs strategy.

### ST 5.6.1 Plan and Provide for External Media Support and Operations.

Plan and execute a media program directed toward US civilian media and the media agencies of foreign nations that is both proactive and reactive to the demands of the media in order to fulfill our obligations to provide timely and accurate information to the American public. The program will include the development of public affairs guidance (PAG), press releases, and plans to provide information, and to meet the requests of media for information on all exercises and operations where information is not classified. Plans may include briefings and media availability by selected individuals from the command, media opportunities for coverage, and releases of information. **(JP 3-0, 3-07.2, 3-07.3, 3-61)** (JP 3-07.5, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Days	To provide PAG for scheduled events.
M2	Hours	To accredit news pool correspondent (during crisis).
M3	Hours	To coordinate PAG with National Command level and non-DOD agencies and other coalition forces with whom joint force works.
M4	Hours	To establish Joint Information Bureau (after execute order).
M5	Hours	To prepare for and conduct first news conference on crisis or major newsworthy event in theater.
M6	Hours	To provide PAG (after crisis event).
M7	Hours	To provide to media an initial theater position on a breaking news story.
M8	Hours	To release news to media (after event).
M9	Hours	To transmit print journalist stories (from receipt).
M10	Minutes	To provide to CINC or senior staff officer an initial theater position on breaking news story.
M11	Percent	Of media requests for access to key senior officials, accepted.
M12	Percent	Of media support requests, answered.
M13	Percent	Of news released, found to contain inaccurate information.
M14	Percent	Of phases of plan, have incorporated public affairs strategy.

### ST 5.6.2 Coordinate Command/Internal Information Programs.

Coordination with subordinate and component commands will be effected to ensure that internal information requirements are being addressed. This includes arranging for employment of Armed Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS) in the theater and distribution of *Stars & Stripes* or similar print media products. In addition, coordination for the production of command information products and the procurement and distribution of Service publications may be accomplished. **(JP 3-07.3, 3-61)** (CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Days	To deploy AFRTS capability.
M2	Days	To deploy and distribute AFRTS palletized receivers.
M3	Months	AFRTS TV programming lags US commercial programming.
M4	Months	To revise AFRTS format to reflect changing tastes.

M5	Percent	Of personnel overseas with access to <i>Stars and Stripes</i> or similar print media products.
M6	Percent	Of requests for information from organizations and private citizens, answered.
M7	Days/Hours	To hold first news conference or prepare print product on crisis or major newsworthy event in theater.

### ST 5.6.3 Plan and Conduct Community Relations Program.

Within the joint operations area, plan for and execute community relations programs in coordination with civil affairs that support direct communication with local, national, and international publics, as applicable. This effort requires close coordination with the Military Departments and host nations. The program may also include the use of military equipment and units such as military aircraft/vehicles for static display, vessels for ship visits, military bands, and marching units. Plans may include speaking engagements by selected senior commanders and individuals within the commands as well as unit participation in civic activities. **(JP 3-10, 3-61, CJCSM 3122.03)** (JP 3-07.3, 3-57)

M1	Hours	To develop a public opinion baseline.
M2	Hours	To develop and distribute guidance for service members regarding local customs (in advance of deployment).
M3	Hours	To provide staff answers to local media questions.
M4	Percent	Of local customs, laws, and policies addressed in PA planning.
M5	Percent	Of requests for official representation at local events, honored.

### ST 6 COORDINATE THEATER FORCE PROTECTION.

To conserve the fighting potential of a joint force, including actions taken to counter the enemy taking strategic action against that force. Friendly theater protection actions include making Service members, systems, facilities, essential personnel and strategic formations difficult to locate, strike, and destroy. This task includes identifying strategic and operational centers of gravity and protecting them, as well as, joint and multinational theater air, space, land, and sea forces; bases; facilities; and LOCs from enemy strategic maneuver, concentrated enemy attack, and from the effects of chemical and biological warfare. Theater protection extends to US citizens (e.g., vaccines, antidotes, and individual protection equipment, and self-protective equipment), property, and territory within the combatant commander's theater. **(JP 3-0, 3-07.2, 3-11, 4-0)** (JP 1, 3-0, 3-01.5, 3-07.2, 3-10.1, CJCSM 3122.03, DODD 5025.1M, DODD O-2000.12H)

**Note:** Some activities associated with the protection, or survivability, of the force are included under other related theater strategic level joint tasks. Survivability and protection activities regarding individual health and welfare are covered at ST 4.2.2, *Coordinate Health Service Support*. Dispersion and mobility actions are

covered at ST 1, *Deploy, Concentrate and Maneuver Theater Forces*. Offensive counter air activities are included under ST 3.2, *Attack Theater Strategic Targets/Target Sets*. Theater strategic protection includes defensive IO that division of IO comprising actions taken to maintain the integrity of friendly information despite adversary offensive IO. For this task, see ST 5.5, *Conduct Theater-Wide Information Operations (IO)*.

M1	Percent	Of attacks by enemy air successful.
M2	Percent	Of attacks by enemy on theater forces, successful.
M3	Percent	Of attacks by enemy on theater support forces, successful.
M4	Percent	Of theater forces casualties from enemy attacks.
M5	Casualties	Of US non-DOD citizens in theater.
M6	Percent	Of forces operate in areas under control of friendly ground forces (during execution).
M7	Percent	Of forces operate under air superiority umbrella (during execution).
M8	Percent	Of forces operate within maritime superiority area (during execution).
M9	Percent	Of terrorist attacks, successful.
M10	Percent	Of forces and US citizens who receive vaccines, antidotes, and protective equipment.

#### **ST 6.1 Provide Theater Missile Defense.**

To protect theater forces from missile attack through both active defense and destruction of the enemy's air attack capacity en route to their targets. Theater aerospace defense includes aircraft (including helicopters), interceptor missiles, air defense artillery, nonair defense weapons in an air defense role, and electronic attack to counter enemy aircraft and missiles. This task concerns protecting critical points and facilities (ports, key bridges, theater of war command and control facilities) in the COMMZ (outside the joint operations area), support forces in such a COMMZ, and forces transiting such a COMMZ, or critical facilities of strategic significance in the combat zone. This activity also includes the protection of theater strategic force formations during movement to or when participating in a joint operation. Theater missile defense is always joint and can be a multinational activity. (**JP 3-01.5, 3-12, 3-12.1**) (JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-01.5, 3-10.1)

**Note:** This task pertains to defensive counter air activities. Offensive counter air activities are included under ST 3, *Employ Theater Strategic Firepower*.

M1	Percent	Degradation in forces/material movements because of enemy attacks (affects warfighting OPTEMPO).
M2	Percent	Degradation in warfighting OPTEMPO because of enemy aerospace attacks.
M3	Percent	Of theater forces casualties from enemy air and missile attacks.

M4	Percent	Of defended asset list (DAL), defensible against theater missile threat.
M5	Percent	Of detected ballistic missile elements that provide cueing for counterforce operations.
M6	Percent	Of enemy ballistic missiles launched after depletion of friendly defensive missile stocks.
M7	Percent	Of forces operating under air superiority umbrella.
M8	Percent	Of friendly C2 nodes with a theater missile early warning capability.
M9	Percent	Of indigenous key economic and government service assets, defensible against theater missile threat.
M10	Percent	Of launched ballistic missiles, destroyed before impact.
M11	Percent	Of launched cruise missiles (of all types) destroyed before impact.
M12	Percent	Of protected DAL locations, successfully defended.
M13	Percent	Of selected C2 nodes, receive actual theater missile early warning.
M14	Percent	Of enemy air attacks, successful.
M15	Percent	Of theater assets, defensible against theater missile threat.
M16	Percent	Of ballistic missile elements destroyed before launch.
M17	Percent	Of cruise missile elements (all types) destroyed before launch.
M18	Percent	Of ballistic missile elements destroyed after launch.
M19	Percent	Of cruise missile elements (all types) destroyed after launch.
M20	Minutes	From detection/identification of TM elements to ordnance release against validated TM target.

### ST 6.1.1 Process Theater Air and Space Targets.

To select offensive air threats to the strategic environment and match these as targets for friendly systems. This task includes allocation of targets for attack and the integration of joint, multinational, and theater air defense forces. **(JP 3-56.1)** (JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-01.5, 3-56.1)

**Note:** Detection of airborne targets is covered under ST 2.2.1, *Collect Information on Theater Strategic Situation*. Commitment of defensive systems is provided for at ST 6.1.4, *Organize and Coordinate Theater Air Defense*.

M1	Minutes	To pair an interceptor or missile with a target.
M2	Percent	Of attacks paired with defensive forces.
M3	Percent	Of day's attacks, paired with interceptor aircraft or missiles sites already committed.
M4	Percent	Of enemy feints ignored.
M5	Percent	Of enemy offensive air threats to strategic environment identified.
M6	Percent	Of identified enemy offensive air threats, targeted prior to disrupting friendly operations.

M7	Percent	Of interceptor forces uncommitted when enemy targets present in system.
M8	Percent	Of main raids, paired with defensive forces.
M9	Percent	Of missile sites not committed because of conflict with interceptor aircraft.
M10	Percent	Of raids penetrate to target and inflict damage which hinders military operations.
M11	Percent	Of targets not destroyed in first pairing, reattacked or re-paired.
M12	Seconds	To identify a new track through electronic or procedural means or to declare an unknown.

### **ST 6.1.2 Provide Airspace Control Measures.**

Task moved to: ST 1.3.9 Establish Airspace Control Measures.

### **ST 6.1.3 Establish Theater Space System Force Enhancement Operations.**

To establish and communicate combatant command requirements to initiate and sustain force enhancement operations from space systems. Theater space force enhancement operations are conducted from space with the objective of enabling or supporting terrestrial forces. Requests for on-orbit system support may occur during peace, crisis, war, or military operations other than war, based upon the effective control of space. USSPACECOM will normally act as liaisons to appropriate agencies to ensure supported command requirements are met.

**(JP 5-00.2, CJCSM 3122.03)** (JP 3-03, 3-05, 3-55)

M1	Hours	To review space requirements as part of crisis response.
M2	Months	Since space requirements reviewed (in peacetime).
M3	Percent	Of requirements submitted to USSPACECOM, have on-orbit assets available for them.
M4	Percent	Of requirements submitted to USSPACECOM, require emergency measures to fill.
M5	Percent	Of requirements submitted to USSPACECOM, returned for lack of adequate information for processing and decision.
M6	Percent	Of spaceborne force enhancement requirements coordinated with appropriate agencies and scheduled before execution.
M7	Percent	Of time, a crisis results in significant degradation of peacetime coverage by on-orbit assets.

### **ST 6.1.4 Organize and Coordinate Theater Air Defense.**

To organize and coordinate the combatant commander's forces to destroy or neutralize enemy offensive aircraft to protect friendly forces and vital interests. This task includes organizing and coordinating the use of all available air defense capabilities of friendly theater forces to achieve strategic results in the theater. It includes active measures such as the use of aircraft, air defense weapons, and weapons not normally used in an air defense role, as well as passive air defense

measures such as warning, concealment, camouflage, and deception to reduce and minimize the effectiveness and probability of hostile air attack. **(JP 3-01.5)** (JP 3-01.1, 3-01.5, 3-10.1)

**Note:** The provision of rules of engagement is covered in ST 5.4.1, *Issue Theater Strategic Operation Plans, Orders and ROE*.

M1	Percent	Of air defense assets moved into theater IAW established timelines.
M2	Percent	Of enemy aircraft reach weapons release range before being engaged.
M3	Percent	Of interceptor aircraft integrated into theater air defense system.
M4	Percent	Of interceptor bases respond to tasking with aircraft on alert.
M5	Percent	Of multi-role aircraft integrated into air defense system for alert or airborne divert.
M6	Percent	Of paired targets survive until they deliver ordnance.
M7	Percent	Of surface-to-air missile units can accept tasking because site on alert.
M8	Percent	Of surface-to-air missile units unable to respond to tasking because they have not reloaded missiles.
M9	Percent	Of targets require reattack before being destroyed.
M10	Percent	Of unknown targets, successfully intercepted and identified.

#### **ST 6.1.5 Organize and Coordinate Theater Missile Defense.**

To organize and coordinate joint and multinational forces, supported by national and theater capabilities, to detect and destroy enemy theater missiles in flight or prior to launch. This task includes providing early warning of theater missile attack as well as distribution of this warning to joint, combined, and multinational forces within the theater. This task also includes activities to disrupt the enemy's theater missile operations through an appropriate mix of mutually supportive passive missile defense, active missile defense, attack operations, and supporting C4I measures. (The term "theater missile" applies to ballistic missiles, air-to-surface missiles, and air-, land-, and sea-launched cruise missiles whose targets are within a given theater of operation.) **(JP 3-01.5)** (JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-10.1)

**Note:** For warning provided to reduce the threat from surprise theater missile attack on joint and multinational forces by the use of sensors and indications of imminent hostile activity before it would be otherwise detected by the theater missile warning environment, see ST 2.4.2.1, *Provide Theater Strategic Indications and Warning*.

M1	Casualties/ Day	Attributed to enemy missile attacks (host-nation civilian).
M2	Casualties/ Day	Attributed to enemy missile attacks (military).



M3	Casualties/ Day	Attributed to enemy missile attacks (non-belligerent nation civilian).
M4	Days	To destroy all known fixed launch sites.
M5	Percent	Of daily decline in number of ballistic or cruise missiles launched from land based mobile launchers.
M6	Percent	Of Defensible Asset List (DAL) locations, defensible against theater missile threat.
M7	Percent	Of launched air-to-surface missiles, destroyed before impact.
M8	Percent	Of launched ballistic missiles, destroyed before impact.
M9	Percent	Of launched cruise missiles, destroyed before impact.
M10	Percent	Of protected DAL locations, successfully defended.
M11	Percent	Of theater missile defense assets, moved into theater IAW established timelines.
M12	Minutes	Of warning provided to targeted assets prior to threat arrival.
M13	Percent	Of ballistic missile elements destroyed before launch.
M14	Percent	Of cruise missile elements (all types) destroyed before launch.
M15	Percent	Of ballistic missile elements destroyed after launch.
M16	Percent	Of cruise missile elements (all types) destroyed after launch.
M17	Minutes	From detection/identification of TM elements to ordinance release against validated TM target.

#### **ST 6.1.6 Support Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment in Theater.**

To provide the connectivity and personnel to receive and send tactical warning and (TW/AA). This task covers tactical warning and attack assessment of a missile attack originating from or placing at risk targets within the theater. (JP 3-01.5, 6-0) (JP 3-01.1, 5-0, 5-00.2, 6-0, 6-02)

**Note:** This task is separate and distinct from ST 2.4.2.1 *Provide Theater Strategic Indications and Warning*

M1	Instances	Of anomalous reports.
M2	Minutes	After launch, geographic CINC provided assured warning of theater ballistic missile launch.
M3	Minutes	For a theater to receive event data over data circuits.
M4	Minutes	From initial notification until establishment of a Missile Event Conference.
M5	Percent	Of detected ballistic missile launches provided cueing for counterforce operations.

#### **ST 6.2 Coordinate Protection for Theater Forces and Means.**

To coordinate the safeguarding of friendly strategic and operational centers of gravity and force potential by reducing or avoiding the effects of enemy actions. In military operations other than war, this activity includes protecting government

and civil infrastructure. This task includes protection of noncombatant evacuees prior to departure from theater. **(JP 3-0, 3-01.5)** (JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-10.1, 3-11, 5-0, 6-0, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Days	Delay in schedule for operation, because of requirement to remove hazards (e.g., mines, unexploded ordnance, obstacles and NBC contamination).
M2	Hours	Before execution of mission, fully implemented and coordinated security plan in place and operational.
M3	Percent	Of critical friendly facilities (e.g., command posts), damaged.
M4	Percent	Of friendly aircraft, damaged or destroyed on ground.
M5	Percent	Of friendly communications, disrupted, delayed, or jammed by enemy actions.
M6	Percent	Of friendly ships, damaged or destroyed in port or anchorage.
M7	Percent	Of operational forces committed to removal of operational hazards.
M8	Percent	Of POD/POE facilities, destroyed by enemy action.
M9	Percent	Of time, lift activities at POD or POE facilities interrupted.
M10	Percent/week	Of friendly support installations, attacked and damaged (less aircraft and ships).

#### **ST 6.2.1 Coordinate the Preparation of Strategically Significant Defenses.**

To coordinate protective construction and hardening for strategically significant forces and key facilities (e.g., C2 facilities and logistic terminals). **(JP 3-01.5, 3-11, 4-04)** (JP 3-01.1, 3-07.2, 3-10.1, CJCSM 3122.03)

**Note:** The strategically significant forces and key facilities are identified in ST 6 *Coordinate Theater Force Protection*.

M1	Incidents	Of critical friendly facilities (e.g., command posts), damaged or destroyed in previous week.
M2	Percent	Of critical assets and facilities, hardened.
M3	Percent	Of planned facility hardening, completed at execution.
M4	Percent	Of unhardened theater assets, damaged or destroyed.

#### **ST 6.2.2 Coordinate the Removal of Strategically Significant Hazards.**

To coordinate the removal of hazards that adversely affects execution of the geographic combatant commander's plan. Significant hazards are identified during the development of courses of action. **(JP 3-0, 3-11)** (JP 3-0, 3-02, 3-10.1, 3-13.1)

**Note:** See also ST 1.4, *Enhance Strategic Mobility*.

M1	Hours	Delay in execution of scheme of maneuver, because clearing minefield (land or sea).
M2	Hours	Delay in execution of scheme of maneuver, because removing hazards (e.g., mines, unexploded ordnance, obstacles, WMD contamination).
M3	Hours	Delay in execution of scheme of maneuver, because surveying OA for strategically significant hazards.
M4	Percent	Of identified strategically significant hazards, successfully removed or neutralized.

### ST 6.2.3 Protect Use of Electromagnetic Spectrum.

To optimize friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum and minimize systems degradation by spectrum interference and electronic fratricide despite the enemy's use of electronic warfare and competing friendly use of the spectrum. This is a division of electronic warfare and also called electronic protection and includes deconflicting friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum. **(JP 3-0, 3-13.1, 3-51, 6-0)** (JP 3-07.1, 3-10.1, 3-13.1, CJCSI 3220.01, CJCSM 3122.03)

**Note:** The provision of rules of engagement is covered in ST 5.4.1, *Issue Theater Strategic Operation Plans, Orders and ROE*.

M1	Hours	Of queuing for message traffic.
M2	Percent	Of friendly communications, disrupted, delayed, or degraded by enemy actions.
M3	Percent	Of messages, sent by alternate routing.
M4	Percent	Of sorties experience meaconing events.

### ST 6.2.4 Ensure Acoustic Protection.

To ensure friendly, optimal use of the acoustic spectrum for US forces. This task includes acoustic warfare support measures and acoustic warfare counter-countermeasures. **(N/A)** (JP 2-01, 3-54, 5-03.1)

M1	Percent	Of time action must be taken to curtail friendly activities to ensure optimal use of acoustic spectrum.
M2	decibels	Loss due to transit of friendly ships.
M3	Hours	To recover an optimal acoustic spectrum after passage of friendly ships.
M4	Hours	Search time lost due to enemy actions to degrade the acoustic spectrum.
M5	Percent	Of time units observe acoustic emission plan.

### ST 6.2.5 Establish and Coordinate Positive Identification Procedures for Friendly Forces in Theater. Task moved to: ST 5.1.9

**ST 6.2.6 Establish Security Procedures for Theater Forces and Means.**

To enhance freedom of action by reducing the vulnerability of friendly joint forces to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. This task includes measures to protect forces from surprise, hostile observation, detection, interference, espionage, and sabotage. This activity also includes protecting and securing the flanks in joint operations and protecting and securing critical installations, facilities, systems and air, land, and sea LOCs. It includes antiterrorism to protect the morale of the force and enhance the legitimacy of host-nation forces. **(JP 3-0, 3-10, 4-0)**  
(JP 3-0, 3-07.5, 3-10.1, 3-54, 3-56.1, CJCSM 3122.03)

**Note:** Protection from hostile air and missile attack is covered by ST 6.1, *Provide Theater Missile Defense*; operations security is at ST 6.3.1, *Employ Theater Operations Security (OPSEC)*; and deception is at ST 6.4, *Conduct Deception in Support of Theater Strategy and Campaigns*.

M1	Hours	For internal/external reaction force to reach installation or facility under attack.
M2	Incidents	By terrorists against coalition forces in theater.
M3	Incidents	By terrorists against US forces in theater.
M4	Percent	Of aircraft sorties, delayed on ground because of enemy attack.
M5	Percent	Of aircraft, rendered inoperable or destroyed on ground.
M6	Percent	Of APOD and APOE facilities, destroyed by enemy action.
M7	Percent	Of critical friendly facilities (e.g., PODs, command posts), destroyed, damaged, or rendered inoperable by sabotage or insurgents or terrorist actions.
M8	Percent	Of critical friendly facilities, hardened or protected against hostile acts.
M9	Percent	Of ships delayed from deploying because of enemy attack.
M10	Percent	Of ships rendered inoperable or destroyed while on berth or at anchor.
M11	Percent	Of SPOD and SPOE facilities, destroyed by enemy action.
M12	Percent	Of facilities that are under the reaction force umbrella.
M13	Percent	Of force protection activities that are coordinated. Note - Involves deconfliction among DOS, joint/component force protection staffs and coalition security forces within the theater.
M14	Days	To establish and implement command force protection policies.
M15	Days	To evaluate terrorist threat.
M16	Days	To establish the appropriate force protection posture.
M17	Hours	To disseminate changes in terrorist threats through forward intelligence elements.
M18	Percent	Of ability to deny terrorists the capability to strike.
M19	Incidents	Of unauthorized entry to US facilities.
M20	Percent	Of individuals that are educated/trained in AT awareness/protection prior to arrival in theater.
M21	Hours	Before assigned forces are available for level II response.

M22	Hours	Before assigned forces are available for level III response.
M23	Days	Before EPWs are evacuated to theater EPW camps (rear area).
M24	Incidents	Of noncombatants preventing friendly movement along designated MSRs.
M25	Incidents	Of criminal activity involving US personnel against local populace.

#### **ST 6.2.6.1 Establish and Coordinate Counter-Reconnaissance Theater-Wide.**

To establish and coordinate, in support of theater campaign, all measures taken to counter enemy reconnaissance efforts within the theater. This effort is directed against all reconnaissance attempts and activities. **(JP 3-10.1)** (JP 3-10.1, 3-55, 3-58)

**Note:** This task is performed in conjunction with ST 5.4.2, *Synchronize Joint Operations and Subordinate Campaign Plans*.

M1	Percent	Of movements of critical units or equipment, fully considered overhead reconnaissance system patterns.
M2	Percent	Of theater strategic movements and encampments, obscured during passage of on-orbit systems.
M3	Percent	Of theater strategic movements, conducted at night or in adverse weather to avoid overhead detection.

#### **ST 6.2.6.2 Establish and Coordinate Protection of Theater Installations, Facilities, and Systems.**

To establish and coordinate conduct of theater-wide efforts to protect theater installations, facilities and systems. This includes both active and passive measures and efforts to increase redundancy, either through conversion, construction or local procurement. **(JP 3-0, 3-07.2, 3-10, 3-10.1, 4-0, 4-04)** (JP 3-01.1, 3-01.5, 3-10.1, 4-02.1, 4-05, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Casualties/week	To US noncombatants.
M2	Incidents	Of critical friendly facilities (e.g., command posts, ports), destroyed or damaged.
M3	Incidents	Of damage to APOD and APOE facilities by enemy action (impacting scheme of maneuver).
M4	Incidents	Of damage to SPOD and SPOE facilities by enemy action (impacting scheme of maneuver).
M5	Percent	Of attacking missiles, successfully penetrated friendly theater defenses, culminating in warhead delivery or function on target.
M6	Percent	Of CONUS civil government C2 assets, defensible against ballistic missile threat.
M7	Percent	Of CONUS military assets, including C2 assets, defensible against theater missile threat.

M8	Percent	Of critical facilities, without available backup or alternate facilities.
M9	Percent	Of detected ballistic missile launches, provided cueing for counterforce operations.

### ST 6.2.6.3 Establish and Coordinate Protection of Theater Air, Land, and Sea LOCs.

To establish and coordinate the conduct of theater-wide offensive and defensive operations to ensure freedom of action along theater lines of communication. This effort includes not only the maintenance of existing LOCs, but also securing new LOCs, both for planned and for potential operations. When appropriate in a maritime theater, provide for convoys, circuitous routing, and zigzag plans.

(JP 3-0, 3-10) (JP 3-07, 3-10.1, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Hours	For rapid reaction forces to reach point of a LOC attack.
M2	Hours	To restore LOC following interruption.
M3	Percent	Of traffic flow on LOCs (air, land, and sea), interrupted by hostile action.
M4	Percent	Reduction in LOC capacity, because of enemy attack in the joint operations area.
M5	Percent	Of security forces involved in maneuver and mobility support compared to EPW operations or area security.

### ST 6.2.6.4 Establish and Coordinate Theater-Wide Counterintelligence Requirements.

To establish and coordinate activities or actions to provide protection against espionage, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities in the theater. (JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-07.2, 4-0)

(JP 2-01, 3-05, 3-07.1, 3-07.3, 3-10, 3-13.1, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Hours	After CI EEI satisfied, collection asset retasked.
M2	Hours	To circulate new threat warnings and reports of evolving threats.
M3	Incidents	Of strategic movements detected or attacked by enemy lethal/nonlethal means.
M4	Incidents	Of espionage, sabotage, or assassination.
M5	Percent	Of allies with joint information security agreements.
M6	Percent	Of attempted adversary penetrations of friendly information systems, successful.
M7	Percent	Of CI personnel have access to theater plans and orders.
M8	Percent	Of counterintelligence requirements, covered by collection plan.
M9	Percent	Of critical movements (conducted after onset of crisis or operation), under observation of nonfriendly overhead assets.

M10	Percent	Of friendly trusted sources (systems and personnel), under suspicion of enemy influence.
M11	Percent	Of joint force operations, delayed, disrupted, canceled or modified because of successful enemy intelligence collection efforts.
M12	Percent	Of planned activities to provide protection against espionage, sabotage, or assassinations, actually conducted.
M13	Percent	Of theater intelligence personnel, assigned to counterintelligence.
M14	Percent	Of adversary penetrations of friendly INFO systems, identified and targeted.

### ST 6.2.7 Initiate and Coordinate Personnel Recovery in Theater.

To initiate and coordinate programs for the peacetime and wartime recovery of isolated personnel and to provide support to their families. This task includes reporting, locating, supporting the person and their family, recovery and return of the isolated person to their family or duty. The designated Area SAR Coordinators are: Inland Area, USAF; Maritime Area, USCG; Overseas Area, and the appropriate combatant commander. DOD component SAR facilities are for military operations. These facilities may be used for civil needs on the basis of not-to-interfere with military missions. This task includes setting theater standards for survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) training based upon mission requirements. **(JP 3-50, 3-50.2, 3-50.3)** (JP 0-2, 3-05, 3-05.3, 3-05.5, 3-07.5, 3-50.21, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Months	Since review of theater CSAR guidance.
M2	Percent	Of aircrews missing behind enemy lines, recovered.
M3	Percent	Of aircrews (that transmit their location), rescued within 24 hours of being shot down (in wartime).
M4	Percent	Of crew members from lost ship, recovered (in peacetime).
M5	Percent	Of escapees, recovered.
M6	Percent	Of man-overboard victims (not recovered by own ship), later recovered by theater search and rescue efforts.
M7	Percent	Of personnel from lost ship, rescued (in wartime).
M8	Percent	Of personnel missing behind enemy lines, recovered.
M9	Percent	Of personnel missing in aircraft accidents, ship sinkings, or field maneuvers, recovered (in peacetime).

#### ST 6.2.7.1 Operate Theater Joint Search and Rescue Center (JSRC).

To stand up and operate a theater JSRC for combat search and rescue (CSAR). For combatant commands overseas, it is not intended that SAR Coordinators have primary responsibility for SAR in foreign territory or areas of the high sea which have not been accepted by the United States for international SAR responsibility. However, it is intended that an appropriate SAR Coordinator or designated

subordinate act as the United States official for overseeing coordination of all United States SAR interests in such areas. **(JP 3-50.2, 3-50.21, 3-50.3)**  
(JP 3-50.2, 3-50.21, 3-56.1)

M1	Hours	For JSRC capability to be established (after first forces deploy).
M2	Hours	For JSRC to have complete CSAR posture (after forces deploy into new area).
M3	Hours	To establish CSARTF (when appropriate).
M4	Minutes	For unit and RCC to notify JSRC (after receiving distress indicator).
M5	Minutes	To assign CSAR mission coordinator (when required).

#### **ST 6.2.7.2 Coordinate Civil Search and Rescue.**

To initiate and coordinate efforts to recover isolated US personnel, both military and civilian. This task also includes, on a not-to-interfere with military missions basis, support to the efforts of non-US civil SAR efforts. **(JP 3-50, 3-50.1, 3-50.2)**  
(JP 3-50, 3-50.3, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Percent	Of crewmembers from lost ship recovered (in peacetime).
M2	Percent	Of man-overboard victims (not recovered by own ship), later recovered by theater search and rescue efforts.
M3	Percent	Of personnel missing in aircraft accidents, ship sinkings, or field maneuvers, recovered (in peacetime).
M4	Months	Since review of theater host-nation agreement for civil SAR.

#### **ST 6.2.7.3 Coordinate Combat Search and Rescue.**

To coordinate combat search and rescue (CSAR) primarily in support of flight operations, with capability to support other personnel recovery requirements. It also includes providing planning and guidance to subordinate organizations, including areas such as host-nation policies, laws, regulations, and capabilities. **(JP 3-50.2, 3-50.21, 3-56.1, 4-02)** (JP 3-04.1, 3-05, 3-07.5, 3-50.2, 3-50.3, 3-55.1, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Percent	Of aircrews missing behind enemy lines, recovered.
M2	Percent	Of aircrews (that transmit their location), rescued within 24 hours of being shot down (in wartime).
M3	Percent	Of personnel from lost ship, rescued (in wartime).
M4	Percent	Of personnel missing behind enemy lines, recovered.

#### **ST 6.2.7.4 Support Evasion and Escape in Theater.**

To support isolated US personnel in evasion, recovery, and captivity support and recovery. This task also includes those activities involved in supporting those isolated individuals who, due to unique circumstances, are effecting their own



recovery. **(JP 3-50.2, 3-50.3)** (JP 2-0, 3-05, 3-05.3, 3-07.5, 3-51, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Designated	SAFE areas or evasion and recovery areas maintained by combatant command.
M2	Hours	For unit notification of JSSA and DIA POW/MIA by combatant command of isolation in hostile territory of individual with blood chit.
M3	Percent	Discrepancy in blood chit accounting during annual inventory (within theater).
M4	Percent	Discrepancy in blood chit holdings (within theater).
M5	Percent	Of combatant command evadee caches, compromised within six months of emplacement.
M6	Percent	Of combatant command isolated personnel have a completed EPA.
M7	Percent	Of combatant command personnel entered into assisted recovery system, subsequently returned to friendly control.
M8	Percent	Of combatant commander OPLANs and CONPLANs have evasion and recovery concepts.
M9	Percent	Of detainees in neutral nations within theater, under cognizance of combatant commander.
M10	Percent	Of escapees on neutral territory within theater, under cognizance of combatant commander.
M11	Percent	Of escapees, recovered.
M12	Percent	Of evadees in assisted recovery system, moved out of hostile territory.
M13	Percent	Of known evadees in theater, supported in some form by combatant commander or subordinate organization.
M14	Percent	Of required blood chits, in theater.
M15	Percent	Of sensitive or covert evasion and recovery plans, procedures, operations programs or equipment, compromised through use or subsequent debriefings.

#### **ST 6.2.8 Establish NBC Defense in Theater.**

To ensure programs are in place to defend against, detect, monitor, and reduce NBC threats. This includes detection, identification, characterization, warning and reporting of NBC threats, individual and collective protection, decontamination, preventive medicine, casualty treatment and consequence management. This task involves both threat reduction and implementation of readiness measures. **(JP 3-0, 3-11)** (JP 3-10.1, 3-11, CJCSI 3110.07, CJCSM 3122.03)

**Note:** For identification of likely friendly targets of enemy NBC attack, see ST 2.4.1.2, *Determine Enemy's Theater Strategic Capabilities and Intentions*. See also ST 8.4.4 *Counter Weapon and Technology Proliferation*.

M1	Hours	To establish a theater NBC Warning and Reporting System.
M2	Percent	Of forces protected by vaccines and pre-treatments.
M3	Percent	Of strategic forces and means trained and equipped to operate in an NBC environment.
M4	Percent	Of JMETL ST tasks that can be performed in an NBC environment.
M5	Percent	Of enemy NBC attacks detected.
M6	Instances	Of strategic forces and facilities effected by an off-target attack without warning.
M7	Instances	Of strategic forces and facilities with NBC casualties.
M8	Instances	Of false alarms.
M9	Instances	Of theater medical facilities not able to treat contaminated casualties.
M10	Instances	Of decontaminated capability being insufficient for the situation.
M11	Percent	Of known/suspected enemy NBC targets that are identified and targeted.

#### **ST 6.2.9 Minimize Safety and Health Risks.**

Task moved to: ST 4.6 *Minimize Safety Risks* and ST 4.2.2 *Coordinate Health Service Support*.

#### **ST 6.3 Secure Theater Systems and Capabilities.**

To protect friendly systems and capabilities by identifying threats and reducing or compensating for vulnerabilities. **(JP 3-13.1, 3-54, 6-0)** (JP 3-13.1, 3-54, 4-02.1, CJCSI 3110.02, CJCSI 3210.01, CJCSI 6510.01B, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Days	Since review of physical security plans for C4 facilities in the joint operations area.
M2	Days	To conduct threat analysis for the joint operations area.
M3	Days	To conduct vulnerability assessment of C4 systems.
M4	Days	To develop plan for restoring C4 system after attack.
M5	Hours	Since threat analysis updated for the joint operations area.
M6	Hours	To detect attack on C4 system.
M7	Hours	To recover from attack on C4 system and to restore system to operation.
M8	Minutes	To conceal and obscure theater systems with smoke.

#### **ST 6.3.1 Employ Theater Operations Security (OPSEC).**

To deny the adversary critical information necessary to accurately estimate the military situation. This task includes analyzing friendly force actions to identify critical information, observable and predictable actions exploitable by adversary intelligence, conducting risk management, and selecting measures that mitigate vulnerabilities. This task includes consideration of friendly signatures in terms of

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the enemy (includes terrorist) commander's perspective. **(JP 2-0, 3-0, 3-07, 3-13.1, 3-54)** (JP 1, 3-05, 3-07.5, 3-10.1, 3-56.1, 3-58, CJCSI 3213.01A, CJCSM 3122.03)

Note: This task supports ST 5.5, Coordinate Theater-Wide Information Operations (IO).

M1	Percent	Of force buildup, conducted covertly.
M2	Percent	Of media reports describing close-hold friendly actions.
M3	Percent	Of routine combat actions have timing or location changes at least weekly.
M4	Percent	Of routine actions of commander, staff, or communications (including courier), have timing or location changes at least biweekly.
M5	Percent	Of supply buildup, conducted covertly.
M6	Yes/No	Utilize OPSEC process to identify and protect critical information.
M7	Yes/No	Analyze threat including adversary's goals, strategy, critical friendly information known, and intelligence collection capabilities.
M8	Yes/No	Analyze operation or activity OPSEC vulnerabilities to include indicators of critical information created by friendly activities that can be collected or acted upon to the disadvantage of friendly forces.
M9	Yes/No	Identify possible OPSEC measures and select specific measures for execution.
M10	Instances	Identified reaction to OPSEC measures.
M11	Instances	Adjustments to ongoing activities based on feedback on adversary reactions.

### ST 6.3.2 Employ Theater Electronic Security.

To protect all forms of strategic theater noncommunications electromagnetic radiation's (e.g., radar) from interception and study by unauthorized persons seeking information of value. **(JP 3-13.1, 3-54)** (JP 3-51, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Percent	Of time, command operates in restrictive EMCON condition.
M2	Instances	Of procedures to prevent or disrupt collection of ELINT by foreign intelligence agencies.
M3	Instances	Of procedures to reprogram noncommunications electromagnetic systems software in response to identified threats.
M4	Hours	To generate an operational change request message based on possible threat to noncommunications electromagnetic systems.
M5	Hours	To respond to operational change request on emergency basis.
M6	Days	To respond to operational change request on urgent basis.
M7	Months	To respond to operational change request on routine basis.

**ST 6.3.3 Supervise Communications Security (COMSEC).**

To supervise the protection resulting from all measures designed to deny unauthorized persons information of value that might be derived from the possession and study of telecommunications. COMSEC includes cryptosecurity, transmission security, emission security, and physical security of communications security materials and information. **(JP 3-13.1, 6-0)** (JP 3-13.1, 5-00.2, 6-02, CJCSI 6510.01B, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Hours	Between changes of unit/activity call signs and frequencies.
M2	Hours	Since inventory of COMSEC equipment and documents.
M3	Days	To emergency issue new CEOI to US and allied units operating together.
M4	Hours	To emergency issue new CEOI to US joint forces.
M5	Percent	Of friendly communications, sent via secure means.
M6	Percent	Of total communications circuits, use secure equipment.
M7	Percent	Of US and allied units, operate from common CEOI.
M8	Percent	Of US joint force units, operate from common CEOI.
M9	Percent	Of time, command operates in restrictive EMCON condition.

**ST 6.3.4 Coordinate Concealment of Theater Forces/Facilities.**

To coordinate protection of theater strategic forces and facilities from enemy observation and surveillance sensors. **(JP 3-01.5, 3-10, 4-04)** (JP 3-01.1, 3-01.5, 3-07.1)

M1	Days	Of covert buildup, conducted covertly.
M2	Days	Of covert buildup, sustained.
M3	Percent	Of C2 posts and critical facilities, protected from enemy observation.
M4	Percent	Of critical COMMZ facilities, protected from enemy observation.
M5	Percent	Of force buildup, conducted covertly.
M6	Percent	Of friendly communications, sent via secure means.
M7	Percent	Of units equipped with anti-surveillance sensor and sensor jamming devices.

**ST 6.3.5 Protect Theater Information Systems.**

To coordinate theater-wide activities to protect and defend information and information systems. This task includes integrating and synchronizing indigenous and joint force capabilities for defensive IO, ranging from technical security measures (such as INFOSEC) to procedural measures (such as counterintelligence, physical security, and hardening of communications nodes). Information assurance includes producing the theater policies and procedures designed to ensure availability, integrity, authenticity, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation of information. Information system defense includes defensive

measures, detection and reporting of attacks or intrusions, and the initiation of restoral and response processes. (**JP 3-0, 3-13, 3-13.1, 3-54, 3-58, 6-0, 6-02**) (JP 2-01, CJCSI 3210.01, CJCSI 6510.01B)

**Note:** ST 5.1.6, *Establish Information Assurance (IA) Procedures*, covers the restoration of systems.

M1	Yes/No	Do commands responsible for design, operation and maintenance of information systems perform risk assessments of potential IO threats and take appropriate action to respond to those risks that meet the appropriate criteria?
M2	Yes/No	Do commands responsible for design, operation and maintenance of information systems have IA or defensive IO memorandums of understanding with commercial communications providers who support information systems?
M3	Yes/No	Do commands responsible for design, operation and maintenance of information systems use "Red Teams" to identify vulnerabilities in those systems?
M4	Percent	Of theater strategic C4I systems not protected by firewalls, virus detection software and other appropriate defensive IO measures.
M5	Percent	Of information system hardware and software components that have backup components to replace them if they fail or are corrupted.
M6	Number	Of redundant communications paths available to connect information systems.
M7	Instances	Of information systems being disabled, corrupted or compromised through identified adversary IO actions or criminal mischief.
M8	Hours	For appropriate Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) to respond, identify and correct information system failures attributed to adversary IO action or criminal mischief.
M9	Percent	Of licensed system administrators for critical C4I systems.

#### **ST 6.4 Conduct Deception in Support of Theater Strategy and Campaigns.**

To manipulate the enemy theater commander's perceptions in order to influence him to accomplish actions advantageous to friendly operations. The theater deception plan complements the combatant commander's operation plan. Deception can consist of concealment of friendly actions and intentions or it can be the projection of capabilities which do not exist in the time, place, or size depicted. Several measures are available to a combatant commander for conducting deception, to include physical, technical, and administrative. (**JP 2-0, 3-0, 3-13.1, 3-54, 3-58, CJCSM 3122.03**) (JP 3-01.1, 3-02, 3-05, 3-50.3, 3-58, 6-0, CJCSI 3110.09)

**Note:** Related activities include: ST 6.3, *Secure Theater Systems and Capabilities*; ST 6.2.6, *Establish Security Procedures for Theater Forces and Means*; ST 2, *Conduct Theater Strategic Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance*

(intelligence support for deception planning and supervision); and ST 5, *Provide Theater Strategic Command and Control, Communications, and Computers (C4)* (various organizing, planning, and directing activities and resource allocation). This task supports ST 5.5, *Conduct Theater-Wide Information Operations (IO)*.

M1	Days	After execution of protected plan, enemy still responding with some forces to deception.
M2	Days	After execution of theater of war deception operation, friendly forces still able to influence adversary action (or inaction).
M3	Hours	To develop theater deception analysis and deception COAs (during crisis).
M4	Percent	Of proposed theater of war deception plans, compromised by lack of enforcement of <i>need to know</i> .
M5	Percent	Of theater deception operations, terminated without target becoming aware of deception.
M6	Percent	Of theater deception plans, protected by deception plans.
M7	Percent	Of theater of war deceptions, cause third party (friendly or neutral) actions adverse to friendly campaign plan.

#### **ST 6.4.1 Protect Details of Theater Strategy and Campaign Plans and Operations.**

To deny the enemy access to information on the true intent of the geographic combatant commander's strategy and campaign plans, operation plans, and military deception plans. This task includes limiting, to the last possible moment, the number of people aware of friendly plans; delaying or masking theater strategic movements and preparations; and deceiving friendly leaders and joint force personnel where necessary. **(JP 3-0, 3-13.1, 3-54, 3-58)** (JP 3-58, 6-02, CJCSI 3110.09, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Instances	Of active measures employed to mislead enemy estimates of friendly intentions.
M2	Percent	Of personnel have approved <i>need to know</i> for plans.
M3	Percent	Reduction in compartments (including intelligence and special action programs (SAPs)) at or immediately after campaign operations commences.
M4	Personnel	Approved <i>need to know</i> for plans.
M5	Instances	Of active security compartmentalization (including intelligence and special action programs (SAPs)) for campaign planning.

#### **ST 6.4.2 Misinform Adversary Regarding Conduct of Theater Strategy, Campaigns, and Unified Operations.**

To develop and disseminate the deception plan, which includes the target and story. This task includes the actual execution of the deception plan at the theater level. The deception plan is focused on enemy expectations, preconceptions, and fears concerning friendly intent, in order to deceive the enemy commander of the

true friendly intentions regarding the theater strategy and campaigns and joint operations. Deception plans will use the entire joint and multinational theater forces and means, as appropriate, for deceiving the enemy. **(JP 2-0, 3-0, 3-13.1, 3-17, 3-58)** (JP 3-54, 3-58, CJCSI 3110.09, CJCSM 3122.03)

**Note:** For the deployment and maneuver of theater strategic and operational forces for deception purposes, see ST 1, *Deploy, Concentrate, and Maneuver Theater Forces*.

M1	Days	After execution of protected plan, enemy still responding with some forces to deception.
M2	Percent	Of enemy forces, deployed to deal with deception threat.
M3	Percent	Of enemy forces, prepared for actual operation.
M4	Percent	Of enemy movements, consistent with deception plan vs. actual plans.
M5	Percent	Of plans include deception plan.
M6	Percent	Of strategic plans, campaigns plans, and operations plans include deception plan.

#### ST 6.4.3 Assess Effect of Theater Deception Plan.

To determine the effects that the deception story and related actions have had on the plans and actions of the opposing enemy commander and staff. **(JP 2-0, 3-0, 3-13.1, 3-58)** (JP 3-01.1, 3-10.1, 3-54, CJCSI 3110.09, CJCSM 3122.03)

**Note:** The organization responsible for deception planning and supervision requires intelligence support. Those activities relating to intelligence support or deception should be covered under ST 2, *Conduct Theater Strategic Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance*. ST 2 includes friendly counterdeception in ST 2.4.1.2, *Determine Enemy's Theater Strategic Capabilities and Intentions*.

M1	Days	Between updates on effectiveness of theater deception plan.
M2	Percent	Of deception program evaluators have access to all aspects of campaign plan.
M3	Percent	Of updates on effectiveness of theater deception plan, based on intercepts of enemy communications.

#### ST 7 ESTABLISH THEATER FORCE REQUIREMENTS AND READINESS.

To identify the resources required to execute approved theater strategies for achieving assigned missions and end states. This task pertains to resources for the theater, alliances, coalitions, or other groups and support to other combatant commanders. This task applies across the range of theater activities. **(JP 0-2, 3-0, 3-08v1, 4-0, 4-01.6, 5-0)** (JP 0-2, 3-0, 3-08v1, 3-08v2, 3-11, 5-03.1)

M1	Percent	Of joint, combined or multinational doctrine changes that originate in theater.
M2	Percent	Of theater force goals, supported by theater Country Teams.
M3	Percent	Of theater force apportionment requests, met in JSCP.
M4	Weeks	To complete TPFDD (for refinement conference).

### **ST 7.1 Recommend Warfighting and Other Requirements and Test Concepts.**

To recommend and prioritize the theater's peacetime and wartime needs in light of guidance, threat estimates, technology, projected capabilities, resource constraints, and resulting strategy or employment concepts. This task includes testing and recommending concepts for mobilizing, deploying, employing, sustaining, and redeploying the force. Requirements include the size and structure of the force needed to achieve national military objectives in the theater through execution of the approved theater strategy and campaign plans. Where necessary, proposed adjustments to theater boundaries and restrictions and constraints should be recommended. The task includes requirements for supporting other combatant commanders. **(JP 5-0)** (JP 3-0, 4-0, 5-0)

M1	Percent	Of Mission Needs Statement, accepted by JROC or Services.
M2	Weeks	To complete TPFDD (for refinement conference).
M3	Percent	Of TPFDD files need changes (at refinement conference).
M4	Weeks	To identify theater needs and submit to OSD as part of the CINC's Integrated Priority List.

#### **ST 7.1.1 Provide OPLANs for Mobilization and Deployment Planning and Execution.**

To provide developed joint operation plans to higher echelons as the basis for mobilization, deployment, sustainment, and redeployment planning and execution. This provides the basis for national mobilization, deployment, sustainment, and redeployment planning in support of theater OPLANs. **(JP 4-0, 4-01, 4-01.1, 5-0)** (JP 2-01, 4-01, 4-05, 5-0, 5-03.1, CJCSI 3110.13, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.03)

**Note:** This task builds upon the OPLAN development accomplished at ST 5.3.4, *Prepare and Coordinate Theater Strategy, Campaign Plans or Operation Plans and Orders*. It is distinguished from that task in that it is the provision of external reinforcement requirements to national level planners.

M1	Requests	For additional information received after provision of OPLANs.
M2	Months	From request for OPLAN until transmitted.
M3	Percent	Of units sourced in OPLAN, dual apportioned.
M4	Months	In advance of effective date OPLAN provided.



### ST 7.1.2 Determine Deployment Requirements.

To determine the need for strategic movement of joint/multinational forces, from their current locations, into a theater of war or the joint operations area.

Deployment planning should be consistent with theater strategy, operation plans or theater campaign plan, sequence of joint operations, and the operational commander's subordinate campaign scheme. **(JP 4-0, 4-01, 4-01.3, 4-05, 5-0)** (JP 3-02.2, 4-01, 4-01.3, CJCSI 3202.01)

M1	Days	In advance of deployment when requirements submitted to USTRANSCOM.
M2	Percent	Of deployment requests have fatal errors.
M3	Percent	Of deployment requirements, adjusted within thirty days of sea movement.
M4	Percent	Difference between planned deployment requirements and actual requirements.
M5	Days	To develop deployment requirements.
M6	Percent	Of deployment requirements, adjusted within seven days of air movement.

### ST 7.1.3 Tailor Joint Forces for Deployment.

To determine the right mix and sequence of units in deploying joint forces to a theater in force projection operations. It may not be possible to tailor those joint forces that deploy early, but their force packages should include sufficient combat power for the short term. Follow-on forces can then be tailored for the long-term mission. **(JP 3-0, 5-0)** (JP 3-50.2, 4-01, 4-01.1, 4-02.2, 5-03.1, 6-02, CJCSI 3202.01)

M1	Percent	Of OPLAN forces, rephased (at execution).
M2	Days	Of required wartime logistic support deploy with FDOs.
M3	Percent	Of required logistic support for deploying combat units deploy.
M4	Hours	To tailor allocated joint force.
M5	Days	To tailor apportioned joint force.
M6	Percent	Of joint force staff directorates and agencies submit TPFDD requirements by time specified by JPG.
M7	Hours	For components to source TPFDD.
M8	Hours	For supported CINC to accept supporting CINC's TPFDD.
M9	Hours	To identify theater needs and submit requests to CJCS.
M10	Hours	To modify TPFDD.
M11	Hours	To validate TPFDD.

**ST 7.1.4 Determine and Validate Forces and Cargo to be Deployed or Redeployed.**

To identify the actual unit's personnel and cargo, personnel replacements, and cargo required to support the combatant commands. This task includes specification of origin and port of debarkation or ocean area. This task includes examining requirements to retrograde personnel and equipment from theater (for example, evacuate medical casualties). This task is accomplished by the supported and supporting combatant commanders and their Service component commands that produces a validated TPFDD. **(JP 2-03, 3-0, 4-01, 4-01.2, 4-01.3, 5-0)** (JP 4-01.1, 4-02.1, 5-03.1, CJCSM 3500.03)

M1	Percent	Of movement requirements, rejected for missing information.
M2	Percent	Of TPFDD EADs/LADs match campaign plan.
M3	Hours	To generate revised TPFDD (during crisis action planning).
M4	Months	To generate revised TPFDD (during deliberate planning).
M5	Months	To update theater force structure requirements (on receipt of mission change in peacetime).
M6	Days	To update theater force structure requirements (on receipt of mission change, during crisis or in wartime).
M7	Percent	Of deployment requests with no fatal errors.
M8	Percent	Of deployment requirements, unchanged within seven days of air movement.
M9	Percent	Of deployment requirements, unchanged within thirty days of sea movement.
M10	Days	To identify theater needs and submit requests to supported CINC.
M11	Hours	To validate TPFDD to USCINTRANS.
M12	Hours	To modify TPFDD upon change to mission requirements.
M13	Hours	To source TPFDD.
M14	Incidents	Of fatal errors when transportation support forces entered into Supported CINC's TPFDD (by required date).
M15	Hours	Until USTRANSCOM issues deployment order or deployment pre-order to Transportation Component Commands (from receipt of supported CINC's deployment order).
M16	Percent	Of short ton requirements, priorities, and adequate pallet positions for geospatial information and services stocks identified in TPFDD for initial deployment.
M17	Days	To adjust TPFDD to meet geospatial information and services stock movement for initial deployment.
M18	Yes/No	Update theater force structure requirements in time to execute supported CINC's TPFDD.
M19	Percent	Of transportation requirements filled with dual OPLAN apportionment.
M20	Requests	Or less for additional information after OPLAN is provided to units.
M21	Percent	Of OPLAN milestones completed in a timely manner.

M22	Percent	Maximum difference between OPLAN TPFDD and forces that flow at execution.
M23	Hours	Required to transmit levy flows after receipt of validated TPFDD.
M25	Hours	Required to notify wing commander after receipt of replacement shortfalls form AFPC/supported CINC.

### ST 7.1.5 Determine Theater Warfighting and Other Needs, Solutions, and Concepts.

To analyze the theater to determine requirements for improved capabilities in doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, and materiel, and make recommendations for solutions. This task also includes and is based upon development of warfighting and other concepts. This task further involves reporting requirements and recommendations to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and multinational authorities for force development. This task includes exercise and evaluation of proposed solutions and concepts. **(JP 5-0)** (JP 5-0, 5-03.1)

**Note:** Concepts developed in ST 5.3, *Determine Strategic Direction*, provide the basis for the conduct of this task.

M1	Percent	Of proposed new concepts, accepted by CJCS and Services.
M2	Weeks	To develop and provide concepts, requirements, or recommendations to CJCS.
M3	Weeks	To identify theater needs and submit to CJCS for integration with other R&D requirements.
M4	Weeks	To develop and submit Mission Needs Statement.
M5	Days	To develop and submit Mission Needs Statement for quick reaction response.
M6	Percent	Of Mission Needs Statements, accepted by JROC substantially as submitted.
M7	Percent	Of personnel constraints/shortfalls that have alternatives.
M8	Percent	Of changes to joint, combined or multinational doctrine originate in theater.
M9	Percent	Of changes to organization, developed in theater.
M10	Months	For combatant command to develop and provide Mission Needs Statement to CJCS (after identification of requirement).
M11	Months	For combatant command update to theater list of needs and solutions.
M12	Percent	Of new concepts tested in theater by exercises.
M13	Semi-annually	Participate in JROC process.
M14	Semi-annually	Participate in Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) to improve warfighting effectiveness with an emphasis on assuring interoperability.
M15	As Required	Prepare Integrated Priority List (IPL).

M16	As Required	Participate in all phases of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) to ensure theater requirements are addressed.
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**ST 7.1.6 Determine Theater Force Size and Structure Requirements.**

To analyze approved theater objectives and, based upon the theater strategy, determine force size and structure requirements to execute that strategy. Theater forces include combat formations, special operations forces, and necessary support forces. This information is provided to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and NCA for both apportionment of the force and, as required, developing the force and establishing resource priorities. In military operations other than war, this includes support to insurgency and counterinsurgency, combating terrorism, and peace operations. **(JP 3-0, 5-0)** (JP 3-50.2, 4-01.3, 6-0)

M1	Options	For force mix examined.
M2	Percent	Of force manpower is combatants (tooth to tail).
M3	Percent	Of apportioned combat forces lack apportioned doctrinal support forces.
M4	Percent	Of requested forces apportioned for planning.
M5	Weeks	To submit force requirement against proposed mission.
M6	Hours	To submit force requirement (after warning order).
M7	Percent	Of apportioned combat forces that lack doctrinal support forces have them requested.

**ST 7.1.7 Establish Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL).**

To analyze applicable tasks derived through mission analysis of joint operation plans and external directives and select for training only those tasks that are essential to accomplish the organization's wartime mission. To establish supporting conditions and standards for each task in the JMETL for collective joint, individual, and leader training. This activity also pertains to missions associated with military operations other than war. For components, this activity may involve establishing Service METL. **(JP 3-0, CJCSM 3500.03)** (JP 3-05, 3-05.3, 3-59, CJCSI 3500.02A)

**Note:** The coordination of joint training in theater is covered ST 4.2.4, *Establish and Coordinate Training of Joint and Combined Forces*.

M1	Percent	Of JMETs, evaluated.
M2	Weeks	To develop OPLAN associated METs (from OPLAN approval).
M3	Percent	Of service supporting plans have METs.
M4	Percent	Of theater JMETs common with and included in Joint Force Provider JMETL.
M5	Months	Since OPLAN associated METs reviewed.
M6	Percent	Of OPLANs with associated METs.

M7	Percent	Of missions with associated METs.
M8	Months	Since JMETL updated.

### **ST 7.2 Maintain and Report Readiness of Theater Forces.**

To maintain force readiness and to report on the ability of theater forces and theater deployable forces, units, weapons systems, or equipment to deliver the outputs for which they were designed in executing theater strategy and campaigns. This task includes the ability of a supporting combatant commander to provide forces to supported combatant commander. This activity includes reporting force status in the areas of personnel, equipment on hand, equipment readiness, and training (with respect to accomplishing the command's JMETL). This activity includes sustainment reporting. **(JP 1-03.3, 4-0, 5-0)** (JP 0-2, 3-07.2, 3-07.3, 5-0, CJCSI 3500.01A, CJCSI 3500.02A, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Of military authorizations, filled.
M2	Percent	Of civilian authorizations, filled.
M3	Percent	Of combatant commander's JMETL tasks, covered by annual training.
M4	Percent	Of deficiencies reported in an AAR noted in visit to same or other unit 180 days after submission of AAR.
M5	Percent	Of JMETL tasks trained to standard under NBC conditions.
M6	Percent	Of units will maintain a minimum of C1 in training, equipment, and manpower.
M7	Yes/No	Units below C2 augmented to raise C-rating prior to deployment.
M8	Percent	Of combatant command's force structure, trained to meet JMETL requirements.
M9	Months	Since policy, education, and training vision reviewed.

#### **ST 7.2.1 Determine and Report Force Readiness.**

To determine and report on the status of resources and state of joint training for specified theater assigned missions with developed plans. **(JP 1-03.3, 3-0, 5-0)** (JP 4-0, CJCSI 3500.02A, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	To conduct initial assessment of recently constituted joint task force staff.
M2	Hours	To submit first crisis action status reports (after unit notification).
M3	Percent	Of OPLANs that address shortfalls resulting from comparison of requirements and assets estimated to be available during JSCP period.
M4	Percent	Of training data, current at execution.
M5	Days	To conduct full assessment of joint task force.
M6	Months	For potential JTF (Service Comp HQ) to brief CINC on assessment of JTF METL task capabilities and plan for addressing training deficiencies.

M7	Percent	Of assigned combat units that participate in joint exercises.
M8	Percent	Of assigned support units that participate in OPLAN exercises (annually).
M9	Percent	Of missions on which current readiness data is available.
M10	Percent	Of JMETL on which current (within 180 days) training data exists.
M11	Percent	Of units/organizations on which current readiness data is available.
M12	Days	For deployed commander to establish 100% accountability of deployed forces.
M13	Hours	To report change in C-rating.
M14	Minutes	To fill non-scheduled requests for status.
M15	Hours	To produce the first status report on deploying forces.
M16	Hours	For deployed commander to transmit required casualty report to Service headquarters to allow for timely notification of NOK.

### ST 7.2.2 Assess and Report Theater Military Capability.

To assess and report, both formally and informally, the composite military capability and limitations of theater forces. **(JP 3-0, 5-0)** (JP 0-2, 3-07, CJCSI 3500.01A, CJCSI 3500.02A)

M1	Percent	Of joint exercises have a formal evaluation program.
M2	Percent	Of deficiencies (noted by external inspector), corrected or rebutted.
M3	Days	To conduct full assessment of joint task force.
M4	Months	Since comparison of CINC SITREP, CINC Integrated Priority List (IPL), and CINC Critical Items List (CIL).
M5	Percent	Of assessments, provided to Joint Staff by reporting date.
M6	Percent	Of assigned combat units participate in joint exercises.
M7	Months	For designated JTF headquarters to exercise as JTF HQ.
M8	Months	For potential JTF (Service comp HQ) to brief CINC on assessment of JTF METL task capabilities and plan for addressing training deficiencies.
M9	Percent	Of assigned support units participate in joint exercises annually.

### ST 7.2.3 Conduct Joint After Action Reporting.

To provide joint after-action reports on operations by theater forces. This includes both inputs to JAARS and the preservation of records of historical interest.

**(JP 1-03)** (JP 3-05.3, 3-07.1, 3-07.2, 3-07.4, 3-13.1, CJCSI 3500.02A)

M1	Percent	Of joint exercises have Hot Wash-ups attended by CINC, DCINC or COS.
M2	Percent	Of deficiencies reported in AAR noted in visit to same or other unit 180 days after submission of AAR.

M3	Hours	To submit immediate after-action report (at end of operation or exercise).
M4	Days	To submit after-action report (at end of operation or exercise).
M5	Percent	Completion of after-action report (at submission date).

#### **ST 7.2.4 Assess Training and Education Effectiveness.**

To conduct an evaluation of education and training to measure the demonstrated performance of combatant commanders, components, individuals, leaders, and units against specified education and training standards. This task, conducted by the combatant commanders, includes after-action reviews, feedback, and organizational assessments and provides feedback for altering policy. **(N/A)** (CJCSI 3500.01A, CJCSI 3500.02A, CJCSM 3500.03)

M1	Percent	Of a combatant command's combat force structure, trained to meet JMETL requirements.
M2	Percent	Of a combatant command's combat support force structure, trained to meet JMETL requirements.
M3	Percent	Of a combatant command's combat force structure, trained to meet Service METL requirements.
M4	Percent	Of a combatant command's combat support force structure, trained to meet Service METL requirements.
M4	Percent	Of combatant command's personnel educated in PME and JPME for their assigned billet.

#### **ST 8 DEVELOP AND MAINTAIN ALLIANCE AND REGIONAL RELATIONS.**

To perform politico-military activities in a theater within existing alliances or in maintaining, improving, or developing new relations with countries not in an alliance with the United States. These activities are done through the ambassador or Country Team, or in support of Country Team objectives, and frequently involve more than one nation. The activities include tasks designed to enhance US relations with other nations. In military operations other than war, this includes support to counterproliferation, counterinsurgency, combating terrorism, arms control, peace operations, nations assistance, enforcement of sanctions, enforcement of exclusion zones, and counterdrug operations. It also includes interagency support. **(JP 1, 3-0)** (JP 3-0, 3-07.1, 4-02.1, 5-0)

M1	Percent	Of in-theater Ambassadors/DCMs have met CINC/DCINC.
M2	Percent	Of military operations have overt/covert US assistance.
M3	Percent	Of theater nations have military agreements with US.

#### **ST 8.1 Foster Alliance and Regional Relations and Security Arrangements.**

To build cooperative relationships with other nations in the region and international commands and agencies. Actions must be taken with careful

consideration of the diversity of extant political systems, alliances, and the unique character of the people and their leadership. This task includes promoting regional stability and requires sensitivity to the perceptions and interests of the different nations in the region. **(JP 3-0, 5-0)** (JP 1, 3-0, 3-07)

M1	Instances	Of US senior officers and civilian government officials' visits to theater nation.
M2	Instances	Of initiating community action projects.
M3	Percent	Of combatant commander-sponsored joint exercises include allied forces.
M4	Percent	Of in-theater Ambassadors/DCMs have met CINC/DCINC.
M5	Percent	Of major end items have commonality with US systems in allied nations.
M6	Percent	Of US vital interests in-theater threatened by regional nations.
M7	Weeks	Since official general officer/flag officer visit to theater nation.
M8	Percent	Of status-of-forces agreements (and other diplomatic arrangements and legal protocols), in effect.
M9	Percent	Participation in interagency working groups.
M10	Days	To establish interagency working group.
M11	Days	To resolve identified regional military issues with interagency coordination.
M12	Time	To conduct staff review of US national, political, and military security objectives for theater.
M13	Percent	Of time spent developing, coordinating, and directing the execution of military contacts and nation assistance programs in countries requiring assistance.
M14	Time	To take positive action to resolve regional military issues including interagency coordination.
M15	Percent	Of Defense Representatives available to work engagement activities for a given country.
M16	Instances	Of exchange programs—US to foreign/foreign to US exchanges.
M17	Instances	Of combined exercises, port visits, or bilateral activities.
M18	Weeks	To provide response to requests for assistance from SAOs.
M19	Weeks	To provide response to requests for assistance, with equipment in country, during a security assistance surge.

### ST 8.1.1 Enhance Regional Politico-Military Relations.

To strengthen and promote alliances through support of regional relationships. This task includes understanding and adjusting to national and regional concerns and differences, reviewing and advising the Country Team and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on status-of-forces agreements (SOFA) and similar types of issues. **(JP 3-0)** (JP 3-0, 3-05.3, 3-07.1, 3-08v2, 3-57)

M1	Days	For combatant command staff to respond to Country Team message.
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M2	Hours	For combatant commander to respond to cable from US Ambassador.
M3	Incidents pa	Of liberty restricted or modified in response to host-nation religious or national event.
M4	Incidents/Month	Involving US Service personnel.
M5	Instances	Of Country Team sponsored bilateral events.
M6	Instances	Of GO/FO visits to theater nation.
M7	Instances	Of initiating community action projects.
M8	Days pa	Of liberty allowed by host nation.
M9	Months	Since official general officer/flag officer visit to theater nation.
M10	Percent	Of regional locations have US forces and SOFAs in place.

### ST 8.1.2 Promote Regional Security and Interoperability.

To work with allies within the framework of military alliances to improve or secure US posture in the region. This task includes establishing multinational command relationships and authority, developing agreement on the threat, assessing operational capability deficiencies, establishing multinational interoperability arrangements, determining international logistic arrangements, defining and disseminating multinational rules of engagement, and conducting multinational training—all while developing favorable host-nation relations. **(JP 3-0, 5-0)**  
(JP 3-05, 3-08v2)

M1	Days	To determine supportability of allied support request.
M2	Days	To determine supportability of non-DOD US agency support request.
M3	Months	Since review of existing plans involving agency or coalition participation.
M4	Percent	Of allied nations update their cooperative logistics agreement within five (5) years.
M5	Percent	Of allies have information sharing MOAs or LOAs with CINCs.
M6	Percent	Of joint force operations break down over sharing of intelligence.
M7	Percent	Of joint force operations modified by failure to share intelligence.
M8	Percent	Of national forces and agencies operating with US theater forces have intelligence sharing arrangement.
M9	Percent	Of theater OPLANs and Contingency Plans supported by access and support arrangements with designated host nations.
M10	Instances	Of combined exercises or bilateral activities.
M11	Percent	Of military armaments (FMS).
M12	Percent	Of combatant command's theater subregions have an exercise conducted in the subregion during a two year training cycle.
M13	Percent	Of combatant command's friendly theater countries have an exercise conducted in the country during a two-year training cycle.
M14	Annually	CINC's staff conducts a major staff training exercise that involves coalition training.

M15	Percent	Of combatant command's theater subregions have an exercise conducted for the purpose of regional engagement during a two-year training cycle.
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### ST 8.1.3 Develop Headquarters or Organizations for Coalitions.

To establish, as appropriate, headquarters or organizations, or both, for supporting operations in war or military operations other than war. (JP 3-0-0) (JP 0-2, 3-0, 3-7, 3-07.1, 3-08v2)

**Note:** For tasks pertinent to these coalition headquarters, see ST 5, *Provide Theater Strategic Command and Control, Communications, and Computers (C4)*.

M1	Days	To establish fully operational coalition headquarters.
M2	Hours	To establish coalition headquarters.
M3	Percent	Of coalition headquarters division chiefs filled by non-US officers.
M4	Percent	Of general officer/flag officer positions in coalition headquarters held by non-US officers.
M5	Instances	Of MOOTW in which US and allied staff officers work in same compound or area.
M6	Instances	Of MOOTW in which US and allied staff officers work in integrated staff office environment.
M7	Percent	Of OPLANs, campaigns, and operations developed as coalition efforts.
M8	Percent	Of US units (battalion, ship or squadron size or above) have allied LNOs assigned.

### ST 8.1.4 Develop Multinational Intelligence/Information Sharing Structure.

To enhance each member nation's intelligence and information capabilities through development of sharing structure. This task includes determining what information commanders may share with multinational partners and developing databases with multi-level security access to provide member forces a common intelligence picture based upon multinational force and national security requirements. (JP 2-0, 5-00.2) (JP 3-10.1, CJCSI 5221.01)

M1	Percent	Of allied nations with whom US has intelligence sharing agreements.
M2	Percent	Of allied nations sharing intelligence with US within the last year on a basis outside alliance intelligence channels.
M3	Percent	Of non-alliance nations with which US shared intelligence within the last year.
M4	Percent	Of non-alliance nations with whom US has intelligence sharing agreements.
M5	Percent	Of nations have counterintelligence sharing agreements with combatant command concerning terrorism activities.

M6	Percent	Of nations have intelligence sharing agreements with combatant command concerning terrorism activities.
M7	Instances	Of nations sharing police information with US agencies or Unified Command.
M8	Instances	US agencies have intelligence sharing automated data links with Unified Command.
M9	Percent	Of nations share police data with US military law enforcement agencies.
M10	Percent	Of unfiltered intelligence passed to host-nation counterdrug agencies.
M11	Percent	Of nations have counterintelligence sharing agreements with combatant command concerning narcotics activities.
M12	Percent	Of nations have intelligence sharing agreements with combatant command concerning narcotics activities.

### **ST 8.2 Provide Support to Allies, Regional Governments, International Organizations or Groups.**

To provide support to friendly governments and organizations operating in the theater. Typically, that support includes intelligence, logistic, and C2 support, civil-military operations, security assistance, nation assistance, consequence management, and other forms of support to further national objectives. This task can include support to domestic civil government. **(JP 2-0, 3-07, 3-08v1, 4-0)**  
(JP 3-0, 3-07.5, 3-08v1, 3-10.1)

M1	Days	To deploy JTF disaster relief elements.
M2	Days	To respond to Country Team request for assistance.
M3	Hours	For US Country Team and combatant command to coordinate response to natural disaster.
M4	Hours	To establish liaison with Country Team, host nation, and other USG agencies, PVO/NGO/IO and coalition forces.
M5	Instances	Of insufficient logistical support provided to nations, groups, or agencies.
M6	Instances	Of insufficient personnel support provided to nations, groups, or agencies.
M7	Instances	Of personnel provided to support other nations, groups, or agencies.
M8	Instances	Of PVOs in OA maintaining liaison with commander.
M9	Instances	Of PVOs in OA receiving US military support.
M10	Instances	Of theater nations declining military assistance.
M11	Percent	Of funds provided for HCA, SA and MCA operations accounted for.
M12	Percent	Of allied nations update cooperative logistics agreement with USG within two years.
M13	Percent	Of approved projects completed.
M14	Percent	Of cooperative agreements with allied nations updated within two years.

M15	Percent	Of Country Teams' requests for military goods/services filled.
M16	Percent	Of designated foreign military students provided training.
M17	Percent	Of designated foreign military students trained.
M18	Percent	Of nations have politico-military agreements with US.
M19	Percent	Of PVOs in OA maintain liaison with commander.
M20	Percent	Of PVOs in OA receive US military support.
M21	Percent	Of regional nations have signed non-proliferation treaty.
M22	Percent	Of supported nation movement requirements translated to meet RDD.
M23	Tons per day	Of supplies and materiel provided in assistance.
M24	Percent	Of NGOs in OA maintain liaison with commander.
M25	Percent	Of NGOs in OA receive US military support.
M26	Instances	Of NGOs in OA maintaining liaison with commander.
M27	Instances	Of NGOs in OA receiving US military support.
M28	Percent	Of requests by allies for Civil Military Support, met within required time frame.
M29	Percent	Of requests by allies for communications support, met within required time frame.
M30	Percent	Of requests by allies for logistics support, met within required time frame.
M31	Percent	Of requests by allies for security assistance support, met within required time frame.
M32	Percent	Of requests to release intelligence to allies, approved.
M33	Percent	O support requests and plans receiving legal review for compliance with US law and policy.

### ST 8.2.1 Coordinate Security Assistance Activities.

To provide defense articles military training and advisory assistance, and other defense-related services. This type of support may be provided by grant or credit funds appropriated by the US government or with host-nation national funds. Security assistance is a Department of State program which is administered by the Department of Defense through in-country security assistance organizations (SAO). (JP 0-2, 3-0, 3-07, 3-08v1, 4-0) (JP 3-05, 3-07.1, 3-07.4, 3-07.5, 4-0, CJCSM 3113.01, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Weeks	To respond to request for assistance.
M2	Percent	Of coalition and peacekeeping forces with theater military participation have major weapons systems common with US systems.
M3	Percent	Of Country Teams' annual security assistance proposals (FMF/IMET) funded.
M4	Percent	Of Country Teams' requests for military goods/services supported.
M5	Percent	Of designated foreign military personnel trained.
M6	Percent	Of designated foreign military students trained.

M7	Percent	Of military goods/services/training purchased from the US.
M8	Percent	Of weapons common with US systems.
M9	Weeks	To respond to request for assistance with equipment in country during a security assistance surge.

### ST 8.2.2 Coordinate Civil Affairs in Theater.

To coordinate those activities that foster relationships between theater military forces and civil authorities and people in a friendly country or area. This task includes providing the necessary support for civil affairs activities in a theater(s) of operations/JOA. **(JP 0-2, 3-05, 3-57)** (JP 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-07.5, 3-10.1, 3-61, CJCSI 3110.12, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Days	Of lead time to obtain RC CA.
M2	Days	To assess HN government organization, degree of effectiveness, and economic conditions of civilians.
M3	Hours	To provide CA staff augmentation to combatant command.
M4	Instances	Of liaison requirements with other DOD elements; US Government agencies; multinational forces; HN government officials; NGOs/PVO's.
M5	Instances	Of US government agencies in CMO.
M6	Percent	Of civil unrest incidents handled by host-nation forces.
M7	Percent	Of HNS contractor resources identified.
M8	Percent	Of OPLANs supported by an Annex G, CA area study, CA OPLAN, CA estimate to provide CA activities that facilitate mission accomplishment.
M9	Percent	Of US CA military involved.

### ST 8.2.3 Coordinate Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

To anticipate and respond to national, multinational, and interagency requests for assistance for such events as floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, typhoons, or other natural or man made disasters, such as terrorist or rogue state use of WMD, that occur outside the United States and its territories and possessions. Combatant commanders anticipate these events from their knowledge of current conditions or historical patterns and prepare contingency plans, forces, and equipment for rapid response to requests. This task includes seeking advance agreements on procedures and restraints on the use of multinational resources. This task also includes providing assistance before, during, or after hostile action, to reduce the probability of loss of life or damage, minimize effects, and initiate recovery. Additional activities include surveying the disaster area, prioritizing needs, conducting medical assessments, and providing medical services, communications, shelter, subsistence, water, engineering support, transportation, fire fighting, mass care, urban search and rescue, HAZMAT response, and energy distribution. **(JP 3-05, 3-07, 3-07.1, 3-57)** (JP 2-01, 3-07, 3-07.1, 3-08v1, 3-57, 4-02.1, 4-04, CJCSI 3110.14)

M1	Days	To deploy civil-military engineering units and begin engineering tasks.
M2	Days	To organize relief effort in country.
M3	Days	To reestablish communications in country.
M4	Hours	To assess situation and define assistance needed.
M5	Hours	To begin delivering disaster relief supplies into host country.
M6	Hours	To deliver critical material/supplies in crisis.
M7	Hours	To distribute supplies and services where needed.
M8	Hours	To insert disaster survey liaison team.
M9	Percent	Of natural disasters in allied theater nations.
M10	Days	To reestablish lines of communication in country.

#### ST 8.2.4 Coordinate Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Programs.

To assist nations in the theater with medical, dental, and veterinary care (in rural, coastal, or outlying island areas); the construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; well-drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. Those activities identified specifically as humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) are specific programs authorized in legislation and controlled in accordance with title 10, US Code, section 401. **(JP 3-0, 3-07, 4-04)** (JP 0-2, 3-0, 3-05, 3-07.1, 3-07.5, 3-08v1, 3-57, 4-02.1, 4-06, 5-0, CJCSI 3110.14, CJCSM 3113.01)

M1	Instances	Of units trained to perform HCA.
M2	Percent	Of project effort by host-nation personnel.
M3	Percent	Of forces available, trained and properly equipped to perform mission.
M4	Percent	Of HCA deployments support combatant commander's regional objectives.
M5	Percent	Of HCA project/deployments with some materials supplied by host nation.
M6	Percent	Of procedures and restraints on use of US military resources in place before force deployment.
M7	Percent	Of personnel trained to perform HCA.

#### ST 8.2.5 Coordinate Nation Assistance Support.

To support and assist in development of nations, normally in conjunction with the Department of State and/or an ally. The degree of support will depend on operational conditions. **(JP 3-0, 3-57, 4-04)** (JP 3-07, 3-07.1, 3-50.3, 3-57, 4-02, 4-02.1, 5-03.1)

M1	Days	To process and answer DOS or Country Team requests.
M2	Percent	Of each project allocated to host-nation personnel.

M3	Instances	Of projects deemed long-term investments (e.g., continue to pay off five years after completion).
M4	Percent	Of projects or deployments with materials supplied by host nation.

**ST 8.2.6 Coordinate Military Civic Action Assistance.**

To coordinate with or assist host-nation forces on projects useful to the local population. Such projects contribute to the local community's economic and social development and improve the standing of the military forces with the population. These activities could include education, training, public sanitation, and others. **(JP 3-07.4, 3-57, 4-04)** (JP 3-07.1, 3-08v1, 3-57, 4-02)

M1	Days	To process and answer DOS or Country Team request.
M2	Percent	Of each project allocated to host-nation personnel.
M3	Percent	Of host nation and US military civic action assistance mission objectives accomplished.
M4	Percent	Of military civic action projects performed by units without primary training mission.
M5	Instances	Of projects deemed long-term investments (e.g., continue to pay off five years after completion).
M6	Percent	Of projects or deployments with materials supplied by host nation.
M7	Percent	Of required forces available, trained and properly equipped to perform civic action missions.
M8	Percent	Of MCA projects wins support for government objectives and for the military (from local population).

**ST 8.2.7 Assist in Restoration of Order.**

To halt violence and reinstitute peace and order. These activities are typically undertaken at the request of appropriate national authorities of a foreign state, or to protect US citizens. Therefore, these activities may be undertaken in cooperation with other countries or unilaterally by US forces. **(JP 3-0, 3-07)** (JP 3-0, 3-05, 3-07.2, 3-10.1)

M1	Hours	From first forces on ground until US personnel are secure.
M2	Hours	To begin arriving in the objective area (after receipt of warning order).
M3	Instances	Of foreign civilian casualties.
M4	Instances	Of foreign military casualties.
M5	Instances	Of US civilian casualties.
M6	Percent	Of US military casualties.

### ST 8.2.8 Support Peace Operations in Theater.

To support peace operations in theater by effectively coordinating the interaction of military forces with political and humanitarian agencies involved in traditional peacekeeping operations, support of diplomatic actions, and forceful military actions. This task can include coordination with international organizations and regional groupings. **(JP 0-2, 3-0, 3-07)** (JP 0-2, 3-07.3, 3-08v1, 3-08v2, 3-57, 4-02.1, CJCSI 3110.14)

M1	Percent	Of civil unrest incidents handled by host-nation forces.
M2	Percent	Of contributing states with representation on staff proportional to troop contribution.
M3	Percent	Of nations operating under UN Command and Control.
M4	Percent	Of nations operating under US Command and Control.
M5	Percent	Of refugees receiving minimum nutrition.
M6	Percent	Of refugees sheltered.

#### ST 8.2.8.1 Support Multilateral Peace Operations.

To take action to preserve, maintain, or restore the peace. Such action is normally conducted under the authority of Chapters VI or VII of the UN Charter or by regional arrangements in accordance with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. **(JP 0-2, 3-0)** (JP 3-07, 3-07.3, 3-08v1, 3-08v2, CJCSI 3110.14)

M1	Hours	To begin arriving in the objective area, after receipt of warning order.
M2	Hours	To secure US personnel in country, after initial arrival of forces.
M3	Percent	Of contributing states with representation on staff proportional to troop contribution.
M4	Percent	Of law enforcement contingent provided by host nation.
M5	Percent	Of nations operating under UN Command and Control.
M6	Percent	Of nations operating under US Command and Control.
M7	Percent	Of operations conducted exclude one or more national force contributions.
M8	Percent	Of refugees receive minimum nutrition.
M9	Percent	Of refugees sheltered.

#### ST 8.2.8.2 Establish and Coordinate a Peacekeeping Infrastructure.

To establish, preserve, and maintain peace through an infrastructure of military and/or civilian personnel. Such action is conducted with the consent of parties to the dispute and with a truce in place. The United Nations under Chapter VI of the UN Charter normally authorizes such actions. These traditionally are noncombat operations (except for the purpose of self-defense) and are normally undertaken to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement and in support of diplomatic efforts to achieve a lasting political settlement of the dispute. **(JP 3-0, 3-07, 3-07.3)** (JP 3-0, 3-07, 3-07.1, 3-08v2,



5-0, CJCSI 3110.14)

M1	Hours	To begin arriving in the objective area (after receipt of warning order).
M2	Hours	To secure US personnel in country (after initial arrival of forces).
M3	Percent	Of contributing states with representation on staff proportional to their troop contribution.
M4	Percent	Of law enforcement contingent provided by host nation.
M5	Percent	Of nations operating under UN Command and Control.
M6	Percent	Of nations operating under US Command and Control.
M7	Percent	Of operations conducted that exclude one or more national force contributions.
M8	Percent	Of refugees receive minimum nutrition.
M9	Percent	Of refugees sheltered.

**ST 8.2.8.3 Coordinate Peace Enforcement.**

To coordinate the use of force or the threat of the use of force, under the authority of the United Nations Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to preserve, maintain or restore international peace and security or address breaches of the peace or acts of aggression. **(JP 3-0, 3-07)** (JP 0-2, 3-08v1, 3-08v2, 3-09.3, CJCSI 3110.14)

M1	Hours	To begin arriving in objective area (after receipt of warning order).
M2	Hours	To secure US personnel in country (after initial arrival of forces).
M3	Instances	Of violations of imposed cease fire.
M4	Percent	Of casualties for peace enforcement forces per week.
M5	Percent	Of law enforcement contingent provided by host nation.
M6	Percent	Of military forces submit to peace enforcement.
M7	Percent	Of refugees receive minimum nutrition.
M8	Percent	Of refugees sheltered.

**ST 8.2.9 Coordinate Theater Foreign Internal Defense Activities.**

To coordinate the participation of civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. This task includes coordination of counterinsurgency operations within the joint operations area. **(JP 3-0, 3-07, 3-07.1, 3-57)** (JP 3-0, 3-05, 3-07, 3-07.1, 3-08v1)

M1	Instances	Of exchange of information on host nation between USDAOs and combatant commander's staff.
M2	Instances	Of meetings of combatant commander FID advisory committee in last year.

M3	Months	Since update of FID programs in combatant commander's vision and strategy.
M4	Percent	Accuracy in accounting for funds used in FID.
M5	Percent	Of agreement between SOA AIASA equipment requests and combatant command position on equipment to threatened nation.
M6	Percent	Of FID funding later found to not be authorized in law.
M7	Percent	Of FID SA efforts in theater supported by planned and executed military activities.
M8	Percent	Of ongoing FID efforts in line with current US national security policy and strategy.
M9	Percent	Of outstanding issues resolved at annual combatant command hosted Joint Service Program Management Review.
M10	Percent	Of POLAD chaired combatant commander FID advisory committee meetings.
M11	Percent	Of theater FID effort effectively absorbed by threatened nation.
M12	Percent	Of theater FID effort effectively absorbed by threatened nations in theater.
M13	Percent	Of theater nations in theater included in annual combatant commander's joint and combined exercises.
M14	Weeks	Since combatant commander contact with SOAs.

#### ST 8.2.10 Coordinate Multinational Operations Within Theater.

To coordinate with allies and coalition partners and appropriate international organizations to ensure mutual support and consistent effort in the theater. Effective coordination is achieved when all parties understand and agree to the desired end state, concept of operations, intent, objectives, priorities, and support requirements. **(JP 3-0, 5-0)** (JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-0, 3-08v1, 3-09)

M1	Hours	For combatant command staff to prepare response to coalition proposals during negotiations.
M2	Percent	Of allies and coalition partners actively participate on joint force Headquarters Staff.
M3	Percent	Of allies and coalition partners agree on common approach.
M4	Percent	Of allies and coalition partners agree on common end state.
M5	Percent	Of allies and coalition partners operate from common intelligence base.
M6	Percent	Of allies and coalition partners operate from common logistics infrastructure.
M7	Percent	Of allies and coalition partners read-on to overall OPLAN.
M8	Percent	Of demands of existing coalition partners anticipated by combatant command staff.
M9	Percent	Of demands of potential coalition partners anticipated by combatant command staff.
M10	Percent	Of nations whose forces operate under common and agreed command structure.

### ST 8.2.11 Cooperate With and Support Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) in Theater.

To work with and arrange for a mutually beneficial relationship between the combatant commander and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating within the theater. This task includes ensuring that NGOs or their interests are represented at every level of the chain of command within the theater. It also includes ensuring that military forces are aware of the capabilities and limitations of NGOs. In cooperating with NGOs it is important to keep in mind that they maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations and thus are of a different character from private organizations. **(JP 3-0, 3-07, 3-08v1, 3-57)** (JP 3-0, 3-07.5, 3-08v1, 4-02.1, CJCSI 3110.14)

M1	Hours	Before joint force personnel and NGOs meet (during a crisis).
M2	Hours	To contact in-theater NGOs.
M3	Hours	To respond to NGO requests under existing agreement.
M4	Percent	Difference between promised aid during planning and support of NGOs in execution.
M5	Percent	Of humanitarian effort in which military effort is duplicative of NGO effort.
M6	Percent	Of joint force headquarters have NGO representation.
M7	Percent	Of joint force initiated programs sustainable by NGO or PVO organizations upon military departure.
M8	Percent	Of NGOs have relationship with combatant command in peacetime.
M9	Percent	Of NGOs have reciprocal agreements with combatant command in peacetime.

### ST 8.2.12 Cooperate With and Support Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) in Theater.

To work with and arrange for a mutually beneficial relationship between the combatant commander and private voluntary organizations (PVOs) operating within the theater. This task includes ensuring that PVOs or their interests are represented at every level of the chain of command within the limitations of military forces and that military forces are aware of the capabilities and limitations of PVOs. **(JP 3-07, 3-08v1, 3-57)** (JP 3-0, CJCSI 3110.14)

M1	Hours	Before joint force personnel and PVOs meet (during a crisis).
M2	Hours	To contact in-theater PVOs.
M3	Hours	To respond to PVO requests under existing agreement.
M4	Percent	Difference between promised aid during planning and support to PVOs in execution.
M5	Percent	Of humanitarian effort in which military effort duplicative of PVO effort.

M6	Percent	Of joint force headquarters has PVO representation.
M7	Percent	Of joint force initiated programs sustainable by NGO or PVO organizations upon military departure.
M8	Percent	Of PVOs have relationship with combatant command in peacetime.
M9	Percent	Of PVOs have reciprocal agreements with combatant command in peacetime.
M10	Percent	Of PVOs with interoperable communications systems both voice and data.

**ST 8.2.13 Coordinate Countermine Activities.**

To coordinate US forces support for countermine activities in the theater with NGOs, PVOs, host nations, and US governmental agencies. Activities focus on reducing or eliminating the threat to noncombatants and friendly military forces posed by mines, boobytraps, and other explosive devices by training host-nation forces in the location, recognition, and safe disposal of mines and other destructive devices, as well as program management. **(N/A)** (JP 3-05, 3-15)

M1	Percent	Of accuracy in accounting for funds used in countermine operations.
M2	Weeks	To coordinate with the Department of State (DOS) to conduct countermine operations.
M3	Days	To contact in-theater NGOs/PVOs.
M4	Percent	Of humanitarian effort in which military effort is duplicative of NGOs/PVOs.
M5	Days	To begin delivering countermine operations supplies and equipment.
M6	Days	To establish lines of communications in country.
M7	Weeks	To organize countermine efforts in country.
M8	Hours	To establish liaison with Country Team, host nation and other USG agencies, PVO/NGO/IO, and coalition forces.
M9	Percent	Of US CA/PSYOP military involved.

**ST 8.3 Obtain Support for US Forces and Interests.**

To make agreements with, and seek the assistance of, alliance and other countries in the region for support of US forces. This support includes status-of-forces agreements, sustainment, intelligence, operations, C2, overflight and landing rights, lines of communications, facilities, space, labor, skilled manpower. Support may be from governments, NGOs, or private entities. **(JP 2-0, 3-0, 4-0, 4-01, 5-0)** (JP 3-07.5, 3-10.1, 4-0, 4-01, 4-03)

M1	Incidents	Of violation of host-nation flight rules, per 10,000 flights.
M2	Percent	Of overflight requests approved in last 12 months.
M3	Percent	Of peacetime support provided by allied host nation.
M4	Percent	Of portcall delays of military vessels.

M5	Percent	Of stationing costs borne by allied host nation.
M6	Percent	Of US dependents living in substandard housing.

### ST 8.3.1 Arrange Stationing for US Forces.

To obtain approval for and to house and dispose forces to best support peacetime presence and military operations. This task is conducted within the bounds of physical limitations and political constraints. It includes negotiation of status-of-forces agreements. **(JP 4-0, 4-05)** (JP 3-0, 4-05)

**Note:** See also ST 8.1.1, Enhance Regional Politico-Military Relations.

M1	Incidents	Of US personnel injured/killed by terrorists.
M2	Incidents	Of US property damaged by terrorist incidents.
M3	Kilometers	To travel in country for US Army brigades to reach their GDP positions.
M4	Percent	Of host-nation criminal cases involving US forces or dependents.
M5	Percent	Of US air forces deploy outside host nation for training.
M6	Percent	Of US forces living in substandard barracks in peacetime.
M7	Percent	Of US ground forces deploy outside host nation for training.
M8	Percent	Of US land based wartime fighter sorties aerial refuel to range their targets.
M9	Percent	Of US units deploy outside host nation for their primary wartime mission.
M10	Weeks	To find permanent quarters in host nation for US dependents.

### ST 8.3.2 Establish Bilateral or Multilateral Arrangements.

To establish, in anticipation of requirements to conduct operations with friends and allies outside an alliance command structure, mutually agreed procedures. This task includes harmonization of the approaches of the respective national forces, including actions to preclude or minimize fratricide. This task also includes taking into account differences in language, customs, organization, military capability, level of training, and political constraints. This activity includes establishing command relationships. **(JP 3-0, 5-0)** (JP 2-0, 3-0, 4-0, 5-0)

M1	Percent	Of non-alliance nations have provided exercise commanders at some level of chain of command.
M2	Percent	Of non-alliance nations have conducted exercises with US within the last year.
M3	Percent	Of non-alliance nations with which US has communications agreements.
M4	Percent	Of non-alliance nations with whom US has cross-serving agreements.
M5	Months	To formalize MOA or other agreement.

M6	Percent	Of non-alliance nation's weapons can use US ammunition.
M7	Hours	To obtain authorization to release sensitive/classified information to allied forces.
M8	Percent	Of nations have agreements with US on mutual disaster relief.
M9	Percent	Of nations have extradition treaties with US, covering narcotics offenses.
M10	Percent	Of nations have extradition treaties with US, covering terrorism offenses.

**ST 8.3.3 Arrange Sustainment Support for Theater Forces.**

To obtain sustainment support from sources other than the US military. This activity includes host-nation support, logistic civil augmentation, third-country support, and captured materiel. **(JP 4-0, 4-01, 4-04)** (JP 3-0, 3-10.1, 4-0, 4-01, 4-02.1)

**Note:** This task usually supports ST 4.4, *Develop and Maintain Sustainment Bases*.

M1	Days	Saved in closing TPFDD relative to C-day (using HNS).
M2	Days	To act on agreed support.
M3	Days	To initiate agreed upon support.
M4	Days	To obtain basing rights.
M5	Hours	To obtain overflight authorization.
M6	Instances	Of C4I capability damaged by enemy forces, repaired by host-nation damage control elements.
M7	Instances	Of interrogator/translator capability delays operations.
M8	Instances	Of issues resolved by liaison officers.
M9	Instances	Of modifications to existing plans upon execution.
M10	Percent	Host-nation security and means increases availability of combat forces.
M11	Percent	Host-nation security and means increases availability of tactical forces.
M12	Percent	Host-nation infrastructure and damage control increase C3I capacity.
M13	Percent	Of combat service support personnel provided by host nation.
M14	Percent	Of combat service support personnel requirement reduced by host-nation support.
M15	Percent	Of combat support personnel requirement reduced by host-nation support.
M16	Percent	Of equipment and personnel to remove strategically significant hazards provided by host nation.
M17	Percent	Host-nation infrastructure increases communications capacity.
M18	Percent	Of JSCP assigned OPLANs identifying/projecting host-nation support resources.
M19	Percent	Of maintenance units trained to convert captured material to friendly use.

M20	Percent	Of OPLANs, CONPLANs, FUNCPLANs without fully negotiated provisions for host-nation support.
M21	Percent	Of peacetime support provided by host nation.
M22	Percent	Of projected HNS responses identified by the joint force.
M23	Percent	Of significant hazards removed by host nation.
M24	Percent	Of specialized maintenance units prepared to convert captured material to friendly use.
M25	Percent	Of stationing costs paid by host nation.
M26	Percent	Of strategically significant hazard reduction provided by host nation.
M27	Percent	Of total combat service support supplied by host nation.
M28	Percent	Of total combat support supplied by host nation.
M29	Percent	Of total cost of operation paid for by HN and third party nations.
M30	Percent	Of total cost of operation paid for by host nation.
M31	Percent	Of total cost of operation paid for by third party nations.
M32	Percent	Of US plans have host-nation supporting plans.
M33	TONS	Of materiel reduced by use of HNS.
M34	Weeks	To begin receiving agreed upon support.
M35	Percent	Of support personnel requirement reduced by host nation support.
M36	Percent	Of support personnel provided by host nation.

#### **ST 8.3.4 Obtain Multinational Support Against Nonmilitary Threats.**

To identify and obtain cooperation and support of allies and friends for protection against nonmilitary threats to civilian and military personnel and to key facilities in the theater. Threats of this nature may come from illegal drug trafficking and terrorism. **(JP 3-07, 3-07.2)** (JP 3-0, 3-07, 3-07.1)

M1	Incidents	Of US personnel injured or killed by terrorists.
M2	Incidents	Of US property damaged by terrorists.
M3	Percent	Of nations share police data with US military law enforcement agencies.

#### **ST 8.4 Provide Theater Support to Other DOD and Government Agencies.**

To provide specified support to other combatant commands, DOD agencies, and other governmental departments or agencies operating within the theater. Support could be to US governmental agencies assisting US or foreign citizens, on US territory, in foreign states, or in international waters in accordance with US law. This support could include intelligence, intercepting and detaining illegal immigrants, logistic, medical, C4, and security support, counterdrug operations, combating terrorism, counterproliferation, and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO). **(JP 3-0, 3-07, 3-07.5, 3-57, 4-04)** (JP 0-2, 3-0, 3-07, 3-07.2, 3-08v1, 3-57)

**Note:** See SN 8.2, *Provide DOD/Government-Wide Support*. For NEO, see also ST 8.4.3, *Coordinate Evacuation and Repatriation of Noncombatants from Theater*.

M1	Hours	To respond to US agency request for intelligence support.
M2	Hours	To respond to US agency request for logistics support.
M3	Instances	Of US agencies receiving C4 support from Unified Command.
M4	Instances	Of US agencies receiving logistics support from Unified Command.
M5	Minutes	For NBC staff members to provide hazard prediction.
M6	Minutes	From notification of nuclear/biological/chemical event to preparation and output of Environmental Hazard report to NFARS and NAFTOC subscribers.
M7	Minutes	To output NUDET information from ROCCs/SOCCs and forward to NFARS, NUDIS, NAFTOC subscribers.
M8	Minutes	To output NUDET information from sensors to NFARS, NUDIS, NAFTOC subscribers.
M9	Months	Since review of support requirements to other agencies.
M10	Percent	Of CARDA/RECA requests processed.
M11	Percent	Of FAA/TC (aircraft in distress) assistance requests filled with an interceptor.
M12	Percent	Of hand-off of potential drug smuggling aircraft effected.
M13	Percent	Of incidents (e.g., terrorist, natural disaster) had coordination procedures with civil agencies to assist or conduct operations in place.
M14	Percent	Of requests by US agencies supported with command and control provided by combatant command.
M15	Percent	Of requests by US agencies supported with logistics support.
M16	Percent	Of steaming hours dedicated to agency support operations.
M17	Percent	Of theater flying hours dedicated to agency support operations.
M18	Percent	Of theater forces conducted agency support operations.
M19	Percent	Of time reliable, uninterrupted air picture provided to other agencies.
M20	Percent	Of US agencies have intelligence sharing agreements with combatant command for narcotics or terrorism offenses.
M21	Percent	Of US agencies have intelligence support provided by combatant command.

#### **ST 8.4.1 Advise and Support Counterdrug Operations in Theater.**

To support counterdrug operations through the establishment of theater joint task forces or elements of multi-jurisdictional forces in support of law enforcement agencies (LEAs) and host-nation (HN) forces. This includes close coordination and direct liaison between the theater and LEAs and HNs. This task requires the integration and coordination of all of the different task categories of counterdrug support, including C4I, planning, logistic, and training. The task combines the combatant commander's unique counterdrug capabilities of detection and



monitoring, with specific responsibility, under the FY 89 National Defense Authorization Act, to integrate US assets into a network that is dedicated to the interdiction of illegal drugs. **(JP 3-0, 3-07, 3-07.4, 3-08v2)** (JP 1, 3-05, 3-07.1, 3-07.4, 3-08v2, 5-0, 6-0, CJCSI 3110.14, CJCSI 3710.01, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Days	To process off-cycle Country Team requests by combatant command headquarters.
M2	Hours	Of warning provided LEAs of arrival in United States of maritime drug shipments.
M3	Instances	Of host-nation personnel training with the US.
M4	Percent	Of Country Team requests handled outside normal planning cycle.
M5	Percent	Of effort provided under OPLAN vice O & M or other funding.
M6	Percent	Of US detection and monitoring capability transitioned to host nation.
M7	Percent	Of US O & M capability transitioned to host nation in last 12 months.
M8	Percent	Reduction of drug traffic into United States from combatant command theater each year.

#### ST 8.4.2 Assist in Combating Terrorism.

To produce effective protective measures to reduce the probability of a successful terrorist attack against theater installations. This task includes those defensive measures (antiterrorism) used to reduce vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces. This task also includes those offensive measures (counterterrorism) taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. **(JP 3-0, 3-07, 3-07.2, 3-10)** (JP 0-2, 2-0, 3-07.1, 3-07.2, 3-08v1, 3-10.1, CJCS Handbook 5260)

M1	Hours	To communicate terrorist threat change within theater.
M2	Hours	To generate an order to combat terrorism.
M3	Hours	To respond to combat terrorist response order.
M4	Instances	Anti/counterterrorism exercises conducted per year.
M5	Instances	Host-nation security personnel have received US training in combating terrorism.
M6	Instances	Of terrorist activity in theater.
M7	Instances	Of terrorist attacks against US nationals per year.
M8	Instances	Of US owned or operated facilities damaged/destroyed as result of terrorist action.
M9	Percent	Of change in number of terrorist incidents per month.
M10	Percent	Of US casualties from terrorist action.
M11	Percent	Of US facilities damaged.
M12	Percent	Of US personnel have received personal security measures training.

M13	Days	For command to establish and implement a terrorist threat self-assessment program.
M14	Days	To implement measures to reduce terrorist threat vulnerabilities (conduct vulnerability assessments/meet construction standards).
M15	Hours	To coordinate on-site JRAC response team at terrorist incident sites and provide information to higher command.
M16	Percent	Of individuals that are educated/trained in AT awareness/protection prior to arrival in theater.
M17	Hours	For response force to deploy against a terrorist threat, IAW threat defense plan.
M18	Percent	Of coordination/communication between base, base defense, and base cluster in response to a terrorist threat.
M19	Days	To evaluate terrorist threat.
M20	Percent	Of ability to deny terrorist capability to strike. Note – This entails the ability to facilitate/monitor security enhancements to include procedures to protect against car/truck/boat bomb attacks at US installations.

### ST 8.4.3 Coordinate Evacuation and Repatriation of Noncombatants from Theater.

To use all available means, including commercial, theater military, host nation, and third-country resources to evacuate US dependents, US Government civilian employees, and private citizens (US and third-country) from the theater and support the repatriation of appropriate personnel to the US. Such operations are conducted in support of the Department of State. Theater organizations at various echelons provide support (for example, medical, transportation, and security) to noncombatants. **(JP 3-0, 3-07, 3-07.5)** (JP 3-07, 3-08v2, 3-10, 3-57, CJCSI 3110.14, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Days	To organize and deploy fully operational JTF.
M2	Hours	To evacuate noncombatants (once CINC directed to conduct evacuation).
M3	Hours	To evaluate situation and present recommendations to decision maker(s).
M4	Percent	Of US citizens and designated foreign nationals accounted for by name during evacuation.
M5	Percent	Of US citizens and designated foreign nationals accounted for.
M6	Percent	Of US citizens and designated foreign nationals evacuated.
M7	Percent	Of US citizens desiring, evacuated.
M8	Percent	Of evacuees available and desiring evacuation, moved (IAW OPLAN timelines).

#### ST 8.4.4 Counter Weapon and Technology Proliferation.

To provide support to DOD and other governmental agencies to prevent/limit/minimize the introduction of weapons of mass destruction, new advanced weapons, and advanced weapon capable technologies to a region.

(JP 3-0, 3-12) (JP 1, 3-07, 3-11)

M1	Percent	Change in number of nuclear powers in the last year.
M2	Percent	Of nations with biological weapon potential that have actual or suspected biological development weapons program.
M3	Percent	Of nations with chemical warfare potential that have actual or suspected chemical development weapons program.
M4	Percent	Of nations with nuclear potential that have actual or suspected nuclear development program.
M5	Percent	Of nations accepted US help in controlling WMD technology proliferation.
M6	Percent	Of nations that have ballistic missile program.
M7	Percent	Of nations that have development program for a ballistic missile having a range of over 1500 NM.
M8	Percent	Of nations that have sea based WMD deterrent force in development.
M9	Percent	Of nations that have successfully mated WMD warheads to ballistic missiles.
M10	Percent	Of nations provided assistance to other nations in the transfer of critical weapons technology.

#### ST 8.4.5 Coordinate Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) in the United States.

To plan for and respond to domestic (inside the United States and its territories) requests for assistance from other US governmental and state agencies in the event of civil emergencies such as natural and man made disasters, civil disturbances and federal work stoppages. Other governmental agencies include such organizations as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the US Coast Guard and state and local divisions of emergency services. (JP 3-0, 3-07, 3-57, 4-02, 4-04, 4-05) (JP 3-08v1, 3-57)

M1	Hours	For DOD to respond request from FEMA for assistance.
M2	Hours	To prepare briefing for NCA on nationalizing the National Guard.
M3	Percent	Restoration of production when federal troops used to restore production after federal work stoppage.
M4	Hours	For DOD to respond to a State request for assistance to National Guard efforts to deal with disasters or disturbances.
M5	Hours	Before federal troops are present and responding to disaster or disturbance.

**ST 8.5 Coordinate and Integrate Regional Interagency Activities.**

To integrate and harmonize the military and civilian components involved in conducting operations. This integration and harmonization is accomplished within an interagency context and is focused on the achievement of US National Strategic Objectives. **(JP 3-0, 3-07, 3-08v1)** (JP 3-0, 3-07, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Hours	To respond to Country Team request for assistance.
M2	Months	Since review of existing plans involving agency or coalition participation.
M3	Percent	Of international agencies have memorandums of agreement or letters of agreement with combatant commander.
M4	Percent	Of LNOs from national agencies, resident on CINC's staff.
M5	Percent	Of missions coordinated with theater, coalition HQ, NGOs, and host-nation governments.
M6	Percent	Of non-DOD and USG operations known by combatant commander.
M7	Percent	Of theater support in concert with published theater strategy and combatant commander's intent.

**ST 8.5.1 Coordinate and Integrate Policy for the Conduct of Theater Operations.**

To work within the Country Team and other forums to provide support to the programs of other US Government departments and agencies within the theater. To ensure that the strategy and campaigns of the combatant commander are understood by other USG agencies and organizations and that maximum support is obtained for the strategy and campaigns. **(JP 3-07.1, 3-08v1)** (JP 3-07.5, 4-02.1)

M1	Hours	To complete poll of appropriate ambassadors as part of crisis assessment (after receipt of warning or alert order for combatant command staff).
M2	Hours	To designate interagency and NGO/PVO liaison points and coordinating mechanisms (after receipt of warning or alert order for combatant command staff).
M3	Percent	Of combatant command OPLANs have Country Team agreements for involved HNs.
M4	Percent	Of NGOs in JOA establish agreed short-term objectives with combatant commander.
M5	Percent	Of organizational goals held in common across US Departments and Agencies, during a crisis response.
M6	Percent	Of PVOs in JOA establish agreed short-term objectives with combatant commander.
M7	Percent	Of involved US agencies for which objectives and COAs have been obtained and considered.

M8	Percent	Of US agencies identified during mission analysis and COA development as involved in crisis, contacted.
M9	Percent	Of USG crisis response participants have common long-term goals.
M10	Percent	Of USG crisis response participants have common short-term goals.

**ST 8.5.2 Facilitate US Information Exchange in Region.**

To ensure the free flow of information within US Government departments and agencies in the theater. This task also includes development of relations with NGOs and PVOs in theater to ensure that all available information is available for resolution of the existing crisis, without creating the impression, internally or externally, that any NGO or PVO is being used as an intelligence source. **(JP 3-0, 6-0)** (JP 3-07.1, 3-08v1, 3-61, 6-0, CJCSI 3500.01A)

M1	Months	Since combatant command hosted conference for theater ambassadors or their representatives.
M2	Percent	Of theater nations in which combatant commander has military intelligence activities link with the CIA, directly or through the Country Team.
M3	Percent	Of Country Teams in theater that have formal and frequent contacts from the combatant command POLAD.
M4	Percent	Of joint force commander CCIFs answered by NGOs and PVOs.
M5	Percent	Of nations and agencies have full access to information when involved in FID program.
M6	Percent	Of NGOs in theater that have established contact point for information exchange with combatant commander.
M7	Percent	Of NGOs in designated JOA have previously established contact point for information exchange with combatant commander.
M8	Percent	Of NGOs in JOA terminate associate relationship because of appearance of being combatant command intelligence source.
M9	Percent	Of PVOs in theater that have established contact point for information exchange with combatant commander.
M10	Percent	Of PVOs in designated JOA have previously established contact point for information exchange with the combatant commander.
M11	Percent	Of PVOs in JOA terminate associate relationship because of appearance of being combatant command intelligence source.

**ST 8.5.3 Establish Theater Interagency Cooperation Structure.**

To establish formal and informal relationships with other US Government departments and agencies in the theater for the mutual exchange of information and support. **(JP 0-2, 1, 3-08v1)** (JP 3-0, 3-07, 3-57, CJCSI 3500.01A)

M1	Hours	To define coordinating relationships and lines of authority after HAST arrives in country.
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M2	Hours	To establish initial combatant commander liaison structure, after appointment of Special representative of the President for an area within JOA.
M3	Hours	To establish initial combatant commander liaison structure, after appointment of United Nations Secretary General Special Envoy.
M4	Hours	To initiate liaison after arrival of both HAST and DART.
M5	Percent	Of command levels with NGO/PVO representation.
M6	Percent	Of Country Teams in theater that have participation with combatant commander (or subordinate unified commander).
M7	Percent	Of host nation internal defense and development (IDAD) programs in theater that have major SA or CMO levels with a special management program.
M8	Percent	Of NGOs in designated JOA have established liaison and coordinating mechanisms with combatant commander.
M9	Percent	Of PVOs in designated JOA have established liaison and coordinating mechanisms with combatant commander.
M10	Percent	Of US Departments and Agencies, including DOD Agencies in designated JOA have established liaison and coordinating mechanisms with combatant commander.

#### ST 8.5.4 Coordinate Theater Consequence Management (CM).

To coordinate support for planning and conducting consequence management in the theater. To identify, resource, and tailor forces for consequence management (JTF-CM) to provide initial incident response and serve as the C2 element for all DOD support in the theater. Task includes establishing liaison with necessary government agencies, regional nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), private voluntary organizations (PVOs), international organizations, and regional military commands that contribute resources to CM operations. **(JP 3-0, 3-08v1)** (N/A)

M1	Hours	To coordinate through OSD and Joint Staff with DOS during crisis action procedures.
M2	Percent	Agreement between combatant command and interested Country Teams on end state and exit criteria.
M3	Percent	Of DOS or Country Team identified conditions that could produce mission failure addressed before execution.
M4	Percent	Of NGOs concerns regarding end state, exit criteria and transition plan formally addressed.
M5	Percent	Of PVOs concerns regarding end state, exit criteria and transition plan formally addressed.

## OPERATIONAL TASKS, MEASURES, AND CRITERIA

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## **OP 1 CONDUCT OPERATIONAL MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER.**

To dispose joint and/or multinational forces, conventional forces, and special operations forces (SOF) to impact the conduct of a campaign or major operation by either securing positional advantages before battle is joined or exploiting tactical success to achieve operational or strategic results. This activity includes moving or deploying forces for operational advantage within a joint operations area and conducting maneuver to operational depths (for offensive or defensive purposes). It also includes enhancing the mobility of friendly forces and controlling battlespace on land, on and under sea, in air, or in space. Operational formations are actually composed of tactical forces moving to achieve operational or strategic objectives. As shorthand, they are referred to as operational formations or operational forces. **(JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-02, 3-09, 4-0, 4-01.6, 4-01.8)** (JP 3-01.1, 3-05.3, 3-15, 3-54, 4-01.6, CJCSI 3110.14, CJCSI 3202.01, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Of transportation provided, compared to planned.
M2	Percent	Of allocated forces in place at campaign or major operation execution.

### **OP 1.1 Conduct Operational Movement.**

To conduct actions to deploy, shift, regroup, or move joint or multinational operational formations within JOA from less to more promising locations relative to enemy locations. Such movements can take place by any means (joint, multinational, host nation, or third-country) or mode (air, land, or sea). **(JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-02, 3-09, 4-0, 4-01, 4-01.1)** (JP 3-08v1, 3-61, 4-0, 4-01, 4-01.2,

## 4-01.3, CJCSM 3500.05)

**Note:** Transportation augmentation for operational movement from sources not organic to an operational formation is covered under OP 4.5.1, *Provide for Movement Services in the Joint Operations Area (JOA)*, and OP 5.4.5, *Coordinate/Integrate Components, Theater, and Other Support*.

M1	Hours	Delay in opening APOD or SPOD (due to late arrival of port personnel).
M2	Percent	Of airborne tanker requirements and utilization optimized.
M3	Percent	Of planned cargo delivered.
M4	Percent	Of forces close into positions on OPLAN/OPORD time lines.
M5	Percent	Of movement requirements rejected.
M6	Percent	Of deployment requirements adjusted within seven day TPFDD projection window.
M7	Percent	Of units closed on or before CJTF's RDD.
M8	Knots	Rate of movement.

### OP 1.1.1 Formulate Request for Strategic Deployment to a Joint Operations Area (JOA).

To prepare a request to the theater combatant commander for the strategic movement of joint/multinational operational forces from outside the JOA. The request should be consistent with the joint force commander's campaign scheme, sequencing of operations, and time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD). Although the request for forces during the transition from peacetime, to conflict, to war may be the geographic combatant commander's responsibility, there may be times when a subordinate joint force commander requests additional forces. Such forces may be required to counter a threat to the commander's own center of gravity or to take advantage of a tactical success beyond his current capability. **(JP 4-0, 4-01.1)** (JP 3-0, 3-17, 4-01.3, 5-03.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Of accurate deployment orders and notification requirements disseminated within reporting criteria.
M2	Percent	Of deployment requirements adjusted within seven days of movement by air.
M3	Percent	Of deployment requirements adjusted within thirty days of movement by sea.
M4	Percent	Of time airborne tanker requirements and utilization optimized.
M5	Percent	Of total unit type capabilities required in first request.
M6	Percent	Of ULNs close by RDD.
M7	Percent	Of units close by RDD.
M8	Hours	To prepare transportation request.
M9	Hours	To review request, with decision by JFC (prior to dispatch).

# **CHAPTER 3**

## **CONDITIONS FOR JOINT TASKS**

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## Conditions for Joint Tasks

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1. Purpose. This chapter is the reference for the physical, military, and civil conditions that can be used to describe the operational context for selected mission tasks.
2. Introduction. This list of conditions in this section is part of the JMETL development process. The process is initiated by a commander's mission analysis to identify specified and implied tasks that may be described using the definitions in Chapter 2. Once the tasks are selected, the conditions in this section or those developed by the commander may be used. Conditions must affect the performance of the selected task; otherwise, they are not used.
3. Conditions. Conditions are used in the JMETL development process to express variables of the environment that affect task performance. Conditions are applied to specific tasks and not overall missions because conditions may affect tasks differently within the context of a mission. Conditions that are relevant affect performance of the task. If the condition does not affect how to train, organize, or equip to perform a task it is not relevant and should not be used. (For example: The political environment may limit the target sets that in turn affect the ordnance and delivery systems required. The terrain may limit the type of combat units that can operate in the designated area. A SOF operation requires special training.) Conditions help establish the training environment for joint training events, either academic or exercise.
4. Development of Conditions. The following guidelines that were used to develop the conditions in the UJTL should be used to develop proposed changes and additions to the conditions listed. These recommended changes should be forwarded to the USJFCOM for approval and insertion in the UJTL.
  - a. **Conditions should be factors of the immediate environment.** Conditions are aspects of the environment immediately surrounding the performance of a task.
  - b. **Conditions should directly affect the performance of a task.** A condition must directly affect the ease or difficulty of performing at least one task.
  - c. **Conditions should not be a related task.** Task performance may be constrained or enabled by the level of performance of a related task; however, related tasks are not treated as conditions because they do not directly affect performance of the specific task.



d. **Each condition should have a unique, understandable name.** Each condition should have a name that distinguishes it from every other condition and from every task.


e. **Conditions may apply to all levels of war and all types of tasks.** Some conditions may seem to apply to a particular level of war or a particular type of task (joint vs. Service), but they are, in fact, generic.

f. **Conditions should be placed logically in the conditions list structure.** Each condition should be placed under the physical environment (land, sea, air, and space), the military environment (mission, forces, C4-related, intelligence-related, movement-related, firepower-related, protection-related, sustainment-related, threat-related or conflict), or the civil environment (political, cultural, and economic).

g. **Descriptors for each condition are divided into three or more distinct categories.** Categories have been developed for each condition that distinguish among several levels at which the condition may be experienced and are based, whenever possible, on objective, quantitative criteria.

h. **Conditions and descriptors should be written to be compatible with task/conditions/standards framework.** Conditions are expressed within the framework of the phrase, "perform this task under conditions of...." Therefore, each condition and condition descriptor phrase should fit within this framework.

5. Organization of Conditions List. Conditions in this manual are organized (see Figure 3-1) into three broad categories: physical, military, and civil. Beneath each category, a number of related conditions are organized. For example, conditions that are organized under the physical environment include land, sea, air, and space. Each condition contained in this document is briefly defined and is assigned a unique reference code beginning with the letter "C." In addition, for each condition, several descriptors are provided that allows a user to specify how the condition is likely to exist in a particular mission or scenario. For example, for the condition C 1.3.1, *Climate*, descriptors allow the user to specify whether the climate is tropical, temperate, arctic, or arid. If climate does not affect how an organization trains, organizes, or equips itself to perform a selected task the condition is not valid and is not part of the JMETL.



**Figure 3-1 Organization of Conditions for Joint Tasks**

The following pages are a table of contents for conditions that are hyperlinked to each condition's location. Click on the page number of the condition you want to view instead of scrolling through many pages to get there. Turning on your web tool can also be useful when using the hyperlinks. You can find the web tool by going to the View menu, selecting Toolbars, and ensuring that Web is checked. Another easy way to navigate through this chapter is by using the Online Layout on the View menu.

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## Conditions of the Physical Environment

This section includes factors arising from nature and the physical environment as modified by man and includes the organization of physical conditions in the major subcategories of land, sea, air, and space.

### **C 1.0      PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT**

Includes those factors of the natural environment and other factors, within the natural realm, as modified by civilization.

### **C 1.1      Land**

Physical characteristics, both natural and man-made, of a land area.

*Descriptors:* Highly developed (urban); Moderately developed (suburban, rural); Undeveloped (natural state).

### **C 1.1.1      Terrain**

General characteristics of land areas.

*Descriptors:* Mountainous; Piedmont; Steppe (pampas, plains, savanna, veldt); Delta (river systems, lakes regions); Desert; Jungle; Arctic.

### **C 1.1.1.1      Terrain Relief**

Height of immediate terrain relative to surrounding area, measured from a base point (adjacent valley or plateau).

*Descriptors:* High (> 500 ft); Moderate (100 to 500 ft); Low (10 to 100 ft); Very Low (< 10 ft).

### **C 1.1.1.2      Terrain Elevation**

Height of immediate terrain in reference to sea level.

*Descriptors:* Very high (> 10,000 ft); High (6,000 to 10,000 ft); Moderately high (3,000 to 6,000 ft); Moderately low (1,000 to 3,000 ft); Low (500 to 1,000 ft); Very low (< 500 ft).

### **C 1.1.1.3      Terrain Slope**

The average steepness or grade of a land area.

*Descriptors:* Steep (> 10%); Moderate (3 to 10%); Little (< 3%).

### **C 1.1.1.4      Terrain Firmness**

The terrain's ability to support weight.

*Descriptors:* Excellent (paved); Good (hard-packed ground); Fair (firm surface when dry or frozen); Poor (spongy soil, soft sand, deep snow).

- C 1.1.1.5 Terrain Traction**  
Ability to maintain sufficient friction with terrain to control movement.  
*Descriptors:* Good (wet or dry); Fair (good when dry); Poor (sandy, muddy, icy).
- C 1.1.1.6 Vegetation**  
Plants, trees, and shrubs.  
*Descriptors:* Jungle (rainforest, canopied); Dense (forested); Light (meadow, plain); Sparse (alpine, semi-desert); Negligible (arctic, desert).
- C 1.1.1.7 Terrain Relief Features**  
Specific terrain features in immediate area.  
*Descriptors:* Large raised (mountain, mesa, butte); Small raised (hill, knoll); Small depressed (gap, ravine, gully); Large depressed (canyon, valley).
- C 1.1.2 Geological Features**  
Features relating to the earth's subsurface.  
*Descriptors:* Stable; Unstable.
- C 1.1.2.1 Geological Activity**  
Seismic or volcanic activity in region.  
*Descriptors:* Current (volcanic eruptions, earthquakes); Recent (aftershocks, minor emissions); Inactive.
- C 1.1.2.2 Magnetic Variation**  
Deviations caused by position relative to the location of the magnetic pole.  
*Descriptors:* Significant; Moderate; Slight.
- C 1.1.2.3 Subsurface Water**  
Availability of underground water supplies.  
*Descriptors:* Accessible (adequate supply and reasonably close to surface); Somewhat accessible (at moderate depths); Inaccessible (unavailable or present only at great depth).
- C 1.1.3 Man-Made Terrain Features**  
Degree to which civilization and military actions have affected the physical environment.

*Descriptors:* Significant (large-scale civilian or military impact); Moderate (impact on specific small areas); Negligible (undeveloped land area).

**C 1.1.3.1 Urbanization**

Presence of built-up population centers.

*Descriptors:* Significant (> 500,000 people); Moderate (50,000 to 500,000 people); Minor (< 50,000 people); Negligible (rural).

**C 1.1.3.2 Significant Civil Structures**

Synthetic structures that alter terrain (bridges, stadiums, canals), or that could impact terrain, if damaged (locks, dams, tunnels).

*Descriptors:* Numerous (urban); Some (suburban); Few or none (rural).

**C 1.1.3.3 Terrain Color Contrast**

The color or shading differential between civilian and military objects and the natural or physical environment.

*Descriptors:* Significant (dark or light objects on opposing background); Moderate (distinct variation between objects and background); Negligible (objects blend with background).

**C 1.1.3.4 Obstacles to Movement**

The presence of obstacles to movement and maneuver; covering land, sea, and air operations (land and sea mines, barrage balloons, constructed obstacles).

*Descriptors:* Extensive (system of obstacles); Moderate (some use of obstacles); No.

**C 1.1.3.5 Route Availability**

The availability of navigable routes over land areas.

*Descriptors:* High (multiple paved, all weather roads); Moderate (Some paved, but limited all weather road surfaces); Low (Few roads or trails, no all weather routes).

**C 1.1.4 Landlocked Waters**

Bodies of water surrounded by land to include lakes, reservoirs, and wetlands.

*Descriptors:* Very large (large lakes); Large to moderate (lakes, reservoirs); Small (ponds).

**C 1.1.4.1 Landlocked Waters Depth**

The depth of water at a particular point or area.

*Descriptors:* Deep (> 30 feet); Moderate (10 to 30 feet); Shallow (4 to 10 feet); Very Shallow (< 4 feet).

**C 1.1.4.2      Landlocked Waters Current**

A steady, generally predictable flow of water.

*Descriptors:* Strong (> 3 knots); Moderate (1 to 3 knots); Gentle (< 1 knot).

**C 1.1.4.3      Landlocked Waters Width**

Width of bodies of water.

*Descriptors:* Very large (> 5 NM); Large (1 to 5 NM); Moderate (3000 feet to 1 NM); Small (500 to 3000 ft); Narrow (< 500 feet).

**C 1.1.4.4      Landlocked Waters Bottom**

Characteristics of the land underneath landlocked waters.

*Descriptors:* Flat and Firm; Flat and soft; Moderate slopes; Irregular or Rocky.

**C 1.1.4.5      Landlocked Waters Shore Gradient**

Slope of the land at the edge of the water.

*Descriptors:* Gentle (< 3%); Moderate (3 to 10%); Steep (> 10%).

**C 1.1.4.6      Landlocked Water Temperature**

Water temperature (degrees Fahrenheit).

*Descriptors:* Extremely cold (<35F); Cold (35F-50F); Moderate (56F-75F); Warm (>75F).

**C 1.1.4.7      Divers/Swimmers Landlocked Water Elevation**

The height above sea level at which diving operations will be conducted.

*Descriptors:* Norm (<2300 feet); High altitude (2300 feet and above).

**C 1.1.4.8      Divers/Swimmers Landlocked Water Currents**

A steady, generally predictable flow of water.

*Descriptors:* Very strong (>1 knot); Strong (.75-1 knots); Moderate (.25-.27 knots); Mild (<.25)

**C 1.2            SEA**

Those factors associated with the continuous salt water ocean system to include oceans, seas, gulfs, inlets, bays, sounds, straits, channels, and rivers.

*Descriptors:* Open (open ocean, blue water beyond 5 NM of land); Littoral (Coastal, (within 5 NM of land areas) ); Riverine (inland from

the littoral terrain to include rivers, canals, and delta areas connected to landlocked waters).

**C 1.2.1 Ocean Waters**

Primary bodies of salt water that are not landlocked.

*Descriptors:* Atlantic (North and South); Pacific (North and South); Indian; Arctic.

**C 1.2.1.1 Ocean Depth**

The depth of ocean water at a point or for an area.

*Descriptors:* Shallow (< 100 fathoms); Limited (100 to 500 fathoms); Deep (500 to 2500 fathoms); Very deep (> 2500 fathoms).

**C 1.2.1.2 Ocean Currents**

A steady, generally predictable flow, present either in open ocean waters or in littoral coastal ocean waters.

*Descriptors:* Strong (> 3 knots); Moderate (1 to 3 knots); Little or no (< 1 knot).

**C 1.2.1.3 Sea State**

Roughness of seas caused by wind or disturbances.

*Descriptors:* Calm to slight (Beaufort Force < 5, Sea State 3 or less, seas 4 ft or less); Moderate (Beaufort Force 5, Sea State 4, seas 4-8 ft); Rough (Beaufort Force 6-7, Sea State 5-6, seas 8-16 ft); Very Rough (Beaufort Force 8-9, Sea State 6, seas 17-20); High (Beaufort Force 10, Sea State 7, seas 20-30 ft); Extremely rough (Beaufort Force above 10, Sea State above 7, seas above 30 ft).

**C 1.2.1.4 Ocean Temperature**

Water surface temperature (degrees Fahrenheit). *Descriptors:*

Extremely cold (< 35° F); Cold (35° to 55° F); Moderate (56° to 75° F); Warm (> 75° F).

**C 1.2.1.5 Saline Content**

Level of salt content in water (parts per thousand).

*Descriptors:* Low (< 25 ‰); Average (25 to 35 ‰); High (> 35 ‰).

**C 1.2.1.6 Ocean Features**

Features just above, just below, or within 10 fathoms of the ocean surface to include islands, atolls, reefs, shoals, rocks, or icebergs.

*Descriptors:* Large raised (islands); Small raised (atolls, reefs); Small submerged (rocks, icebergs); Large submerged (shoals, subsurface reefs).



- C 1.2.1.7      Sea Room**  
Availability of space for maritime maneuver. Includes dynamic factors such as confining ice, submerged wrecks, or potentially damaging floating objects such as logs. Applies especially to coastal polar, littoral, or riverine environments.  
*Descriptors:* Unrestricted (open ocean); Moderate (some confining factors); Confined (coastal and riverine waters).
- C 1.2.1.8      Ocean Acoustics**  
Assessed qualities of the tactical subsurface environment, including factors such as sound propagation path, layer depth, and propagation loss (but excluding sea state, ambient noise and other factors covered separately in this section) that affect the ability to detect subsurface objects.  
*Descriptors:* Good (subsurface detection systems operate effectively in the acoustic environment); Fair (systems moderately degraded by acoustic conditions); Poor (systems severely degraded by acoustic conditions).
- C 1.2.1.9      Ocean Bioluminescence**  
Emission of visible light by living marine organisms.  
*Descriptors:* Bright (significantly enhances visibility near water surface); Noticeable (provides some additional light near water surface); No.
- C 1.2.1.10      Ocean Ice**  
The presence of ice at or near the ocean surface.  
*Descriptors:* Pack (surface covered with solid ice); Marginal (broken ice on surface); Isolated (ice chunks/icebergs possible); No
- C 1.2.1.11      Ocean Ice Thickness**  
The thickness of ocean surface ice.  
*Descriptors:* Great (>8 feet); Moderate (between 3 and 8 ft); Minimal (<3 ft).
- C 1.2.1.12      Ocean Ambient Noise**  
The ambient noise level in the ocean caused by marine life, geological factors, or by civilization.  
*Descriptors:* High; Moderate; Low.
- C 1.2.1.13      Ocean Fronts and Eddies**  
Fronts are tactically significant discontinuities in the water mass, such as horizontal temperature gradient, which significantly alter

the pattern of ocean acoustics. Eddies are circular fronts that have broken off from a strong front such as the Gulf Stream.

*Descriptors:* Significant (fronts and eddies will have a major impact on the ability to detect subsurface objects); Moderate (not the central factor in acoustic conditions); Negligible.

**C 1.2.1.14 Divers/Swimmers Underwater Visibility**

The maximum distance objects can be seen at the depth which underwater operations are being conducted.

*Descriptors:* Zero (<1 foot); Poor (1-5 feet); Fair (6-10 feet); Good (11-50 feet); Excellent (51-200 feet); Unlimited (>200 feet).

**C 1.2.1.15 Divers/Swimmers Ocean Depth**

The depth of ocean water at a point or for an area.

*Descriptors:* Very shallow (<40 feet); Shallow (40-60 feet); Moderate (60-100 feet); Deep (> 100 feet)

**C 1.2.1.16 Divers/Swimmers Ocean Currents**

A steady, generally predictable flow, present either in open ocean waters or in littoral coastal ocean waters.

*Descriptors:* Very strong (>1 knot); Strong (.75-1 knots); Moderate (.25-.75 knots); Mild (<.25 knots)

**C 1.2.2 Ocean Bottom**

The characteristics of the sea bottom.

*Descriptors:* Regular (no significant features); Irregular (sea bottom irregularities).

**C 1.2.2.1 Sea Bottom Contours**

Gradient of the seabed.

*Descriptors:* Flat (floors of ocean basins, plains); Gentle (continental shelf); Moderate (ridges, fracture zones); Steep (trenches, sea mounts).

**C 1.2.2.2 Sea Bottom Composition**

Seabed material from the ocean bottom to the littoral..

*Descriptors:* Sandy; Silty; Rocky.

**C 1.2.3 Harbor Capacity**

The size and characteristics of a harbor.

*Descriptors:* Large (accommodates many large ships); Moderate (accommodates a few large ships); Limited (accommodates one large ship); No (unable to handle large ships).

- C 1.2.3.1 Harbor Shelter**  
The amount of protection provided from the open ocean by natural features.  
*Descriptors:* Complete (well protected from wind and surf); Limited; Little or no (completely exposed to wind and surf).
- C 1.2.3.2 Harbor Depth**  
Water level at low tide.  
*Descriptors:* Deep (> 60 ft); Moderate (30 to 60 ft); Shallow (< 30 ft; may not be able to handle fully-loaded ships).
- C 1.2.3.3 Harbor Currents**  
Moving water caused by tidal change and river runoff.  
*Descriptors:* Fast (> 3 knots); Moderate (1 to 3 knots); Negligible (< 1 knot).
- C 1.2.4 Littoral Characteristics**  
The characteristics of the shore area, including contiguous waters and land areas.  
*Descriptors:* Harsh (difficult grades, surfaces, inshore currents; extensive obstacles); Moderate (moderate grades, currents; some obstacles); Mild (gentle natural factors; no obstacles).
- C 1.2.4.1 Littoral Gradient**  
Slope of the beach, from low tide up to the extreme high tide mark.  
*Descriptors:* Gentle (< 2%); Moderate (2 to 5%); Steep (> 5%).
- C 1.2.4.2 Littoral Composition**  
Shoreline material, from shallow water to high tide marks.  
*Descriptors:* Firm (hard sand, pebbled, rock); Slippery (shale pieces); Soft (mud, soft sand).
- C 1.2.4.3 Littoral Terrain Features**  
Those land features that overlook the littoral.  
*Descriptors:* Negligible (inland barely rises above high tide mark); Influential (treeline, embankment); Controlling (cliffs, hills).
- C 1.2.4.4 Littoral Tides**  
Change in height from low to high tide.  
*Descriptors:* Great (> 10 ft); Moderate (3 to 10 ft); Small or negligible (< 3 ft).

- C 1.2.4.5 Littoral Currents**  
Flows peculiar to that shoreline area.  
*Descriptors:* Extreme (dangerous undertow); Moderate (some impediment to movement); Negligible.
- C 1.2.5 Riverine Environment**  
Type of riverine environment.  
*Descriptors:* River; Canal; Delta.
- C 1.2.5.1 Riverine Navigability**  
Category of navigable waterway.  
*Descriptors:* Type I (shallow rivers, not navigable by coastal or ocean going vessels); Type II (rivers navigable by coastal or ocean going vessels); Type III (deltas, canals).
- C 1.2.5.2 Riverine Tidal Turbulence**  
The extent of turbulence in the tidal zone causing the movement of material such as debris, pollutants, or vegetation, thereby affecting visibility through water.  
*Descriptors:* High; Moderate; Low.
- C 1.2.5.3 Riverine Current**  
The velocity of flowing water in riverine environment.  
*Descriptors:* Strong (> 3 knots); Moderate (1 to 3 knots); Gentle (< 1 knot).
- C 1.2.5.4 Riverine Bank Gradient**  
Slope of the land at the water's edge.  
*Descriptors:* Gentle (< 5 degrees); Moderate (5 to 15 degrees); Steep (> 15 degrees).
- C 1.2.6 Shipping Presence**  
Presence of shipping activity in area.  
*Descriptors:* High (active shipping area); Moderate (some shipping activity in area); Negligible.
- C 1.2.6.1 Shipping Density**  
The general level of shipping in an area.  
*Descriptors:* Heavy (> 10 vessels per 60 square mile area); Moderate (5-10 vessels per 60 square mile area); Light (< 5 vessels per 60 square mile area).
- C 1.2.6.2 Shipping Type**  
The primary characteristics of the shipping in an operating area.

*Descriptors:* Ocean going (vessels over 200 feet long); Coastal (vessels between 50-200 feet long); Small craft (vessels < 50 feet long); Mixed (combination of vessel sizes).

**C 1.2.6.3 Shipping Identifiability**

The physical characteristics of vessels that allow them to be identified to include size, markings, unique hull forms, observable activity, electromagnetic emissions, and communications capability.

*Descriptors:* Easy (minimal assets required to identify vessels); Moderate (moderate level of assets required to identify vessels); Difficult (substantial assets required to identify vessels).

**C 1.3 AIR**

Characteristics of the lower atmosphere, to include climate, visibility, and weapons effects.

*Descriptors:* Natural (climate, visibility); Induced (atmospheric weapons effects).

**C 1.3.1 Climate**

Aggregate long-term weather history for a region.

*Descriptors:* Tropical; Temperate; Arctic; Arid.

**C 1.3.1.1 Season**

Periods of the year characterized by changes in temperature, daylight length, storm activity, and precipitation.

*Descriptors:* Winter (cold; short days); Spring (wet; moderate temperatures); Summer (hot; long days); Fall (cool; dry weather).

**C 1.3.1.2 Weather Systems**

Systems that determine weather over the next 2 to 5 days.

*Descriptors:* Clear (high pressure); Unsettled (low pressure); Major storm.

**C 1.3.1.3 Weather**

Current weather (next 24 hours).

*Descriptors:* Clear; Partly cloudy; Overcast; Precipitating; Stormy.

**C 1.3.1.3.1 Air Temperature**

Atmospheric temperature at ground level (degrees Fahrenheit).

*Descriptors:* Hot (> 85° F); Temperate (40° to 85° F); Cold (10° to 39° F); Very cold (< 10° F).

**C 1.3.1.3.2 Barometric Pressure**

Measured surface air pressure.

*Descriptors:* High (>30.20); Rising; Falling; Low (< 29.50).

**C 1.3.1.3.3 Surface Wind Velocity**

The speed at which air moves through the atmosphere at an altitude up to 500 feet.

*Descriptors:* Light (< 7 mph); Moderate (7 to 24 mph); Strong (25 to 46 mph); High (47 to 72 mph); Hurricane force (> 73 mph).

**C 1.3.1.3.3.1 Low Altitude Wind Velocity**

The speed at which air moves through the atmosphere at an altitude between 500 to 10,000 feet..

*Descriptors:* Light (< 7 mph); Moderate (7 to 24 mph); Strong (25 to 46 mph); High (47 to 72 mph); Very High (> 73 mph).

**C 1.3.1.3.3.2 Medium Altitude Wind Velocity**

The speed at which air moves through the atmosphere at an altitude between 10,000 and 25,000 feet..

*Descriptors:* Light (< 20 mph); Moderate (20 to 50 mph); Strong (50 to 100 mph); High (100 to 150 mph); Very High (> 150 mph).

**C 1.3.1.3.3.3 High Altitude Wind Velocity**

The speed at which air moves through the atmosphere at an altitude higher than 25,000 feet.

*Descriptors:* Light (< 20 mph); Moderate (20 to 50 mph); Strong (50 to 100 mph); High (100 to 150 mph); Very High (> 150 mph).

**C 1.3.1.3.4 Wind Direction**

The relative direction of the air moving through the atmosphere.

*Descriptors:* Head Wind; Crosswind; Tail Wind

**C 1.3.1.3.5 Relative Humidity**

A measure of water vapor in the air.

*Descriptors:* Very Low (< 10%); Low (10 to 50%); Moderate (50 to 75%); High (> 75%).

**C 1.3.1.3.6 Precipitation**

Liquid, freezing and frozen water that falls to the surface.

*Descriptors:* Type and Intensity.

**C 1.3.1.3.6.1 Precipitation Type**

The form or state of water falling to the surface.

*Descriptors:* Liquid (rain or rain showers); Freezing (liquid water freezing upon contact with the surface); and Frozen (snow, hail, sleet).

#### **C 1.3.1.3.6.2 Precipitation Intensity**

The rate of fall (related to the droplet/crystal size).

*Descriptors:* Heavy ( $>0.3$ " /hr); Moderate ( $0.1$ - $0.3$ " /hr); Light (trace- $<0.1$ " /hr); and Trace (does not completely wet or cover an exposed area regardless of duration).

#### **C1.3.1.3.7 Icing**

The formation or coating of ice upon surfaces.

*Descriptors:* Severe (accumulates faster than deicing/anti-icing systems can control/reduce the icing resulting in possible catastrophe); Moderate (accumulation may be hazardous during short encounters); Light (accumulation may be a problem during prolonged exposure).

#### **C 1.3.1.3.8 Turbulence and Wind Shear**

Rapid changes in air movement over relatively short distances.

*Descriptors:* Extreme (rapid fluctuations in airspeed  $> 25$  kts; impossible to control; structural damage possible); Severe (large variations in airspeed approximately  $25$  kts; momentary loss of control); Moderate (small variations in airspeed of  $15$ - $25$  kts; changes in aircraft altitude/attitude, but positive control maintained); Light (slight, erratic changes in altitude/attitude; small variations in airspeed of  $5$ - $15$  kts).

#### **C 1.3.1.3.9 Altitude**

Height above sea level.

*Descriptors:* Low (sea level to  $500$  ft); Moderately low ( $500$  to  $10,000$  ft); Moderately high ( $10,000$  to  $25,000$  ft); High ( $25,000$  to  $45,000$  ft); Very high ( $> 45,000$  ft);

#### **C 1.3.2 Visibility**

Maximum distance to see an object given the moisture and particulate matter (dust, salt, ash) suspended in the atmosphere.

*Descriptors:* Very low ( $< 1/8$  NM); Low ( $1/8$  to  $1$  NM); Moderate ( $1$  to  $3$  NM); Good ( $3$  to  $10$  NM); High ( $10$  to  $20$  NM); Unlimited ( $> 20$  NM).

#### **C 1.3.2.1 Light**

Light available to illuminate objects from natural or manmade sources.

*Descriptors:* Bright (sunny day); Day (overcast day); Low (dusk, dawn, moonlit, streetlight lit); Negligible (overcast night).

**C 1.3.2.2    Obscurants**

Temporary addition of material (smoke, dust, ash, sand) to the atmosphere.

*Descriptors:* Dense (hides objects); Moderate (makes objects difficult to see or detect clearly); Light (slight reductions in ability to see or detect); No.

**C 1.3.3    Atmospheric Weapons Effects**

Nuclear, biological, chemical, or electromagnetic impacts.

*Descriptors:* Strong; Moderate; No.

**C 1.3.3.1    Nuclear Effects**

Threat has capabilities or has used (one or more of the following) to cause immediate and/or delayed casualties, psychological disruption, and/or disruption of the operational tempo.

*Descriptors:* Severe (nonfunctional requires essentially complete reconstruction), Moderate (nonfunctional, requires major repairs), and Light (functional or partially functional, requires minor repairs).

**C 1.3.3.1.1    Nuclear Blast/Thermal Effects**

Extent of nuclear blast/thermal effects.

*Descriptors:* Severe (nonfunctional, requires reconstruction); Moderate (nonfunctional, major repairs); Low Light (functional or partially functional, minor repairs).

**C 1.3.3.1.2    Nuclear Radiation Effects**

Extent of radiation effects (level of exposure to unprotected personnel over period of five days).

*Descriptors:* High (> 400 rads); Moderate (200 to 400 rads); Low (25 to 200 rads); Negligible (< 25 rads).

**C 1.3.3.2    Chemical Effects**

Threat has capabilities to employ, or has used (one or more of the following) to cause immediate and/or delayed casualties, psychological disruption, and/or disruption of the operational tempo.

*Descriptors:* Blood, blister, choking, incapacitating nerve, tear, and/or novel. Persistent, semi-persistent, non-persistent. Artillery, bomb, bomblet, missile, rocket, spray (aerial), (ground), unconventional, or no. For MOOTW: Toxic industrial chemical (TIC); Release other than attack (ROTA); Collateral damage.



**C 1.3.3.3 Biological Effects**

Threat has capabilities to employ, (or has used one or more of the following) to cause immediate and/or delayed casualties, psychological disruption, and /or disruption of the operational tempo.

*Descriptors:* Pathogen (specify e.g., plague, anthrax, botulism, VEE); Toxin (specify, e.g., ricin, bottox, venom); other agents of biological origin (e.g., bioregulators and modulators). Anti-personnel, -animal, -crop. Contagious (yes or no). Lethal (days), lethal (latent), or incapacitating. Persistency (yes or no). Artillery bomb, bomblet, missile, rocket, spray (aerial), spray (ground), unconventional or no. For MOOTW: Biohazard.

**C 1.3.3.4 Electromagnetic Effects**

Extent to which electronic warfare, nuclear electromagnetic pulse, or directed energy are employed.

*Descriptors:* Extensive; Minor; No.

**C 1.3.4 Airspace Availability**

Freedom of airspace from confining factors such as FIRs, restricted areas, MOAs, Fire Support Control Zones, Air Space Coordination Areas that limit freedom of flight.

*Descriptors:* Unrestricted (no confining factors); Moderate (some confining factors); Limited (extensive confining factors).

**C 1.3.5 RF Spectrum**

Extent to which use or exploitation of the radio frequency (RF) spectrum is inhibited or degraded due to overcrowding, unavailability or operational restrictions caused by friendly, enemy or neutral forces (e.g., civil air government, private citizenry, etc.) Such use or exploitation may include, but not limited to: Communications (voice and/or data), emissions control, C2 attack or protect, jamming, or electronic support.

*Descriptors:* Unrestricted (no limitations); Moderate (some limiting factors); Limited (numerous limiting factors); Severely Degraded (virtually unavailable for use due to physical or operational restrictions).

**C 1.4 SPACE**

Characteristics of the earth's upper atmosphere and the environment at satellite altitudes.

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*Descriptors:* Natural (high energy particles); Induced (objects in space).

**C 1.4.1      Objects in Space**

Satellites, vehicles, particles, and debris in orbit around the earth.

*Descriptors:* Communications satellites; Navigation satellites; Reconnaissance satellites; Environmental satellites; Surveillance satellites; Weapons; Debris

**C 1.4.1.1      Orbit Density**

Existing satellites and space junk in a particular orbit.

*Descriptors:* High (many objects); Moderate (a scattering of objects); Low (very few objects).

**C 1.4.1.2      Orbit Type**

A space object's elliptical path around the earth.

*Descriptors:* Geosynchronous (orbit matches earth's rotation); Sun synchronous (over the same part of the earth at the same time each day); Medium earth; Polar; Molnyia (highly elliptical); Low earth.

**C 1.4.2      Natural Environment**

Geomagnetic and solar activity, high energy particles at satellite altitudes, ionospheric disturbances.

*Descriptors:* Geomagnetic storms; solar flares; solar radio bursts; scintillation; atmospheric drag.

**C 1.4.2.1      Solar and Geomagnetic Activity**

Level of solar and/or geomagnetic activity; encompasses secondary effects (atmospheric drag on satellites, radiation hazards, etc.).

*Descriptors:* High (significant disturbances); Moderate (moderate disturbances); Little or No (very low presence of disturbances).

**C 1.4.3      High Energy Particles**

Level of high energy particles caused by solar activity.

*Descriptors:* High (significant presence of high energy particles); Moderate (moderate presence of high energy particles); Little or No (very low presence of high energy particles).

## **Conditions of the Military Environment**

This section includes factors related to military forces. The organization of military conditions includes the major sub-categories of mission, forces and conditions related to the areas of command, control, and communications; intelligence; deployment, movement, and maneuver; firepower; protection; sustainment; threat; and conflict. Conditions in this section may apply to either friendly or enemy forces, as indicated parenthetically after the name of the condition (friendly, enemy).

### **C 2.0      MILITARY ENVIRONMENT**

Those factors related to the mission, command structure, and forces. These factors can apply to US forces, allied and coalition forces, neutral forces, and enemy forces.

#### **C 2.1      MISSION**

Those factors that frame and influence the execution of the mission assigned or understood.

*Descriptors:* Straightforward (well within current capabilities); Moderately challenging (safely within current capabilities); Stressful (very demanding mission relative to current capabilities).

##### **C 2.1.1      Mission Instructions**

Clarity of instructions, directives, policy guidance (including end state), strategies, or status of forces agreements, below the NCA level.

*Descriptors:* Clear (addresses likely issues and hedges, leaves little or no ambiguity as to intent, and allows freedom of action where required); Minimal (few in number, leaves most decisions to the on-scene commander); Restrictive (a large number of instructions, leaves little discretion to the on-scene commander).

##### **C 2.1.1.1      Command Level**

The level of command directing the mission.

*Descriptors:* NCA; Combatant Commander; (Subunified Commander) Commander; Joint Task Force; Joint Force (Functional) Component Commander; (Joint Force) Service Component Commander; Multinational.

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- C 2.1.1.2 Pre-Existing Arrangements**  
Those plans, organizations, relationships, and arrangements that existed before the present mission or tasking and that might influence execution of the concept of operations.  
*Descriptors:* No; Partial; Strong (e.g., NATO).
- C 2.1.1.3 Mission Classification**  
The degree of secrecy assigned to the mission.  
*Descriptors:* Overt; Covert.
- C 2.1.1.4 ROE**  
The divergence of the Rules of Engagement from the Standing Rules of Engagement, CJCSI 3121.01., as published by the Director of Operations, The Joint Staff.  
Note: The issue of ROE restrictiveness should be addressed as C 2.1.1, Mission Instructions.  
*Descriptors:* US; NCA Modified; NORAD; NATO; UN (applying to UN operations, from Korea to peacekeeping); Multinational (ROE agreed amongst several nations in a coalition operation).
- C 2.1.1.5 SOFA**  
The degree of control a host nation cedes over the conduct and punishment of guest forces under Status of Forces Agreements or like instruments.  
*Descriptors:* Cooperative; Restrictive.
- C 2.1.1.6 Military Commitments to Other Nations**  
The amount of commitment on the part of one nation to assist another.  
*Descriptors:* Major (robust use of lift or furnishing of major end items); Limited (clothing and individual equipment for whole units of battalion size or larger); Negligible.
- C 2.1.1.7 Military Commitments from Other Nations**  
The amount of commitment on the part of other nation to support mission.  
*Descriptors:* Major (large contributions of forces, supplies, or other resources); Limited (some contributions of forces, supplies, or other resources); Negligible.
- C 2.1.2 Legal State**  
The legal state under which military forces are operating.  
*Descriptors:* Peace; Military Operations Other Than War; War.

**C 2.1.3 Mission Preparation**

Degree to which preparations for mission have been completed at time of mission execution. Includes intelligence, logistic, positioning of units, etc.

*Descriptors:* Completed (fully developed plan, including approval); Partially Completed (an OPLAN has been developed but is not fully refined and approved); Outline (a concept of operations or a draft OPLAN has been produced); No.

**C 2.1.4 Theater Dimensions**

The location and size of the theater or sub-area of a theater and the time available for mission accomplishment.

*Descriptors:* Massive (a theater of war, a vast area with long distances); Medium (a theater of operations with a large area); Small (a joint operations area).

**C 2.1.4.1 Location**

The location where the task must be performed.

*Descriptors:* Ashore; Afloat; Airborne; Space.

**C 2.1.4.2 Theater(s)**

The number of theaters in which actions are taking place. Does not include peaceful transit of geographic combatant commander's AOR.

*Descriptors:* Single; Two; More than Two.

**C 2.1.4.3 Joint Operations Area**

Physical scope and breadth of an area designated by the JFC in which joint forces operate.

*Descriptors:* Very small (< 100,000 km<sup>2</sup>); Small (100,000 to 300,000 km<sup>2</sup>); Moderate (300,000 to 1,000,000 km<sup>2</sup>); Large (1,000,000 to 3,000,000 km<sup>2</sup>); Very large (> 3,000,000 km<sup>2</sup>).

**C 2.1.4.4 Intertheater Distance**

Mileage between two (intertheater) locations (e.g., CONUS to joint operations area).

*Descriptors:* Very short (< 1000 NM); Short (1,000 to 3,500 NM); Moderate (3,500 to 5,000 NM); Long (5,000 to 7,500 NM); Very long (> 7,500 NM).

**C 2.1.4.5 Intratheater Distance**

Mileage between two locations (e.g., airfield to the FEBA).

*Descriptors:* Very short (< 10 NM); Short (10 to 50 NM); Moderate (50 to 150 NM); Long (150 to 500 NM); Very long (> 500 NM).

**C 2.1.5 Time Available**

The time available, normally the time allowed, to complete a phase in a concept of operations.

*Descriptors:* Minimal (minutes to hours); Short (hours to days); Moderate (days to weeks); Long (weeks to months).

**C 2.1.5.1 Lead Time**

The time from receipt of a warning or directive to initiation of military operations.

*Descriptors:* Minimal (minutes to hours); Short (hours to days); Moderate (days to weeks); Long (weeks to months).

**C 2.1.5.2 Mission Duration**

The time a unit is expected to continue to conduct a mission.

*Descriptors:* Very short (< 30 days); Short (30 to 90 days); Medium (90 to 180 days); Long (180 to 365 days); Very long (> 365 days).

**C 2.2 FORCES**

The overall capabilities of the forces of a nation, alliance, or coalition.

*Descriptors:* Strong (large, modern, well-trained, well-equipped, and well-led); Marginal; Weak (small, old, poorly trained, poorly equipped, poorly led).

**C 2.2.1 Forces Assigned**

The capabilities of combat and support forces assigned to a combatant commander day-to-day.

*Descriptors:* Strong (planned forces in place); Marginal (planned defensive forces in place); Weak (reinforcements needed for defensive operations).

**C 2.2.2 Competing Apportionments**

The extent to which forces are distributed for planning, in that the same force may be apportioned simultaneously to more than one combatant commander (for planning).

*Descriptors:* No; Two; Multiple.

**C 2.2.3 Forces Allocated**

The extent to which forces are distributed to a commander for accomplishment of assigned mission.

*Descriptors:* Strong (exceeds plan); Adequate (meets plan); Marginal (less than plan).

**C 2.2.4 Personnel Capability**

The extent to which personnel are capable of performing assigned tasks.

*Descriptors:* High (fully trained and equipped); Partial (partially trained and equipped); Low (poorly trained and equipped).

**C 2.2.4.1 Personnel Nutrition and Health**

The degree to which the members of a force are healthy and free of disease.

*Descriptors:* Excellent (> 90%); Fair (50 to 90%); Poor (< 50%).

**C 2.2.4.2 Personnel Literacy**

The literacy level of military personnel.

*Descriptors:* Very high (most with some college); High (most with high school education); Moderate (most with no high school, but with some literacy); Low (most lack basic literacy skills).

**C 2.2.4.3 Personnel Physical Conditioning**

The level of physical conditioning of military personnel.

*Descriptors:* Excellent (extensive, demanding training); Good (some organized training); Poor (no organized training).

**C 2.2.4.4 Personnel Morale**

The state of a force's spirit and confidence.

*Descriptors:* Excellent (determined, will stand and fight); Good (under normal circumstances will meet the enemy and give a good account of themselves); Poor (not committed to the leader or the effort, likely to yield ground or surrender).

**C 2.2.4.5 Personnel Experience**

The degree to which the civilian and military personnel assigned the task is experienced at the task.

*Descriptors:* High (professional long-term military and civilian personnel); Normal (mix of professional personnel with new personnel and reserves); Limited (largely a conscript force or a force with very high turnover of personnel); Negligible.

**C 2.2.4.6 Personnel Fatigue**

The degrees to which personnel, due to lack of rest, are experiencing fatigue.

*Descriptors:* No (personnel are well rested); Moderate (personnel operating with inadequate rest; decision making skills are somewhat

impaired); Severe (significant impairment to physical and decision making skills; need extended recovery period).

### **C 2.2.5 Modern Military Systems**

The availability of modern weapon and information systems.

*Descriptors:* Abundant (widely distributed throughout the force); Limited (not widely distributed and use closely controlled); Few (treated as "magic bullet" systems or weapons and very closely controlled).

#### **C 2.2.5.1 Modern Weapons Systems**

The availability of modern weapons systems in numbers and types.

*Descriptors:* Abundant (widely distributed throughout the force); Limited (not widely distributed and use closely controlled); Few (treated as "magic bullet" systems or weapons and very closely controlled).

#### **C 2.2.5.2 Modern Information & Intelligence Processing Systems**

The availability of modern information systems in numbers and types.

*Descriptors:* Abundant (widely distributed throughout the force); Limited (not widely distributed and use closely controlled); Few (treated as "high value" systems and very closely controlled).

#### **C 2.2.5.3 Military Systems Reliability**

The qualities of reliability, maintainability, and sustainability built into military systems.

*Descriptors:* High (few breakdowns and those fixed without major effort); Acceptable (operates at or near established reliability standards; maintainable in theater); Low (often breaks down or must be repaired by specialists in rear areas).

#### **C 2.2.5.4 Military Systems Maturity**

The development and deployment status of a force's leading edge technology systems.

*Descriptors:* Brass Board (pre-production state of development); Early (first units equipped and trained with new systems); Evolved (numerous units equipped with new systems; follow-on systems are in development); Advanced (fully developed and integrated into the force); Overage (questionable reliability).

### **C 2.2.6 Interoperability**

The ability of systems, units, or forces to interact and operate effectively with other systems, units, or forces.



*Descriptors:* Full (systems, units, or forces can integrate easily, both vertically and horizontally); High (systems, units, or forces can be integrated vertically and horizontally with few workarounds); Some (systems, units, or forces can only partially interoperate); No.

### **C 2.2.7 Military Force Relationships**

The extent to which force elements (e.g., military branches, paramilitary organizations) cooperate with each other and adhere to the chain of command.

*Descriptors:* Strong (act as single team and adhere to chain of command); Moderate (some individual force element agendas, but general adherence to chain of command); Poor (uncooperative, force elements may act independently).

## **C 2.3 COMMAND, CONTROL & COMMUNICATIONS**

### **C 2.3.1 Command Arrangements**

Type of relationships or procedures set up among forces and their staffs for the effective management of forces and accomplishment of the mission.

*Descriptors:* NATO; Multinational; Joint; Service Unilateral; Ad Hoc.

#### **C 2.3.1.1 Joint Staff Integration**

The extent to which staffs of two or more forces or agencies of the same nation have integrated their doctrine, staff, force techniques and procedures, and training.

*Descriptors:* Full (broadly based and fully interactive); Partial (some common experience and/or some level of integration); Poor (not broadly based and has not worked together).

#### **C 2.3.1.2 Multinational Integration**

The extent to which staffs of two or more forces, or agencies of two or more nations, have integrated their senior command and staff billets, information and intelligence, doctrine and procedures, logistics, and training.

*Descriptors:* Full (broadly based and fully interactive); Partial (indications are there is some common experience and/or some level of integration); Poor (not broadly based and has not worked together).

#### **C 2.3.1.3 Staff Expertise**

The level of skill and experience that staff personnel can provide to the commander, with regard to operational art and logistics, the

capabilities and limitations of force elements, and tactics, techniques, and procedures.

*Descriptors:* High (staff works well together and has a good grasp of the technical, tactical, and logistic aspects of the forces assigned or likely to be assigned); Moderate (staff effective and generally knows the technical, tactical, and logistic aspects of assigned forces); Limited (staff lacks skill in working together or lacks knowledge of assigned forces).

**C 2.3.1.4 Pre-Existing Command**

The extent to which an existing command and staff headquarters structure exists.

*Descriptors:* No (ad hoc); Partial (pre-designated command organization, with at least some training of augmentees); Strong (existing and functioning).

**C 2.3.1.5 Command Authority**

A commander's degree of authority over assigned forces.

*Descriptors:* Combatant Command (command authority) (COCOM); Operational Control (OPCON); Tactical Control (TACON) (support).

**C 2.3.1.6 Communications Connectivity**

The degree to which communications can be maintained up and down the chain of command and horizontally.

*Descriptors:* Continuous (operates with almost no interruptions); Intermittent (some interruptions will occur); Periodic (only operates periodically); Comm Out.

**C 2.3.1.7 Classification**

The highest level of information security at which a headquarters or force is operating.

*Descriptors:* Secret; Top Secret; Code Word; NATO Secret; NATO Cosmic Top Secret; Multinational Designated.

**C 2.3.1.8 Information Exchange**

The freedom with which information (e.g., intelligence and logistic data and operations plans) can be distributed or released within a staff or to operating units, to include among allies or coalition partners.

*Descriptors:* Unrestricted; Restricted; Highly restricted.

**C 2.3.1.9 Information Volume**

The volume of data or information generated or made available to decision makers.

*Descriptors:* High (>50 inputs per hour, often containing conflicting information); Moderate (20-50 inputs per hour, containing some conflicting information); Low (<20 inputs per hour, containing highly consistent information).

**C 2.3.1.10 Command Relationships**

The complexity of command relationships required to train, organize and generate the force prior to transfer to the combatant commander for employment.

*Descriptors:* Minimal (employing commander responsible for the forces); Moderate (employing commander supported by 1 or 2 supporting commanders or agencies); Complex (employing commander supported by more than 3 commanders or agencies).

**C 2.3.2 Military Style**

The approach of a nation and its commanders to the conduct of military operations.

*Descriptors:* Predictable (closely follows doctrine, narrow, inflexible); Conventional (range of capabilities, some flexibility); Innovative (adapts easily to changing circumstances).

**C 2.3.2.1 Leadership Style**

The approach of the commander to the exercise of command and handling of subordinates.

*Descriptors:* Autocratic; Bureaucratic; Participative; Mission Orders.

**C 2.3.2.2 Force Emphasis**

The special weight or importance placed by a nation in the specific characteristics or composition (e.g., land, sea, air) of its armed forces.

*Descriptors:* Nuclear; Nuclear triad; Balanced conventional; Land; Maritime; Air; Space; Unconventional.

**C 2.3.2.3 Flexibility of Warfare Style**

Extent to which a nation's armed forces can adapt to various styles of warfare (e.g., moving from conventional to unconventional warfare).

*Descriptors:* High; Moderate; Low.

**C 2.3.2.4 Component Headquarters Location**

The location of component command headquarters with relation to the joint force commander's headquarters.

*Descriptors:* Separate; Collocation of some; Collocation of all.

**C 2.4 INTELLIGENCE****C 2.4.1 Warning**

The degree of certitude of warning received.

*Descriptors:* Unambiguous; Ambiguous.

**C 2.4.2 Intelligence Data Base**

The availability of intelligence data or threat assessments to support a mission or task.

*Descriptors:* Abundant (multiple sources of current intelligence data on most or all targets); Adequate (at least one current source of intelligence on most targets); Marginal (intelligence data is neither current nor complete); Negligible (Little or no current intelligence on any targets).

**C 2.4.3 Theater Intelligence Organization**

The status of an intelligence collection, processing, and production organization within a theater or dedicated to the theater.

*Descriptors:* Mature; Growing; Immature.

**C 2.4.4 Theater Intelligence Access**

The ability of intelligence gathering resources to penetrate and cover the AOR.

*Descriptors:* Easy (easily penetrable); Minimally difficult (penetrable with minimal difficulty); Difficult (penetrable with major difficulty); Negligible (impenetrable).

**C 2.4.5 Intelligence Countermeasure Capability**

The ability of a nation to detect and counter intelligence gathering by an enemy.

*Descriptors:* Strong (thoroughly understand and control enemy sources); Moderate (partial understanding and control over enemy sources); Weak (little understanding or control over enemy sources).

**C 2.4.6 Certitude of Data**

The degree of confidence in the accuracy of intelligence data.

*Descriptors:* Absolute (100% confidence); High (>90%); Moderate (50-90%); Low (25-50% confidence); Little or No (<25% confidence).

**C 2.4.7 Intelligence Dissemination and Receipt**

Proper communications paths, dissemination suite, receipt suite, and display suite between producers and customers are in place to allow timely transmission and receipt of information.

*Descriptors:* Fully exists; Partially exists; Does not exist.

**C 2.4.8 EW Capability**

The ability to make use of electromagnetic and directed energy control. Use the electromagnetic spectrum to attack the enemy.

*Descriptors:* Strong capability against the enemy; Moderate capability; Weak capability.

**C 2.5 DEPLOYMENT, MOVEMENT & MANEUVER**

**C 2.5.1 LOC and Planning Status**

Status of lines of communication and planning for deployment, movement, or maneuver.

*Descriptors:* Good (secure LOCs and planning well advanced); Poor (LOCs not secure or planning not well advanced); Bad (neither secure LOCs nor planning exists).

**C 2.5.1.1 TPFDD Availability**

Availability of time-phased force and deployment data needed to execute a deployment.

*Descriptors:* Full (planned and refined TPFDD exists); Partial (an applicable TPFDD has been in development); No (no planning has been conducted for this size force or this area).

**C 2.5.1.2 Deployment Lead Time**

The amount of time to travel from home station to arrival where the unit will be deployed.

*Descriptors:* Long (weeks to months); Moderate (days to weeks); Minimal (days).

**C 2.5.1.3 Intertheater LOCs**

Freedom of movement for forces and materiel between theaters.

*Descriptors:* Secure; Contested; Unsecured.

**C 2.5.1.4 Intratheater LOCs**

Freedom of movement for forces and materiel within a theater.

*Descriptors:* Secure; Contested; Unsecured.

**C 2.5.1.5 Entry Capability**

Extent to which a military force is capable of entering an area of operations unopposed or opposed.

*Descriptors:* Strongly Opposed; Moderately Opposed; Unopposed; Administrative.

- C 2.5.1.6 Intransit Visibility Capability.**  
Extent to which deployable forces are able to provide data on forces and materiel to Global Transportation Network via automated identification technologies (AIT).  
*Descriptors:* Full (forces and materiel all use AIT compatible with feeder systems); Partial (some unit AIT and feeder systems use); None (no unit AIT and feeder system ITV available).
- C 2.5.2 Lift Assets**  
Adequacy of lift assets for moving and supporting forces.  
*Descriptors:* Robust (as planned); Limited (somewhat less than planned); Little or no.
- C 2.5.2.1 Airlift Assets**  
Availability of airlift assets for deployment or employment of forces.  
*Descriptors:* Robust (as planned); Limited (somewhat less than planned); Little or no.
- C 2.5.2.2 Sealift Assets**  
Availability of sealift assets for deployment or employment of forces.  
*Descriptors:* Robust (as planned); Limited (somewhat less than planned); Little or no.
- C 2.5.2.3 Ground Transportation Assets**  
Availability of ground transportation assets to support deployment or employment of forces.  
*Descriptors:* Robust (as planned); Limited (somewhat less than planned); Little or no.
- C 2.5.2.4 Spacelift Assets**  
Availability of launch pads, vehicle assembly/staging areas, launch vehicles, and range facilities.  
*Descriptors:* Robust (as planned); Limited (somewhat less than planned); Little or no.
- C 2.5.2.5 Refueling Assets**  
Availability of refueling assets for deployment or employment.  
*Descriptors:* Robust (as planned); Limited (somewhat less than planned); Little or no.
- C 2.5.3 En Route Support**  
Availability of support, and ITV data capture and basing needed to ensure the movement of forces. Includes refueling (or bunkering),

arming, maintaining, troop support, ITV data capture and basing. For maritime movement, includes convoy escorts and naval covering forces.

*Descriptors:* Robust (as planned); Limited (somewhat less than planned); Little or no.

**C 2.5.3.1 Intermediate Staging Bases**

Availability of intermediate bases and ports for staging aircraft, ships, and troops for strategic deployment.

*Descriptors:* Robust (as planned); Limited (somewhat less than planned); Little or no.

**C 2.5.3.2 Overflight/Passage Rights**

Right to overfly national territory or national waters or to transit sovereign waters.

*Descriptors:* Granted (most direct route is available); Limited (fairly direct route is available); Restricted (best route is quite indirect).

**C 2.5.3.3 En Route Supply**

Availability of supply needed to ensure the movement of forces. Includes refueling (or bunkering), arming, maintaining, troop support, and basing.

*Descriptors:* Robust (as planned); Limited (somewhat less than planned); Little or no.

**C 2.5.4 Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration**

Ability to support the delivery, disposition, and ITV of units, equipment, and personnel that arrive by intertheater strategic lift or intratheater lift.

*Descriptors:* Robust (as planned); Limited (somewhat less than planned); Little or no.

**C 2.5.4.1 Reception Facilities**

Extent to which facilities are available to allow off-load of ships or aircraft.

*Descriptors:* Robust (as planned); Limited (somewhat less than planned); Little or no.

**C 2.5.4.1.1 Pier Space**

The amount of berthing space available to load or unload ships.

*Descriptors:* Generous (> two FSS size vessels); Moderate (one to two FSS size vessels); Little (< one FSS size vessel).

**C 2.5.4.1.2 Maximum on Ground (MOG)**

The maximum number of aircraft an airfield can physically accommodate at one time for unloading and loading based on dimensions of ramp space and/or runway for runway operations. The physical MOG may be further qualified as a working MOG based on limiting factors such as servicing or maintenance capability. MOG is often addressed in terms of wide-body equivalents (C-5, C-17m B-747, etc) or narrow-body equivalents (C-141, C-130, DC-8).  
*Descriptors:* High (> 10); Medium (4 to 10); Low (1 to 3).

**C 2.5.4.1.3 Runway Length**

The length of usable runway.  
*Descriptors:* Long (> 8200 ft); Commercial (5000 to 8200 ft); Short (3500 to 5000 ft); Very short (< 3500 ft).

**C 2.5.4.1.4 Runway Weight Bearing Capacity**

The weight bearing capacity of a runway or the larger airport surfaces.  
*Descriptors:* Jumbo (C-5); Large (B-747); Medium (C-141, C-17); Low (C-130).

**C 2.5.4.2 Onward Movement Facilities**

Facilities available to marshal cargo and personnel and move them forward in the theater.  
*Descriptors:* Robust (extensive); Limited (less than required); Little or no.

**C 2.5.4.2.1 Beddown Facilities**

Space available for handling materials and personnel from arriving ships and aircraft.  
*Descriptors:* Robust (extensive); Limited (less than required); Little or no.

**C 2.5.4.2.2 Marshaling Facilities**

Facilities for assembling, holding, maintaining visibility over and organizing supplies and equipment, especially vehicles and transportation, for onward movement.  
*Descriptors:* Robust (extensive); Limited (less than required); Little or no.

**C 2.5.4.2.3 Staging Area**

Location established for the concentration of units and transient personnel between movements.



*Descriptors:* Robust (extensive); Limited (less than required); Little or no.

## **C 2.6 FIREPOWER**

### **C 2.6.1 Degree of Dispersion**

The degree to which forces or facilities are concentrated in one area or conform to linear formations or lines, e.g., FLOT, FEBA, or naval battle group formations.

*Descriptors:* High (a dispersed battlefield with no force concentrations and no major sustainment or logistic concentrations or chokepoints); Moderate (forces are attempting to maintain a fluid situation and large concentrations of sustainment and logistic chokepoints are avoided); Low (front lines consisting of trenches and other fortifications or massed groupings behind the FEBA).

### **C 2.6.2 Degree of Camouflage**

The degree to which forces, units, items of equipment, or personnel are hidden from visual, electronic, or other forms of detection.

*Descriptors:* High (widespread and effective); Moderate (neither widespread nor highly effective); Low.

### **C 2.6.3 Target Hardness**

The degree to which a target or set of targets has been protected against firepower attacks.

*Descriptors:* Super (buried to great depth and otherwise protected, e.g., DPRK HARTS); Heavy (reinforced construction, usually with added protection, such as rock rubble); Sheltered (e.g., hangerette); Unprotected.

### **C 2.6.4 Preplanned Targets**

The degree to which initial fires have been preplanned, particularly in peacetime.

*Descriptors:* Fully (initial targeting complete and current); Partially (initial targeting either incomplete or dated); No.

### **C 2.6.5 Target Mobility**

The ability of a potential target to relocate.

*Descriptors:* High (dwell time in minutes, can quickly relocate upon detection or taking a combat action); Good (can move < 30 minutes); Limited (can move < 90 minutes); Very limited (several hours to tear down and erect); No (fixed site).

- C 2.6.6 Target Range**  
The range of a target from an attacking system or unit.  
*Descriptors:* Greater than 1500 NM; Between 1000-1500 NM; Between 500-1000 NM; Between 250-500 NM; Between 50-250 NM; Between 30-100 km; Between 10-30 km; Between 3-10 km; Between 1-3 km; Between 0.3-1 km; Less than 0.3 km.
- C 2.6.7 Collateral Damage Potential**  
The degree to which the civilian population and structures (e.g., homes, hospitals, schools) are close to targets, and therefore at risk from attacks.  
*Descriptors:* High (civilian structures are in close proximity to military targets); Moderate (there is some separation between civilian structures and military targets); Low (military targets are well separated from civilian population centers).
- C 2.6.8 Target Thermal Contrast**  
The temperature differential between background areas and targets.  
*Descriptors:* High (greater than 10°C); Moderate (2°C to 10°C); Little or No (< 2°C).
- C 2.7 Protection**
- C 2.7.1 Rear Area/Local Security**  
The extent to which the rear area or local area is secure.  
*Descriptors:* High; Moderate; Limited.
- C 2.7.2 Air Superiority**  
The extent to which operations in the air, over sea and/or, over land can be conducted with acceptable losses due to hostile air forces and air defense systems action.  
*Descriptors:* Full (Air Supremacy); General; Local; No.
- C 2.7.3 Space Control**  
The measure by which we gain and maintain space superiority to assure friendly forces can use the space environment while denying its use to the enemy.  
*Descriptors:* Full; Partial; No.
- C 2.7.3.1 Space Platforms**  
The number of space platforms that are available for the specific joint operations area.

*Descriptors:* Abundant (> 100% required platforms); Sufficient (> 90% required platforms); Limited (20 to 75% required platforms); Severely limited (< 20% required platforms); No.

**C 2.7.3.2 Space Platforms (Availability)**

The percentage of available time space platforms that can be used over the joint operations area. Time can be limited due to operational procedures, general ephemeris conditions, or sun angle (too high or eclipse).

*Descriptors:* High (> 90 %); Moderate (60 to 90%); Low (< 60%).

**C 2.7.3.3 Space Platforms (Linkability)**

The method required to link the joint operations area commanders to the space platforms.

*Descriptors:* Complex (never been attempted before); Defined (design on paper); Proven (fully operational).

**C 2.7.4 Maritime Superiority**

The extent to which operations on, over, or under the sea can be conducted with acceptable losses due to hostile military naval actions.

*Descriptors:* Full; Local; No.

**C 2.7.5 Ground Superiority**

The extent to which operations on or over land can be conducted with acceptable losses due to hostile military ground actions.

*Descriptors:* Full; Local; No.

**C 2.7.6 Facility Survivability**

*Descriptors:* Vulnerable (not EMP or shock hardened, not concealed); Shock Hardened; EMP Hardened; Concealed; Mobile; Mobile and Enduring.

**C 2.8 SUSTAINMENT**

**C 2.8.1 Sustainment Facilities**

Those grounds, buildings, and equipment available to provide and support sustainment of the force.

*Descriptors:* Abundant; Adequate; Limited; No.

**C 2.8.2 Deployed Supplies**

The number of days of supply available to forces in a military operation.

*Descriptors:* Abundant (> 90 days); Sufficient (30 to 90 days); Limited (10 to 30 days); Short (3 to 10 days); Negligible (< 3 days).

### **C 2.8.3 CONUS Resupply**

The adequacy of national level production and supply stocks and theater priority, which allows the theater to draw sustainment from outside of the theater.

*Descriptors:* Adequate (no impact on defensive or offensive operations due to lack of long-term logistic support); Sufficient (no impact on defensive operations due to lack of long-term logistic support); Limited (defensive operations must be tailored to accommodate limits on logistic support); Negligible (deferred theater).

#### **C 2.8.3.1 Pipeline Responsiveness**

The adequacy of the logistics pipeline to provide retrograde to repair facilities and for repair facilities to issue replacement parts. This includes theater evacuation, transportation, and repair facility policies affecting the movement and repair of high value, class IX repair parts.

*Descriptors:* Robust (pipeline is active and repair parts move unimpeded); Slow (Pipeline is bogged down due to lack of retrograde, proper distribution, or bits and pieces needed for repair); Unresponsive (Pipeline is shut down due to no movement of parts--on hand stocks are only source of resupply).

### **C 2.8.4 Pre-positioned Materiel**

Equipment or supplies pre-positioned at or near the point of planned use or at a designated location.

*Descriptors:* Extensive (can equip most ground forces and provide fuel and ammunition for air and naval forces apportioned); Limited (can equip and support early arriving forces, e.g., DFMs); No.

### **C 2.8.5 Host-Nation Support (HNS)**

The extent of civil and military assistance provided by a host nation to foreign forces within its territory.

*Descriptors:* Extensive (includes engineering, security, and medical services, which reduce equivalent deployment requirements by > 50%); Moderate (includes engineering, security, and medical services, which reduce equivalent deployment requirements by 15 to 50%); Limited (includes engineering, security, and medical services, which reduce equivalent deployment requirements by < 15%); No.

**C 2.8.6 Commercial Procurement**

The extent to which materiel and services can be procured from the local economy in theater.

*Descriptors:* Fully available (> 90% of items normally available in the US); Extensive (50 to 90% of items normally available in the US); Limited (15 to 50% of items available in the US); Negligible (< 15% of items available in the US).

**C 2.9 THREAT****C 2.9.1 Threat**

Seriousness of threat to the nation.

*Descriptors:* Extreme (national survival); Grave (national interest); Very serious (treaty commitment); Serious (UN Resolution).

**C 2.9.2 Threat Form**

Types of potential aggression.

*Descriptors:* Conventional; Unconventional (guerrilla warfare); Nuclear; Chemical; Biological; Terrorist; Economic, Information Warfare; paramilitary organizations.

**C 2.9.3 Threat Existence**

The perceived potential for aggression or harm to a nation, government, or its instrumentalities.

*Descriptors:* Acknowledged (threat is recognized); Ambiguous (threat is recognized but not well understood); Unacknowledged (threat is neither recognized nor accepted as genuine).

**C 2.9.4 Threat Posture**

The timing of potential aggression against friendly forces.

*Descriptors:* Imminent (overt attack has begun); Ready (preparations for immediate attack completed); Near-term (preparations for immediate attack noted); Long-term (long-term indicators noted).

**C 2.9.5 Threat Size**

The relative size of the potential aggressor to friendly forces.

*Descriptors:* Overwhelming (significantly more enemy than friendly assets); Large (somewhat more enemy than friendly assets); Moderate (comparable level of enemy to friendly assets); Low (less enemy than friendly assets).

- C 2.9.5.1 Threat Land Force Size**  
The relative size of land forces of the potential aggressor to friendly land forces.  
*Descriptors:* Overwhelming (significantly more enemy than friendly land forces); Large (somewhat more enemy than friendly land forces); Moderate (comparable level of enemy to friendly land forces); Low (less enemy than friendly land forces).
- C 2.9.5.2 Threat Naval Force Size**  
The relative size of naval forces of the potential aggressor to friendly naval forces.  
*Descriptors:* Overwhelming (significantly more enemy than friendly naval forces); Large (somewhat more enemy than friendly naval forces); Moderate (comparable level of enemy to friendly naval forces); Low (less enemy than friendly naval forces).
- C 2.9.5.3 Threat Air Force Size**  
The relative size of air forces of the potential aggressor to friendly air forces.  
*Descriptors:* Overwhelming (significantly more enemy than friendly air forces); Large (somewhat more enemy than friendly air forces); Moderate (comparable level of enemy to friendly air forces); Low (less enemy than friendly air forces).
- C 2.9.5.4 Threat Space Force Capability**  
The relative capability of the potential aggressor to inhibit operations of friendly space forces.  
*Descriptors:* Overwhelming (significant capability to inhibit operations of friendly space operations); Large (some advantage in inhibiting friendly space force operations); Moderate (comparable capability between adversary and friendly space forces); Low (minimal ability to inhibit space force operations).
- C 2.9.5.5 Threat Information Operations Capability**  
The relative operations capability of the potential aggressor.  
*Descriptors:* Large (significant capability to adversely impact friendly forces); Moderate (some capability to adversely impact friendly forces); Low (minimal ability to inhibit space force operations).
- C 2.9.6 Threat Disposition**  
The status of deployed forces belonging to a potential aggressor.  
*Descriptors:* Full (fully positioned for attack); Partial (partially positioned for attack); Little or No (not positioned to initiate attack).

**C 2.10      CONFLICT****C 2.10.1      State of Conflict**

Level of conflict in operational area.

*Descriptors:* Pre-hostilities; Preliminary skirmishes; Fully Developed; "Mop-up"; Cease-Fire; Post-hostilities.

**C 2.10.2      Breadth of Conflict**

Scope and breadth of conflict area.

*Descriptors:* Isolated; Localized; Theater; Multi-Theater; Global.

**C 2.10.3      Type of Conflict**

Type of weapons and forces employed.

*Descriptors:* Unconventional; Conventional; Nuclear; Chemical; Biological.

## **Conditions of the Civil Environment**

This section includes factors related to a people, their government, politics, culture, and economy that impact military operations. The organization of civil conditions, includes the major subcategories of: political policies, culture, and economy.

### **C 3.0 CIVIL ENVIRONMENT**

Those factors related to a people, their government, history, politics, culture, and economy that impact military operations.

### **C 3.1 POLITICAL POLICIES**

Those factors that derive from the people, their national government, and international and non-government organizations that support or oppose military action.

*Descriptors:* Fully supportive; Mixed support; Neutral; Opposed.

#### **C 3.1.1 Domestic Political Support**

Support of the people and government in the region (excluding National Command Authorities) for military actions.

*Descriptors:* Full; Limited; Negative.

#### **C 3.1.1.1 Domestic Public Support**

Public support for the actions of their government.

*Descriptors:* Full (large majority of citizens in support); Limited (majority of citizens in support, but many with some reservations); Negative (public opinion in opposition).

#### **C 3.1.1.2 Congressional Support**

Legislative Branch support of the Executive Branch or NCA.

*Descriptors:* Full (resolution passed; non-partisan support); Limited (resolution passed with restrictions); Negative (resolution rejected); neutral (no resolution offered).

#### **C 3.1.1.3 Interdepartmental/Interagency Relationships**

Extent to which Executive Branch of government and other agencies work together toward articulated goals.

*Descriptors:* Strong (fully cooperative); Correct (partially cooperative); Uncooperative (working in opposition to one another).

#### **C 3.1.1.4 Legality**

The extent to which an act or action is in accordance with domestic or international law.



*Descriptors:* Full; Disputed (ambiguous); Condemned (clearly violates laws).

**C 3.1.1.5 Media Relations**

The rapport between the military and the press, and the attitude of the press toward particular military activities.

*Descriptors:* Mutually supportive; Cooperative; Strained; Adversarial.

**C 3.1.2 International Politics**

Those political factors, independent of one's own government, which impact the commander's freedom of action.

*Descriptors:* Supportive; Indifferent; Opposed (unilateral action).

**C 3.1.2.1 Major Power Involvement**

The major power interests about a region or military operation and the ability and willingness of a particular major power to act on those interests.

*Descriptors:* Active (major power has interests and may be willing to act); Limited (major power has interests but is not inclined to act); No (lack of major power interest).

**C 3.1.2.2 Foreign Government Stability**

The degree to which governments in a region remain in power and are consistent in their policies.

*Descriptors:* High (solid); Moderate (fluctuating); Low (unpredictable).

**C 3.1.2.3 Foreign Government Support**

The willingness of a foreign government to support military actions of another nation.

*Descriptors:* Complete; Diplomatic; Limited; Negative.

**C 3.1.2.4 Foreign Public Opinion**

Foreign public attitude expressed about a military operation.

*Descriptors:* Supportive; Moderately supportive; Indifferent; Moderately opposed; Aggressively opposed.

**C 3.1.2.5 International Organization Support**

The degree of support expressed by non-governmental organizations for military actions.

*Descriptors:* Fostering; Limited; Uncertain; No.

**C 3.1.2.6 Multinational Business Support**

The degree of support expressed by multinational business organizations for military actions (e.g., oil companies).

*Descriptors:* Fostering; Limited; Uncertain; No.

**C 3.1.3 NCA Decisions**

Decisions taken by the NCA with regard to national security policy and strategy.

*Descriptors:* Clear and unrestrictive; Vague; Restrictive.

**C 3.1.3.1 Number of Crises**

The number of crises (MRC or LRC) being addressed by the NCA and the NSC.

*Descriptors:* Large (> two); Moderate (two); Small (only one).

**C 3.1.3.2 Mission Priority**

The relationship of one mission compared to another.

*Descriptors:* High (higher than other current missions); Moderate (comparable priority with other current missions); Low (lower than other current missions).

**C 3.1.3.3 Mobilization Level**

The extent of mobilization by a nation.

*Descriptors*

Descriptor	Rationale
Volunteerism	Title X - SEC 12301 (d)
Service Secretary 15-Day Call-up	Title X - SEC 12301 (b)
Presidential Selective Reserve Call-up	Title X - SEC 12304
Partial	Title X - SEC 12302
Full	Title X - SEC 12301 (a)
Total	

**C 3.1.3.3.1 Force Level**

The size of mobilization required.

*Descriptors:* Total (all Reserve component forces plus draft); Full (major force buildup); Partial (major support units required); Limited (augmentation by Reserve component personnel or units required).

**C 3.1.3.3.2 Draft**

Compulsory military service.

*Descriptors:* No; Partial; All males; Full.

**C 3.1.3.3.3 Mobilization Facilities**

Those grounds, buildings, and equipment available to train or retrain an expanding active duty force.

*Descriptors:* Abundant; Adequate; Limited; No.

**C 3.1.3.4 Restraints on Action**

The limitations on a commander's freedom of action attendant to an NCA-assigned mission.

*Descriptors:* Severe (impedes mission accomplishment); Moderate (alternate COAs can accommodate); No.

**C 3.2 CULTURE**

Those aspects of a people that relate to their language, history, customs, economics, religion, and character.

*Descriptors:* Western; Non-Western.

**C 3.2.1 Language**

The spoken and written means of communication.

*Descriptors:* Primarily English; English as secondary; Other.

**C 3.2.1.1 Language Translation**

The types of translations to be performed during the mission, including weaponeering, engineering, intelligence, POW interrogation, and staff coordination.

*Descriptors:* Diplomatic/political (Level 3/4/5); Technical (Level 3+); Social (Level 2+).

**C 3.2.1.2 Language Translators**

The number and type of translators to be used during the mission, including those for weaponeering, engineering, intelligence, POW interrogation, and staff coordination.

*Descriptors:* Numerous (> 50 Level 3+); Many (10 to 50 Level 3+); Few (< 10 Level 2/3); Negligible (in-house capability).

**C 3.2.2 Customs Adjustment**

Customs within a nation or an area that may require accommodation.

*Descriptors:* Significant; Minor; No.

**C 3.2.2.1 Societal Openness**

The degree to which the population of a nation or an area is open to the presence of people from different nations or cultural backgrounds.

*Descriptors:* Limited (very hard to penetrate); Moderate; High (easy to penetrate).

**C 3.2.2.2 Legal Penalties**

The seriousness of legal or religious penalties, in a foreign nation, associated with acts that violate cultural or legal norms.

*Descriptors:* Low; Moderate; High.

**C 3.2.2.3 Law Source**

The basis for current laws and justice (see C 3.2.2.2, Legal Penalties).

*Descriptors:* Koran; English Common Law; Napoleonic Code.

**C 3.2.3 Religious Beliefs**

Strength of adherence to religion, the impact on behavior, and the degree of domination over the life of a nation.

*Descriptors:* Strong; Moderate; Indifferent.

**C 3.2.3.1 Religious Unity**

Degree of religious unity within a nation.

*Descriptors:* Strong (monolithic); Moderate (stratified); Low (fragmented).

**C 3.2.3.2 Religious Militancy**

The degree to which a religious group believes it can or should impose its views on others, internally or externally, by force of arms, if necessary.

*Descriptors:* Significant (pursues internal domination and exports beliefs by force); Moderate (politically active internally and exports beliefs by missionary activity); Limited (disinclined to impose religious views externally); No.

**C 3.2.3.3 Religion-State Relationship**

The extent to which a given religion influences the civil government of a nation.

*Descriptors:* Dominant (theocracy); Strong (guides civil law); Limited (influences civil law); No.

**C 3.2.4 Significant Cultural Sites**

Restrictions on actions due to the existence of particular sites held by certain cultures or religions to be sacred places or national treasures.

*Descriptors:* Presence of internationally; Presence of locally; No.

- C 3.2.5 Cultural Unity**  
The extent to which a country is free from serious ethnic, cultural, and language divisions.  
*Descriptors:* High (unified); Moderate (few divisions, causing minor problems); Low (serious divisions; causes internal conflict).
- C 3.2.6 National Character**  
Perceived behavior of the populace in a nation or an area.  
*Descriptors:* Open and adaptable; Careful and moderate; Closed and rigid.
- C 3.2.6.1 National Discipline**  
The historically-based perception of a nationality's response to the direction and will of their central government.  
*Descriptors:* High (blind adherence); Moderate (willing conformance); Limited (questioning acceptance); Low (rebellious nonconformance).
- C 3.2.6.2 National Aggressiveness**  
Tendency to use national power to achieve goals.  
*Descriptors:* High; Moderate; Low.
- C 3.2.6.3 Nationalism**  
Belief that the good of the nation is paramount.  
*Descriptors:* High; Moderate; Low.
- C 3.2.6.4 Ethnocentrism**  
Degree of emphasis on a particular ethnic grouping or background.  
*Descriptors:* High; Moderate; Low.
- C 3.2.6.5 Internationalism**  
Degree of involvement in international organizations, even to the extent of granting some degree of sovereignty to such an international organization.  
*Descriptors:* Strong (supports supra-national approaches); Moderate (cooperates with international organizations); Low (resists involvement of international organizations); Anti- (actively opposes non-governmental organizations approaches).
- C 3.3 ECONOMY**  
Those factors that provide a nation with the manpower, materiel, and money to allow it to play a role on the military stage and shape that role.

*Descriptors:* Knowledge-based, post industrial (Third Wave); Industrial (Second Wave); Agrarian (First Wave).

**C 3.3.1 Population**

The population of a nation or region based on the estimates from the Bureau of the Census.

*Descriptors:* Very large (> 150 million); Large (75 to 150 million); Medium (30 to 75 million); Small (5 to 30 million); Very small (< 5 million).

**C 3.3.1.1 Size of Military**

The number of people in a nation or region who are currently under arms, or who are trained and available for military service.

*Descriptors:* Very large (> 5 million); Large (2 to 5 million); Medium (500,000 to 2 million); Small (200,000 to 500,000); Very small (< 200,000).

**C 3.3.1.2 Population Growth Rate**

The annual change in a nation's population due to birthrates, migration, etc.

*Descriptors:* Exploding (> 2%); Positive (.5 to 2%); Stable (.5 to -.5%); Declining (< -.5%).

**C 3.3.1.3 Educated Population**

The general level of education of the people of a nation. Ranked here by average literacy level, however, it is also reflected by (1) total secondary schools, technical schools, and university graduates per 100,000 population; and (2) total schools and universities per 100,000 population.

*Descriptors:* Highly (> 90%); Moderately (60 to 89%); Poorly (< 59%).

**C 3.3.1.4 Civil Health**

The physical and medical condition of a people, ranked here by only one indicator, life expectancy at birth.

*Descriptors:* Robust (> 70 years); Good (61 to 69 years); Fair (55 to 60 years); Poor (< 55 years).

**C 3.3.1.5 Health Risk**

Disease presence and conditions favorable to disease transmission.

*Descriptors:* Low; Moderate; High.

- C 3.3.1.6 Civil Unrest**  
The level of dissension within a nation or region as reflected by acts of civil disobedience or demonstrations against government or government policies.  
*Descriptors:* Extensive (weekly incidents); Moderate (quarterly incidents); Little (annual incidents).
- C 3.3.2 Refugee Impact**  
Impact of need for humane treatment of refugees and displaced persons on military operations.  
*Descriptors:* Severe (highly disruptive); Moderate (minor impacts); Negligible.
- C 3.3.2.1 Refugee Type**  
The principal reason for population dislocation or migration.  
*Descriptors:* Political; Economic; Religious; War.
- C 3.3.2.2 Refugee Congestion**  
Degree of disruption of main supply routes, avenues of approach, and LOCs.  
*Descriptors:* Severe (stoppages, prolonged slowdowns); Moderate (speed reduced significantly); Negligible.
- C 3.3.2.3 Refugee Care Responsibility**  
Requirement to provide basic shelter, security, health, sanitation, and nutrition for refugees.  
*Descriptors:* Significant (drain on forces); Moderate (some services provided by other groups); No.
- C 3.3.2.4 Refugee Relocation Effort**  
Degree of effort expended by the military force to place refugees back in their original homes or cities.  
*Descriptors:* Significant (drain on forces); Moderate (performed by other groups); No.
- C 3.3.3 Gross Domestic Product (GDP)**  
The value of all goods and services produced domestically, measured in US dollars.  
*Descriptors:* Very large (> 1000 billion); Large (500 to 1000 billion); Medium (100 to 500 billion); Small (30 to 100 billion); Very small (< 30 billion).
- C 3.3.4 International Economic Position**  
The relative economic standing of a nation or region.

*Descriptors:* Powerful (G-7+); Strong (post-industrial); Moderate (industrial); Low (newly industrialized); Poor (pre-industrial).

**C 3.3.4.1 Economic Self-Sufficiency**

The ability of a nation to sustain itself without support from other nations. It is not only the amount of imports to exports, but also the dependence on the import of a particular product and the uniqueness of that product that can make a nation vulnerable.

*Descriptors:* High (self-sufficient); Moderate (dependent on other nations for few goods); Low (dependent on other nations for critical items).

**C 3.3.4.1.1 Self-Sufficiency in Food**

Amount of food consumption produced locally.

*Descriptors:* High (> 70%); Moderate (30 to 70%); Low (< 30%).

**C 3.3.4.1.2 Self-Sufficiency in Fuel**

Amount of fuel consumption produced locally.

*Descriptors:* High (> 70%); Moderate (30 to 70%); Low (< 30%).

**C 3.3.4.1.3 Self-Sufficiency in Raw Materials**

Amount of raw materials (needed for finished goods consumption) produced locally.

*Descriptors:* High (> 70%); Moderate (30 to 70%); Low (< 30%).

**C 3.3.4.1.4 Self-Sufficiency in Finished Goods**

Amount of finished goods (needed for local economy) produced locally.

*Descriptors:* High (> 70%); Moderate (30 to 70%); Low (< 30%).

**C 3.3.4.1.5 Self-Sufficiency in Machinery**

Amount of machinery (needed for local economy) produced locally.

*Descriptors:* High (> 70%); Moderate (30 to 70%); Low (< 30%).

**C 3.3.4.2 Fiscal Position**

The availability of currency and reserves to support military action.

*Descriptors:* Strong; Adequate; Weak.

**C 3.3.4.3 Infrastructure Dependence**

The degree of infrastructure (roads, shipping/fishing fleet, railroads, pipelines, communications, etc.) required to sustain the economy.

*Descriptors:* Low (excess infrastructure capacity or low economic needs required to sustain economy); Moderate (economy capable of



withstanding some loss of infrastructure); High (full infrastructure required to sustain basic economy).

**C 3.3.5****Industry**

The general ability of a nation to produce materiel for warfighting.

*Descriptors:* Highly developed; Moderately developed (produces some materiel that supports military operations); Limited (depends heavily on imports).

**C 3.3.5.1****Industrialization**

The extent of industrialization, measured as percent of GDP.

*Descriptors:* Heavy (> 30% GDP); Moderate (20 to 30% GDP); Limited (5 to 20% GDP); Low (< 5% GDP).

**C 3.3.5.2****Industrial Growth Rate**

Annualized rate of growth in industrial production.

*Descriptors:* High (> +4%); Moderate (2 to 4%); Low (0 to 2%); Declining (0 to -4%); Dangerously declining (any continuous decline).

**C 3.3.5.3****Electrical Production**

Electrical generation capacity per capita.

*Descriptors:* High (> 4000 kWh); Moderate (1000 - 4000 kWh); Low (< 1000 kWh).

**C 3.3.5.4****Armaments Production Capacity**

Annual armaments production capacity.

*Descriptors:* Limited; Significant (multiple areas); Extensive (nearly self-sustaining).

**C 3.3.6****National Potential**

A nation's ability to expand its economy and thus its warmaking potential.

*Descriptors:* Large (ability to rapidly convert industry to defense); Moderate (ability, over time, to convert industry to defense); Limited (little or no ability for conversion to defense).

**C 3.3.6.1****Transportation Infrastructure**

Adequacy of railroads, highways, inland waterways, pipelines, sea and air ports, merchant marine ships, and telecommunication stations.

*Descriptors:* Extensive; Moderate; Limited.

**C 3.3.6.2 Telecommunications Infrastructure**

Extent of national capability for transmission, emission, or reception of signals, writings, images, sounds, or information by wire, radio, visual, or any other means.

*Descriptors:* Extensive (strong, modern capability); Moderate (significant infrastructure, but not modern); Limited.

**C 3.3.6.3 Available Capital**

A nation's available capital, including capital markets (banks, pension funds), capital goods (manufactured products used to produce other goods), and capital formation.

*Descriptors:* Abundant (unlimited); Ample; Modest; Meager (unavailable internally).

**C 3.3.7 Science and Technology**

The level of effort and ability of a nation to develop and exploit science and technology.

*Descriptors:* Abundant; Ample; Modest; Insignificant.

**C 3.3.7.1 Basic Research**

The amount of a nation's intellectual resources applied to basic research.

*Descriptors:* Abundant; Ample; Modest; Insignificant.

**C 3.3.7.2 Research Application (Military)**

A nation's ability to turn basic research into (militarily) useful products.

*Descriptors:* Abundant; Ample; Modest; Insignificant.

**C 3.3.7.3 High Technology Production**

A nation's ability to mass-produce high-technology products.

*Descriptors:* Abundant; Ample; Modest; Insignificant.

**C 3.3.7.4 Information Management**

A nation's ability to collect and process information.

*Descriptors:* Extensive (fully integrated and networked); Good (partially integrated and networked); Fair (poorly integrated, but with access to Internet); Poor (limited distributed-computer network).

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# **APPENDIX A**

# **GLOSSARY**

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APPENDIX A**Part I -- ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**

AADC	area air defense commander
AAR	after action review/report
AAW	antiair warfare
AC	active component
ACA	airspace control authority
ACC	Air Combat Command; air component command
ACL	allowable cabin load
ACSA	acquisition cross-Service agreement
ACTD	Advanced Concepts Technology Demonstration
ADA	air defense artillery
ADM	atomic demolition munition
ADP	automated data process(ing)
ADVON	advanced echelon
AE	aeromedical evacuation
AFFOR	Air Force forces
AFRTS	Armed Forces Radio and Television Service
AFT	Air Force tasks
AFTL	Air Force Task List
AI	air interdiction
AIASA	annual integrated assessment of security assistance
AIT	Automated Identification Technology
AJBPO	Area Joint Blood Program Office
ALCM	air launched cruise missile
ALCON	all concerned
ALD	available-to load-date at POE
AMC	Air Mobility Command
AMCIT	American citizen
AMEMBASSY	American Embassy
AMET	agency mission essential task
AMETL	Agency Mission Essential Task List
AMOPS	Army Mobilization and Operations Planning System
AOR	area of responsibility
APIC	allied press information center
APOD	aerial port of debarkation
APOE	aerial port of embarkation
APS	afloat prepositioning shipping
AR	Army Reserve
ARFOR	Army forces
ART	Army tasks

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ASAT	antisatellite
ASBPO	Armed Services Blood Program Office
ASD	Assistant Secretary of Defense
ASF	aeromedical staging facility
ASW	antisubmarine warfare
AT	antiterrorism
ATACMS	Army Tactical Missile System
ATM	Army tactical missions
ATO	air tasking order
AUTL	Army Universal Task List
AUTODIN	Automatic Digital Network
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
BAI	backup aircraft inventory
BBCO	boards, bureaus, centers and offices
BDA	bomb or battle damage assessment
BES	budget estimate submission
BM	ballistic missile
BSU	blood supply unit
BW	biological warfare
C2	command and control
C2I	command, control and intelligence
C2W	command and control warfare
C3I	command, control, communications, and intelligence
C4	command, control, communications, and computers
C4I	command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
C4ISR	command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance
CA	civil affairs
CAP	crisis action planning
CARDA	CONUS Airborne Reconnaissance for Damage Assessment
CAS	close air support
CAT	crisis action team
CBW	chemical and biological warfare
CCIR	commander's critical information requirements
CCPDS-R	Command Center Process and Display Subsystem-Replacement
CCSTAT	Command Center status
CD-ROM	compact disk read only memory
CEOI	communications-electronics operating system
CERT	Computer Emergency Response Team

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CG	Chairman's guidance
CI	counterintelligence
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIB	combined information bureau
CIL	critical items list
CIN	cargo increment number
CINC	commander of a combatant command; commander in chief
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
CJCSM	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual
CJTF	commander, joint task force
CM	consequence management
CMD	command
CMDTINST	Commandant Instruction
CMO	civil-military operations
CMOC	civil-military operations center
COA	course of action
COCOM	combatant command (command authority)
COG	centers of gravity
COMMZ	communications zone
COMSEC	communications security
CONOPS	concept of operations
CONPLAN	operation plan in concept format
CONUS	continental United States
COS	Chief of Staff
CP	command post
CPA	Chairman's Program Assessment
CPD	combat plans division
CPR	Chairman's Program Recommendations
CRAF	Civil Reserve Air Fleet
CRC	CONUS replacement center
CRM	collection requirements management
CS	combat support
CSAR	combat search and rescue
CSARTF	combat search and rescue task force
CSS	combat service support
CT	combating terrorism
CTAPS	contingent theater automated planning system
CTF	combined task force
DA	direct action
DAL	defended asset list
DARPA	Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

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DART	disaster assistance response team
DCA	defensive counterair
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DCM	Deputy Chief of Mission
DCS	Defense Communications System
DE	damage expectancy
DEFCON	defense readiness condition
DGZ	desired ground zero
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIAC	Defense Intelligence Analysis Center
DISA	Defense Information Systems Agency
DISN	Defense Information System Network
DISUM	daily intelligence summary
DJTFA	deployable joint task force augmentation cell
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DM	decision making
DMPI	designated mean point of impact
DMSP	Defense Meteorological Satellite Program
DMSSC	Defense Medical Systems Support Center
DNBI	disease nonbattle injury
DPG	Defense Planning Guidance
DNSI	defense nuclear surety inspection
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense Directive
DODI	Department of Defense Instruction
DOE	Department of Energy
DOS	Department of State
DOT	Department of Transportation
DP	displaced person
DSN	Defense Switched Network
DT&E	developmental test & evaluation
DTRA	Defense Threat Reduction Agency
DWT	deployed weapons team
E4	Echelon 4
EA	electronic attack
EAD	earliest arrival date at port of debarkation
EAM	emergency action message
EAP	emergency action procedures
EDD	earliest delivery date
EEFI	essential elements of friendly information
EEI	essential elements of information
ELINT	electronics intelligence
EMCON	emission control

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EMD	engineering and manufacturing development
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
EP	electronic protection
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency; evasion plan of action
EPAT	estimated probability of arrival time
EPW	enemy prisoners of war
ES	electronic warfare support
EW	electronic warfare
EWS	electronic warfare support
EXORD	execute order
EZ	extraction zone
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FCE	forward command element
FD	force direction
FDO	flexible deterrent option
FDP&E	force deployment planning and execution
FE	forcible entry
FEBA	forward edge of the battle area
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FFRDC	federally funded research and development companies
FHA	Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
FLOT	forward line of own troops
FM	force management
FMF	Fleet Marine Force
FMS	force module subsystem
FO	forward observer
FP	force protection
FSB	forward staging base
FSC	fire support coordinator
FSS	fast sealift ships
FUNCPLAN	functional plan
GCCS	Global Command and Control System
GDP	gross domestic product
GDSS	Global Decision Support System
GPMRC	Global Patient Movement Requirements Center
GTN	Global Transportation Network
HA	humanitarian assistance
HAST	humanitarian assistance survey team
HAZMAT	hazardous materials
HCA	humanitarian and civic assistance

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HN	host nation
HNS	host-nation support
HPT	high-payoff target
HPTL	high-payoff target list
HQ	headquarters
HS	home station
HUD	heads-up display
HUMINT	human intelligence
HVT	high-value target
IA	information assurance
IAW	in accordance with
IB	inboard
ICBM	intercontinental ballistic missile
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDAD	internal defense and development
IFF	identification, friend or foe
IMA	individual mobilization augmentee
IMET	international military education and training
INFO	information
INFOCON	information condition
INFOSEC	information security
INTEL	intelligence
INTREP	intelligence report
INTSUM	intelligence summary
IO	information operation
IOC	initial operational capability; intelligence operations center; Industrial Operations Command
IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlespace
IPL	integrated priority list
IR	information requirement
IRR	individual ready reserve
ISB	intermediate staging base
ISR	independent surveillance and reconnaissance
ITV	in-transit visibility
ITW/AA	integrated tactical warning/attack assessment
I&W	indications and warning
IW	information warfare
JAARS	Joint After Action Reporting System
JBPO	Joint Blood Program Office
JCEOI	JTF communications electronic operation instruction
JCMOTF	Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force

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JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff (includes the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff)
JDDP	Joint Doctrine Development Program
JDISS	Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System
JEL	joint electronic library
JEMP III MRM	Joint Exercise Management Package III Mission Requirements Module
JF	joint force
JFACC	joint force air component commander
JFC	joint force commander
JFRL	joint restricted frequency list
JIB	Joint Information Bureau
JIC	Joint Intelligence Center
JIER	Joint Information Exchange Requirements
JIPB	joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace
JLOTS	joint logistics over-the-shore
JMAO	Joint Mortuary Affairs Office or Officer
JMC	joint movement center
JMET	joint mission essential task
JMETL	Joint Mission Essential Task List
JMNA	Joint Military Net Assessment
JMRR	Joint Monthly Readiness Review
JOA	joint operations area
JOPEs	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JP	joint publication
JPD	Joint planning document
JPG	joint planning group, joint planning guidance
JPME	joint professional military education
JPOTF	Joint Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Task Force
JRA	joint rear area
JRAC	joint rear area coordinator
JRC	joint reconnaissance center
JROC	Joint Requirements Oversight Council
JRSOI	joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
JS	Joint Staff
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
J-SEAD	joint suppression of enemy air defenses
JSIMS	Joint Simulation System
JSOA	joint special operations area
JSOTF	joint special operations task force
JSPS	Joint Strategic Planning System
JSR	Joint Strategy Review
JSRC	joint search and rescue center

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JSSA	Joint Service Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) Agency
JSST	Joint Space Support Team
JTCB	Joint Targeting Coordination Board
JTF	joint task force
JTRU	joint transportation reserve unit
JTS	Joint Training System
JTTP	joint tactics, techniques, and procedures
JWCA	Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment
JWFC	Joint Warfighting Center
LAD	latest arrival date (at port of debarkation)
LAN	local area coordinator
LD	land defense
LEA	law enforcement agency
LERTCON	alert condition
LFT&E	live fire test & evaluation
LNO	liaison officer
LO	land offense
LOA	letter of agreement
LOAC	law of armed conflict
LOC	lines of communications
LOI	letter of instruction
LOTS	logistics over-the-shore
LR	land retrograde
LRC	lesser regional contingency
LZ	landing zone
MA	mission assessment
MACOM	major Army command
MARFOR	Marine Corps forces
MASF	mobile aeromedical staging facility
MCA	Military Civic Action
ME	munitions effect
MEA	munitions effectiveness assessment
MEDEVAC	medical evacuation
MET	mission essential task
METL	mission-essential task list
METOC	meteorological and oceanographic
MHE	material handling equipment
MIO	maritime intercept operations
MLA	missing in action
MO	maritime operation
MOA	memorandum of agreement

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MOG	maximum on ground
MOOTW	military operations other than war
MOP	memorandum of policy
MOU	memorandum of understanding
MPF	maritime prepositioning force
MPLAN	Marine Corps Mobility Management Plan
MPS	maritime prepositioning ships
MRC	major regional contingency
MRM	mission requirements module
MS	mobilization station
MSC	Military Sealift Command
MSCA	military support to civil authorities
MSCLEA	military support for civilian law enforcement agencies
MSR	main supply route
MTF	medical treatment facility
MTMC	Military Traffic Management Command
MTW	Major Theater of War
MWR	morale, welfare and recreation
MWTTY	missile warning teletype
NABS	NORAD Airborne Battle Staff
NAF	naval air facility
NATO	National Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVFOR	Navy forces
NBC	nuclear, biological, and chemical
NBI	nonbattle injury
NCA	National Command Authorities
NCCS	Nuclear Command and Control System
NCMP	Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan
NCO	noncommissioned officer
NDI	non-developmental item
NEO	noncombatant evacuation operation
NEPA	National Environment and Policy Act
NFARS	NORAD Forward Automated Reporting System
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NIST	National Intelligence Support Team
NLT	not later than
NM	nautical mile
NMCC	National Military Command Center
NMCS	National Military Command System
NMS	National Military Strategy
NOFORN	not releasable to foreign nations
NOK	next of kin
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defense Command

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NRT	near-real-time
NSC	National Security Council
NSCS	National Security Council System
NSFS	naval surface fire support
NSS	non-self-sustaining
NTA	naval task
NTPI	nuclear technical proficiency inspection
NUDET	nuclear detonation
NUWEP	policy guidance for the employment of nuclear weapons
NWAI	nuclear weapons assessment inspection
OA	operational area
OAS	Organization of American States
OB	order of battle
OCA	offensive counterair
OCONUS	outside the continental United States
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OI	operating instruction
O&M	operations and maintenance
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OP	operational
OPCON	operational control
OPLAN	operation plan
OPORD	operation order
OPNAV	Naval operations
OPREP	operation report
OPSEC	operations security
OTEMPO	operating tempo
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSIA	On-Site Inspection Agency
OT&E	operational test & evaluation
pa	per annum
PA	public affairs
PAG	public affairs guidance
PAR	Program Assessment Review
PAX	passengers
PBD	program/budget decision
PCCIR	primary control center intelligence requirements
PCL	positive control launch
PDM	Program Decision Memorandum
PEO	peace enforcement operations
PIN	personnel increment number
PIR	priority intelligence requirements

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PK	peacekeeping
PKO	peacekeeping operations
PME	professional military education
PO	peace operation
POD	port of debarkation
POE	port of embarkation
POL	petroleum, oils, and lubricants
POLAD	political advisor
POL-MIL	political-military
POM	Program Objective Memorandum
POR	preparation of overseas replacements
POW	prisoner of war
PPBS	Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
PRC	populace and resource control
PREPO	prepositioned force, equipment, or supplies
PSRC	Presidential Selected Reserve Callup Authority
PSYOP	psychological operations
PTSR	postmobilization training support requirement
PVO	private voluntary organization
RC	Reserve Components
RCC	rescue coordination center
RCU	Reserve component unit
R&D	research & development
RDD	required delivery date (at destination)
RDT&E	research, development, test, and evaluation
RECA	residual capabilities assessment
RECCE	reconnaissance
RFI	request for information
RLD	ready to load date (at origin)
ROE	rules of engagement
ROTA	release other than attack
ROTC	Reserve Officer Training Corps
R&R	rest and relaxation
RRF	ready reserve fleet
RSOI	reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
RSS	regional security strategy
RSTA	reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition
RTD	returned to duty
SA	security assistance
SAM	surface-to-air missile
SAO	security assistance organization
SAP	special access program



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SAR	search and rescue; satellite access request
SAS	special ammunition storage
SEAD	suppression of enemy air defenses
SECTRANS	Secretary of Transportation
SELRES	selected reserve
SERE	survival, evasion, resistance, escape
SIGINT	signals intelligence
SIOP	Single Integrated Operation Plan
SIPRNET	SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network
SITREP	situation report
SLBM	sea-launched ballistic missile
SLOC	sea lines of communications
SM	situation monitoring
SMCC	Survivable Mobile Command Center
SN	strategic national
SOA	special operations area
SOCC	Sector Operations Control Center (NORAD)
SOF	special operations forces
SOFA	status-of-forces-agreement
SOP	standing operating procedure
SORTS	status of resources and training system
SORTSREP	SORTS Report
SPOD	seaport of debarkation
SPOE	seaport of embarkation
SRP	sealift reserve program; Sealift Readiness Program
SRV	search and rescue vehicle
SSBN	fleet ballistic missile submarine
SSM	surface-to-surface missile
ST	strategic theater
TA	tactical
TAC	terminal access controller
TACON	tactical control
TASS	tactical automated switch system
TBM	theater ballistic missile
TC	Transportation Corps (Army)
TCC	transportation component command; transmission control code
TCT	time critical target
TDD	target detection device
TENCAP	Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities Program
THREATCON	threat condition
TFE	transportation feasibility estimator
TIC	toxic industrial chemical

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TLAM	Tomahawk hand-attack missile
TM	theater missile
TMD	theater missile defense
TMEP	Theater Mortuary Evacuation Point
TNPD	Theater Nuclear Planning Document
TOA	transfer of authority
TOE	table of organization and equipment
TOR	transfer of responsibility
TOT	time on target
TP	technical publication
TPFDD	time-phased force and deployment data
TPFDL	time-phased force and deployment list
TPMC	Theater Patient Movement Center
TPMRC	Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center
TPRC	Theater Planning Response Cell
TST	time sensitive target
TTP	tactics, techniques, and procedures
TW/AA	tactical warning and attack assessment
UAR	unconventional assisted recovery
UARM	unconventional assisted recovery mechanism
UAV	unmanned aerial vehicle
UCP	Unified Command Plan
UJTL	Universal Joint Task List
ULN	unit line number
UMD	unit manning document
UN	United Nations
UNREP	underway replenishment
UNTL	Universal Naval Task List
USAF	United States Air Force
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USARPAC	United States Army Pacific
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USCINCEUR	United States Commander in Chief, Europe
USCINCSOC	Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command
USCINCTRANS	Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command
USDAO	United States Defense Attaché Office
USG	United States Government
USIA	United States Information Agency
USJFCOM	United States Joint Forces Command
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USN	United States Navy

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USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
USR	unit status report
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
USSPACECOM	United States Space Command
USSTRATCOM	United States Strategic Command
USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
UTC	unit type code
UW	unconventional warfare
VISA	Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement
WMD	weapons of mass destruction
WMD/HYE	weapons of mass destruction/high yield explosives
WMP	war mobilization plan
WRM	war reserve material

## Part II -- DEFINITIONS

The following training terminology has been standardized by J7 JETD and is applicable within the context of the Joint Training System.

command-linked tasks. Discrete events or actions designated by a joint force commander that must be performed by commands and agencies outside the command authority of the joint force, if the joint force is to successfully perform its missions. Command-linked tasks are designated by the supported joint force commander, but are normally scheduled for training, evaluated, and assessed by the organization providing the support.

conditions. Those variables of an operational environment or situation in which a unit, system, or individual is expected to operate that may affect performance.

criterion. The minimum acceptable level of performance associated with a particular measure of task performance. It is often expressed as hours, days, percent, occurrences, minutes, miles, or some other command stated measure.

essential task. Tasks based on mission analysis and approved by the commander that are absolutely necessary, indispensable, or critical to the success of a mission.

interagency operations. Operations in which government or non-government agencies interact with the Armed Forces of the United States. These agencies may include the National Security Council, headquarters of operating elements of the Department of State and Transportation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Adjutants General of the 50 states and four territories; and other US government agencies; agencies of partner nations; non-governmental organizations; regional and international organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United Nations; and the agencies of the host country.

interoperability. The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.

joint exercise. A joint military maneuver, simulated wartime operation, or other Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff/combatant commander-designated event involving planning, preparation, execution, and evaluation. A joint exercise involves forces of two or more Military

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Departments interacting with a combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander, involves joint forces and/or joint staffs, and is conducted using joint doctrine or joint tactics, techniques, and procedures.

joint mission essential task (JMET). A mission task selected by a joint force commander deemed essential to mission accomplishment and defined using the common language of the Universal Joint Task List in terms of a task. Force providers will also select additional tasks in accordance with their joint training mission for assigned combatant headquarters and forces and deemed essential to the mission of the combatant headquarters and forces. Also called JMET.

joint mission essential task list (JMETL)/agency mission essential task list (AMETL). A list of JMETs/AMETs selected by a commander to accomplish an assigned or anticipated mission. A JMETL/AMETL includes associated tasks, conditions, standards, and requires the identification of command-linked and supporting tasks. Also called JMETL or AMETL

Joint Professional Military Education. That portion of professional education concentrating on the instruction of joint matters. Also called JPME.

joint training. Military training based on joint doctrine or joint tactics, techniques, and procedures to prepare joint forces and/or joint staffs to respond to strategic and operational requirements deemed necessary by combatant commanders to execute their assigned missions. Joint training involves forces of two or more Military Departments interacting with a combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander; involves joint forces and/or joint staffs; and is conducted using joint doctrine or joint tactics, techniques, and procedures.

measure. Provides the basis for describing varying levels of task performance.

military training. The instruction of personnel to enhance their capacity to perform specific military functions and tasks; the exercise of one or more military units conducted to enhance their combat readiness.

mission 1. The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefor. 2. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, a duty assigned to an individual or unit; a task. 3. An assignment with a purpose that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore.

operation. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, Service, training, or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign.

specified task. A task explicitly stated and assigned.

standard. The minimum acceptable proficiency required in the performance of a task. For mission essential tasks of joint forces, each task standard is defined by the joint force commander and consists of a measure and criterion.

supporting task. Specific activities that contribute to the accomplishment of a joint mission essential task. Supporting tasks associated with a command's or agency's mission essential task list are accomplished by the joint staff or subordinate commands or agencies.

task. A discrete event or action that enables a mission or function to be accomplished by individuals or organizations.

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# **APPENDIX B**

# **UNIVERSAL JOINT TASK LIST**

# **ORGANIZATION CHARTS**



## SN 1 CONDUCT STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT

### Determine Transportation Infrastructure and Resources

SN 1.1

SN 1.1.1

Determine Transportation  
and Support Availability

SN 1.1.2

Coordinate and Match Transportation  
Resources and Requirements

SN 1.1.3

Determine Possible Closure Times

SN 1.1.4

Provide for En Route Support and  
Clearances

SN 1.1.5

Determine Impact of Climate, and Geography  
on Deployment

SN 1.1.6

Determine the Impact of Threat Activity on  
Strategic Mobility

### Conduct Deployment and Redeployment

SN 1.2

SN 1.2.1

Integrate Deployment Systems

SN 1.2.2

Provide Forces and Mobility Assets

SN 1.2.3

Conduct Terminal Operations

SN 1.2.4

Provide Movement to POE

SN 1.2.5

Move Forces from POE to POD

SN 1.2.6

Conduct Redeployment or  
Retrograde of Personnel and  
Equipment from Theater

SN 1.2.7

Coordinate Global Strategic Refueling

SN 1.2.8

Provide Global Patient Movement  
and Evacuation

## SN 2 DEVELOP NATIONAL STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE

### Plan and Direct Strategic Intelligence Activities SN 2.1


- SN 2.1.1  
Develop National  
Strategic Intelligence  
Policy
- SN 2.1.2  
Determine and Prioritize  
National Strategic  
Intelligence  
Requirements
- SN 2.1.3  
Prepare National  
Strategic Collection  
Plan
- SN 2.1.4  
Allocate National  
Intelligence  
Resources Worldwide
- SN 2.1.5  
Determine National  
Strategic Intelligence Issues

### Collect Strategic Information SN 2.2

- SN 2.2.1  
Collect Information on  
Strategic Situation  
Worldwide
- SN 2.2.2  
Support Combatant  
Commander's  
Surveillance  
and Reconnaissance  
Requirements

### Process and Exploit Collected Strategic Information SN 2.3

- SN 2.3.1  
Conduct Technical  
Processing and  
Exploitation of  
Strategic Information
- SN 2.3.2  
Collate National  
Strategic Information
- SN 2.3.3  
Correlate National  
Strategic Information



## SN 3 EMPLOY FORCES

### Coordinate Forward Presence of Forces in Theaters SN 3.1


- SN 3.1.1  
Station Forces Forward in Theaters
- SN 3.1.2  
Coordinate Periodic and Rotational Deployments, Port Visits, and Military Contacts
- SN 3.1.3  
Support Establishment of Access and Storage Agreements
- SN 3.1.4  
Coordinate Joint/Multinational Training Events
- SN 3.1.5  
Acquire Host-Nation Support (HNS)


### Manage National Strategic Firepower SN 3.2


- SN 3.2.1  
Process Strategic Targets
- SN 3.2.2  
Generate and Disperse Strategic Forces
- SN 3.2.3  
Manage Strategic Force Readiness Levels
- SN 3.2.4  
Manage Strategic Weapon Stockpile
- SN 3.2.5  
Determine National Strategic Targeting Policy
- SN 3.2.6  
Develop National Strategic Attack Policy

### Employ National Strategic Firepower SN 3.3


- SN 3.3.1  
Employ National Lethal Capabilities
- SN 3.3.2  
Synchronize Strategic Attack
- SN 3.3.3  
Demonstrate National Military Capabilities
- SN 3.3.4  
Apply National Nonlethal Capabilities
- SN 3.3.5  
Conduct National Combat Assessment
- SN 3.3.6  
Determine National Residual Capabilities









## SN 5 PROVIDE STRATEGIC DIRECTION AND INTEGRATION









## SN 6 CONDUCT MOBILIZATION


**Prepare Units and Individuals at Mobilization Station (MS) or CONUS Replacement Center (CRC) for Deployment** SN 6.5

- SN 6.5.1  
Receive and Provide Base and Operations Support for Units and Individuals
- SN 6.5.2  
Evaluate RC Units for Deployment
- SN 6.5.3  
Cross-Level and Redistribute Personnel and Equipment
- SN 6.5.4  
Train Units and Individuals to Minimum Operationally Ready/POR Status
- SN 6.5.5  
Secure Clearance for Deploying Nonvalidated Units

**Mobilize CONUS Sustaining Base** SN 6.6

- SN 6.6.1  
Expand Mobilization Stations
- SN 6.6.2  
Expand Training Base
- SN 6.6.3  
Expand Logistic Support
- SN 6.6.4  
Expand Health Service Support
- SN 6.6.5  
Expand Transportation System
- SN 6.6.6  
Expand Other Support
- SN 6.6.7  
Plan and Maintain Industrial Base Capabilities

**Provide Command and Control over Mobilized Forces** SN 6.7



## SN 8 FOSTER MULTINATIONAL AND INTERAGENCY RELATIONS

### Support Other Nations or Groups SN 8.1

- SN 8.1.1 Provide Security Assistance
- SN 8.1.2 Support Nation Assistance
- SN 8.1.3 Support Peace Operations
- SN 8.1.4 Support Military Civic Actions
- SN 8.1.5 Conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Humanitarian and Civic Assistance
- SN 8.1.6 Provide Civil Affairs Support Policy
- SN 8.1.7 Coordinate Information Sharing Arrangements
- SN 8.1.8 Provide Support to Foreign Internal Defense in Theater
- SN 8.1.9 Cooperate With and Support NGOs and PVOs
- SN 8.1.10 Coordinate Actions to Combat Terrorism
- SN 8.1.11 Support Countermine Activities
- SN 8.1.12 Coordinate Counterproliferation Programs and Activities


### Provide DOD/ Government - Wide Support SN 8.2


- SN 8.2.1 Support DOD and Joint Agencies
- SN 8.2.2 Support Other Government Agencies
- SN 8.2.3 Support Evacuation of Noncombatants from Theaters
- SN 8.2.4 Assist Civil Defense


### Coordinate Military Activities Within the Interagency Process. SN 8.3

- SN 8.3.1 Coordinate and Control Policy for the Conduct of Operations
- SN 8.3.2 Conduct Information management in the Interagency Process
- SN 8.3.3 Establish Interagency Cooperation Structures
- SN 8.3.4 Perform Consequence Management (CM) in the Interagency Arena
- SN 8.3.5 Coordinate DOD/ Government Information Operations (IO)


# ST 1 DEPLOY, CONCENTRATE, AND MANEUVER THEATER FORCES





















## ST 5 PROVIDE THEATER STRATEGIC COMMAND AND CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPUTERS (C4)



# ST 5 PROVIDE THEATER STRATEGIC COMMAND AND CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPUTERS (C4)

## Provide Strategic Direction to Theater Forces ST 5.4

- ST 5.4.1  
Issue Theater Strategic  
Operation Plans, Orders,  
and ROE
- ST 5.4.2  
Synchronize Joint  
Operations and Subordinate  
Campaign Plans
- ST 5.4.3  
Establish or Participate in a  
Joint, Combined, or  
Multinational Force

ST 5.4.3.1  
Augment the Joint Force Staff

ST 5.4.3.2  
Activate Combatant Command  
Boards, Centers, Cells, and Bureaus

STA 5.4.3.3  
Develop Joint Force Liaison  
Structure

## Conduct Theater-Wide Information Operations (IO) ST 5.5

- ST 5.5.1  
Plan and Integrate Theater-  
Wide Information Operations  
(IO)
- ST 5.5.2  
Control Theater Information  
Operations (IO)
- ST 5.5.3  
Establish and Monitor Theater  
Information Security Policy,  
Plans, Programs, and Direction

## Develop and Provide Public Affairs in Theater ST 5.6

- ST 5.6.1  
Plan and Provide for  
External Media Support  
and Operations
- ST 5.6.2  
Coordinate Command/  
Internal Information  
Programs
- ST 5.6.3  
Plan and Conduct  
Community Relations  
Program

# ST 6 COORDINATE THEATER FORCE PROTECTION

## Provide Theater Missile Defense

ST 6.1

ST 6.1.1  
Process Theater Air  
and Space Targets

ST 6.1.2  
Provide Airspace  
Control Measures

ST 6.1.3  
Establish Theater Space  
System Force Enhancement  
Operations

ST 6.1.4  
Organize and Coordinate  
Theater Air Defense

ST 6.1.5  
Organize and Coordinate  
Theater Missile Defense

ST 6.1.6  
Support Tactical Warning  
and Attack Assessment in  
Theater

## Coordinate Protection for Theater Forces and Means

ST 6.2

ST 6.2.1  
Coordinate the Preparation  
of Strategically Significant  
Defenses

ST 6.2.2  
Coordinate the Removal of  
Strategically Significant  
Hazards

ST 6.2.3  
Protect Use of  
Electromagnetic Spectrum

ST 6.2.4  
Ensure Acoustic  
Protection

ST 6.2.5  
Moved to:  
ST 5.1.9

ST 6.2.6  
Establish Security  
Procedures for  
Theater Forces and Means

ST 6.2.6.1  
Establish and Coordinate  
Counter-Reconnaissance  
Theater-Wide

ST 6.2.6.2  
Establish and Coordinate  
Protection of Theater  
Installation, Facilities,  
and Systems

ST 6.2.6.3  
Establish and Coordinate  
Protection of Theater Air,  
Land, and Sea LOCs

ST 6.2.6.4  
Establish and Coordinate  
Theater-Wide  
Counterintelligence  
Requirements

ST 6.2.7  
Initiate and Coordinate  
Personnel Recovery in Theater

ST 6.2.7.1

Operate Theater Joint  
Search and Rescue Center (JSRC)


ST 6.2.7.2  
Coordinate Civil  
Search and Rescue

ST 6.2.7.3  
Coordinate Combat  
Search and Rescue

ST 6.2.7.4  
Support Evasion  
and Escape in Theater

ST 6.2.8  
Establish NBC  
Defense in  
Theater

ST 6.2.9  
Move to:  
ST 4.2.2  
ST 4.6





## ST 7 ESTABLISH THEATER FORCE REQUIREMENTS AND READINESS

### Recommend Warfighting and other Requirements and Test Concepts ST 7.1

#### ST 7.1.1

Provide OPLANS for Mobilization  
and Deployment Planning  
and Execution

#### ST 7.1.2

Determine Deployment Requirements

#### ST 7.1.3

Tailor Joint Forces for Deployment

#### ST 7.1.4

Determine and Validate Forces  
and Cargo to be Deployed or Redeployed

#### ST 7.1.5

Determine Theater Warfighting  
and Other Needs, Solutions, and Concepts

#### ST 7.1.6

Determine Theater Force Size  
and Structure Requirements

#### ST 7.1.7

Establish Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL)

### Maintain and Report Readiness of Theater Forces ST 7.2

#### ST 7.2.1

Determine and Report Force Readiness

#### ST 7.2.2

Assess and Report Theater Military Capability

#### ST 7.2.3

Conduct Joint After Action Reporting

#### ST 7.2.4

Assess Training and Education Effectiveness


# ST 8 DEVELOP AND MAINTAIN ALLIANCE AND REGIONAL RELATIONS

## Foster Alliance and Regional Relations Security Arrangements ST 8.1

- ST 8.1.1  
Enhance Regional Politico-  
Military Relations
- ST 8.1.2  
Promote Regional Security  
and Interoperability
- ST 8.1.3  
Develop Headquarters or  
Organizations for Coalitions
- ST 8.1.4  
Develop Multinational  
Intelligence/Information  
Sharing Structure

## Provide Support to Allies, Regional Governments, International Organizations or Groups ST 8.2

- ST 8.2.1  
Coordinate Security  
Assistance Activities
- ST 8.2.2  
Coordinate Civil Affairs  
in Theater
- ST 8.2.3  
Coordinate Foreign Disaster  
Relief
- ST 8.2.4  
Coordinate Foreign  
Humanitarian and Civil  
Assistance Programs
- ST 8.2.5  
Coordinate Nation Assistance  
Support
- ST 8.2.6  
Coordinate Military Civic  
Action Assistance
- ST 8.2.7  
Assist in Restoration of Order
- ST 8.2.8  
Support Peace Operations  
in Theater
- ST 8.2.8.1  
Support Multilateral Peace  
Operations
- ST 8.2.8.2  
Establish and Coordinate a  
Peacekeeping Infrastructure
- ST 8.2.8.3  
Coordinate Peace Enforcement
- ST 8.2.9  
Coordinate Theater Foreign  
Internal Defense Activities
- ST 8.2.10  
Coordinate Multinational  
Operations Within Theater
- ST 8.2.11  
Cooperate With and Support  
Nongovernment Organizations  
(NGOs) in Theater
- ST 8.2.12  
Cooperate With and Support Private  
Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) in  
Theater
- ST 8.2.13  
Coordinate Countermeasures Activities



# OP 1 CONDUCT OPERATIONAL MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER

## Conduct Operational Movement OP 1.1


- OP 1.1.1  
Formulate Request for Strategic Deployment to a Joint Operations Area (JOA)
- OP 1.1.2  
Conduct Intratheater Deployment and Redeployment of Forces within Joint Operations Area (JOA)
- OP 1.1.3  
Conduct Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (JSOI) in the Joint Operations Area (JOA)

## Conduct Operational Maneuver and Force Positioning OP 1.2

- OP 1.2.1  
Coordinate the Transition of Joint Forces to and from Tactical Battle Formations
- OP 1.2.2  
Posture Joint Forces for Operational Formations
- OP 1.2.3  
Assemble Forces in the Joint Operations Area (JOA)
- OP 1.2.4  
Conduct Operations in Depth
- OP 1.2.4.1  
Conduct a Show of Force
- OP 1.2.4.2  
Conduct a Demonstration
- OP 1.2.4.3  
Conduct Forcible Entry: Airborne, Amphibious, and Air Assault
- OP 1.2.4.4  
Reinforce and Expand Lodgment.
- OP 1.2.4.5  
Conduct Raids in the Joint Operations Area (JOA)
- OP 1.2.4.6  
Conduct Penetration, Direct Assault, and Turning Movements
- OP 1.2.4.7  
Conduct Direct Action in the Joint Operations Area (JOA)
- OP 1.2.4.8  
Conduct Unconventional Warfare in the Joint Operations Area (JOA)
- OP 1.2.5  
Conduct Offensive Operations in the Joint Operations Area (JOA)
- OP 1.2.6  
Conduct Defensive Operations in the Joint Operations Area (JOA)
- OP 1.2.7  
Conduct Retrograde Operations in the Joint Operations Area (JOA)

## Provide Operational Mobility OP 1.3

- OP 1.3.1  
Overcome Operationally Significant Barriers, Obstacles, and Mines
- OP 1.3.2  
Enhance Movement of Operational Forces
- OP 1.3.3  
Coordinate Waterspace Management



## **OP 2 PROVIDE OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE**

### **Direct Operational Intelligence Activities OP 2.1**

OP 2.1.1  
Determine and Prioritize  
Operational Priority  
Intelligence Requirements  
(PIR)

OP 2.1.2  
Determine and Prioritize  
Operational Information  
Requirements (IR)

OP 2.1.3  
Prepare Operational  
Collection Plan

OP 2.1.4  
Allocate Intelligence  
Resources in the Joint  
Operations Area (JOA)

### **Collect and Share Operational Information OP 2.2**

OP 2.2.1  
Collect Information on  
Operational Situation

OP 2.2.2  
Directly Support Theater  
Strategic Surveillance and  
Reconnaissance Requirements

OP 2.2.3  
Collect and Assess Meteorological  
and Oceanographic (METOC)  
Operational Information

OP 2.2.4  
Determine Logistical Capabilities of the  
Joint Operations Area (JOA)


OP 2.2.5  
Collect Target Information


### **Process and Exploit Collected Operational Information OP 2.3**

OP 2.3.1  
Conduct Technical Processing  
and Exploitation in the  
Joint Operations Area (JOA)


OP 2.3.2  
Collate Information


OP 2.3.3  
Correlate Information























## OP 6 PROVIDE OPERATIONAL FORCE PROTECTION

### Provide Operational Air, Space, and Missile Defense OP 6.1

- OP 6.1.1 Process/Allocate Operational Aerospace Targets
- OP 6.1.2 Integrate Joint/Multinational Operational Aerospace Defense
- OP 6.1.3 Provide Airspace Control
- OP 6.1.3.1 Employ Positive Control Measures
- OP 6.1.3.2 Employ Procedural Control Measures
- OP 6.1.4 Counter Enemy Air Attack (Defensive Counterair (DCA)) in the Joint Operations Area (JOA)
- OP 6.1.5 Conduct Joint Operations Area (JOA) Missile Defense
- OP 6.1.6 Conduct Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment in the Joint Operations Area (JOA)

### Provide Protection for Operational Forces, Means, and Noncombatants OP 6.2

- OP 6.2.1 Prepare Operationally Significant Defenses
- OP 6.2.2 Remove Operationally Significant Hazards
- OP 6.2.3 Protect Use of Electromagnetic Spectrum in the Joint Operations Area (JOA)
- OP 6.2.4 Protect Use of the Acoustic Spectrum in the Joint Operations Area (JOA)
- OP 6.2.5 Moved to: OP 5.1.11
- OP 6.2.6 Conduct Evacuation of Noncombatants from the Joint Operations Area (JOA)
- OP 6.2.7 Moved to OP 4.7.8
- OP 6.2.8 Establish NBC Protection in the Joint Operations Area (JOA)
- OP 6.2.9 Coordinate and Conduct Personnel Recovery
- OP 6.2.9.1 Provide Civil Search and Rescue
- OP 6.2.9.2 Provide Combat Search and Rescue
- OP 6.2.10 Develop and Execute Actions to Control Pollution and Hazardous Materials
- OP 6.2.11 Provide Counterdeception Operations
- OP 6.2.12 Provide Counter-Psychological Operations
- OP 6.1.13 Conduct Countermine Activities
- OP 6.1.14 Employ Operations Security (OPSEC) in the Joint Operations Area (JOA)

## OP 6 PROVIDE OPERATIONAL FORCE PROTECTION

### Protect Systems and Capabilities in the Joint Operations Area (JOA) OP 6.3

- OP 6.3.1  
Moved to OP 6.2.14
- OP 6.3.2  
Supervise Communications Security (COMSEC)
- OP 6.3.3  
Employ Electronics Security in the Joint Operation Area (JOA) for Operational Forces
- OP 6.3.4  
Protect Information Systems in the Joint Operations Area (JOA)
- OP 6.3.5  
Coordinate Concealment of Forces/Facilities


### Conduct Military Deception in Support of Subordinate Campaigns and Major Operations OP 6.4


- OP 6.4.1  
Develop Operational Deception Plan
- OP 6.4.2  
Conduct Operational Deception
- OP 6.4.3  
Assess Effect of Operational Deception Plan


### Provide Security for Operational Forces and Means OP 6.5


- OP 6.5.1  
Provide Counterreconnaissance in the Joint Operations Area (JOA)
- OP 6.5.2  
Protect and Secure Flanks, Rear Areas, and COMMZ in the Joint Operations Area (JOA)
- OP 6.5.3  
Protect/Secure Operationally Critical Installations, Facilities, and Systems
- OP 6.5.4  
Protect and Secure Air, Land, and Sea LOCs in the Joint Operations Area (JOA)
- OP 6.5.5  
Integrate Host-Nation Security Forces and Means

















TA 6.2.1  
Establish and  
Operate a Joint  
Search and  
Rescue Center

TA 6.4.1  
Establish and Operate  
Joint Evacuation  
Control Center

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**APPENDIX C**

**OPERATIONS LIBRARY**

**FOR JOINT EXERCISE**

**MANAGEMENT**

**PACKAGE III MISSION**

**REQUIREMENTS**

**MODULE (JEMP III**

**MRM)**



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## APPENDIX C

### OPERATIONS LIBRARY FOR JOINT EXERCISE MANAGEMENT PACKAGE III MISSION REQUIREMENTS MODULE (JEMP III MRM)

1. Introduction. These descriptions are consistent with the operations titles found in the JEMP III MRM software. The original list of terms in the MRM do not include descriptions for Information Operations (IO) and Information Warfare (IW) that are included in this appendix. Also, when using the MRM, operators may use, as appropriate, the descriptions for IO, IW, and command and control warfare (C2W) in this appendix when selecting C2W from the list of operations.

2. Mission Analysis.

a. The types of operations listed in this appendix provide an important link in the mission analysis process that ultimately is designed to identify mission essential tasks associated with the concept of operations. The success of any requirements-based analysis of military capabilities depends on the ability of the CINCs and their staffs to describe their mission requirements using a common task framework. In the Joint Training System, JMETLs are developed using such a requirements-based process, in conjunction with the UJTL.

b. The process starts with a mission (an assignment with a purpose) that provides direction to a command. The command then develops a "concept of operations" for the mission, which begins the process of establishing mission requirements. Joint Publication 1-02 defines a concept of operations as frequently "...embodied in campaign plans and operation plans; in the latter case, particularly when the plans cover a series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession." The list of operations contained in this appendix is designed to provide a menu for use by joint force commanders as part of their process of developing their mission requirements. Operations that comprise a concept of operations consist of a variety of tasks. Joint Publication 1-02 defines an operation as "...the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign." Based on the doctrine for each type of operation, various tasks from the UTJL and Service task lists can be identified that will provide structure to the operation.

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3. Development of Operations List. Operations in this appendix and the MRM were identified through an analysis of joint and Service doctrine (primarily joint doctrine). In addition to the operations lists in this appendix, each military Service could identify many types of operations peculiar to that Service's unique capabilities and doctrine. Each of the operations listed below is based in doctrine and defined based upon the doctrine listed with the definition.

4. Organization of Operations. The operations are listed under four broad categories, listed below:

- a. Force Employment (equates to Major Theater War (MTW))
- b. Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)
- c. Support (operations in MTW and MOOTW)
- d. Planning (not operations per se, but included in everyone)

5. Operations Definitions:

a. Force Employment. The series of operations always found in Major Theater Wars (MTW), conducted in a hostile environment, against an enemy force.

(1) Theater Counterair. Those operations conducted within the geographic confines of a Theater to attain and maintain a desired degree of air superiority by the destruction or neutralization of enemy forces. Counterair operations can be either offensive or defensive. The choice between offensive and defensive operations is based on the joint force commander's assessment of the overall threat, the mission, forces available, and other considerations of the operational situation. Counterair operations include such measures as the use of interceptors, bombers, antiaircraft guns, SAMs, and ECM to destroy the air or missile threat both before and after it is launched. (JP 1-02, JP 3-01.2)

(a) Offensive Counterair (OCA). OCA operations are those counterair operations mounted to destroy, disrupt or limit enemy airpower before it can be brought to bear. Such operations aim at attacking as close as possible to the source of enemy airpower. OCA operations are conducted at a time and place of friendly force choosing rather than in reaction to enemy initiatives. (JP 1-02, JP 3-01.2)

(b) Defensive Counterair (DCA). DCA operations (air defense) are those counterair operations conducted primarily in reaction to enemy air offensive initiatives and include all measures and means designed to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air attacks against the joint force.

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DCA operations defend friendly lines of communication, protect friendly bases, and support friendly land and naval forces while denying the enemy the freedom to carry out offensive air operations. DCA operations encompass both passive (cover, concealment, dispersion, deception, and mobility), and active (airborne and surface ESM, SIGINT, and weapons systems). (JP 1-02, JP 3-01.2)

(c) Theater Missile Defense (TMD). TMD operations counter the TM threat (ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and air-to-surface missiles whose targets are within a given theater of operation). TMD is composed of four operational elements: passive defense; active defense; attack operations; and command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I). TMD is inherently joint in nature and the TM threat may appear across a range of military operations. In the planning stage of a mission or operation, TMD forces, requirements, and capabilities must be integrated into all phases of the mission or operation. (JP 3-01.5, JP 3-10.1)

(d) Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD). SEAD is any activity that neutralizes, destroys, or temporarily degrades enemy surface-based air defenses by either destructive or disruptive means. Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (J-SEAD) is a broad term that encompasses all SEAD activities provided by components of a joint force in support of one another. SEAD and J-SEAD should be integral to planning and executing joint air operations. (JP 1-02, JP 3-01.4)

(2) Rear Area Security. Rear Area Security encompasses those activities which facilitate protection and operation of installations and forces supporting the main force. In the Joint arena, the rear area is called the Joint Rear Area (JRA). Included in Rear Area Security operations are those security operations which prevent or minimize disruption of support; prevent or minimize enemy interference with friendly C4I; protect personnel and facilities; protect Rear Area lines of communication (LOCs); find, fix, contain, and defeat the enemy; plan and execute area damage control and assess and prioritize bases. Achieving local and overall security in the JRA requires establishing unity of command and unity of effort among all forces in the JRA, to include combat forces transiting and operating in the JRA. (JP 1-02, JP 3-10, JP 3-10.1)

(3) Joint Interdiction. Joint Interdiction operations encompass those actions designed to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy's surface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces. Joint interdiction is conducted in support of theater or joint operations area (JOA) wide priorities or between supporting and supported components.

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Joint interdiction operations can achieve tactical, operational, or strategic level effects. (JP 1-02, JP 3-0, JP 3-03)

(4) Land Offense (LO). Land offense operations are those operations conducted by joint force land forces. These operations may be undertaken to secure key or decisive terrain, to deprive the enemy of resources or decisive terrain, to deceive or divert the enemy, to develop intelligence, or to hold the enemy in position. Forms of land offense operations are movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit. These operations are taken by the joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. (JP 3-0, JP 3-02.1, FM 101-5-1, FM 100-5)

(a) Movement to Contact (LO). Movement to contact is that form of land offense operation employed by the land forces to gain or re-establish contact with the enemy. The aim of the movement to contact is to gain an advantage over the enemy to facilitate future operations by establishing contact and developing and exploiting the situation. On establishing enemy contact, the on scene commander has five basic options: hasty attack, hasty defense, report and bypass, delay, or withdraw.

(b) Attack (LO). The attack is that form of land offense operation characterized by coordinated movement supported by fire. It may be designated as a main or supporting attack. The principal attack options include hasty attack, deliberate attack, spoiling attack, counterattack, raid, feint, and demonstration.

(c) Exploitation (LO). Exploitation is a form of land offense operation that is a direct follow-on to a successful attack. It is dominated by the core functions of move and strike. The object of exploitation is complete disintegration of the enemy. Exploitation is characterized by speed, mobility, and maximum freedom of action of commanders at the point of decision, minimum necessary control measures, highly reliable communications, and accurate reporting.

(d) Pursuit (LO). Pursuit is that form of land offense operation that sequentially follows attack and exploitation. Pursuit is designed to cut off and annihilate a hostile force. Dominated by the core functions move and strike, it is normally conducted as a series of encirclements in which successive portions of the fleeing enemy are intercepted and captured or destroyed. Pursuit operations are characterized by decentralization, initiated from the front vice directed from the rear, and require the use of both a direct-pressure force and an encircling force.

(5) Land Defense (LD). Land defense operations are those operations conducted by land forces, which resist, defeat, or destroy an enemy attack.

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Alone they achieve no decision, so they must be followed by, or combined with, offensive action. Land defense operations are normally conducted to develop favorable conditions for offensive action, destroy or trap a hostile force, reduce the enemy capacity for offensive action, deny an enemy entry into an area, deny an enemy access to designated terrain or facilities, or to economize forces in one area in order to apply decisive force elsewhere. There are two types of land defense operations; the area defense and the mobile defense.

(a) Area (LD). The area defense denies the enemy's access to specific terrain or facilities for a specified time. In an area defense, the joint force land component commander does not seek to destroy the attacking force outright. Area defense operations are normally tied to other simultaneous or subsequent operations to achieve a decisive defeat of the enemy. The area defense is characterized by use of obstacles and planned fires, mutually supporting positions, and the use of mobile reserves to execute local counterattacks.

(b) Mobile (LD). Mobile defenses are force-oriented operations designed to defeat and ultimately destroy an attacking force. They trade terrain to expose the enemy to a counterattack. Mobile defense operations consist of a minimum force deploying forward to set up a counterattack and a large striking force capable of executing a decisive counterattack for the joint force land component commander. A mobile defense is characterized by speed, flexibility, mobility, and a very tightly knit command and control architecture. A reserve may be constituted to give the striking force additional flexibility in dealing with unexpected situations.

(6) Land Retrograde (LR). A land retrograde operation is a movement away from the enemy force. It may be forced or voluntary. A higher commander than the executing force commander must approve the retrograde operation. Such operations are conducted to improve an operational or tactical situation or prevent a worse one from developing. There are three types of retrograde operations: delays, withdrawals, and retirements. They are designed to resist, exhaust, and damage an enemy force; draw the enemy into an unfavorable position; avoid combat in undesirable conditions; gain time without fighting a decisive engagement; disengage from battle; and reposition forces, shorten lines of communication, or conform to movements of other friendly troops

(a) Delay (LR). A land retrograde delay operation is a form of retrograde operation in which a force under pressure trades space for time by slowing down the enemy's momentum and by inflicting maximum damage on the enemy without, in principle, becoming decisively engaged.

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Delaying operations allow the joint force land component commander to concentrate, preserve, or withdraw forces; to establish defenses in greater depth; to economize forces in an area; to cover a defending or withdrawing unit; to protect a friendly unit's flank; or to complete offensive actions elsewhere. In the delay, the destruction of the enemy force is secondary to slowing his advance to gain time. (JP 1-02)

(b) Withdrawal (LR). A withdrawal is a form of land retrograde operation in which forces voluntarily withdraw from contact with the enemy in order to remove all or part of the force from combat, to adjust defensive positions, or to relocate the force to perform other missions. The withdrawal may be conducted with or without enemy pressure. Withdrawal operations are characterized by simultaneous movement of all force elements whenever possible, information dominance of the withdrawing force, the use of cover, concealment and deception, and the use of feints and demonstrations by other elements of the joint force. (JP 1-02)

(c) Retirement (LR). A retirement is a form of land retrograde operation in which units not in contact with the enemy move further away from the enemy. Retirement operations allow the joint force land component commander to position forces for other missions, to adjust his defensive scheme, to prepare to assist other units' delays and withdrawals, or to deceive the enemy. Retiring units are normally covered by the security forces of another unit to their rear. As such, retirements are normally conducted as tactical road movements where security and speed are the most important considerations. Normally, retiring units move at night or during periods of limited visibility. Operation security (OPSEC) is critical to the retirement operation. (JP 1-02)

(7) Maritime Operations (MO). MO are those operations normally conducted by naval forces and encompassing sub-surface, surface, and air operations. In a maritime Major Theater War (MTW) environment, the maritime air operations would most likely be joint operations. MO include antisubmarine warfare (ASW), barrier operations, surface operations to destroy enemy naval forces, surface and air operations to destroy enemy bases and infrastructure, operations to seize advanced naval bases, and blockade operations. (JP 1-02, JP 3-04)

(a) Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) (MO). ASW is that set of maritime operations conducted by the joint force naval component commander to protect the naval forces and ensure control and dominance of the sea underwater areas in the joint operating area (JOA). The ASW protection of a force depends on defense-in-depth and close coordination

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between maritime and patrol aircraft, helicopters, surface ships, and friendly submarines. (JP 1-02)

(b) Barrier (MO). Barrier is that set of maritime operations conducted by the joint force naval component commander to delay, disrupt, or attrit enemy forces or to protect friendly forces. Barrier operations are normally conducted as part of joint doctrine barrier, obstacle and mine warfare operations. These operations are always conducted as part of a larger campaign and normally require the support of other joint forces in the JTF. (JP 1-02, JP 3-15)

(c) Destroy Enemy Naval Forces (MO). Destroy enemy naval forces is that set of offensive maritime operations conducted by the joint force naval component commander to specifically target enemy naval forces. These operations require a finely tuned C4I architecture and encompass anti-air warfare (AAW), anti-surface warfare (ASUW), and anti-submarine warfare (ASW). Other elements of the joint task force may be called upon to assist in the conduct of these operations. The end purpose of these operations is to ensure protection of the joint force and to ensure open and protected sea lines of communications to and from the joint operations area (JOA). (JP 3-0)

(d) Destroy Enemy Bases/Infrastructure (MO). Destroy enemy bases/infrastructure is that set of offensive maritime operations conducted by the joint force naval component commander to destroy or neutralize the enemy's ability to control and support his own naval forces. These operations require accurate intelligence, a sophisticated C4I architecture, the use of air, surface, and possibly sub-surface elements of the naval component, and may require the use of other elements of the JTF.

(e) Seize Advanced Bases (MO). Seize advanced bases is that set of offensive maritime operations conducted by the joint force naval component commander to obtain sites for further prosecution of the campaign. These operations are normally conducted by naval expeditionary force using landing force elements to physically seize and occupy the bases. (JP 3-0, JP 3-02, JP 3-02.1)

(8) Blockade. A blockade is an operation conducted by a joint force to isolate a place, especially a port, harbor, or part of a coast, by ships or troops and aircraft to prevent enemy forces from entry or exit. Blockades have strategic implications and are normally ordered at the theater level or higher. (JP 3-0, JP 3-04)



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(9) Nuclear. Nuclear operations are those strategic operations in which nuclear weapons are employed against enemy forces or facilities. The decision to employ nuclear weapons lies solely with the President of the United States. Considerations in nuclear force planning and employment must include the characteristics and limitations of the nuclear forces available and seek to optimize both the survivability and combat effectiveness of these forces. (JP 3-0, JP 3-12)

(10) Theater Nuclear. Theater nuclear operations are those nuclear operations conducted within a specific theater. The same restrictions apply as for other nuclear operations. Only the President of the United States can authorize the use of theater nuclear weapons. The theater nuclear forces are integrated with conventional forces and function under the command of the geographic combatant commander. (JP 3-0, JP 3-12, JP 3-12.1)

(11) Space. Space operations are those operations, which leverage space assets to control the space environment, apply force, conduct enabling and supporting operations for terrestrial forces and support space forces. Space operations include space control operations; which provide freedom of action in space for friendly forces while denying it to an enemy, and include the broad aspects of protection of US and US allied space systems and negation of enemy space systems; and space support operations, which ensure that space control and support of terrestrial forces are maintained. Space support operations include launching and deploying space vehicles, maintaining and sustaining space vehicles while they are in orbit, and recovering space vehicles as required. (JP 1-02, JP 3-0)

(12) Strategic Attack. In the conduct of a campaign against an enemy, an early advantage is taken by conducting direct attacks against enemy strategic centers of gravity. These operations may be conducted by the range of capabilities available or made available to the JFC. When a functional capability is selected, and the bulk of the capability needed to attack enemy centers of gravity are from one functional area, the functional commander will normally be tasked as the supported commander to conduct such operations. (JP 3-0)

(13) Information Operations (IO). IO are those actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems. (DODD S3600.1, CJCSI 3210.01A, CJCSI 6510.01B, JP 3-13.1)

Note: IO are continuous in nature and are conducted across the full range of military operations. While IO are conducted

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within the military information environment, they interact with the global information environment.

(a) Information Warfare (IW). Information operations conducted during time of crisis or conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries. (DODD S3600.1, CJCSI 3210.01A, CJCSI 6510.01B, JP 3-13.1)

Note: IW is a subset of IO that is only conducted during crisis or conflict. Actions may be taken by a commander to achieve information superiority by affecting adversary information, information-based processes, information systems, and computer-based networks while defending one's own information, information-based processes, information systems, and computer-based networks.

(b) Command and Control Warfare (C2W). C2W is the integrated use of operations security (OPSEC), military deception, psychological operations (PSYOP), electronic warfare (EW), and physical destruction, mutually supported by intelligence; to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary command and control capabilities, while protecting friendly command and control capabilities against such actions. C2W is an application of information operations in military operations. C2W is both offensive and defensive: a. C2 attack. Prevent effective C2 of adversary forces by denying information to, influencing, degrading, or destroying the adversary C2 system. b. C2-protect. Maintain effective command and control of own forces by turning to friendly advantage or negating adversary efforts to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy the friendly C2 system. (DODD S3600.1, CJCSI 3210.01A, CJCSI 6510.01B)

b. Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). MOOTW encompass a wide range of activities where the military instrument of national power is used for purposes other than the large-scale combat operations usually associated with war. Although these operations are often conducted outside the United States, they also include military support to US civil authorities. Military operations other than war usually involve a combination of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces as well as the efforts of governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations in a complementary fashion. (JP 3-0, JP 3-07)

(1) Foreign Internal Defense (FID). FID operations support a host nation's fight against lawlessness, subversion, and insurgency. US military support to FID focuses on assisting host nation personnel to anticipate,

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preclude, and counter these threats. Specific tools in support of FID are multinational exercises, exchange programs, civil-military operations, intelligence and communications sharing, logistic support to security assistance programs, and combat operations. (JP 3-0, JP 3-07, JP 3-07.1)

(2) Combating Terrorism (CT). Combating terrorism operations are those activities both offensive (counterterrorism), and defensive (anti-terrorism) in nature. The former typically occurs outside the territory of the United States, while the latter may occur anywhere in the world. The Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Federal Aviation Administration are actively involved in antiterrorism operations. (JP 1-02, JP 3-0, JP 3-07)

(a) Antiterrorism (CT). Antiterrorism operations include defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces. These operations take place both in the United States and in worldwide bases, installations, embassies, and consulates. (JP 1-02, JP 3-0, JP 3-07, JP 3-07.2)

(b) Counterterrorism (CT). Counterterrorism operations are offensive in nature and involve measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Sensitive and compartmented counterterrorism programs are addressed in relevant National Security Decision Directives (NSDDs), National Security Directives (NSDs), contingency plans, and other relevant classified documents. (JP 1-02, JP 3-0, JP 3-07, JP 3-07.2, JP 3-05)

(3) Peace Operations (PO). Peace operations are those operations undertaken to achieve a peaceful settlement among belligerent parties. Peace Operations encompass three general areas: diplomatic, traditional peacekeeping, and forceful military actions. The three types of peace operations are peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace enforcement. Peace operations are not typically conducted within the territory of the United States. (JP 3-0, JP 3-07)

(a) Peacekeeping (PO). Peacekeeping operations (PKO) are those military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreements), and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. (JP 3-0, JP 3-07, JP 3-07, JP 3-07.3)

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(b) Peacemaking (PO). Peacemaking operations constitute the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute, and resolves issues that led to conflict. Military activities that support peacemaking include military-to-military relations and security assistance. (JP 3-0, JP 3-07, JP 3-07.3)

(c) Peace Enforcement (PO). Peace enforcement operations (PEO) are the application of military force, or threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. PEO missions include intervention operations, as well as operations to restore order, enforce sanctions, forcibly separate belligerents, and establish and supervise exclusion zones for the purpose of establishing an environment for truce or cease-fire. Unlike PKO, such operations do not require the consent of the states involved, or of the other parties to the conflict. (JP 3-0, JP 3-07, JP 3-07.3)

(4) Counterdrug. Counterdrug operations include detection and monitoring, support to cooperative foreign governments, support for interdiction; support to drug law enforcement agencies, internal drug prevention and treatment programs, research and development, and C4I support. Counterdrug operations conducted by the Department of Defense support the National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS). (JP 3-0, JP 3-07, JP 3-07.4)

(5) Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO). NEO are operations that safely and quickly remove civilian noncombatants from an area outside the United States where they are being, or may be, threatened. Although NEO are principally conducted for US citizens, Armed Forces of the United States may also evacuate citizens from host, allied, or friendly nations if the National Command Authorities (NCA) determines it to be in the best interest of the United States. The Department of State (DOS) has the lead in conducting NEO. US ambassadors or chiefs of diplomatic missions are responsible for planning for NEOs by preparing emergency action plans to be implemented when NEOs are required. (JP 3-0, JP 3-07, JP 3-07.5)

(6) Humanitarian Assistance (HA). HA operations are those operations conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life, or that can result in great damage to, or loss of, property. HA provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities

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or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing HA. (JP 1-02, JP 3-0, JP 3-07)

(7) Domestic Support. Domestic support operations are those operations conducted within the United States in support of civil authorities. Such operations include disaster-related civil emergencies, civil defense for attacks directed against the territory of the United States, assistance to law enforcement agencies in civil disturbance situations, protection of life and federal property, and prevention of disruptions at federal functions. The Armed Forces of the United States can augment domestic governments of the United States. Such operations can include support to education systems, medical facilities, emergency response, and transportation systems in remote and depressed areas. (JP 3-0, JP 3-07)

(8) Maritime Intercept Operations (MIO). MIO are those enforcement of sanctions operations which employ coercive measures to interdict the movement of certain types of designated items into or out of a nation or specified area. These operations are military in nature and serve both political and military purposes. The political objective is to compel a country or group to conform to the objectives of the initiating body. The military objective is to establish a barrier, which is selective, allowing only those goods authorized to enter or exit. Depending on geography, MIO sanction operations involve some combination of air and surface forces. Assigned forces should be capable of complementary mutual support and full communications compatibility. (JP 3-0, JP 3-07)

(9) Consequence Management (CM). CM operations comprise USG interagency assistance to protect public health and safety, restore government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of a terrorist incident involving the employment of a weapon of mass destruction/high yield explosive (WMD/HYE). WMD/HYE is any weapon or device intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of people through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxin or poisonous chemicals, or other precursors; a disease organism; radiation or radioactivity; or high yield explosive. Consequence management operations may be either domestic or foreign.

(a) Domestic Consequence Management. Domestic consequence management operations are conducted within the US and its territories in support of civil authorities dealing with WMD/HYE related incidents. These operations involve specialized assistance in response to the use of WMD/HYE against US domestic vital interests.

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(b) Foreign Consequence Management. Foreign consequence management operations are conducted outside the US and its territories in support of host-nation authorities dealing with WMD/HYE related incidents. These operations involve specialized assistance in response to the use of WMD/HYE against US military forces, allies, regional friends, or vital interests.

(c) Support. Support operations comprise the set of operations that may be conducted in both Major Theater Wars (MTW) and in military operations other than war.

(1) Force Projection (FP). Force projection operations are those operations directed by the NCA to respond quickly to an emerging or escalating crisis. In force projection operations forces are strategically lifted from CONUS or another theater. Force projection operations may be opposed or unopposed. When opposed, forcible entry operations may be required. Characteristics of force projection operations are the requirement for a forced entry capability in opposed situations, the protection of forces, rapid force buildup, a robust liaison and communications capability, and complete dimensional superiority. (JP 3-0, JP 3-07)

(a) Mobilization (FP). Mobilization operations are those sets of activities by which the Armed Forces of the United States, or part of them, are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. This includes activating all or part of the Reserve components as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel. (JP 4-05)

(b) Deployment (FP). Deployment operations are those sets of operations that relocate forces and materiel to desired operation areas. Deployment encompasses all activities from origin or home station through destination, specifically including intra-continental United States, inter-theater, and intratheater movement legs, staging, and holding areas. (JP 1-02, JP 4-0, JP 4-01)

(c) Reception, Staging, Onward Movement & Integration (RSOI) (FP). RSOI operations are those operations conducted in-theater to receive units, personnel, equipment, and materiel, and to process them and move them to the point at which they will be transferred to the responsible operational commander, available for battle. These operations include bed-down activities at airfields and joint logistics over the shore (JLOTS). (JP 4-01.3, JP 4-01.5)

(2) Forcible Entry (FE). Forcible Entry Operations are those force projection operations in which a military lodgment is seized and held

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against armed opposition. Forcible entry operations are normally joint operations and may include amphibious, airborne, and air assault operations, or any combination thereof. Characteristics of forcible entry operations are the requirement for detailed intelligence, unity of effort, tightly controlled operation security (OPSEC), a viable deception plan, speed, and the element of surprise. (JP 3-0, JP 3-02, JP 3-18)

(a) Amphibious (FE). An amphibious operation is a forcible entry attack launched from the sea by naval and landing forces, embarked in ships or craft, involving a landing on a hostile or partially hostile shore. Amphibious operations are conducted in 5 phases: planning, embarkation, rehearsal, movement, and assault. (JP 1-02, JP 3-0, JP 3-02, JP 3-02.1, JP 3-18)

(b) Airborne (FE). An airborne forcible entry operation is an operation conducted by US Army airborne and US Air force units to seize a lodgment (normally an airfield) and defend it while the joint force commander executes a rapid build-up of combat power. (JP 3-0, JP 3-18)

(c) Air Assault (FE). An air assault forcible entry operation is an operation conducted by US Army air assault units to seize a lodgment (normally an airfield) and defend it while the joint force commander executes a rapid build-up of combat power. (JP 3-0, JP 3-18)

(3) Search and Rescue (SAR). Search and rescue operations are those operations which entail the use of aircraft, surface craft, submarines, specialized rescue teams and equipment to search for and rescue personnel in distress on land or at sea. (JP 1-02, JP 3-0, JP 3-50, JP 3-50.1)

(4) Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR). Combat search and rescue (CSAR) is a specific task performed by rescue forces to effect the recovery of distressed personnel during war or military operations other than war. Each Service and USSOCOM is responsible for conducting CSAR in support of their own operations, consistent with their assigned functions. Joint CSAR operations are those that have exceeded the capabilities of the component commanders in their own operations, and require the efforts of two or more components of the joint force to accomplish the operation. (JP 1-02, JP 3-0, JP 3-50.2)

(5) Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA). RSTA operations are that series of operations in which information is collected and forwarded to cognizant intelligence and targeting agencies to further prosecute operations. The primary objective of RSTA operations is to support military operations across the range of military operations.

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RSTA operations are performed by forces with a primary RSTA mission and other forces with either a collateral RSTA mission, or the capability to perform such a mission. RSTA operations have three mission areas which are relevant across strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. They are indications and warning, planning and employment, and assessment. (JP 1-02, JP 3-0, JP 3-55)

d. Planning. Planning for operations is a systematic, highly developed process that lends itself to the formation and use of templates. The MRM covers both campaign planning and joint task force (JTF) planning.

(1) Campaign Planning. Campaign planning is the process whereby combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders translate national or theater strategy into operational concepts through the development of campaign plans. Campaign planning may begin during deliberate planning when the actual threat, national guidance, and available resources become evident, but is normally not completed until after the National Command Authorities select the course of action during crisis action planning. Campaign planning is conducted when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major joint operation. (JP 1-02, JP 5-0)

(2) JTF Planning. JTF planning is a coordinated joint staff procedure used by the joint force commander to determine the best method of accomplishing assigned tasks and to direct the actions necessary to accomplish the assigned mission. (JP 1-02, JP 5-0)



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ERRATA 1 TO CJCS MANUAL 3500.04B

1. Holders of this errata sheet and CJCSM 3500.04B, 1 October 1999, "UNIVERSAL JOINT TASK LIST," are requested to make the following changes:

a. Pen and Ink Changes

Page iii, under the column labeled "PAGE": Change: "2-1 thru 2-456" to "2-1 thru 2-460," "3-1 thru 3-66" to "3-1 thru 3-62," "A-1 thru A-14" to "A-1 to A-20," and "B-1 thru B-42" to "B-1 thru B-48." Write "ER-1" in the right margin by the change.

b. Page Insertion

Chapter 2, page 2-300: Insert pages 2-301 thru 2-460 after page 2-300.

2. When the prescribed action has been taken, this transmittal should be filed behind the Record of Changes page in the basic document.

**OP 1.1.2 Conduct Intratheater Deployment and Redeployment of Forces Within the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To conduct relocation or movement of operational forces by any means or mode of transportation within a JOA preparatory to deploying the force into combat formation in support of the joint force commander's plan. Accordingly, deployment must support the commander's desired employment dispositions. This task includes generating and dispersing operational forces. Redeployment may be a combat or administrative movement from deployed position in the JOA to home bases or other taskings. Extraction pertains to combat movement of personnel, units, and materiel from positions in the immediate vicinity of enemy forces to designated areas. **(JP 4-0, 4-01.1)** (JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-07, 3-17, 4-01, 4-01.1, 4-02.2, 5-00.2, 6-02, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Of cargo requested delivered.
M2	Percent	Of casualties en route.
M3	Percent	Of forces closed at planned completion time.
M4	Percent	Of guides indigenous.
M5	Percent	Of movement orders requiring revision.
M6	Percent	Of transport force utilized.
M7	Percent	Of units closed on or before RDD.
M8	Hours	To deploy transportation and security forces.
M9	Hours	To estimate lift and security requirements.
M10	Minutes	To pass command authority of in-transit forces.
M11	Hours	To prepare movement orders.
M12	Hours	To select routes, assembly and dispersal points.
M13	Hours	To close joint force into joint force designated assembly area.
M14	Minutes	Delay in passing of command authority of in-transit forces.
M15	Percent	Of TPFDD personnel requirements sourced prior to C-Day.
M16	Percent	Of unit and non-unit personnel who moved as scheduled POEs.
M17	Percent	Of unit/personnel requirements provided at D-Day.
M18	Percent	Of units arrive at POD later than RDD.

**OP 1.1.3 Conduct Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (JRSOI) in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To conduct reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of units, personnel, equipment and materiel into JOA. Task includes offloading of aircraft, railcars, and ships, including discharge at pier side and in the stream, and processing and moving them to the point where they are transferred to the responsible tactical commander, making them part of the operational forces available for battle. This task includes clearing air and sea ports of debarkation (POD), moving unit personnel and equipment from PODs to staging areas, joining unit personnel (normally deployed by air) with their equipment (normally shipped by sea or prepositioned in storage sites or vessels), providing supplies and support necessary to achieve readiness for onward movement, and accomplishing integration

of forces. **(JP 4-01.3, 4-01.5, 4-01.7, 4-04)** (JP 3-05, 3-07.5, 3-10, 4-01.7, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	For JLOTS to discharge cargo from ship.
M2	Hours	Necessary to clear APOD of chalk's cargo.
M3	Hours	Necessary to clear APOD of chalk's personnel.
M4	Hours	Necessary to clear SPOD of personnel landing administratively.
M5	Hours	Necessary to clear SPOD of ship's cargo.
M6	Percent	Of time airfield is in the maximum on ground category.
M7	Percent	Of unit personnel and equipment assembled when transferred to tactical commander.
M8	Total	Personnel per day moved by host-nation support to marshaling areas.
M9	Days	Ship remains in vicinity of port awaiting discharge of cargo.
M10	Hours	To clear frustrated cargo from APOD.
M11	Hours	To clear frustrated cargo from SPOD.
M12	Hours	To match personnel arriving by air with equipment arriving by sea.
M13	Hours	To match personnel arriving by air with equipment prepositioned.
M14	Days	To begin unloading of ships upon arrival in theater.
M15	Percent	Of APOD/SPODs available for possible evacuation operations.
M16	Percent	Of transportation assets available for onward movement to staging area or destination.
M17	Percent	Of throughput actually achieved.
M18	Days	To accomplish link-up of personnel and equipment.
M19	Days	Forces en route to final destination from staging area or POD.
M20	Days	To accomplish with the joint force.
M21	Percent	Of units closed NLT RDD.
M22	Percent	Of ULNs closed NLT RDD.

### **OP 1.2 Conduct Operational Maneuver and Force Positioning.**

To maneuver joint and multinational operational forces to and from battle formations and to extend forces to operational depths to achieve a position of advantage over the enemy for accomplishing operational or strategic objectives.

**(JP 3-0, 3-02, 3-03, 3-09, 3-10.1)** (JP 3-01.1, 3-03, 3-05, 3-17, 3-54, 4-0, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Of maneuver force attacked prior to transition to battle formation.
M2	Percent	Of maneuver force concentrated at decisive point prior to detection.
M3	Percent	Of supporting force concentrated at desired point prior to detection.
M4	KPH	Rate of movement.
M5	Knots	Rate of movement.

**OP 1.2.1 Coordinate the Transition of Joint Forces to and from Tactical Battle Formations.**

To coordinate the extension of (or withdrawal from) joint/multinational operational forces in width and/or depth to increase tactical readiness for battle in conformance with the joint force commander's campaign or major operation plan and to facilitate the tactical commander's plan and intent. **(JP 3-02, 3-07.1, 3-10.1, 4-01.6)**  
(JP 3-07, 3-08v1, 3-50.21, 4-0, 4-01.1, 4-01.2, 4-01.6, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	For joint force to transition to or from operational battle formation.
M2	Hours	From planned execution time force transitions to or from operational battle formation.
M3	Hours	To move operational joint forces into locations to facilitate tactical commanders' plans for implementing subordinate campaign plan.
M4	Percent	Of operational force moved into position to facilitate tactical commander's plans.
M5	Percent	Required logistics in place on-schedule.

**OP 1.2.2 Posture Joint Forces for Operational Formations.**

To coordinate the grouping of joint forces and means into operational formations for the conduct of major operations and campaigns. Operational level formations must support the commander's concept and provide for the effective use of all elements of the force. These formations retain a capability for maneuvering and increasing the strength of forces and means during the operation. The formations need agility to rapidly transform from one type of operation to another without the loss of momentum or effectiveness, continuity of operations, and protection of the force. Operational formations may consist of several echelons of joint and combined arms organizations, for example, armor, mechanized, artillery, helicopter and air forces, grouping of air and missile defense forces, naval battle groups (to include amphibious forces), special operating forces, engineers, reserves of various types, and support forces. A commander can use posturing to deceive the enemy of true intentions. **(JP 3-0, 3-50.21)** (JP 3-02, 3-10.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	To assign multinational forces to operational formations (after acceptance into joint force).
M2	Hours	To assign forces to components (after receipt of warning or activation order).
M3	Hours	Until component units are prepared to send and receive data and do parallel planning (after receipt of warning order).
M4	Percent	Of joint force sequenced physically to execute campaign plan's operational maneuver.
M5	Percent	Units close on or before specified date and time.

### OP 1.2.3 Assemble Forces in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).

To assemble designated joint forces where they are best disposed in time and place to initiate the operational commander's campaign plan and achieve operational and even strategic advantage. **(JP 3-0, 3-02)** (JP 3-03, 3-07.3, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Of required logistics stockpiled/positioned (prior to campaign or major operation D-day).
M2	Percent	Of designated forces mass in designated assembly area according to planned times.
M3	Hours	To mass joint force forces at decisive points, intact and combat effective (after transition to battle formation).
M4	Hours	To complete joint force movement to assembly area (from which to maneuver).

### OP 1.2.4 Conduct Operations in Depth.

To conduct various types of operations to operational depths in achieving a position of advantage for the defeat or neutralization of enemy operational forces in order to accomplish operational or strategic objectives. This task includes conventional forces and SOF. This task can accommodate various types of operational maneuver, offensive or defensive. In Operation DESERT STORM against Iraq, there were several examples of OP 1.2.4, namely: the airpower phase of the campaign; the "Hail Mary" turning movement against the Republican Guard; and the US Marine Corps and multinational penetration in the east toward Kuwait. **(JP 1, 3-0, 3-03, 3-10.1)** (JP 3-0, 3-01.4, 3-01.5, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Of enemy forces and materiel destroyed or disrupted by friendly force offensive action.
M2	Percent	Of enemy LOC capacity degraded by friendly force offensive operations.
M3	Tons	Of enemy logistics flow reduced by friendly offensive operations, compared to prior to attack.
M4	Percent	Of enemy surrender (and desert) per day (after attack in depth).
M5	Instances	Of operations branches formerly closed to friendly forces as options opened (now feasible or acceptable).
M6	Instances	Of operations branches formerly open to enemy as options closed (no longer feasible, suitable or acceptable).
M7	Percent	Of enemy force interdicted sufficiently to allow friendly control of timing and tempo of campaign or major operation.
M8	Percent	Of enemy force operationally isolated.
M9	Percent	Of enemy forces and materiel diverted from offensive to defensive action.
M10	Percent	Of enemy forces isolated by joint force maneuver operation.
M11	Percent	Of enemy ground forces cut off from combat zone by joint force maneuver operation.
M12	Percent	Reduction in volume of enemy signals throughout JOA.

**OP 1.2.4.1 Conduct a Show of Force.**

To conduct an exhibition intended to demonstrate military resolve and capability to a potential belligerent to deter war or conflict. This task could be providing for increased forward presence or employing assigned forces. An example of this task is conducting a force training exercise that coincides with a troublesome international political situation. **(JP 3-0, 3-02, 3-08v2, 3-11)** (JP 3-07.1, 3-07.3, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	Before indications target nation aware, at highest decision making levels, of show of force.
M2	Days	Before target nation begins to modify targeted behavior.
M3	Percent	Of undesirable actions by target nation changed to acceptable after show of force.
M4	Days	Show of force can be sustained without additional forces or dedicated sustainment.

**OP 1.2.4.2 Conduct a Demonstration.**

To employ forces to create a diversion to draw the attention and forces of an adversary from the area of a major operation without an engagement. The demonstration may be staged to deceive the enemy. An example of a demonstration is the presence of Naval forces in the Persian Gulf off the Kuwait/Iraq littoral to divert Iraqi attention from planned land operations. This task includes the planning of branches and sequels involved if the action goes beyond a demonstration, either as a result of a changing situation or enemy action. **(JP 3-02, 3-07.1)** (JP 3-02, 3-08v2, 3-54, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Days	Demonstration holds attention of targeted enemy forces.
M2	Hours	Before indications target nation aware, at highest decision making levels, of demonstration.
M3	Percent	Enemy forces drawn away from main thrust by demonstration.
M4	Percent	Of enemy force diverted from targeted behavior or area of intended friendly action.
M5	Percent	Of friendly force committed to demonstration.
M6	Percent	Of friendly forces becoming actively engaged with enemy as result of demonstration.
M7	Percent	Of joint force combat power required for demonstration.
M8	Percent	Of joint force combat power required for show of force.
M9	Percent	Of targeted enemy forces displace toward demonstration after start.
M10	Days	Demonstration can be sustained without additional forces or dedicated sustainment.
M11	Percent	Of undesirable actions by target nation changed to acceptable after demonstration.

**OP 1.2.4.3 Conduct Forcible Entry: Airborne, Amphibious, and Air Assault.**

To conduct operations to seize and hold a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition, to strike directly at enemy operational or strategic center(s) of gravity, or to gain access into the operational area or for introducing decisive forces into the region. A joint force may be tasked to do this by airborne, amphibious, and/or air assault in conjunction with other maritime, air, and special operations forces comprising the joint force. **(JP 1, 3-0, 3-02, 3-03)** (JP 3-01.5, 3-02.2, 3-03, 3-09.3, 4-01.1, 4-01.5, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Days	Until APOD/SPOD infrastructure will support introduction of follow-on forces LAW operations time lines (after initial insertion).
M2	Days	Until APOD/SPOD secured from direct fire and observed indirect fire for follow-on forces (after initial insertion).
M3	Hours	To seizing lodgment area (after initial insertion).
M4	Percent	Friendly casualties.
M5	Percent	Of early entry forces available for follow-on missions.
M6	Percent	Of forcible entry force arrives at objective as planned.
M7	Percent	Of lodgment area controlled on D-day.
M8	Percent	Of enemy forces caught by surprise.
M9	Days	Until early entry forces available for follow-on missions.
M10	Casualties	Suffered by seizing force.
M11	Hours	Additional to planned, to seize lodgment.
M12	Percent	Of initial forcible entry force arrives at lodgment at planned TOT.
M13	Percent	Of objective secured.

**OP 1.2.4.4 Reinforce and Expand Lodgment.**

To reinforce and expand the lodgment in a hostile or threatened territory to ensure the continuous air or sea landing of troops and materiel and provide the maneuver space necessary for projected operations. Normally, it is the area seized in the assault phase of an airborne, amphibious, or air assault operation. **(JP 3-0, 3-02, 3-10, 3-10.1, 3-17)** (JP 3-09.3, 4-01.6, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Days	Until APOD/SPOD has air and missile defense (after initial insertion).
M2	Hours	Until APOD/SPOD infrastructure supports introduction of follow-on forces (after initial insertion).
M3	Hours	Until APOD/SPOD secured from direct fire and observed indirect fire for follow-on forces (after initial insertion).
M4	Hours	Until lodgment secured from direct fire and observed indirect fire (after initial insertion).
M5	Hours	For multinational and interagency linkages to be established (after initial entry).



M6	Hours	For remainder of force to close into lodgment area (after initial entry).
M7	Hours	For required expansion of lodgment (after initial entry).
M8	Percent	Of entry force casualties daily.
M9	Percent	Of entry forces available for follow-on missions.
M10	Percent	Of forcible entry force arrives at objective as planned.
M11	Percent	Of SPOD/APOD capacity being used.
M12	Days	Until early entry forces available for follow-on missions.
M13	Percent	Of required follow-on forces accommodated by adequate APODs/SPODs in lodgment area.

**OP 1.2.4.5 Conduct Raids in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To conduct raids into hostile territory. These activities are often small-scale and designed for swift penetration to secure information, confuse the enemy, or destroy key installations. Coordinating the withdrawal of forces conducting raids is part of this task. **(JP 3-0, 3-02, 3-03, 3-07)** (JP 3-02, 3-05, 3-05.5, 3-09, 3-52, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	Between desired and actual time in position.
M2	Minutes	Between planned and actual time of target attack.
M3	Hours	From completion of task until friendly forces successfully withdraw from enemy area.
M4	Hours	From initiation of action until decisive point or high-value target(s) destroyed.
M5	Hours	From initiation of action until mission completed.
M6	Percent	Of direct action missions achieve aim.
M7	Percent	Of enemy targets successfully attacked by friendly forces.
M8	Percent	Of enemy units confused by friendly action.
M9	Percent	Of missions with fully prepared alternate target.
M10	Instances	Of operations compromised during exfiltration.
M11	Instances	Of operations compromised during infiltration and execution.
M12	Instances	Of operations compromised prior to infiltration.
M13	Percent	Of raid requires forces external to executing unit.
M14	Percent	Of raids striking correct target.
M15	Percent	Of recovery missions result in recovery of target and mission personnel to friendly control, alive.
M16	Percent	Of recovery missions where planned withdrawal from the immediate objective area successful.
M17	Days	To arrange joint service support for raid party operation.
M18	Hours	To select and prepare a force for a raid.
M19	Days	To select raid targets in JOA.
M20	Days	To select, form, and train raiding party.
M21	Hours	From completion of task until friendly forces successfully withdraw from target area.

#### OP 1.2.4.6 Conduct Penetration, Direct Assault, and Turning Movements.

To conduct offensive operation that seeks to break through the enemy's defense and/or disrupt the enemy defensive systems. The turning movement is a variation of envelopment in which the attacking force passes around or over the enemy's principle defensive positions to secure objectives deep into the enemy's rear to force the enemy to abandon his position or divert major forces to meet the threat. **(JP 3-03, 3-05, 3-05.5)** (JP 3-0, 3-02, 3-50.21, CJCSI 3110.14, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	Between planned and actual entry.
M2	Days	Between planned and actual exit.
M3	Hours	For multinational and interagency linkages to be established (after initial entry).
M4	Days	For remainder of force to close into lodgment area (after initial entry).
M5	Days	For required expansion of lodgment (after initial entry).
M6	Percent	Of forces operating in depth remain within range of friendly supporting firepower.
M7	Percent	Of operations for which appropriate force employed.
M8	Percent	Of operations for which full coordination and deconfliction accomplished.
M9	Percent	Of operations with logistic preparations complete prior to infiltration.
M10	Percent	Of proposed missions rejected due to insufficient preparation time.
M11	Hours	Required to adjust original plan for decisive operations after recognizing planning assumptions invalid.
M12	Days	To identify location of enemy flank.
M13	Hours	To reach critical check points and blocking positions.

#### OP 1.2.4.7 Conduct Direct Action in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).

To conduct short-duration strikes and other small-scale actions by special operations forces in order to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or material. The purpose is to support the campaign plan. This task includes ambushes or direct assaults; the emplacement of mines and other munitions; standoff attacks; support for employment of precision guided weapons, independent sabotage, and antiship operations. **(JP 1, 3-03, 3-05, 3-05.5, 3-09, 3-50.21)** (JP 0-2, 3-02, 3-05.3, 3-50.3, CJCSM 3500.05)

**Note:** See also OP 3.2 *Attack Operational Targets*

M1	Hours	Between desired and actual time in position.
M2	Meters	Between planned and actual drop off point.
M3	Minutes	Between planned and actual exfiltration.

M4	Hours	Between planned and actual infiltration.
M5	Minutes	Between planned and actual time of target attack.
M6	Hours	From completion of task until wounded personnel provided needed medical treatment.
M7	Hours	From initiation of action until decisive point or high-value target(s) destroyed.
M8	Hours	From initiation of action until target personnel seized/captured.
M9	Percent	Of DA recovery mission planned withdrawals from immediate objective area successful.
M10	Percent	Of DA recovery missions with recovery of target and mission personnel to friendly control, alive.
M11	Percent	Of direct action missions achieve aim.
M12	Percent	Of forces operating in depth remain within range of friendly supporting firepower.
M13	Percent	Of friendly personnel recovered uninjured.
M14	Percent	Of friendly personnel successfully recovered.
M15	Percent	Of missions with fully prepared alternate target.
M16	Instances	Of operations compromised during exfiltration.
M17	Instances	Of operations compromised during infiltration and execution.
M18	Instances	Of operations compromised prior to infiltration.
M19	Percent	Of operations for which appropriate force employed.
M20	Percent	Of operations for which complete rehearsal conducted prior to infiltration.
M21	Percent	Of operations for which full coordination and deconfliction accomplished.
M22	Percent	Of operations striking correct target.
M23	Percent	Of proposed DA missions rejected due to insufficient preparation time.
M24	Days	To identify potential target(s) for direct action in JOA.

#### **OP 1.2.4.8 Conduct Unconventional Warfare in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To conduct military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, within the JOA. Included are guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert or clandestine operations, as well as indirect activities of subversion and sabotage. This task also includes, when appropriate, integration and synchronization of indigenous and surrogate forces that are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed by an external source. **(JP 3-03, 3-05, 3-05.3, 3-07.1, 3-09)** (JP 0-2, 3-02, 3-05.3, 3-05.5, 3-50.3, 4-02.2, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Of indigenous and surrogate forces adequately trained and equipped to conduct UW operations/subordinate campaign.
M2	Personnel	Of indigenous and surrogate forces organized to conduct unconventional warfare (UW) operations/subordinate campaign.
M3	Percent	Of indigenous population recruited to support friendly UW plan/subordinate campaign.

M4	Percent	Of isolation phase required time available.
M5	Percent	Of linkups at infiltration successful.
M6	Percent	Of operational and strategic objectives successfully achieved by friendly force UW action.
M7	Percent	Of SOF personnel tasked to JOA trained in theater peculiar requirements.
M8	Percent	Of theater deep zone has active UW, trained and conducting operations.
M9	Percent	Of US personnel committed to JOA fluent in local languages and familiar with local culture.
M10	Percent	Of UW cadre fully trained in UW, to include language in area.
M11	Percent	Of UW forces remaining clandestine or covert.
M12	Percent	Of UW operations include a fully executed PSYOP preparation.
M13	Days	To conduct assessment of indigenous forces in JOA.
M14	Days	To identify requirements for US support.
M15	Percent	Of SOF personnel fully trained to conduct personnel recovery operations.

#### **OP 1.2.5 Conduct Offensive Operations in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To take the battle to the enemy. This task involves taking the initiative from the enemy, gaining freedom of action, and massing effects to achieve operational objectives. This task may be conducted with part of the joint force, while another part is conducting defensive or retrograde operations. **(JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-03, 3-07.1, 3-09.3, 3-15, 3-50.21, 3-54)** (JP 3-05.3, 3-07.1, 3-09, 3-15, 3-53, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Friendly casualties.
M2	Percent	Of decisive targets damaged or destroyed by offensive action.
M3	Percent	Of enemy centers of gravity destroyed or neutralized by offensive action.
M4	Percent	Of enemy force surprised at initiation of offensive action.
M5	Percent	Of enemy forces destroyed.
M6	Percent	Of friendly forces achieve checkpoints on time.
M7	Percent	Of friendly combat units effective after operation.
M8	Percent	Of joint force prepared to conduct offensive at H-hour.
M9	Percent	Of major combat systems effective after attack.
M10	Percent	Of operational objectives achieved by friendly offensive action.
M11	Percent	Of supplies and munitions remaining (at end of operation).
M12	Percent	Of supporting fires provided as planned.
M13	Percent	Of preparation time allowed for rehearsals.
M14	Days	To prepare to continue offensive operations (after pause).
M15	Hours	To prepare hasty defenses.
M16	Days	To seize objectives.
M17	Minutes	To transfer command to new command post.

M18	Hours	Until joint force prepared to conduct offensive operations, (after warning order).
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### OP 1.2.6 Conduct Defensive Operations in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).

To counter the enemy's initiative, to defeat an enemy attack and prevent the achievement of enemy objectives. This task includes taking actions to gain time, to control key terrain or lines of communication in the operational area, or to protect forces, facilities, or locations. This task includes creating the conditions to allow the seizing of the initiative, to include eroding enemy resources at a rapid rate. This task may be conducted with part of the joint force, while another part is conducting offensive or retrograde operations. **(JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-07.1, 3-09.3, 3-10.1, 3-15)** (JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-09, 3-10, 3-10.1, 3-15, 3-55.1, CJCSI 6510.01B, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Of decisive targets damaged or destroyed by defensive action.
M2	Percent	Of force in reserve.
M3	Percent	Of friendly force surprised at initiation of enemy offensive action.
M4	Percent	Of joint force prepared to conduct defensive operations at time of enemy attack.
M5	Percent	Of operational friendly decisive points destroyed or damaged as result of enemy offensive action.
M6	Hours	For enemy to breach deliberate fortifications.
M7	Hours	To commit reserve to battle.
M8	Minutes	To deliver fires on preplanned targets.
M9	Hours	To initiate spoiling attack/counter attack.
M10	Hours	To prepare defensive positions.
M11	Hours	To reposition to counter enemy's main effort/attack in JOA.
M12	Hours	To resume offensive operations from defensive operations.
M13	Minutes	To transfer command to new command post.
M14	Hours	Until joint force prepared to conduct defensive operations, after warning order.

### OP 1.2.7 Conduct Retrograde Operations in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).

To improve an operational situation or to prevent a worse one from occurring by maneuvering forces to the rear or away from the enemy. This task is executed to gain time, to preserve forces or to avoid combat under undesirable conditions or to draw the enemy into a more favorable condition for combat. This task may be conducted with part of the joint force, while another part is conducting defensive or offensive operations. This task includes such movements as withdrawal, retirement, or delaying actions. **(JP 3-0, 3-02, 4-04)** (JP 3-0, 3-03, 3-07.5, 3-09, 3-17, 3-54, 3-61, 4-01.2, 4-02.1, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	Between planning and withdrawal execution.
M2	Hours	Difference between planned and actual completion of withdrawal.
M3	Percent	Of decisive targets/points preserved by retrograde action.
M4	Percent	Of friendly centers of gravity preserved by friendly retrograde action.
M5	Percent	Of friendly force lost during withdrawal (missing, casualty).
M6	Percent	Of friendly force surprised at initiation of enemy offensive action.
M7	Percent	Of joint force already conducted or prepared to conduct retrograde at time of enemy attack.
M8	Percent	Of logistics support activities relocated prior to commencing retrograde operations.
M9	Percent	Of new positions with quartering party in place prior to unit arrival.
M10	Percent	Of operational friendly decisive points destroyed or damaged by enemy offensive action.
M11	Percent	Of units with marked and secure withdrawal routes.
M12	Percent	Of withdrawals planned as not under pressure and conducted as such.
M13	Percent	Of withdrawing force for which full rehearsal conducted.
M14	Percent	Of withdrawing force that moves to prepared positions.
M15	Percent	Of withdrawing units for which guides in place at time of withdrawal.
M16	Percent	That actual enemy threat differs at time of execution from projected.
M17	Hours	To designate covering force.
M18	Days	To develop deception plans to support retrograde operations.
M19	Minutes	To transfer command to new location.
M20	Hours	Until joint force prepared to conduct retrograde operations, from warning order.

### **OP 1.3 Provide Operational Mobility.**

To facilitate the movement of joint and multinational operational formations in a campaign or major operation without delays due to operationally significant terrain or obstacles. **(JP 3-02, 4-01.1, 4-04)** (JP 1, 3-0, 3-02.2, 3-07.3, 3-17, 3-50.21, 4-01.1, 4-02.1, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	That joint force operational airlift/sealift delayed due to obstacles.
M2	Hours	To breach barrier to allow operational forces to penetrate to rear of enemy operational forces.
M3	Days	To clear minefield to allow amphibious landing.
M4	Days	To clear port and restore to full capacity.
M5	Days	To clear port to allow discharge of cargo.
M6	Hours	To restore ground LOC after closure due to heavy rain and flooding.

M7	Hours	To restore ground LOC after closure, due to rockslide or avalanche.
M8	Percent	Of mine countermeasure operations provide needed freedom of movement.

### OP 1.3.1 Overcome Operationally Significant Barriers, Obstacles, and Mines.

To preserve freedom of operational movement by counteracting the effects of natural (existing) and other (reinforcing) operationally significant barriers (i.e., WMD killing fields), obstacles, and mines. The creation of gaps in Saddam's barriers in southern Kuwait and Iraq opposite coalition forces in Operation DESERT STORM is an example of this task. Clearing the minefields on the sea approaches in the same operation is another example. Operationally significant barriers and obstacles include any obstruction designed or employed to disrupt, fix, turn, or block the movement of an operationally significant force. Obstacles can exist naturally or can be synthetic, or can be a combination of both. Examples of such barriers and obstacles include ports, transportation systems, major land formations (for example, mountain ranges), forests, urban areas, and systems of minefields and NBC contaminated areas. **(JP 2-01, 3-02, 3-03, 3-15)** (JP 3-02, 3-09, 3-10.1, 3-15, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	Enemy-emplaced obstacles delay movement of friendly forces.
M2	Hours	For joint force staff to disseminate obstacle data to joint force subordinate units, after discovery.
M3	Hours	Joint force operations delayed for insufficient engineer support.
M4	Percent	Net growth in mined channels and seas.
M5	Percent	Of day required channels kept swept.
M6	Percent	Of lanes kept open by mine sweeping or clearing contamination.
M7	Percent	Of operationally significant obstacles for which branch had been previously identified.
M8	Hours	To sweep a channel.

### OP 1.3.2 Enhance Movement of Operational Forces.

To prepare or improve facilities (for example, airfields, landing zones) and routes (for example, roads, railroads, canals, rivers, ports, port facilities, airfields) for moving operational forces in support of campaigns and major operations. **(JP 3-10.1, 4-0, 4-01.1, 4-01.3, 4-01.5, 4-04)** (JP 3-07.1, 3-09, 3-10.1, 3-50.21, 4-01.6, CJCSM 3500.05)

**Note:** This activity pertains only to that movement directly related to operational movement (see activity OP 1.1, *Conduct Operational Movement*). Maintenance of transportation modes and LOCs is addressed under OP 4, *Provide Operational Logistics and Personnel Support*.

M1	NM	Between two most distant airfields or LZs in combat zone.
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M2	NM	Between two most distant airfields, LZs, or EZs in combat zone.
M3	MOG	For LZ for C-130 aircraft.
M4	Percent	Increase in APOD/SPOD capacity for operational movement.
M5	Hours	Land LOCs (road, rail) delayed for repair.
M6	Percent	Of airfields in JOA with approved approaches compatible with intratheater airlift and OAS aircraft.
M7	Percent	Of airfields in JOA with approved non-precision approaches.
M8	Percent	Of airfields in JOA with approved precision approaches.
M9	Percent	Of airfields in JOA with at least a 2 x C-130 MOG.
M10	Percent	Of airfields in JOA with at least a 2 x C-5 MOG.
M11	Percent	Of LZs in JOA with approved approaches compatible with intratheater airlift and OAS aircraft.
N12	Percent	Of LZs in JOA with approved non-precision approaches.
M13	Percent	Of LZs in JOA with approved precision approaches.
M14	Percent	Of required follow-on forces accommodated by adequate APODs/SPODs in lodgment area.
M15	Hours	Strategic airlift/sealift diverted or canceled because airfields/seaports not prepared sufficiently.
M16	Days	To achieve POD throughput to allow meeting of RDDs.
M17	Instances	Of OPLANs not including smoke and obscurants.

### **OP 1.3.3 Coordinate Waterspace Management.**

To coordinate the prevention of mutual interference between subsurface, surface, and other force elements. Other force elements include items such as towed array sonar, mine countermeasures, or other towed objects at subsurface depths, torpedoes, and ordnance released in designated ordnance drop areas. **(N/A)**  
(CJCSM 3500.05)

**Note:** For airspace management/control see OP 6.1.3 *Provide Airspace Control*.

M1	Incidents	Where proper water space management inadequate.
M2	Incidents	Where proper coordination of movement not adequate.
M3	Percent	Of Notices to Mariners published in timely fashion to ALCON agencies.
M4	Incidents	Of collision at sea.

### **OP 1.4 Provide Operational Countermobility.**

To delay, channel, or stop offensive air, land, and sea movement by enemy operational formations in order to help create positional advantage for friendly joint and multinational operational forces. Operational countermobility exposes enemy decisive points and centers of gravity or high-payoff targets to destruction in conformance with the joint force commander's plans and intent. This task includes execution of sanctions, embargoes, blockades, and no-fly zones. **(JP 3-15, 5-00.2)**  
(JP 3-07.3, 3-10.1, 4-01.6, CJCSM 3500.05)



M1	Percent	Enemy avenues of approach closed as maneuver possibilities by friendly barriers, obstacles, or mines.
M2	Percent	Monthly reduction in civil populace opinion of target nation central government.
M3	Percent	Reduction in estimated potential enemy COAs after taking countermobility action in JOA.
M4	Percent	Reduction in target nation external trade.
M5	Percent	Reduction in target nation GDP.

#### OP 1.4.1 Employ Operational System of Obstacles.

To identify air, land, and sea sites for reinforcing or constructing obstacles to take maximum advantage of existing obstacles to form a system of obstacles (normally on a large-scale) for operational effect. The system of obstacles is intended to provide friendly force flexibility for movement and increase the variety of obstacles the enemy must encounter. This task includes developing existing obstacles and reinforcing terrain with countermobility means (includes air, land, and sea). Systems of obstacles include, but are not limited to, minefields, ADM, and conventional demolitions for achieving operational results in campaigns and major operations. **(JP 3-10.1, 3-15)** (JP 2-01, 3-02, 3-03, 3-07.2, 3-07.5, 3-10.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Increase in friendly force lines of communication after obstacle emplacement.
M2	Percent	Of available enemy LOCs and PODs interdicted by friendly obstacles.
M3	Percent	Of hostile external surface communication absorbed by other LOCs after barrier emplacement.
M4	Percent	Of hostile internal surface communication absorbed by other LOCs after barrier emplacement.
M5	Percent	Reduction in hostile military surface communications after barrier emplacement.
M6	Percent	Reduction in hostile overall surface communications after barrier emplacement.
M7	Percent	Reduction in potential enemy COAs after obstacle emplacement.
M8	Days	Until hostile forces unable to sustain offensive operations.
M9	Percent	Increase in incidence of disease in target nation during quarantine or embargo.

#### OP 1.4.2 Conduct Sanctions and Embargoes.

To carry out acts designed to exclude specific items such as offensive military weapons and associated material from movement into or out of a state. This task includes the planning and execution of operational tasks and synchronization of tactical tasks which compose the sanctions. **(JP 3-0, 3-03, 3-07, 3-08v2)** (JP 2-

01, 3-07.3, 3-08v2, 3-09, 3-53, 5-00.2, CJCSI 3110.14, CJCSI 6510.01B, CJCSM 3500.05)

**Note:** Planning of sanctions and embargoes is conducted under OP 5.3 *Prepare Plans and Orders*.

M1	Percent	Increase in malnutrition in target nation during quarantine or embargo.
M2	Percent	Of joint force maritime assets, including air force and assigned SOF, affected by quarantine or embargo operations.
M3	Percent	Of known scheduled and unscheduled transport carrying targeted materials not allowed to enter or leave quarantine area.
M4	Percent	Reduction in target nation armaments production.
M5	Percent	Reduction in targeted economic area in target nation.
M6	Percent	Increase in incidence of disease in target nation during quarantine or embargo.

#### OP 1.4.3 Conduct Blockades.

To take action to cut off enemy communications and commerce in order to isolate a place or region. This task includes complete blockades and lesser degrees of blockades. This task also includes the planning and execution of operational tasks and synchronization of tactical tasks which compose the blockade. (N/A) (JP 3-0, 3-07, 3-08v2, 5-00.2, CJCSM 3500.05)

**Note:** Planning of blockades is conducted under OP 5.3 *Prepare Plans and Orders*.

M1	Percent	Monthly decline in target nation Central Government popularity in the civil populace.
M2	Percent	Monthly reduction in target nation GDP.
M3	Percent	Of enemy military force movement still maintained through alternative routes.
M4	Percent	Of enemy military force prevented from entering or leaving blockade area.
M5	Percent	Of known scheduled and unscheduled transport prevented from entering or leaving blockade area.
M6	Percent	Of pre-action trade being maintained (through alternative routes).
M7	Percent	Reduction in flow of all supplies to (or from) target nation.
M8	Percent	Reduction in target nation armaments production.
M9	Percent	Reduction in target nation GDP.
M10	Percent	Reduction in target nation sophisticated armaments production.
M11	Percent	Reduction in target nation sophisticated armaments readiness.
M12	Percent	Reduction in target nation WMD production.

**OP 1.4.4 Conduct Maritime Interception.**

To detect, classify, intercept, and board vessels suspected of smuggling drugs, other contraband, or refugees. This task includes the synchronization of tactical tasks which impose the maritime interception. **(JP 3-0, 3-03, 3-07.3, 3-07.4)** (JP 3-08v2, 3-07.3, 3-09, CJCSM 3500.05)

**Note:** Planning of maritime interception is conducted under OP 5.3 *Prepare Plans and Orders*.

M1	Percent	Of pre-action smuggling maintained.
M2	Percent	Of vessels boarded.
M3	Percent	Of vessels diverted had contraband.
M4	Percent	Reduction in flow of contraband to (or from) target nation.
M5	Percent	Reduction in flow of refugees to (or from) target nation.
M6	Refugees	Diverted daily to receiving station.
M7	Refugees	Found on vessels.
M8	Hours	To process and divert refugees to receiving station.
M9	Vessels	Boarded.
M10	Vessels	Diverted due to (suspected) contraband.
M11	Percent	Of pre-action smuggling maintained through alternative routes.

**OP 1.5 Control Operationally Significant Areas.**

To control areas of the JOA whose possession or command provides either side an operational advantage, or denying it to the enemy. Denial of the operational area can be accomplished either by occupying the operationally key area itself or by limiting use or access to the area. For an area or environment to be operationally key, its dominance or control must achieve operational or strategic results or deny same to the enemy. In military operations other than war, control of an operationally significant area also pertains to assisting a friendly country in populace and resource control. **(JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-03, 3-09, 3-10.1)** (JP 1, 2-0, 3-0, 3-07.5, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Of host-nation population under control of civil government.
M2	Percent	Of identified decisive points within OA under friendly control.
M3	Percent	Of joint force forces operating within areas under control of friendly ground forces.
M4	Percent	Of naval operations delayed within maritime superiority area (due to enemy action).
M5	Percent	Of operationally significant areas controlled by friendly forces.
M6	Percent	Of operations delayed or canceled (due to lack of an air superiority umbrella).
M7	Percent	Operationally significant areas currently contested by opposing forces.
M8	Days	With complete control over operationally significant area.

### OP 1.5.1 Control of Operationally Significant Land Area in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).

To control an area or geographic point or position that is important to the success of a campaign or major operation to prevent enemy occupation of the position through fire, fire potential, or occupation of the land area. **(JP 3-0, 3-09, 3-10.1)** (JP 3-0, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Days	Between enemy attacks on areas controlled by friendly forces.
M2	Percent	Critical terrain features under control of friendly forces.
M3	Percent	Of air operations in JOA delayed or canceled (due to enemy ground actions during execution).
M4	Percent	Of force engaged in rear area security.
M5	Percent	Of forces operating within areas under control of friendly ground forces.
M6	Percent	Of identified decisive points and enemy geographic centers of gravity under friendly control.
M7	Percent	Of naval operations delayed or canceled (due to enemy ground attack).
M8	Percent	Of population under civilian government control.
M9	Percent	Of identified decisive points under friendly control.
M10	Casualties	Suffered during control of area.
M11	Percent	Of critical terrain features, under control of friendly forces.
M12	Percent	Of designated land area, controlled within time specified.
M13	Operations	By naval forces delayed.
M14	Percent	Of naval operations delayed or canceled.
M15	Percent	Of personnel and equipment coming through SLOCs experiencing no delay, disruption or cancellation (due to enemy naval action).
M16	Percent	Of joint force operating within maritime superiority area.
M17	Percent	Of time friendly forces operating within, or onshore from, a maritime superiority area.
M18	Percent	Supplies and materiel lost en route on SLOC to enemy surface, subsurface, or air action.
M19	Percent	Friendly attrition rate per sortie.
M20	Percent	Friendly ground force losses due to enemy air activity.
M21	Percent	Friendly surface force losses due to enemy air activity.
M22	Percent	Of enemy units detected, engaged.
M23	Percent	Of enemy units engaged, downed.
M24	Percent	Of friendly forces operating under air superiority umbrella.
M25	Percent	Of time with air superiority over operational area.
M26	Percent	Of critical routes controlled or blocked.
M27	Percent	Of force required to isolate key sector.
M28	Percent	Reduction in movement of supplies into the JOA.
M29	Days	To isolate key sector of the JOA.

### **OP 1.5.2 Gain and Maintain Maritime Superiority in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To achieve that degree of dominance in the sea campaign and major battles over opposing forces which permits the conduct of operations by friendly maritime forces and their related land, sea, air, and special operations forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force in the operational area. **(JP 1, 3-0, 3-03, 3-09)** (JP 1, 3-0, 3-08v2, 3-09, 4-01.2, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Operations	By naval forces delayed.
M2	Percent	Of naval operations delayed or canceled.
M3	Percent	Of personnel and equipment coming through SLOCs experiencing no delay, disruption or cancellation (due to enemy naval action).
M4	Percent	Of joint force operating within maritime superiority area.
M5	Percent	Of time friendly forces operating within, or onshore from, a maritime superiority area.
M6	Percent	Supplies and materiel lost en route on SLOC to enemy surface, subsurface, or air action.

### **OP 1.5.3 Gain and Maintain Air Superiority in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To gain control of the air to the degree which permits the conduct of operations by land, sea, and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force in the operational area. **(JP 1, 3-0, 3-03, 3-09, 3-10.1, 3-50.21)** (JP 1, 3-0, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Friendly attrition rate per sortie.
M2	Percent	Friendly ground force losses due to enemy air activity.
M3	Percent	Friendly surface force losses due to enemy air activity.
M4	Percent	Of enemy units detected, engaged.
M5	Percent	Of enemy units engaged, downed.
M6	Percent	Of friendly forces operating under air superiority umbrella.
M7	Percent	Of time with air superiority over operational area.

### **OP 1.5.4 Isolate the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To deny to a regional adversary or the adversary's supporters access to key sectors of the operational area and impede the adversary's movement of supplies by sea, land, and air from areas outside the operational area. **(JP 3-0, 3-02, 3-03, 3-09, 3-10.1)** (JP 3-05, 3-07, 3-09.3, 3-10, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Of critical routes controlled or blocked.
M2	Percent	Of force required to isolate key sector.

M3	Percent	Reduction in movement of supplies into theater of operations/JOA.
M4	Days	To isolate key sector of theater of operations/JOA.

### **OP 1.5.5 Assist Host Nation in Populace and Resource Control.**

To assist host-nation governments to retain control over their major population centers thus precluding complicating problems which may hinder accomplishment of the joint force commander's mission. This task includes external support for control of civil unrest and restoration of basic public services (police functions, water, electricity, garbage, basic medical care) the lack of which would precipitate civil unrest. This task relates to providing civil affairs, military police, and logistic support for the movement, collections, housing, feeding, and protection of displaced citizens. **(JP 3-07, 3-07.1, 4-04)** (JP 3-05, 3-07.1, 3-07.4, 3-07.5, 3-08v1, 3-10.1, 4-02, CJCSI 3110.14, CJCSM 3500.05)

**Note:** See also OP 4.7.6, *Coordinate Civil Affairs in the Joint Operations Area (JOA)*.

M1	Days	Between occurrences of civil unrest.
M2	Percent	Of normal public services maintained during operation.
M3	Percent	Of joint force personnel assigned to perform basic public services in host nation.
M4	Percent	Of joint force personnel assigned to perform police functions in host nation.
M5	Percent	Of friendly force, engaged in refugee care and handling.

### **OP 1.6 Conduct Patient Evacuation.**

To conduct patient evacuation and provide transportation of patients by any means to greater capability of medical care. To provide forces, resources, and evacuation channels for patient evacuation. **(JP 3-11, 4-01.3, 4-02, 4-02.2, 5-00.2, CJCSM 3122.03)** (JP 3-02, 4-02.2, CJCSM 3141.01, CJCSM 3500.05)

**Note:** Planning for patient evacuation is conducted under OP 5.3 *Prepare Plans and Orders*. Planning evacuation includes identifying and considering all the issues associated with the optimum utilization of patient evacuation resources and producing the necessary products to ensure effectiveness of patient evacuation operations are maximized.

M1	Percent	Of requested forces provided for aeromedical evacuation for the operation.
M2	Full/ Partial/No	Degree to which forces are capable of aeromedical evacuation operations.
M3	Number	Of patients that can be evacuated from inter and intratheater by aeromedical evacuation forces.

M4	Number	Of patients evacuated by fixed wing aircraft.
M5	Percent	Of stable and stabilized patients evacuated through the air.

## **OP 2 PROVIDE OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE.**

To produce the intelligence required to accomplish objectives within a joint operations area (JOA), to include planning and conducting subordinate campaigns and major operations. Operational intelligence includes determining when, where, and in what strength the enemy will stage and conduct campaigns and major operations. This task also includes providing intelligence support for friendly C2W. Operational intelligence addresses the threat across the range of military operations including operations other than war. Operational surveillance and reconnaissance are included in this task. It also includes intelligence support to friendly nations and groups. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3.01.1, 3-03, 3-09, 3-13.1, 3-50-21)** (JP 2-0, 3-01.1, 3-03, 3-05.3, 3-07.4, 3-07.5, 3-09, 3-50.21, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Days	In advance of collection intelligence requirements identified.
M2	Percent	Of PIRs collected in time to meet current operational needs.
M3	Percent	Of PIRs included in collection plan.
M4	Percent	Of targets accurately identified.
M5	Percent	Of targets accurately located.
M6	Hours	Since most current intelligence information was last collected.
M7	Hours	Turnaround time to process new intelligence data.
M8	Hours	Warning time for significant enemy actions.

### **OP 2.1 Direct Operational Intelligence Activities.**

To assist joint force commanders in determining their intelligence requirements, then planning the operational collection effort and issuing the necessary orders and requests to intelligence organizations. This task includes reviewing, validating, and prioritizing requirements and taskings. Requirements include intelligence for US forces and for host nations or groups in supporting military operations other than war and warfighting operations. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-09, 3-50.21, 3-54)** (JP 2-0, 3-07.5, 3.1-, 4-02.1, CJCSI 3710.01, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.5)

M1	Hours	To disseminate PIRs to subordinate elements of joint force (after collection).
M2	Hours	Between updates of PIRs.
M3	Days	In advance of collection, intelligence requirements identified.
M4	Percent	Of events accurately dealt with by operating instructions (OIs), checklists, and threat reference materials.

M5	Instances	Of PIRs identified during execution not previously identified during crisis action planning.
M6	Percent	Of total PIRs identified during execution.
M7	Hours	To disseminate initial and subsequent PIRs to all components.

### OP 2.1.1 Determine and Prioritize Operational Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR).

To assist joint force commanders in determining and prioritizing their priority intelligence requirements. In military operations other than war, it includes helping and training host nations to determine their intelligence requirements, such as in a counterinsurgency. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-03, 3-09, 3-10.1, 3-58)** (JP 2-01, 3-05.3, 3-10.1, 3-55, 5-00.2, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	Average age of intelligence data on high priority PIRs.
M2	Days	Before next phase of a campaign, joint force commander PIRs validated or updated.
M3	Days	In advance of collection, intelligence requirements identified.
M4	Instances	Of open joint force commander PIRs (at any one time).
M5	Percent	Of PIRs addressed in intelligence update.
M6	Percent	Of PIRs covered by a collection plan.
M7	Instances	Of PIRs identified after collection begins.
M8	Percent	Of unvalidated PIRs resubmitted.
M9	Percent	Of validated PIRs have collection effort.
M10	Hours	Since last update of PIRs.
M11	Hours	To disseminate initial and subsequent PIRs to all components.
M12	Hours	To prioritize intelligence collection requirements.
M13	Days	To provide current information for PIR.

### OP 2.1.2 Determine and Prioritize Operational Information Requirements (IR).

To identify those items of information that must be collected and processed to develop the intelligence required by the commander's PIR. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-03)** (JP 3-09, 5-00.2, 6-0, CJCSI 3810.01A, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05, DODI 8910.01M)

M1	Hours	Needed to create usable information requirements to support newly designated PIRs.
M2	Percent	Of joint force information requirements relate to a current PIR.
M3	Percent	Of joint force subordinate command PIRs supported by joint force IRs.
M4	Percent	Of PIRs have multiple information requests.



**OP 2.1.3 Prepare Operational Collection Plan.**

To develop a collection plan that will satisfy the commander's intelligence requirements. Collection planning includes assigning the appropriate collection capabilities to fulfill specific intelligence requirements. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-09)** (JP 2-01, 3-55, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Of counterintelligence requirements covered by prepare CI collection plan.
M2	Percent	Of operations by enemy intelligence discovered in time to respond.
M3	Percent	Of PCCIRs (identified during crisis action planning) covered by more than one collection asset.
M4	Percent	Of PIRs (identified during crisis action planning) covered by a collection asset or request for information.
M5	Percent	Of PIRs outstanding.
M6	Percent	Of Requests for Information (RFIs) satisfied.
M7	Percent	Of Requests for Information (RFIs) have more than one type of collection asset or resource assigned.
M8	Percent	Of Requests for Information (RFIs) included in collection plan.
M9	Hours	To coordinate a "No Strike" target with joint force headquarters J-3.
M10	Hours	To prepare CI collection plan requirement (after becoming aware of CI collection effort).
M11	Hours	To prepare collection request for newly identified PIR.

**OP 2.1.4 Allocate Intelligence Resources in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To assign adequate resources to theater and JTF intelligence organizations to permit the accomplishment of assigned intelligence tasks. This task includes requesting support and the reallocation of additional assets from national intelligence agencies and from allied countries. **(JP 2-0, 2-01)** (JP 2-0, 2-01, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	For joint force J-2 to receive report of organic collection assets from components (after arrival).
M2	Hours	To retask collection asset (after PIR satisfied).
M3	Percent	Of requests for collection or production validated.
M4	Hours	To prepare report on available collection assets.
M5	Hours	To request support and the reallocation of additional assets from national or allied nations when joint force assets not available.
M6	Hours	To request a National Intelligence Support Team (NIST) and additional theater intelligence support element.

**OP 2.2 Collect and Share Operational Information.**

To gather information from operational and tactical sources on operational and tactical threat forces and their decisive points (and related high-payoff targets

such as WMD production, infrastructure and delivery systems). It also includes collection of information on the nature and characteristics of the operational area (including area of interest). Locating and reporting captured or isolated personnel falls under this task. In addition, collection of data to support combat assessment is included in this task. The sharing of collected information within the multi-Service intelligence communities can consolidate return of information, promote fusion, and prevent retasking of scarce assets. This task applies in peace and war and those military operations other than war. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-0, 3-50.21)** (JP 2-0, 3-0, 3-07.5, 4-02.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	To retask collection asset (after PIR satisfied).
M2	Percent	Of PIRs collected in time to meet current operational needs.
M3	Percent	Of PIRs with at least one source yielding intelligence information.
M4	Percent	Of PIRs with more than one source yielding intelligence information.
M5	Percent	Of targets accurately identified.
M6	Percent	Of targets accurately located.
M7	Percent	Of time operational decisions supported by information covered by collection plan.
M8	Hours	Since current intelligence information collected.
M9	Hours	To produce a significant event report after observation.
M10	Hours	To provide intelligence information reports.
M11	Hours	Instances all available collection assets were integrated into a comprehensive collection plan.
M12	Percent	Maintained an operational joint deployable intelligence system.
M13	Percent	Submitted RFIs were reviewed for validation.

### **OP 2.2.1 Collect Information on Operational Situation.**

To obtain operationally significant information on enemy (and friendly) force strengths and vulnerabilities, threat operational doctrine, and forces (land, sea, and air and space). Threat includes threat allies, and, in military operations other than war, insurgents, terrorists, illegal drug traffickers, belligerents in peace support or peace enforcement situations, and other opponents. It also includes collecting information on the nature and characteristics of the area of interest, to include collecting battlefield damage assessment, munitions effects, medical assessments, and hazards, such as NBC contamination to conduct mission assessment. The nature and characteristics of the area include significant political, economic, industrial, geospatial (e.g., aeronautical, hydrographic, geodetic, topographic), demographic, medical, climatic, and cultural, as well as psychological profiles of the resident populations. This task includes collecting counterintelligence information to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations or persons, or international terrorist activities. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 2-03, 3-0, 3-50.21, 3-54)** (JP 2-01.2, 3-0, 3-07.5, 3-50.21, 3-55, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	To retask collection asset.(after CI PIR satisfied).
M2	Hours	For CRM to retask collection asset to outstanding PIR or PIP (after PIR satisfied).
M3	Hours	Between taskings to collection assets on new HPTs.
M4	Hours	From receipt of tasking until reconnaissance or surveillance assets respond.
M5	Percent	Of collection requirements filled by joint force assets.
M6	Percent	Of collection requirements satisfied.
M7	Percent	Of collection which could benefit from "cross-cueing" and "tip-off."
M8	Percent	Of commander's area has required reconnaissance and surveillance coverage.
M9	Percent	Of disease nonbattle injury (DNBI) incurred in first month of deployment from lack of collection of medical information.
M10	Instances	Of failure to respond to commander's requirements for reconnaissance or surveillance assets.
M11	Percent	Of high-payoff targets accurately located.
M12	Percent	Of manned sorties requiring imagery for aircrews have it before flight briefing.
M13	Percent	Of non-aviation missions requiring current imagery have it prior to execution.
M14	Percent	Of PIRs covered by collection asset or request for information.
M15	Percent	Of PIRs identified during planning process covered by collection asset or request for information.
M16	Percent	Of PIRs with at least one source yielding intelligence information.
M17	Percent	Of PIRs with more than one source yielding intelligence information.
M18	Percent	Of PIRs covered by more than one collection asset.
M19	Percent	Of potential targets dropped for lack of adequate information.
M20	Percent	Of targets accurately identified.
M21	Percent	Of targets accurately located.
M22	Percent	Of time operational decisions required information not covered by collection plan.
M23	Instances	Of times commander made decisions without sufficient information (due to failure to collect).
M24	Percent	Of PIRs on situation outstanding.
M25	Minutes	Since high priority targets were last detected, identified and located.
M26	Minutes	Since current intelligence information was collected.
M27	Minutes	To fill requests for information on new HPTs during execution.
M28	Hours	To identify shortfalls in reconnaissance platforms (after development of collection plan).
M29	Percent	Of commander's area has reconnaissance and surveillance coverage.
M30	Minutes	To determine raid size.

M31	Minutes	For ballistic missile to be detected (after launch).
M32	NM	Beyond engagement range aircraft detected.
M33	NM	Difference between plotted and actual position of target.
M34	NM	From sensor enemy air raid detected.
M35	NM	From sensor single enemy aircraft detected.
M36	Seconds	From target detection until height confirmed.
M37	Percent	Of enemy aircraft detected in time to allow weapons employment.
M38	Percent	Of enemy aircraft detected in time to allow second engagement.
M39	Percent	Of enemy aircraft passing through coverage area detected.
M40	Percent	Of friendly returning aircraft detected.
M41	Percent	Of raids detected.
M42	Percent	Of targets lost after detection.
M43	Percent	Of targets undetected in ground clutter.
M44	Minutes	To build air picture after radar comes on-line.
M45	Percent	Of targets have combat assessment data available from more than one collection platform.
M46	Percent	Of targets have more than one type of system available to perform assessment.
M47	Percent	Of unsatisfied (i.e., do not exist or not adequate) priority one geospatial information and services generated or made adequate within required timeframe.
M48	Percent	Of unsatisfied (i.e., do not exist or not adequate) priority two geospatial information and services generated or made adequate within required timeframe.
M49	Percent	Of unsatisfied (i.e., do not exist or not adequate) priority three geospatial information and services generated or made adequate within required timeframe.

### OP 2.2.2 Directly Support Theater Strategic Surveillance and Reconnaissance Requirements.

To provide, as directed, surveillance and reconnaissance support, to include natural environmental conditions, environmental protection and human health infrastructure, and other environmentally sensitive areas, to combatant commanders and national level agencies. This task includes providing the output of joint operations area assets or asset production, to meet the needs of combatant commanders and designated national agencies. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-01.1, 3-03, 3-09, 3-50.21, 3-55)** (JP 2-0, 3-01.1, 3-05, 3-09, 3-50.21, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

**Note:** See also OP 6.2.5, *Provide Positive Identification of Friendly Forces Within the Joint Operational Area*.

M1	Percent	Of combatant commander and national level collection requirements satisfied by piggybacking on existing collection mission on non-interference basis.
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M2	Hours	To provide JOA collected data to combatant command or national analysts.
M3	Minutes	To redirect surveillance or reconnaissance assets to meet new collection requirement.
M4	Minutes	To redirect surveillance or reconnaissance assets to meet overriding combatant commander or national new collection requirement.

### **OP 2.2.3 Collect and Assess Meteorological and Oceanographic (METOC) Operational Information.**

To collect and assess operationally significant METOC information on enemy (and friendly) force strengths and vulnerabilities and forces. This includes collecting and assessing climatic and hydrographic information necessary to understand the nature and characteristics of the area, and how the climate will effect the enemy's use and friendly forces defense of nuclear, chemical and biological warfare (CBW). This also includes the production and assessment of tactical decision aids and weather effects matrices for the planning and execution of operations **(JP 2-01, 3-08v1, 3-59)** (JP 3-05, 3-56.1, CJCSI 3810.01A, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3141.01, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Of METOC products produced and issued on time to assigned/gained units.
M2	Percent	Of METOC products received from strategic and/or operational centers.
M3	Percent	Accuracy of operational forecasts and products, to include weather effects matrices and tactical decision aids.
M4	Days	Required to establish theater/operational area METOC data collection network.

### **OP 2.2.4 Determine Logistical Capability of the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

Determine a host-nation's capability to procure, receive, store, maintain, distribute, and control the flow of military material between the point of reception into the military system and the point of issue. Task includes a detailed analysis of: host-nation's road, rail, and air networks; port and harbor facilities, storage, maintenance, health services, and warehousing capabilities; and other logistical supply and field service activities. **(JP 3-09, 3-50.21, 4-0, 4-03)** (JP 3-0, 4-0, 4-02.1, CJCSM 3150.23, CJCSM 3500.05)

TBD		
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### **OP 2.2.5 Collect Target Information.**

To acquire information that supports the detection, identification, and location of enemy targets in sufficient detail to permit attack by friendly weapons. The target acquisition system may be closed loop (an inherent part of friendly weapons

system), open loop (separate from the firing system but nevertheless part of the overall weapon system), or an independent surveillance and reconnaissance system. Activities include searching, detecting, locating, and identifying targets and conducting post-attack battle damage assessment. This task includes electronic warfare support (EWS). **(JP 3-01.5, 3-02, 3-09, 3-09.3, 3-10.1)** (JP 3-0, 3-01.4, 3-05.5, 3-09, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Of TST (TM, SEAD, etc.) that are detected.
M2	Percent	Of TST (TM, SEAD, etc.) that are located.
M3	Percent	Of TST(TM, SEAD, etc.) that are correctly identified (ID).
M4	Minutes	To retask ISR platforms for TCT or TST assets active.
M5	Percent	Of reconnaissance or surveillance assets active.
M6	Percent	Of enemy targets detected.
M7	Percent	Battle damage assessment of enemy engaged.
M8	Hours	To identify and submit all source collection requirements for all phases of the targeting process (including support of near-real-time BDA).
M9	Minutes	To develop, maintain, and update target databases to include estimates of target recoverability, resupply, and regeneration.
M10	Hours	To develop potential target list and perform target system analysis, critical element selection, vulnerability assessment, and target validation based on commander guidance/objectives and enemy center of gravity analysis.
M11	Minutes	To integrate information operations to include information warfare data/analysis (information protection, psychological operations, military deception, information, physical destruction, electronic warfare) and information-in-warfare (ISR, weather, navigation, storage and retrieval, comms, public affairs) into operational targeting (law of armed conflict (LOAC)) and strategy (ROEs, constraints, limitations) process.
M12	Minutes	To identify, prioritize, and nominate targets for attack, deception, disruption, exploitation, and reattack based on the commander's guidance and objectives for preplanned and near-real-time (NRT) precision engagement.
M13	Minutes	To select desired mean point of impacts (DMPis) for each target in support of preplanned and NRT employment requirements.
M14	Minutes	To derive precise/mensurated target coordinates for preplanned and NRT munitions employment.
M15	Minutes	To determine best weapon/weapon system match for desired levels of damage given selected targets/DMPis.

### **OP 2.3 Process and Exploit Collected Operational Information.**

To convert collected operational information into forms that can be readily used by intelligence analysts during production. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-54)** (JP 3-0, 3-05.3, 3-09, CJCSI 6510.01B, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Raw information correctly prepared for production phase.
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M2	Minutes	Turnaround time to process new intelligence data.
M3	Percent	Of collected information which can be, processed in the joint operations area (JOA).
M4	Hours	Report any significant event after receipt from organic collection assets.
M5	Hours	Produce an INTSUM after arrival in the JOA.
M6	Hours	Report initial organic collection assets to the JTF and unified command after designation as a JSOTF.

### **OP 2.3.1 Conduct Technical Processing and Exploitation in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To perform activities such as imagery development and interpretation, document translation, data conversion, technical analysis of captured enemy material, and decryption of encoded material. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-08v2, 3-09, 3-54)** (JP 2-0, 2-01, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Increase in processing time when exploitation is concurrent with processing.
M2	Percent	Of collected information which can be processed in JOA.
M3	Percent	Of collected information processed within 24 hours.
M4	Hours	To provide intelligence analysts hard copy formal report of information obtained in processing.
M5	Minutes	To provide intelligence analysts voice or electronic mail report of information.
M6	Minutes	To read wet film (after recovery of aircraft or other photo system).

### **OP 2.3.2 Collate Information.**

To identify and group together related items of information for critical comparison. **(JP 2-0, 2-01)** (JP 2-0, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Of analysis actions returned by joint force all source analyst for additional items of information.
M2	Percent	Of joint force intelligence products lack adequate correlation of information to provide insight into joint implications of subject.
M3	Percent	Of time joint force intelligence products updated with available information not previously correlated.
M4	Percent	Of mission area related items accurately identified and grouped for comparison.

### **OP 2.3.3 Correlate Information.**

To associate and combine data on a single subject to improve the reliability or credibility of the information. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-07.1, 3-54)** (JP 2-0, 3-08v2, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Data Points	Assembled on single subject.
M2	Percent	Of joint force reported information graded as credible.
M3	Percent	Of joint force reported information graded as highly reliable.
M4	Percent	Of available separate sources used by joint force J-2 analysts to increase credibility of information.
M5	Percent	Of mission area related items accurately associated and combined.

#### **OP 2.4 Produce Operational Intelligence and Prepare Intelligence Products.**

To convert processed and exploited information into intelligence that satisfies the joint operations area (JOA) commander's PIRs, intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB), and other intelligence requirements. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-01.1, 3-07.1, 3-54)** (JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-0, 3-08v2, 4-02.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	To produce and disseminate joint force DISUM (after arrival in joint operations area).
M2	Hours	To produce and disseminate component INTSUMs (after arrival in joint operations area).
M3	Minutes	To brief operations command duty officer (after issuing an advisory report).
M4	Minutes	To disseminate an advisory report (after observation of activity).
M5	Hours	To prepare briefing based on new intelligence.

#### **OP 2.4.1 Evaluate, Integrate, Analyze, and Interpret Operational Information.**

To appraise information for credibility, reliability, pertinency, and accuracy (Evaluate). It includes forming patterns through the selection and combination of processed information. It involves integrating strategic, operational, and tactical information (Integrate). This task further includes reviewing information to identify significant facts for subsequent interpretation (Analyze). Finally, the task is to judge the significance of information in relation to the current body of knowledge (Interpret). **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-07.1, 3-08v1, 3-50.21, 3-54)** (JP 2-0, 3-01.1, 3-08v2, 4-02.1, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Of produced intelligence judged accurate in light of event.
M2	Percent	Of produced intelligence judged complete, based upon requests for clarification or expansion.
M3	Percent	Of produced intelligence judged relevant to military situation.
M4	Percent	Of produced intelligence judged timely by users.
M5	Percent	Of produced intelligence judged useable by users.



#### OP 2.4.1.1 Identify Operational Issues and Threats.

To assess threats to the United States, US military forces, and the countries and forces of multinational partners. This task includes assessing potential issues and situations that could impact US national security interests and objectives within the joint operations area. This task includes analyzing the nature and characteristics of the theater to determine the types and scale of operations the theater will support and the impact of significant regional features and hazards on the conduct of both friendly and enemy campaigns or joint operations. The analysis includes the impact of limiting factors (for example, rules of engagement) and determination of the geographic combatant commander or CJTF area of interest. Significant regional features include political, economic, industrial, geospatial (e.g., aeronautical, hydrographic, geodetic, topographic), meteorological, demographic, climatic, populace, cultural, medical, lingual, historical, and psychological features of the area. This task also includes analyzing significant alterations to the theater of war that create strategic hazards (such as NBC contamination). Further this task includes conducting analyses to determine the impact of social, political, economic, and health environment on the area of operations and in particular on campaign plans and joint operations. Finally, it includes an analysis of opportunities for obtaining local resources, facilities, and support in the area of operations and ways of minimizing interference with military operations. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 2-03, 3-07.1)** (JP 2-0, 3-07.2, 3-07.5, 3-08v1, 3-54, 4-02.1, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	For information on APOD/SPOD capacity to be available to planners (after activation of joint force).
M2	Hours	To disseminate advisory report (after observation of significant event).
M3	Hours	Between joint force updates of enemy order of battle.
M4	Hours	Between joint force updates of friendly force status.
M5	Hours	To reassess new information on operational area.
M6	Instances	Of civil disturbances requiring intervention or disrupting operations anticipated by joint force.
M7	Percent	Of geospatial products and information that are accurate.
M8	Percent	Of joint force operations delayed, disrupted, canceled, or modified due to unforeseen information about operational area.
M9	Percent	Of sustainment capability deployed to the joint operations area (JOA) redundant with that readily available on local economy.
M10	Hours	To reassess new threat information.
M11	Days	Since last joint force assessment of information on operational area completed.
M12	Hours	Since last joint force assessment of threat information completed.

### **OP 2.4.1.2 Determine Enemy's Operational Capabilities, Course of Action, and Intentions.**

To identify, at the operational level, what the enemy (or potential enemy) can do, as well as when, where, and with what strength. This task addresses both military and nonmilitary capabilities. It also includes identifying the enemy's operational centers of gravity. Further, this task addresses the enemy's mobilization potential; operational organization (including alliance forces); and dispositions, doctrine, military capabilities, C2 structure, and decision making processes. This evaluation includes continuous refinement of the orders of battle for the entire array of joint and multinational forces available to the enemy commanders in the area of operations. Also included are the personalities and history of performance of key leaders, determination of who has NBC release authority, and the doctrine for employment of forces at the operational level. In military operations other than war, this activity also includes evaluation of developing insurgencies. Assessment of enemy IO capabilities is included here. This task includes identifying all operational courses of action open to the enemy. When sufficient intelligence is available, determine the relative order of probability of each course of action. Identify any factors that may influence the enemy to adopt each course of action. Finally, this task involves determining the susceptibility of vital elements of the enemy's operational military power to the potential actions of the joint force. Operational vulnerabilities may pertain to political, geographic, climate, economic, scientific, societal, or military factors. This task should, among other results, include the creation of intelligence preparation of the battlespace products for the operational area. These products should include developing templates and reports to assist theater intelligence and targeting organizations in determining, tracking, monitoring, and targeting operational critical target sets, and their associated infrastructure. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-01.1, 3-03, 3-07.1, 3-09, 3-10.1)** (JP 2-0, 3-01.1, 3-55, 4-01.1, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Of enemy operational centers of gravity correctly identified.
M2	Percent	Of enemy operational branches and sequels correctly identified (during planning).
M3	Percent	Of enemy targets correctly identified.
M4	Percent	Of enemy targets or vulnerabilities identified within targeting cycle.
M5	Percent	Of false alarms in forecasting significant enemy actions.
M6	Percent	Of joint force attacks on enemy vulnerabilities have projected effect.
M7	Percent	Of joint force identified target categories produce desired result on enemy.
M8	Percent	Of joint force operations with correctly identified enemy operational and tactical center of gravity (prior to selection of COA).
M9	Percent	Of new processed intelligence data integrated within targeting cycle.

M10	Hours	Required to identify enemy operational and tactical center of gravity.
M11	Months	To create IPB for TCT/TST enemy mission areas (TM, SEAD, etc.).
M12	Hours	To update TST IPBs for enemy TM/BM forces.
M13	Percent	Of AOR covered by theater's TM IPB.
M14	Percent	Of enemy TM activities identified by theater's TM IPB.

#### **OP 2.4.1.3 Identify Friendly/Enemy/Neutral Centers of Gravity.**

Identify physical, operational, cultural, political/diplomatic, and economic, organizational centers of gravity for friendly, enemy, and neutral forces, including, as appropriate, IOs/NGOs/PVOs. **(JP 1, 2-0, 2-01, 3-0, 3-07.4, 3-09, 3-56.1, 5-0, CJCSI 3151.01, CJCSM 3141.01)** (JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-11, 3-12, 3-55, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	To identify centers of gravity for US forces.
M2	Day	To identify centers of gravity for other friendly forces.
M3	Days	To identify centers of gravity for enemy forces.
M4	Days	To identify centers of gravity for neutral forces, including IOs/NGOs/PVOs as appropriate.

#### **OP 2.4.2 Prepare Intelligence for the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To prepare intelligence and present them to the users, including other intelligence personnel, in a finished state. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 2-03, 3-01.1, 3-54)** (JP 2-01, 3-08v2, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	To request organic collection asset reports (after assignment of unit to JTF/joint force).
M2	Hours	To prepare and submit initial organic collection report (after designation of JTF/joint force).
M3	Percent	Of time intelligence summary preparation delayed until late for crisis action planning phase 6.
M4	Hours	To prepare briefing based on new intelligence.
M5	Percent	Of required priority one geospatial information and services that exist as standard/substitute products/information.
M6	Percent	Of priority one geospatial information and services that exist as interim products/information.
M7	Percent	Of priority two geospatial information and services that exist as standard/substitute products/information.
M8	Percent	Of priority two geospatial information and services that exist as interim products/information.
M9	Percent	Of priority three geospatial information and services that exist as standard/substitute products/information.

M10	Percent	Of priority three geospatial information and services that exist as interim products/information.
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#### **OP 2.4.2.1 Provide Indications and Warning for the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To report time-sensitive intelligence on foreign developments that could threaten the United States, its citizens abroad, or allied military, political, or economic interests. This task also includes identifying hostile reactions to US reconnaissance activities and indications of impending terrorist attacks. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-01.1, 3-03, 6-02)** (JP 3-01.1, 3-07.1, 3-08v2, 4-01.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Minutes	Between receipt of significant information and updates of indications and warning conditions.
M2	Hours	Lead time in joint force prediction of enemy actions.
M3	Percent	Of commander's threat conditions (THREATCONs) and attack warnings issued and disseminated.
M4	Percent	Of enemy actions with joint force provided warning.
M5	Percent	Of threat indicators maintained and evaluated during declared DEFCON increases accuracy.
M6	Minutes	Required to transmit indication or warning within JOA after identification or receipt.
M7	Minutes	To submit intelligence portion of commander's situation report (SITREP).

#### **OP 2.4.2.2 Provide Current Intelligence for the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To report operational intelligence of immediate value relating to the joint operations area. This task includes the preparation of intelligence estimates and assessments and periodic intelligence briefings and reports. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 2-03, 3-50.3)** (JP 3-07.1, 3-09, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Of Intelligence Reports (INTREPs) submitted within established criteria.
M2	Percent	Of INTREPs submitted with accuracy of event location, times, and synopsis to allow proper action.
M3	Minutes	To brief operations command duty officer (after issuing an advisory report).
M4	Hours	To prepare briefing based on new intelligence.
M5	Hours	To produce and disseminate component INTSUMs (after arrival).
M6	Hours	To produce and disseminate joint force DISUM (after arrival).
M7	Percent	Of weather support provided to assigned and gained units accurate.
M8	Hours	To produce and disseminate component-related current intelligence.

**OP 2.4.2.3 Provide General Military Intelligence for the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To report intelligence relating to the operational military capabilities of enemy forces. This task includes creating and maintaining databases relating to the military capabilities of current and potential adversaries. **(JP 2-0, 2-01)** (JP 2-01, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	Between electronic updates of reports on enemy military capabilities.
M2	Days	Between hard copy updates of reports on enemy military capabilities.
M3	Percent	Difference between actual enemy military strength, compared to that reported in intelligence reports.
M4	Percent	Of enemy units identified in combat, compared to units identified in intelligence reports.
M5	Percent	Of questions on enemy military forces answered by data in joint force intelligence databases.

**OP 2.4.2.4 Provide Target Intelligence for the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To report intelligence of operational targeting value. This includes supporting the operational targeting process and providing data to support offensive IO. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-05.5, 3-09)** (JP 3-02, 3-05.3, 3-56.1, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3141.01, CJCSM 3500.05)

**Note:** This task supports OP 3.1.3, *Develop Operational Targets*.

M1	Percent	Of enemy targets correctly identified by joint force targeteers.
M2	Percent	Of high priority targets (HPTs) mensurated coordinates allow attack without visual update.
M3	Percent	Of high priority targets (HPTs) with correct location data.
M4	Percent	Of selected joint force High Priority Targets (HPTs) have mensurated coordinates available.
M5	Percent	Of sorties diverted to higher priority targets discovered inside execution cycle.
M6	Percent	Of target locations verified by joint force before next targeting cycle.
M7	Hours	To provide intelligence update to SOF on target situation.
M8	Percent	Targets correctly located and identified.
M9	Percent	Of enemy command posts known and located sufficiently to permit attack by lethal means.
M10	Percent	Of enemy command posts known and located sufficiently to permit attack by nonlethal means.
M11	Percent	Of enemy NBC delivery systems identified by friendly forces.
M12	Hours	To provide battle damage assessment following execution on enemy targets.

## **OP 2.5 Disseminate and Integrate Operational Intelligence.**

To provide operational intelligence, in a timely way, in an appropriate form, and by any suitable means, to the geographic combatant commander and JTF commander and to ensure that the intelligence is understood and considered by the commanders. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 2-03, 3-10.1)** (JP 2-01, 3-01.5, 3-07.2, 3-08v2, 3-10.1, 3-55, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Of time intelligence summaries disseminated late to joint force CAT during crisis action planning, phase 6.
M2	Minutes	To disseminate advisory report (after observation of activity).
M3	Hours	To disseminate intelligence updates (upon completion of assessment).
M4	Minutes	To pass prepared intelligence to joint force commander and staff.
M5	Minutes	To prepare intelligence for joint force commander and staff.
M6	Percent	Of required priority one geospatial information and services provided within required timeframe.
M7	Percent	Of required priority two geospatial information and services provided within required timeframe.
M8	Percent	Of required priority three geospatial information and services provided within required timeframe.
M9	Minutes	To pass prepared intelligence to commander and staff.
M10	Minutes	To prepare intelligence for commander and staff.

### **OP 2.5.1 Provide Intelligence for the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To ensure the transmission to all organizations and personnel with a need to know intelligence materials produced in response to the JOA intelligence requirements. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-01.1, 3-10.1)** (JP 2-01, 3-07.1, 3-10.1, 3-54, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

**Note:** The transmission of intelligence products, by message, hard copy or other method is provided for by OP 5.1.1, *Communicate Operational Information*.

M1	Percent	Of responses to requests for information (RFIs) provide needed information to required accuracy.
M2	Percent	Of time mission-essential intelligence and threat assessments passed within established criteria.
M3	Percent	Of time intelligence summaries disseminated late to joint force CAT during crisis action planning, phase 6.
M4	Minutes	To disseminate advisory report (after observation of activity).
M5	Hours	To disseminate intelligence updates (upon completion of assessment).
M6	Minutes	To pass prepared intelligence to joint force commander and staff.
M7	Minutes	To prepare intelligence for joint force commander and staff.

**OP 2.5.2 Provide Follow-on Intelligence Support to the Joint Operations Area (JOA) Planners and Decision Makers.**

To be available for and to participate in joint force commander strategic planning and execution. This task includes providing intelligence inputs in response to queries based upon furnished intelligence products or the evolution of events within the JOA. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-07.1)** (JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-0, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	For joint force intelligence producers to follow-up or contact customers during planning or execution.
M2	Percent	Of joint force intelligence producers have recorded or posted their customer organization, name and phone number or E-mail address.
M3	Percent	Of time joint force intelligence producer spends on direct contact with his or her customer.
M4	Hours	Since intelligence producer last contacted or spoke with his or her customer (during a crisis).
M5	Minutes	To clarify issues in intelligence products furnished by joint force intelligence producers.
M6	Hours	To disseminate updates upon completion of assessment.
M7	Hours	To provide supplemental information to users for new issues prompted by a joint force intelligence product.

**OP 2.5.3 Provide Near Real-Time Intelligence for the Joint Operations Area (JOA) Planners and Decision Makers.**

Ensure near real-time (defined as within 5 seconds to 5 minutes of occurrence) air, ground, and naval threat. Situational awareness, counterdrug, and AT/FP information is disseminated to decision makers at a usable classification level. **(JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-03, 3-05.3, 3-50.21)** (JP 3-07.4, 3-50.21, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Of events accurately disseminated by intelligence producer to appropriate customers on time.
M2	Percent	Of disseminated events accurately received by appropriate customers on time.

**OP 2.6 Evaluate Intelligence Activities in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To determine how well intelligence operations are being performed and to make any necessary improvements. The primary factor is that the consumer's intelligence requirements are being satisfied on time. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-07.1)** (JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-07.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Of comments critical of joint force J-2 performance represent repeat comments.
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M2	Percent	Of customer complaints result in change within joint force J-2 or explanation to customer of why no change.
M3	Percent	Of evaluator recommendations for improvement implemented by joint force J-2 within 90 days.
M4	Percent	Of evaluator recommendations specifically directed to individual responsible for implementing suggested changes.
M5	Percent	Of intelligence training materials certified accurate by unit chief of intelligence.
M6	Percent	Of joint force intelligence production programs include a customer survey.
M7	Percent	Of joint force J-2 offices with self inspection program.
M8	Days	Since customer comments or observations last passed to joint force J-2 organizations and personnel by DJ-2 or J-2 inspectors.

### OP 3 EMPLOY OPERATIONAL FIREPOWER.

To employ lethal and nonlethal means to defeat enemy forces or to maintain freedom of movement. Operational firepower is by its nature, primarily a joint/multinational task. Firepower refers to the delivery of all types of ordnance to include bombs, rockets, missiles, and artillery as well as other nonlethal means against enemy targets at operational depths. **(JP 3-0, 3-03, 3-09, 3-52)** (JP 1, 3-05, 3-09.3, 3-10, CJCSM 3500.05)

**Note:** Operational firepower is normally furnished by assets other than those required for the routine support of tactical maneuver or strategic attack operations. However, as the range of assets used to support tactical maneuver increases, those assets will play a more significant role in the delivery of operational firepower. Planning for operational firepower is part of the operational command and control activity, OP 5.3, *Prepare Plans and Orders*, in which the joint force commander integrates joint and multinational capabilities into a coherent joint operations area campaign plan with supporting land, naval, air, and special operations plans. Also, see OP 5.6, *Coordinate Operational Information Operations (IO)*.

M1	Minutes	To attack target after most recent information on target provided.
M2	Percent	Of HPTs successfully attacked.
M3	Percent	Of missiles, rockets, and other long-range attack systems successfully engaged targets.

#### OP 3.1 Conduct Joint Force Targeting.

To positively identify and select targets that decisively impact campaigns and major operations and match the targets to appropriate joint or multinational systems. Targeting is accomplished primarily by the individual components to attain objectives and achieve effects as directed by the JFC. The term target is used in its broadest sense to include targets in military operations other than war, such as a target audience of psychological operations in a counterinsurgency situation.



**(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-0, 3-01.4, 3-03, 3-09, 3-56.1)** (JP 2-01, 3-01.1, 3-05.5, 3-07.1, 3-07.5, 3-10.1, 3-55, 3-55.1, 5-00.2, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	To develop attack plan after identification of HPT.
M2	Hours	To issue CJTF's HPT categories (after CINC's warning order).
M3	Hours	To issue CJTF's prohibited target guidance (after CINC's warning order).
M4	Hours	To issue FSC measures guidance (after CINC's warning order).
M5	Hours	To pass JTCB guidance to targeting agencies (e.g., JFACC) (before ATO cycle begins).
M6	Hours	To produce joint force commander apportionment guidance (after CINC's warning order).
M7	Percent	Of desired results achieved (by expected conclusion of given phase or time line).
M8	Percent	Of desired results achieved by theater operational firepower (within specified time/phase).
M9	Percent	Of JTCB target priorities differ from CJTF, CINC and NCA Guidance.
M10	Percent	Of selected targets for which accurate coordinates available.
M11	Percent	Of JTCB selected targets reviewed for political ramifications.
M12	Percent	Of targets susceptible to nonlethal kill allocated to attack using nonlethal means.
M13	Percent	Of enemy NBC delivery systems targeted by friendly forces.

#### **OP 3.1.1 Establish Joint Force Targeting Guidance.**

To provide joint force commander's guidance and priorities for targeting and identification of requirements by components; the prioritization of these requirements; the acquisition of targets or target sets; and the attack of targets by components. The guidance and prioritization matches objectives and guidance with inputs from intelligence and operations personnel to select specific targets. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-0, 3-01.4, 3-03, 3-05.5, 3-09, 3-56.1)** (JP 2-01, 3-05.5, 5-00.2, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Days	In advance of attack, targeting strategy established.
M2	Percent	Of desired results achieved (by expected conclusion of given phase or time line).
M3	Percent	Of HPTs assigned to more than one type attack system.
M4	Percent	Of enemy decisive points translated into HPTs.

#### **OP 3.1.2 Apportion Joint/Multinational Operational Firepower Resources.**

To apportion operational firepower means to operational targets consistent with the joint force commander's plan and intent. To determine and designate the total expected effort by percentage and/or priority that should be devoted to the various land, sea, air, and space operations and/or geographic areas for a given period of

time by each component. Apportionment of firepower resources allows the joint force commander to ensure the weight of the joint firepower effort is consistent with campaign phases and objectives. **(JP 3-0, 3-03, 3-09)** (JP 3-0, 3-03, 3-56.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	To assign firepower resources, once targets identified during planning phase.
M2	Hours	To complete targeting cycle planning.
M3	Instances	Of theater strategic firepower assignments appealed to JFC.
M4	Percent	Of HPTs attacked by joint forces as non-ATO targets.
M5	Percent	Of HPTs covered by at least one attack system.
M6	Percent	Of joint force operations delayed, disrupted, canceled or modified awaiting firepower support.
M7	Percent	Of land, air, and sea delivery systems' targets of opportunity coordinated by JTCCB.
M8	Percent	Of attacking systems that must penetrate to target to deliver ordnance.
M9	Minutes	To assign firepower resources to time-critical targets once targets identified.

### OP 3.1.3 Develop Operational Targets.

To evaluate and choose operational targets for attack to achieve optimum effect in support of the operational level joint force commander's intent. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 2-03, 3-0, 3-03, 3-09, 3-13.1, 3-55, 3-56.1)** (JP 2-01, 3-09.1, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

**Note:** Related activities are found under intelligence and C2, respectively. Air targets for this task include offensive counterair targets but do not include air defense or defensive counter air targets; these are covered in OP 6.1, *Provide Operational Air, Space, and Missile Defense*. Operational targets include the destruction and degradation of enemy C2W means, which include EW. See OP 5.6, *Coordinate Operational Information Operations (IO)*.

M1	Hours	To select targets for attack (once intelligence data available) (during planning phase).
M2	Percent	Of decisive points discovered within execution cycle evaluated.
M3	Percent	Of effort diverted by JFACC or joint force commander to higher priority category.

### OP 3.1.4 Develop High-Payoff and High-Value Targets.

To identify high-value targets (HVTs). HVTs are those assets the enemy requires for the successful completion of a mission. HVTs which, if successfully attacked, would contribute substantially to friendly operations, are called high-payoff targets (HPTs). This task includes prioritizing the HPTs into a high-payoff target list (HPTL) and

developing guidance on what and when they should be attacked and the assets used for the attack. **(JP 3-03, 3-09, 3-13.1, 3-55, 3-56.1)** (JP 2-01, 3-01.1, 3-03, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Minutes	To complete prioritization (once intelligence data considered).
M2	Percent	Of effort diverted by JFACC or joint force commander to higher priority category discovered after allocation, but inside execution cycle.
M3	Percent	Of operational HPTs discovered within execution cycle result in reprioritized target list.

### OP 3.1.5 Publish Air Tasking Order(s) (ATO).

To publish an ATO that assigns missions and specific taskings for each joint force subordinate command employing air assets in the airspace control area of the AOR or joint operations area. Normally published daily, the ATO is disseminated to appropriate units and C2 agencies. It provides specific instructions to each projected mission as well as general instructions and notification to all joint forces. The ATO can also be used to notify supported land and sea forces of expected missions. **(JP 3-03, 3-09.3, 3-56.1)** (JP 3-02, 3-05.3, 3-09, 3-50.21, 3-52, 4-02.2, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	To assign firepower resources (once targets identified).
M2	Instances	Of SAPs not integrated with non-SAP systems.
M3	Percent	Of ATO addressees receive ATO on time.
M4	Percent	Of ATO missions contain errors.
M5	Percent	Of attacks deconflicted with friendly forces.
M6	Percent	Of HPTs attacked with inappropriate munitions.
M7	Percent	Of mismatch between target sets and assigned strike assets.
M8	Percent	Of weapons changes receiving legal review.

### OP 3.1.6 Conduct Operational Combat/Military Operations Other than War Assessment.

To determine the overall effectiveness of joint and multinational forces employment in the operational area as it relates to strategic and operational objectives in subordinate campaigns and major operations. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-0, 3-03, 3-09, 3-56.1)** (JP 2-0, 3-05.5, 3-09, 3-13.1, 3-55, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	To commence follow-on operations or execute restrike, awaiting combat/MOOTW assessment.
M2	Hours	To complete combat/MOOTW assessment.
M3	Hours	To provide full assessment of attacks to joint force commander.
M4	Minutes	To provide initial combat/MOOTW assessment of attacks to joint force commander.

M5	Percent	Of HPTs assessed as killed later assessed as being mission capable.
M6	Percent	Difference between national level and joint force assessment of effectiveness.
M7	Percent	Of targets have combat/MOOTW assessment data available.
M8	Percent	Of targets unnecessarily reattacked.
M9	Minutes	To perform the combat assessment functions of BDA, mission assessment (MA), and munitions effectiveness assessment (MEA) based on commander's guidance/objectives.

**OP 3.1.6.1 Assess Battle Damage on Operational Targets.**

To conduct timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the application of military force either lethal or nonlethal against predetermined operational objectives. BDA can be applied to all types of systems throughout the range of military operations. BDA is primarily an intelligence responsibility in the targeting process with inputs from operators. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-0, 3-03, 3-55)** (JP 2-0, 3-09, 3-09.3, 3-55.1, 3-56.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

**Note:** See also OP 2.2.1, *Collect Information on Operational Situation*.

M1	Hours	To commence follow-on operations or execute reattack (following receipt of assessment).
M2	Hours	To complete full assessment of attacks after TOT.
M3	Minutes	To make initial assessment of attacks after TOT.
M4	Hours	To provide full assessment of attacks to joint force commander.
M5	Minutes	To provide initial battle damage assessment of attacks to joint force commander.
M6	Percent	Of HPTs assessed as killed later assessed as being mission capable.
M7	Percent	Of targets have BDA based on more than one type of system.
M8	Percent	Of targets unnecessarily reattacked.
M9	Percent	Difference between national level and joint force assessment of effectiveness.

**OP 3.1.6.2 Assess Munitions Effects on Operational Targets.**

To evaluate damage from munitions employed to determine more effective munitions for continuing attack of these targets in subordinate campaigns and major operations. **(JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-03, 3-09, 3-56.1)** (JP 2-01, 3-03, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	To commence follow-on operations or execute reattack (following receipt of munitions effects (ME) assessment).
M2	Hours	To complete munitions effects assessment after attack.
M3	Hours	To provide full assessment of attacks to joint force commander.
M4	Minutes	To provide initial munitions effects assessment of attacks to joint force commander.

M5	Percent	Of HPTs assessed as killed later assessed as being mission capable.
M6	Percent	Of HPTs require reattack.
M7	Percent	Of HPTs successfully attacked.
M8	Percent	Difference between national level and joint force assessment of munitions effectiveness.
M9	Percent	Of targets unnecessarily reattacked.

**OP 3.1.6.3 Assess Reattack Requirement.**

To evaluate the overall impact and effectiveness of operations against the enemy and what, if any, changes or additional efforts need to take place to meet the operational commander's objectives in the current major operation or phase of the subordinate campaign. **(JP 3-03, 3-09, 3-09.3, 3-56.1)** (JP 2-0, 3-01.1, 3-12.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	To commence follow-on operations or execute other options.
M2	Hours	To provide full assessment of attacks to joint force commander.
M3	Minutes	To assess reattack requirement (after attack).
M4	Minutes	To provide initial reattack assessment of attacks to joint force commander.
M5	Percent	Of HPT attacks unsuccessful.
M6	Percent	Of HPTs assessed as killed later assessed as being mission capable.
M7	Percent	Of HPTs require reattack.
M8	Percent	Of HPTs successfully attacked.
M9	Percent	Difference between national level and joint force assessment of reattack requirement.
M10	Percent	Of targets unnecessarily reattacked.

**OP 3.1.7 Employ Fire Support Coordination Measures.**

To employ fire support coordination measures and the procedures associated with those measures to assist in the C2 of joint forces. Within their areas of operation, land and amphibious commanders employ permissive and restrictive fire support coordinating measures (e.g., restricted fire line) to enhance the attack of targets; protect forces, populations, critical infrastructure, and sites of religious or cultural significance; and set the stage for future operations. **(JP 3-0, 3-03, 3-01.4, 3-09, 3-10.1, 6-0)** (JP 3-01.4, 3-05.5, 3-07.5, 3-09, 3-09.3, 3-10.1, 3-11, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Instances	Of collateral damage.
M2	Instances	Of fratricide.
M3	Percent	Of high-payoff targets destroyed subsequently attacked by another component.

M4	Percent	Of SOF missions executed with required notification of non-SOF operating forces in area.
M5	Percent	Of target attacks violate coordination measures or procedures.

### **OP 3.2 Attack Operational Targets.**

To engage operational level targets and to shape and control the tempo of campaigns using all available joint and multinational operational firepower (includes ground, naval, air, space, and SOF conventional and special munitions) against land, air, and maritime (surface and subsurface) targets having operational significance. Operational targets can be conventional or NBC (weapons of mass destruction) related. **(JP 1, 2-01, 3-0, 3-03, 3-09, 3-54)** (JP 2-0, 3-55, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Minutes	To get ordnance on target after initiation of task.
M2	Percent	Execution of missions requested by components.
M3	Percent	Of high priority missions executed within specified time.
M4	Percent	Of maneuver forces secure assigned objectives.
M5	Percent	Of missions flown/fired achieve desired target damage.
M6	Percent	Of operational fires on time in support of maneuver forces.
M7	Percent	Of preplanned targets successfully attacked during operation.
M8	Percent	On time of missions with given times on target.
M9	Percent	Of enemy NBC delivery systems engaged/destroyed by friendly forces.

#### **OP 3.2.1 Provide Close Air Support Integration for Surface Forces.**

To attack operational land and sea targets with available joint and multinational operational firepower delivery systems. To delay, disrupt, destroy, or degrade enemy operational forces or critical tasks and facilities (including C2I targets) and to affect the enemy's will to fight. This task includes integrating the tasking and targeting options, as well as the liaison requirements for aircraft to provide direct close air support to surface forces. **(JP 3-0, 3-09, 3-09.3, 3-10, 3-10.1)** (JP 3-09, 3-09.1, 3-09.3, 3-50.21, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Minutes	To complete attack after target identification.
M2	Percent	Of attacking systems deliver ordnance.
M3	Percent	Of enemy desert per day.
M4	Percent	Of enemy forces destroyed, delayed, disrupted, or degraded.
M5	Percent	Of enemy troops surrender.
M6	Percent	Of friendly COAs altered or discarded.

### OP 3.2.2 Conduct Attack on Operational Targets using Nonlethal Means.

To engage operational targets with nonlethal joint and multinational means designed to degrade, impair, disrupt, or delay the performance of enemy operational forces, tasks, and facilities. The means include the use of psychological operations, special operations forces, electronic attack, and other IO capabilities. **(JP 3-0, 3-03, 3-09, 3-11, 3-13, 3-13.1, 3-54, 3-56.1)** (JP 3-0, 3-05, 3-05.5, 3-07.5, 3-09, 3-53, CJCSI 3110.09, CJCSM 3210.01, CJCSM 3500.05)

**Note:** See also OP 5.6 *Coordinate Operational Information Operations (IO)*.

M1	Hours	To initiate PSYOP activities (after warning order).
M2	Minutes	To complete attack on target (after initiation) using nonlethal means.
M3	Percent	Of enemy actions consistent with IW plan objectives.
M4	Percent	Of joint force targets attacked with lethal means also attacked with PSYOP.
M5	Percent	Of preplanned targets successfully attacked.
M6	Percent	Of PSYOP objectives accomplished.
M7	Percent	Reduction in enemy signals volume (after implementation of EW plan).
M8	Percent	Reduction in enemy signals volume (at implementation of EW plan).
M9	Total	Enemy troops per day surrender, defect, or desert.
M10	Days	To initiate PSYOP campaign (after warning order).
M11	Hours	For psychological operations units to arrive in theater (after joint force activation).
M12	Hours	For PSYOP campaign to begin (after joint force activation).
M13	Percent	Of JOA covered by friendly force mass media.
M14	Percent	Of PSYOP effort focused on stabilizing and reinforcing allied forces and host nation.
M15	Percent	Of selected targets for which other attack systems were integrated with PSYOP (e.g., PSYOP and offensive air operations).
M16	Percent	Of target audience exhibits behavior in accordance with joint force commander's desires.
M17	Percent	Of target audience reached by more than one media in PSYOP campaign.
M18	Hours	To initiate electronic attack (after ordered).
M19	Percent	Of electronic attacks achieve desired effects on enemy.
M20	Percent	Of tasked electronic attacks conducted.
M21	Percent	Reduction in enemy communications emissions (after EW attack).
M22	Percent	Reduction in enemy signals volume (after implementation of EW plan).
M23	Percent	Reduction in enemy signals volume (at implementation of EW plan).
M24	Percent	Of enemy air defense capabilities neutralized by nonlethal means.
M25	Percent	Of OPLANs, OPORDs, and component plans, have integrated plan for attack of adversary information system.

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M26	Percent	Of operational phases include information system attack plan.
M27	Percent	Of all information system targets evaluated as candidates for attack.
M28	Percent	Of attacks on adversary information system targets achieve desired damage criteria.
M29	Percent	Of attacks on adversary information systems without fratricide on friendly systems.
M30	Percent	Of attacks on adversary information systems integrated into daily ATO.
M31	Percent	Of adversary information systems included in target lists.
M32	Percent	Of adversary backup and alternate information systems attacked concurrent with attacks on primary systems.
M33	Percent	More time than allocated in campaign plan, needed to achieve desired damage levels on adversary information systems.
M34	Percent	Degradation in enemy information processing capacity after attack.
M35	Hours	For impact of information system attack to be reflected in enemy operation.
M36	Hours	Results of information system attack can be sustained by friendly forces.
M37	Percent	Of OPLANs, OPORDs, and component plans, have integrated nonlethal plan.
M38	Percent	Of all targets evaluated as candidates for attack using nonlethal means.
M39	Percent	Of attacks using nonlethal means on selected targets, achieve desired damage criteria.
M40	Percent	Of attacks using nonlethal means on selected targets, achieve desired nonlethal effect.
M41	Percent	Of attacks using nonlethal means integrated into daily ATO.
M42	Percent	Of attacks using nonlethal means without lethal results.
M43	Hours	Until attack options, using nonlethal means, developed (from warning order).
M44	Percent	Of decrease in support for adversary activity in country of operation resulting from nonlethal efforts.
M45	Percent	Of attacks, using nonlethal means, require lethal support.
M46	Percent	Of attacks, using nonlethal means, result in death or injury to friendly employing forces.

#### **OP 3.2.2.1 Employ PSYOP in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To plan and execute operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences in the operational area to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. PSYOP actions are aimed at making the adversary leadership, military personnel, or population modify their behavior in ways that are favorable to US or allied/coalition efforts in the operation area. PSYOP consolidation activities are planned activities in war and military operations other than war directed at the civilian population located in areas under friendly



control in order to achieve a desired behavior which supports the military objectives and the operational freedom of the supported commander. PSYOP activities are integrated and/or coordinated with other IO activities within the area of operation and with other US/multinational government (outside DOD) informational activities within the operational area. **(JP 3-0, 3-07, 3-07.1, 3-10.1, 3-13.1, 3-50.3, 3-53, 3-54, 3-57, 3-61)** (JP 3-03, 3-05, 3-07.1, 3-07.5, 3-09, 3-10.1, CJCSI 3110.09, CJCSI 3210.01, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

**Note:** This task supports OP 5.6, *Coordinate Operational Information Operations (IO)*.

M1	Days	To initiate PSYOP campaign (after warning order).
M2	Hours	For psychological operations units to arrive in theater (after joint force activation).
M3	Hours	For PSYOP campaign to begin (after joint force activation).
M4	Percent	Of JOA covered by friendly force mass media.
M5	Percent	Of PSYOP effort focused on stabilizing and reinforcing allied forces and host-nation.
M6	Percent	Of selected targets for which other attack systems were integrated with PSYOP (e.g., PSYOP and offensive air operations).
M7	Percent	Of target audience exhibits behavior in accordance with joint force commander's desires.
M8	Percent	Of target audience reached by more than one media in PSYOP campaign.

### **OP 3.2.2.2 Employ Electronic Attack (EA) in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To employ electromagnetic or directed energy to attack personnel, facilities or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability within the operational area. EA includes: 1) actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy's effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum, such as jamming, and 2) employment of weapons that use either electromagnetic or directed energy as their primary destructive mechanism (lasers, radio frequency weapons, particle beams). **(JP 3-0, 3-03, 3-10.1, 3-13.1, 3-54)** (JP 3-01.4, 3-09, 3-51, 3-58, CJCSI 3110.09, CJCSI 3210.01, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

**Note:** Electronic warfare includes three elements, EA (above task), Electronic Protection (EP), and EW Support (ES). Electromagnetic deception, an aspect of EA, is included under OP 6.4 *Conduct Military Deception in Support of Subordinate Campaigns and Major Operations*. EP is included under OP 6.2.3 *Protect Use of Electromagnetic Spectrum in the Joint Operations Area (JOA)*, and EWS is included under OP 2 *Provide Operational Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance*

M1	Hours	To initiate electronic attack (after ordered).
M2	Percent	Of electronic attacks achieve desired effects on enemy.

M3	Percent	Of tasked electronic attacks conducted.
M4	Percent	Reduction in enemy communications emissions (after EW attack).
M5	Percent	Reduction in enemy signals volume (after implementation of EW plan).
M6	Percent	Reduction in enemy signals volume (at implementation of EW plan).
M7	Percent	Of enemy air defense capabilities neutralized by nonlethal means.
M8	Days	To create a frequency deconfliction plan.
M9	Percent	Of tasked electronic attacks conducted.

### OP 3.2.2.3 Employ Information Attack in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).

To employ offensive information operations capabilities to achieve operational objectives. **(JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-13.1, 3-54, 6-0)** (JP 2-01, 3-58, 6-0, CJCSI 3210.01, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Of OPLANs, OPORDs, and component plans, have integrated plan for attack of adversary information system.
M2	Percent	Of operational phases, include information system attack plan.
M3	Percent	Of all information system targets evaluated as candidates for attack.
M4	Percent	Of attacks on adversary information system targets, achieve desired damage criteria.
M5	Percent	Of attacks on adversary information systems without fratricide on friendly systems.
M6	Percent	Of attacks on adversary information systems integrated into daily ATO.
M7	Percent	Of adversary information systems included in target lists.
M8	Percent	Of adversary backup and alternate information systems attacked concurrent with attacks on primary systems.
M9	Percent	More time than allocated in campaign plan, needed to achieve desired damage levels on adversary information systems.
M10	Percent	Degradation in enemy information processing capacity after attack.
M11	Hours	For impact of information system attack to be reflected in enemy operation.
M12	Hours	Before friendly forces can sustain results of information system attack.

### OP 3.2.2.4 Conduct Attack on Personnel, Equipment, and Installations using Nonlethal Means.

To conduct nonlethal attack against personnel, equipment, and installations to neutralize or degrade their combat capability or contribution. This task includes all forms of nonlethal attack not involving PSYOP, EA, and information-based attacks. **(JP 3-0, 3-03, 3-09, 3-13, 3-13.1)** (JP 3-03, 3-09, 3-50.21, 3-54, 3-58, CJCSI 3210.01, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Of OPLANs, OPORDs, and component plans, have integrated nonlethal plan.
M2	Percent	Of all targets evaluated as candidates for nonlethal attack.
M3	Percent	Of attacks, using nonlethal means on selected targets, achieve desired damage criteria.
M4	Percent	Of attacks, using nonlethal means on selected targets, achieve desired nonlethal effect.
M5	Percent	Of attacks, using nonlethal means integrated into daily ATO.
M6	Percent	Of attacks, using nonlethal means without lethal results.
M7	Hours	Until attack, using nonlethal means options developed (from warning order).
M8	Percent	Of decrease in support for adversary activity in country of operation resulting from nonlethal efforts.
M9	Percent	Of attacks, using nonlethal means require lethal support.
M10	Percent	Of attacks, using nonlethal means result in death or injury to friendly employing forces.

### OP 3.2.3 Attack Aircraft and Missiles (Offensive Counterair (OCA)).

To attack the enemy's assets before they can be employed against friendly assets. OCA is an operation mounted to destroy, disrupt, or limit enemy air power as close to its source as possible. It seized the air initiative through taking the air war to the enemy by targeting air bases, support infrastructure, warning and control systems, TM support and launch facilities, surface-based air and missile defenses, and aircraft. **(JP 3-01.1, 3-01.5, 3-10.1)** (JP 3-02, 3-03, 3-09, CJCMS 3500.05)

**Note:** Defensive counterair is addressed under OP 6.1.4 *Counter Enemy Air Attack (Defensive Counterair (DCA)) in the Joint Operations Area (JOA)*.

M1	Percent	Of attacking systems deliver ordnance.
M2	Percent	Of enemy air actions require discard of friendly COAs.
M3	Percent	Of enemy forces destroyed, delayed, disrupted, or degraded.
M4	Percent	Of HPT attacks lack integration of fires assets.
M5	Percent	Of preplanned targets successfully attacked.
M6	Missiles	Launched per day from enemy land based mobile launchers.
M7	Percent	Of enemy theater missile forces destroyed.
M8	Percent	Of enemy TM launch systems and support facilities and forces destroyed.
M9	Percent	Of hostile theater missiles engaged and destroyed.
M10	Percent	Of attack systems directed against declared hostile theater missile elements.
M11	Minutes	To get ordnance on time-sensitive targets after initiation/acceptance of target.

**OP 3.2.4 Suppress Enemy Air Defenses.**

To coordinate, integrate, and synchronize attacks that neutralize, destroy, or temporarily degrade surface-based enemy air defenses by destructive and/or disruptive means. **(JP 3-01.4, 3-03, 3-09, 3-09.3, 3-50.21, 4-01.1)** (JP 1, 3-05.3, 3-15, 3-17, 4-01.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Of enemy air defenses destroyed.
M2	Percent	Of friendly air losses to enemy air defenses.
M3	Percent	Of friendly air sorties attacked by enemy air defense.

**OP 3.2.5 Interdict Operational Forces/Targets.**

To coordinate, integrate, and synchronize actions that divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy's military potential (forces, nodes, LOCs, networks, and infrastructures) before it can be used effectively against friendly forces conducting campaigns and major operations in the JOA. **(JP 3-0, 3-03)** (JP 3-01.4, 3-02, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Destruction of enemy logistics required by operational forces.
M2	Percent	Disruption of enemy logistics required by operational forces.
M3	Percent	Increase in friendly branches/sequels (following interdiction).
M4	Percent	Of attacks having collateral damage within limits defined by NCA or geographic combatant commander.
M5	Percent	Of enemy forces or materials diverted, disrupted, delayed or destroyed (before effective use against friendly forces).
M6	Percent	Of enemy operational targets engaged.
M7	Percent	Of potential enemy COAs denied.
M8	Percent	Of target attacks achieve desired effects.
M9	Percent	Reduction of that enemy LOC capacity required for offensive operations.
M10	Percent	Of enemy operational forces diverted, disrupted, delayed or destroyed by joint force interdiction outside JOA/theater of operations.

**OP 3.2.5.1 Conduct Air Interdiction of Operational Forces/Targets.**

To conduct air operations as part of the JFC's campaign or major operation to destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy's military potential. Actions are conducted at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. **(JP 3-03)** (JP 3-0, 3-07.4, 3-09, 3-12.1, 3-56.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Disruption of enemy logistics required by operational forces.
M2	Percent	Increase in friendly branches/sequels (following interdiction).
M3	Percent	Of attacks have collateral damage within limits defined by NCA or geographic combatant commander.

M4	Percent	Of enemy forces diverted, disrupted, delayed or destroyed before effective uses against friendly forces.
M5	Percent	Of enemy material diverted, disrupted, delayed or destroyed before effective uses against friendly forces.
M6	Percent	Of enemy operational targets engaged.
M7	Percent	Of potential enemy COAs denied.
M8	Percent	Of target attacks achieve desired effects.
M9	Percent	Reduction of that enemy LOC capacity required for offensive operations.
M10	Percent	Destruction of enemy logistics required by operational forces.

### **OP 3.2.5.2 Conduct Surface/Subsurface Firepower Interdiction of Operational Forces/Targets.**

To conduct land or sea operations as part of the JFC's campaign or major operation to destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy's military potential. Actions are conducted at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each mission with the firepower and movement of friendly forces is not required. **(JP 3-03, 3-09, 3-56.1)** (JP 3-0, 3-10.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Increase in friendly branches/sequels (following interdiction).
M2	Percent	Of attacks having collateral damage within limits defined by NCA or geographic combatant commander.
M3	Percent	Of enemy forces or materials diverted, disrupted, delayed or destroyed before effective use against friendly forces.
M4	Percent	Of enemy operational forces diverted, disrupted, delayed or destroyed by joint force interdiction outside JOAs.
M5	Percent	Of enemy operational targets engaged.
M6	Percent	Of potential enemy COAs denied.
M7	Percent	Of targets attacked achieve desired effects.
M8	Percent	Reduction of enemy LOC capacity required for offensive operations.

### **OP 3.2.5.3 Conduct Special Operations Interdiction of Operational Forces/Targets.**

To conduct special operations throughout the joint operations area (JOA) as part of the JFC's campaign or major operation to destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy's military potential. Actions are conducted at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each mission with the firepower and movement of friendly forces is not required. **(JP 3-03, 3-05.3, 3-09)** (JP 3-0, 3-05, 3-09, 3-50.3, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Destruction of enemy logistics required by operational forces.
M2	Percent	Increase in friendly branches/sequels (following interdiction).

M3	Percent	Of attacks have collateral damage within limits defined by NCA or geographic combatant commander.
M4	Percent	Of enemy forces or materials diverted, disrupted, delayed or destroyed before effective use against friendly forces.
M5	Percent	Of enemy operational forces diverted, disrupted, delayed or destroyed outside JOA/theater of operations.
M6	Percent	Of enemy operational targets engaged.
M7	Percent	Of potential enemy COAs denied.
M8	Percent	Of target attacks achieve desired effects.
M9	Percent	Reduction of enemy LOC capacity required for offensive operations.

### OP 3.2.6 Provide Firepower in Support of Operational Maneuver.

To support land and sea joint operational maneuver as part of the JFC's campaign or major operation plan by engaging operational targets (except air defense, antiair, or defensive counterair targets) with available joint and multinational operational firepower delivery systems. **(JP 3-0, 3-03, 3-09)** (JP 3-52, 3-56.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Increase in friendly branches/sequels (following interdiction).
M2	Percent	Of operational maneuvers with faulty operational fire support.
M3	Percent	Of target attacks achieve desired effects.
M4	Percent	Of target attacks in support of operational maneuver cause fratricide.

### OP 3.2.7 Synchronize Operational Firepower.

To synchronize, and integrate as necessary, operational attacks on single or multiple operational targets at the decisive time and place. This integration includes lethal and/or nonlethal means and minimizing their effect on friendly forces, neutrals, and noncombatants. **(JP 3-0, 3-03, 3-09, 3-10.1)** (JP 3-09.3, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	To reattack operational target.
M2	Percent	Of assets used for short notice retargeting (flexibility) in support of maneuver.
M3	Percent	Of attacks deconflicted with friendly forces.
M4	Percent	Of attacks on enemy targets achieve desired effects.
M5	Percent	Of attacks on HPTs lack integration of fires assets.
M6	Percent	Of destroyed HPTs subsequently engaged by fires from another component.
M7	Percent	Of friendly casualties by fratricide.
M8	Percent	Of HPTs attacked by joint force as non-ATO targets.
M9	Percent	Of operational targets attacked by lethal and nonlethal together.
M10	Percent	Of SOF missions executed with appropriate notification of non-SOF operating forces in area.

M11	Percent	Of strategic national missions require theater/JOA support.
M12	Percent	Satisfaction of theater/JOA support for strategic national missions.

### **OP 3.3 Conduct Peace Operations in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To conduct peace operations (PO) in an operational area. This involves actions to preserve, maintain, or restore the peace and coordinate the interaction on military forces with political and humanitarian agencies involved. PO are often associated with foreign humanitarian assistance operations. Such action is normally conducted under the authority of Chapter VI or VII of the UN Charter or by regional arrangements in accordance with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. PO encompasses peacekeeping operations (PKO) and peace enforcement operations (PEO) in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace. Optimally, PKO forces should not transition to PEO or vice versa unless there is the requisite mandate or political decision and appropriate adjustments to force structure, rules of engagement (ROE), and other important aspects of the mission. In PO there should be plans for transition from PKO to PEO (rapid and unpredictable events may occur) or from PEO to PKO (more deliberate and predictable as the operation unfolds successfully). Types of transition may include: US unilateral operation or multinational coalition to a UN-led coalition; combat to noncombat operations; and military to civilian control. PO "mission creep" occurs when a mission changes in response to new events or circumstances. It may develop from inadequate or false assumptions, misinterpreted intent, or unrealistic development of implied tasks in planning. **(JP 0-2, 3-0, 3-07, 3-57)** (JP 3-07.3, 3-08v1, 3-08v2, 3-09, 3-50.3, 3-57, 3-61, JWFC Handbook, CJCSI 3110.14, CJCSM 3500.05)

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#### **OP 3.3.1 Conduct Peacekeeping Operations in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To conduct peacekeeping operations (PKO) in the JOA. PKO are military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. PKO are conducted by impartial peacekeeping (PK) forces. Peacekeepers conduct operations in an open and highly conspicuous manner to establish a presence, which inhibits hostile action by disputing parties and bolsters confidence in the peace process. Such action is normally conducted under the authority of Chapter VI of the UN Charter. **(JP 0-2, 3-0, 3-07, 3-57)** (JP 3-07.3, 3-08v1, 3-08v2, 3-09, 3-50.3, 3-57, 3-61, 4-02.1, JWFC Handbook, CJSCI 3110.14, CJCSM 3500.05)

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### **OP 3.3.2 Conduct Peace Enforcement Operations in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To conduct peace enforcement operations (PEO) in the JOA. PEO are the application of military forces, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolution of sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. Peace enforcers generally have full combat capabilities, although there may be some restrictions on weapons and targeting, depending on the mandate, ROE, and tactical situation. Peace enforcement forces strive to help create the conditions for conflict resolution. Such action is normally conducted under the authority of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. **(JP 3-0, 3-07, 3-57)** (JP 3-07, 3-08v2, CJCSI 3110.14, CJCSM 3500.05, JWFC Handbook)

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### **OP 3.3.3 Conduct Multilateral Peace Operations.**

To conduct peace operations with multinational partners as part of a UN force, regional arrangements, or other multinational coalitions. Such action is normally conducted under the authority of Chapter VI or VII of the UN Charter or by regional arrangements in accordance with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. **(JP 0-2, 3-07, 3-07.3, 3-08v1, 3-08v2,)** (JP 3-07.3, 3-08v2, 3-57, CJCSI 3110.14, CJCSM 3500.05, JWFC Handbook)

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## **OP 4 PROVIDE OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS AND PERSONNEL SUPPORT.**

To provide logistics and personnel support activities required to sustain the force in campaigns and major operations within the joint operations area. The logistic concept should support theater activity by properly organizing support from the CONUS base to the combat zone. At the theater operational level, specific considerations include identification of operational requirements and establishment of priorities for the employment of the resources provided. This theater of operations/joint operations area sustaining base, which includes the communications zone (COMMZ), links strategic sustainment to tactical CSS. In military operations other than war, the activities under operational support also pertain to support of US forces, other US government agencies, and forces of friendly countries or groups being supported by US forces. Operational support includes sustaining the tempo and the continuity of operations throughout a campaign or major operation. This task includes obtaining sustainment support from sources other than Military Services and includes the following: host-nation support, logistic civil augmentation, DOD civilian support, and captured materiel. **(JP 3-0, 3-07.1,**



**3-08v2, 3-50.21, 4-0, 4-01.1, 4-01.2, 4-01.4)** (JP 0-2, 3-05, 3-07.1, 3-07.5, 3-08v2, 3-09, 3-17, 4-01, 4-01.1, 4-02.1, 4-03, CJCSI 3110.14, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

**Note:** Sustainment activities related to setting priorities, establishing stock levels, managing critical materials, and obtaining support from civilian economy (i.e., HNS) are covered by OP 5, *Provide Operational Command and Control (C2)*

M1	Days	From request until requested item received in theater.
M2	Tons	Of backlogged support requirements.
M3	Percent	Of required logistics in place to support campaign.
M4	Days	Of supply in theater.

#### **OP 4.1 Coordinate Supply of Arms, Munitions, and Equipment in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To replenish arms, munitions, and equipment required for joint force components and multinational operational forces in conformance with the commander's campaign or major operation plans. It also includes routine replenishment of arms in the JOA. Transportation and distribution of arms, ammunition, munitions, and equipment are part of this task. It includes distribution not necessarily connected with formations in a campaign or major operation and provision of arms for support organizations and facilities in the COMMZ of the JOA. This task includes collecting, providing, processing ITV data, and actions of the Joint Material Priorities and Allocation Board. **(JP 3-0, 3-08v1, 3-09, 4-0, 4-01.1)** (JP 3-17, 4-01.2, 5-03.1, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	After CJCS Warning Order to determine availability of suitable munitions within theater.
M2	Days	After required date that replenishment stocks are delivered.
M3	Hours	To develop replenishment concept (after receipt of warning order).
M4	Percent	Of fire missions with munitions available on-schedule.
M5	Percent	Of high priority targets with preferred munitions available.
M6	Percent	Of major equipment shortfalls cause unit mission delays.
M7	Percent	Of minimum safety level of build up stocks maintained at staging areas.
M8	Percent	Of required reception and onward movement support available.
M9	Hours	To identify a source of supply and request transportation after notification of logistic shortfalls.

#### **OP 4.2 Synchronize Supply of Fuel in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To provide the uninterrupted flow of fuel (Class III) to joint or multinational operational forces in conformance with the commander's campaign or major operation plans. It also includes routine replenishment of fuel in the operational area. The source of fuel system would include the inland, offshore, or any other fuel

distribution system. **(JP 3-0, 3-08v1, 4-0, 4-01.2, 4-01.6, 4-03)** (JP 3-07.5, 3-08v2, 4-01, 4-01.1, 4-01.2, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

**Note:** For the delivery of Class III see OP 4.5.1 *Provide for Movement Services in the Joint Operations Area (JOA)*.

M1	Hours	To develop replenishment concept (after receipt of warning order).
M2	Gallons per day	Of fuel delivered to theater.
M3	Percent	Of available host-nation POL replenishment and distribution assets integrated into operational planning.
M4	Percent	Of destroyed fuel deliveries anticipated and compensated for.
M5	Percent	Of planning reflect petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) concepts of operations.
M6	Percent	Of refueling capability available at time and place needed.
M7	Percent	Of total refueling assets available to support operational forces.
M8	Days	Operational delay (due to fuel shortages).
M9	Days	Supply of required fuel in place to support campaign.
M10	Percent	Of fuel delivery capacity available.

#### **OP 4.3 Provide for Maintenance of Equipment in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To establish facilities in rear areas for the repair and replacement of materiel and to establish policies on repair and evacuation of equipment in support of operational forces in campaigns and major operations. This activity includes concentrating on and providing maintenance services (including recovery, battle damage assessment, and repair). It also includes providing class IX supplies for retaining operational forces in or restoring them to a high state of materiel readiness. This task includes establishing repair, replacement, and evacuation policies. **(JP 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-09, 3-10.1, 4-0, 4-01.6, 4-06)** (JP 3-04.1, 3-05, 3-07.5, 3-17, 3-50.21, 4-01.6, 4-01.7, 4-02.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

**Note:** See also OP 4.5, *Manage Logistic Support in the Joint Operations Area* to provide maintenance services and class IX supplies in support of operational forces in campaigns, major operations, and routine COMMZ maintenance activities by employing transportation and supply services—applies to this task.

M1	Days	To develop maintenance concept and policies (after receipt of warning order).
M2	Hours	For maintenance facilities to be available in JOA rear area (after receipt of warning order).
M3	Percent	Of enemy material collected, classified and properly disposed.
M4	Percent	Of damaged equipment salvaged.
M5	Percent	Of equipment failures successfully repaired.

M6	Percent	Of equipment repaired at appropriate level with evacuation to higher level.
M7	Percent	Of operations plans address collection, classification, and disposition of salvage.
M8	Percent	Of operations plans address collection, classification, and disposition of enemy material.
M9	Percent	Of support policies and procedures were completed prior to execution.
M10	Hours	To obtain needed parts for repairs.
M11	Hours	To obtain replacement parts.
M12	Hours	To repair equipment.
M13	Hours	To obtain replacement equipment
M14	Yes/No	Equipment repaired within timelines written in applicable instruction.
M15	Percent	Of major components supplied from maintenance channels.

#### **OP 4.4 Coordinate Support for Forces in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To coordinate the providing of trained personnel, units, and replacements to joint forces in the JOA. This task also includes providing personnel and health services support for campaigns, major operations, joint task force organizations, and routine COMMZ support. **(JP 3-0, 4-0, 4-02.1)** (JP 3-07.1, 3-08v1, 4-0, 4-02, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Of personnel replacement requirements not met.
M2	Percent	Of personnel support can be contracted.
M3	Percent	Of replacements adequately trained to perform assigned duties.
M4	Percent	Of units whose actual manning meets or exceeds authorized levels.
M5	Days	To identify personnel replacement requirements.
M6	Days	To obtain replacement personnel and assign to unit.
M7	Yes/No	TPFDD authorization requirements sourced prior to movement.

#### **OP 4.4.1 Coordinate Field Services Requirements.**

To coordinate field services and supplies requirements in support of personnel (including food, water, personal welfare and comfort items; clothing and individual equipment; laundry, bath, and renovation; and mortuary affairs) in the joint operations area. **(JP 1-05, 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-08v1, 3-09, 4-0, 4-04)** (JP 3-05, 3-05.3, 3-04.1, 3-07.5, 3-08v1, 3-08v2, 4-02, 4-02.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Days	To access to laundry and bath facilities.
M2	Days	To obtain delivery of mail to unit level.
M3	Days	Delay in search, recovery, identification, care, and evacuation or disposition of deceased personnel (due to lack of graves registration system, units).

M4	Percent	Of operations include establishment of mortuary collection points, field processing centers, personal effects depots, and US cemeteries in theater.
M5	Percent	Of personal daily water requirement being provided.
M6	Percent	Of personnel provided with required individual clothing and equipment.
M7	Percent	Of personnel receiving at least one hot meal per day.
M8	Months	To establish MWR/USO facilities in protracted operation.
M9	Weeks	To establish joint mortuary affairs office (JMAO).
M10	Days	To establish the joint operations areas MWR/USO policy (from recognition of need).

#### **OP 4.4.1.1 Coordinate Support for Personnel in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To coordinate nonmaterial support activities of military personnel, Department of Defense civilian, qualifying contractor personnel, and other personnel (e.g., accredited news media representatives). Activities include food, water, personal welfare and comfort items, clothing and individual equipment, laundry and bath. This task includes coordinating rigging support for aerial delivery in support of operational objectives. **(JP 1-05, 3-07.1, 3-08v1, 4-0)** (JP 0-2, 3-04.1, 3-07.5, 3-08v1, 4-02.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Of required field services for personnel provided by components in JOA.
M2	Percent	Of planned field services requirements provided in JOA.
M3	Percent	Of planned capacity of field services (bath and laundry) achieved in JOA.
M4	Percent	Of required production rate of potable water achieved in JOA.
M5	Percent	Personnel hospitalized for dehydration in JOA.
M6	Days	To coordinate bath and laundry operations with medical authorities.
M7	Days	To estimate non material support requirements for military, DOD civilian, qualifying contractor, and other personnel in JOA.
M8	Hours	To rig equipment or supplies for airdrop in JOA.
M9	Days	To update field service requirements based on changes in theater population.
M10	Number	Of personnel that can be rigged for a single airdrop.
M11	Tons	Of equipment can be rigged for a single airdrop.

#### **OP 4.4.1.2 Coordinate Mortuary Affairs in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

Coordinate procedures for the search, recovery, evacuation, identification processing, and temporary burial of remains in the JOA. This task addresses decontamination procedures for processing contaminated remains; processing personal effects of deceased, captured, missing, and medically evacuated

personnel; and managing technical services and supplies incident to temporary burial of the remains. This task is normally accomplished through theater mortuary collection points to the joint mortuary affairs office (JMAO). (**JP 4-0, 4-06**) (JP 0-2, 1-05, 3-07.3, 3-07.5, 4-0, 4-01.7, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05, MOP 16)

M1	Percent	Accuracy in maintaining records of deceased/missing personnel in JOA.
M2	Percent	Accuracy in maintaining records of personal effects in JOA.
M3	Percent	Accuracy in processing personal effects of deceased/missing in JOA.
M4	Days	Delay in disposition of remains while awaiting decision on mortuary affairs policy.
M5	Percent	Of instances of release of identification of deceased/missing held up until NOK notified.
M6	Percent	Of operations include establishment of mortuary collection points, field processing centers, personal effects depots, and US cemeteries in theater.
M7	Instances	Of release of identification of deceased/missing before NOK notified.
M8	Percent	Of remains correctly identified.
M9	Percent	Of remains re-identified after disposition.
M10	Days	To coordinate transportation support to return remains to CONUS.
M11	Days	To establish temporary interment facilities.
M12	Days	To identify remains at unit level.
M13	Days	To identify remains of recently deceased, unidentified personnel at theater mortuary evacuation point (TMEP).
M14	Days	To inter remains in temporary sites in JOA (after recovery and identification).
M15	Percent	Of JMAO tasks included in planning.
M16	Days	To process remains from recovery through evacuation to CONUS.
M17	Days	To recover remains at end of firefight/battle.
M18	Months	To recover remains commencing at end of hostilities.
M19	Months	To recover remains from temporary interment sites in JOA and evacuate to CONUS (after end of operations in theater).
M20	Days	To search for, recover, identify, care for, and evacuate or inter deceased personnel (without graves registration units).

#### **OP 4.4.2 Provide for Personnel Services.**

To provide personnel service support (including administration, finance, chaplain, and individual support) to prepare operational forces for campaigns, major operations, routine COMMZ support, accountability of deployed forces, and the sustainment of the tempo of operations. This task includes providing for rest and

relaxation (R&R) facilities. **(JP 1-05, 4-01.2, 5-00.2, CJCSM 3122.03)** (JP 1-05, 2-0, 3-05.3, CJCSI 3141.01, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Days	To establish procedures with International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for handling, treatment and transfer of EPWs (after warning order).
M2	Days	For joint force chaplain to research and interpret cultural and religious factors pertinent to JOA.
M3	Percent	Of military personnel receiving pay on-schedule.
M4	Percent	Of military personnel with access to MWR/USO facilities.
M5	Percent	Of required aerial mail terminals and military post offices established within planned timelines.
M6	Percent	Of required component personnel services capabilities in place and operational.
M7	Days	To identify replacement requirements (contingency planning).
M8	Days	To obtain replacement personnel and assign to unit (contingency planning).
M9	Days	To identify replacement requirements (deliberate planning).
M10	Days	To obtain replacement personnel and assign to unit (deliberate planning).
M11	Days	To deploy financial personnel to AOR.
M12	Percent	Of finance support provided to the deployed commander.
M13	Percent	Of financial customer service provided to deployed personnel.
M14	Percent	Of dependents receiving family support group network service.

#### **OP 4.4.3 Provide for Health Services in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To provide health service support in the operational area to include, but is not limited to: health services resources; preventive and curative health measures; patient evacuation; return to duty determination; blood management, medical logistics; combat stress control, medical, dental, veterinary, ancillary services, optometry, medical food supply, and medical intelligence services. This task includes actions of the Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center (TPMRC) and the Joint Blood Program Office (JBPO). **(JP 3-07.1, 4-0, 4-02, 4-02.1, 4-02.2)** (JP 0-2, 3-02, 3-07.3, 3-10.1, 3-11, 4-02.2, 4-05, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Of personnel accounted for in treatment pipeline.
M2	Percent	Of casualties returned to duty.
M3	Percent	Of casualties die.
M4	Per/day	Provided medical treatment.
M5	Hours	To begin surgery after receiving a wound or injury.
M6	Hours	Turnaround time for medical lab serology and other technical lab testing results.

**OP 4.4.3.1 Manage Joint Blood Program in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To provide blood product collection, storage, testing (if applicable), and distribution systems to support peacetime and contingency blood requirements. This task is normally executed through the supported JFC surgeon charged with managing a network of component and area joint blood programs. This task includes, but is not limited to systems: to track and record final disposition of all blood products, to support look-back protocols, and to communicate between Area Joint Blood Program Offices (AJBPO), Joint Blood Program Office (JBPO), and Armed Services Blood Program Office (ASBPO). **(JP 4-0, 4-02, 4-02.1, CJCSM 3122.03)** (JP 3-08v2, 4-01.7, 4-02, 4-02.2, 5-00.2, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Of accuracy in submitting Blood Reports to ASBPO (based on daily estimates of theater requirements).
M2	Units	Of required blood products per initial admission maintained in JOA.
M3	Percent	Of daily Blood Reports submitted from AJBPO to JBPO by prescribed times.
M4	Percent	Of daily Blood Reports submitted from JBPO to ASBPO by prescribed times.
M5	Percent	Of required blood product on hand.
M6	Days	To coordinate initial activities between Area Joint Blood Program Office(s) and Armed Services Blood Program Office.
M7	Days	To establish Area Joint Blood Program Offices as required in the JOA.
M8	Hours	To establish blood transshipment center(s) in the JOA (after organizational C-Day).
M9	Days	To establish system for collection, storage, and distribution of blood products in the JOA.
M10	Days	To initially coordinate blood requirements and distribution of blood and blood products to support all BSUs and MTFs within AJBPO area (regardless of service component).
M11	Percent	Of blood products in system which must be disposed.

**OP 4.4.3.2 Manage Flow of Casualties in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To organize and control the flow of casualties within the JOA, and to coordinate the flow of patients to medical facilities within the combatant command AOR or for intertheater evacuation. This task includes coordination activities between the TPMRC and the Global Patient Movement Requirement Center. **(JP 3-0, 3-11, 4-01.1, 4-02, 4-02.1, 4-02.2)** (JP 3-02, 4-0, 4-01.1, 4-02, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Of GPMRC generated plans and schedules modified to meet requirements of the JOA.
M2	Percent	Of patients not evacuated within theater evacuation policy time limit.

M3	Days	To establish Joint Patient Movement Requirement Center (JPMRC) in the JOA.
M4	Hours	To formulate and recommend patient evacuation policy, to include contaminated casualties.
M5	Days	To initially coordinate patient evacuation activities among components.
M6	Days	To initially coordinate patient evacuation activities between TPMRC and Global Patient Movement Requirement Center (GPMRC).
M7	Percent	Of US joint force personnel who receive emergency aeromedical in operations area compared to total waiting for it.

#### OP 4.4.3.3 Manage Health Services Resources in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).

To manage the JOA medical resources to provide effective and consistent treatment of wounded, injured, or sick personnel so as to return to full duty or evacuate from the JOA. **(JP 4-0, 4-02)** (JP 0-2, 3-02, 3-07.3, 3-07.5, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Difference in bed space and level of medical supplies among joint force components.
M2	Percent	Of civilian internees assisted by joint force medical units.
M3	Percent	Of DPs assisted by joint force medical units.
M4	Percent	Of EPWs assisted by joint force medical units.
M5	Percent	Of injured or incapacitated personnel returned to duty.
M6	Percent	Of personnel admitted to an MTF on a given day remain at MTF until RTD.
M7	Percent	Of personnel incapacitated by noncombat injuries and illness.
M8	Percent	Of required patient bed spaces actually available.
M9	Percent	Of US national private citizens needing emergency medical assistance receive it.
M10	Hours	To establish liaison between joint force surgeon and joint force component surgeons.
M11	Days	To expand MTFs to full capacity.
M12	Days	To publish estimates of medical sustainment and anticipated resupply requirements (after arrival of joint force HQ medical staff).

#### OP 4.4.4 Reconstitute Forces.

To reconstitute combat/operationally-attrited units to a desired level of combat effectiveness commensurate with mission requirements and availability of resources. Reconstitution includes two types of activities, reorganization and regeneration. **(N/A)** (JP 3-0, 3-02.2, 4-02.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Days	Necessary to reconstitute combat attrited unit.
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M2	Percent	Of reorganized/regenerated organizational personnel fully trained and qualified.
M3	Percent	Of salvage and battle damage repair conducted with in-theater forces.

**OP 4.4.5 Train Joint Forces and Personnel.**

To train replacements and units, especially newly rebuilt units, in the theater of operations. In military operations other than war, this activity includes training assistance for friendly nations and groups. **(JP 1-05, 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-10.1, 4-01, 4-06)** (JP 0-2, 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-10.1, 3-50.21, 3-50.3, 3-61, 4-01, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Days	For unit to begin training (upon arrival in theater).
M2	Hours	To establish required training program (from mission change).
M3	Percent	Of METL, on which unit is proficient.
M4	Months	Since commander's JMETL last updated.
M5	Hours	To submit first crisis action status reports after unit notification.
M6	Days	For replacements and units to achieve minimum required proficiency.
M7	Percent	Of JMETL tasks trained to standard under NBC conditions.

**OP 4.4.6 Provide Religious Ministry Support in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To coordinate the providing of religious support among components of a JTF. This task includes identifying professional assistance, program funding, and logistics requirements to support personnel within the JTF. Additionally, this task includes establishing and coordinating a Task Force Religious Ministry Support Plan that will provide chaplain coverage to all elements. Additional activities include providing required religious support assets to support planned or ongoing operations, assisting PVO/NGOs with HA programs, and enemy prisoners of war to receive appropriate religious ministry support. Finally, the task includes providing advice to the commander on moral/ethical issues and indigenous/cultural customs that may impact planning and execution of an operation or campaign. **(JP 1-05)** (JP 3-05.3, 3-07.3, 3-07.5, 4-06, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Of deviation from Service criteria for assignment of chapel assistants.
M2	Percent	Of major military locations with services for all major denominations available on weekly basis.
M3	Percent	Of authorized chaplains assigned and present for duty.
M4	Percent	Of chaplains' time spent with military personnel in work areas.
M5	Percent	Of civilian internees receive ministry and care.
M6	Percent	Of deceased in mass casualty event receive final ministry.
M7	Percent	Of deployed personnel with access to counseling by clergy.

M8	Percent	Of deployed personnel with access to religious services.
M9	Percent	Of EPWs receiving religious ministrations.
M10	Percent	Of hospital casualties seen weekly or more by chaplains.
M11	Instances	Of hospital death without chaplain presence.
M12	Percent	Of injured in a mass casualty event receive ministry.
M13	Percent	Of joint force personnel unable to celebrate major religious holidays.
M14	Percent	Of joint force religious activities being adequately supplied.
M15	Percent	Of memorial services conducted within JOA vice home station.
M16	Percent	Of NGOs which joint force chaplain has established liaison.
M17	Percent	Of PVOs which joint force chaplain has established liaison.
M18	Percent	Of religious faith groups in joint force receiving balanced coverage throughout JOA.
M19	Months	Since last command chaplain survey of morale within joint force in JOA.
M20	Hours	To receive counseling, support and comfort from time of request.

#### OP 4.4.7 Provide for Legal Services.

To advise JTF commanders, component commanders, and staffs on civil, acquisition, fiscal, military, international, and operational law issues. Provide personal legal assistance to authorized clients, including foreign criminal jurisdiction support; investigate and process claims; provide advice concerning rules of engagement, support of allies, status-of-forces agreements, applicable international agreements, and the law of armed conflict; review rules of engagement and operation plans; and ensure the effective use of legal personnel and resources. This task includes overseeing administration of military justice, international law, operations law, environmental law, intelligence law, battlefield acquisition, claims by and against the United States, and advice on detention and handling of EPWs. **(JP 3-05, 3-07.1, 3-08v1, CJCSM 3122.03)** (JP 3-05.3, 3-07.1, 3-50.21, 4-05, CJCSI 5810.01, CJCSM 3141.01, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Of deployable units with appropriate legal personnel.
M2	Percent	Of actions delayed by lack of available legal personnel expertise.
M3	Yes/No	Non-judicial punishment actions complete within standards set by instruction.
M4	Yes/No	Courts martial actions complete within standards set by instruction.
M5	Yes/No	Administrative discharge actions complete within standards set by instruction.
M6	Yes/No	Claims actions complete within standards set by instruction.
M7	Hours	To provide legal review of contingency acquisition action.
M8	Hours	To provide legal review on fiscal law issue pertaining to funding for contingency operations.
M9	Days	To obtain legal services upon request.

M10	Hours	To provide legal review of proposed HNS agreement or modification.
M11	Days	For review of CA plan by competent legal authority.

**OP 4.5 Manage Logistic Support in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To maintain the timely flow of stocks (all classes of supply in large quantities) and services (maintenance and personnel) to forces, using joint or multinational transportation means (over ground, air, and sea lines of communications) in support of subordinate campaigns and major operations and normal support operations.

**(JP 3-0, 3-08v1, 4-0, 4-01, 4-01.1, 4-01.6, 4-01.7)** (JP 3-0, 3-07.3, 3-08v1, 4-01, 4-01.5, 4-01.6, 4-02.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Of ammo availability compared to requirements.
M2	Percent	Of required support material distributed at time and place required.
M3	Percent	Of supplies available compared to requirements.
M4	Percent	Of total fuel available compared to requirements.

**OP 4.5.1 Provide for Movement Services in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To move personnel, equipment, and supplies to sustain campaigns and major operations and to provide transportation resources for moving the forces that execute those operations. This task includes transportation mode operations, movement management and control, terminal operations, and joint logistic-over-the-shore (JLOTS) and in-transit visibility (ITV). This task includes actions of the joint movement center (JMC). **(JP 3-08v1, 4-0, 4-01, 4-01.1, 4-01.2, 4-01.3, 4-01.6)** (JP 3-08v1, 3-09, 3-17, 4-0, 4-01, 4-01.1, 4-01.3, 4-01.5, 4-01.6, 4-02.1, 4-02.2, CJCSM 3500.05)

**Note:** Transportation mode operations include moving cargo, equipment, and personnel by various modes of transport and providing transport resources in support of campaigns and major operations. However, analysis of the movement of forces is done under OP 1.1, *Conduct Operational Movement*, and OP 1.3, *Provide Operational Mobility*. Also, movement management and control, although inherent to movement services, is a C2 activity analyzed under OP 5 *Provide Operational Command and Control, (C2)*.

M1	Percent	ACL filled for in-theater airlift sorties (not including staging and backhaul).
M2	Hours	For JMC to begin operation (upon arrival in-theater).
M3	Percent	Of airfields with required material handling equipment (MHE).
M4	Percent	Of in-theater airlift sorties (not including staging and backhaul) flying at 90% ACL or better.
M5	Percent	Of LZs with required material handling equipment (MHE).
M6	Percent	Of scheduled transport movements accomplished on-schedule.

M7	Ton miles	Of supplies and equipment transported per day.
M8	PAX/day	Transported in support of operations.
M9	Hours	To provide the JMC initial requirements after arrival in-theater.
M10	Days	To published an accurate TPFDL NLT validation suspense date.
M11	Percent	Of supply and equipment moved per day that have intransit visibility (ITV).
M12	Percent	Of supplies and equipment moved arrived by RDD.
M13	Percent	Of PAX moved arrive by RDD.

#### OP 4.5.2 Supply Operational Forces.

To provide all classes of supply, geospatial information and services (formerly mapping, charting, and geodesy), water, and related services for sustaining operational forces throughout a campaign or major operation in the quantities and at the time and place needed. This task includes requesting, receiving, producing, procuring, storing, protecting, relocating, and issuing the necessary supplies and services. It also includes building up the necessary stockage levels in staging areas for conducting the campaign and collecting, providing, and processing ITV data. **(JP 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-08v2, 3-10.1, 4-0, 4-01, 4-01.7, 4-04)** (JP 3-08v1, 3-10.1, 4-0, 4-01.2, 4-02.1, 4-03, CJCSM 3500.05)

**Note:** Establishment of supply priorities is covered under OP 5.3.9, *Prepare Campaign or Major Operations and Related Plans and Orders*.

M1	Days	To develop concept of replenishment requirements (after receipt of warning order).
M2	Days	In advance of shortfalls, constrain identified.
M3	Percent	Of replenishment stocks delivered to customer in theater by RDD.
M4	Percent	Of shortfalls in supply have acceptable alternatives.
M5	Percent	Of required supplies delivered.
M6	Percent	Of required reception and onward movement support available at time and place required.
M7	Percent	Of required supplies assured to be available when and where needed.
M8	Days	Of supplies stockpiled to support campaign.
M9	Days	Of sustainment supply supported by available facilities.
M10	Tons/Day	Supplies delivered to operational forces.
M11	Days	To achieve time-phased operating and safety levels (of supply).
M12	Percent	Of priority one geospatial information and services stored in right quantities and right location(s).
M13	Percent	Of priority two geospatial information and services stored in right quantities and right location(s).
M14	Percent	Of priority three geospatial information and services stored in right quantities and right location(s).
M15	Days	Between request for supplies and equipment and receipt.

M16	Days	To process receipts (receipt processing time).
M17	Percent	Of requested supplies and equipment received by RDD.
M18	Percent	Of supplies and equipment at staging areas that have intransit visibility (ITV).
M19	Days	Between submission of request for procurement of supplies and equipment and receipt by the customer.
M20	Hours	To process procurement receipts (procurement processing time).
M21	Percent	Of requested procurement for supplies and equipment are received by RDD.
M22	Percent	Of supplies and equipment procured have intransit visibility (ITV).
M23	Square feet	Of storage space available.
M24	Percent	Of required storage capacity is available.
M25	Percent	Of inventory accuracy and accountability for materiel stored in staging areas.

#### **OP 4.5.3 Recommend Evacuation Policy and Procedures for the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To recommend policy and procedures for the evacuation of personnel, equipment, and noncombatants from the operational area. For patient evacuation, this task requires the JFC surgeon to advise the combatant commander on a recommended patient evacuation policy. **(JP 4-02, 4-02.2, CJCSM 3122.03)** (JP 3-05.3, 4-0, 4-02, 4-02.1, 5-03.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Of US joint force personnel evacuated in 24-hour period.
M2	Weeks	Since evacuation plans were updated for JOA.
M3	Yes/No	Theater evacuation policy established by the geographic CINC.
M4	Percent	Of noncombatants successfully evacuated.

#### **OP 4.5.4 Coordinate Recovery and Salvage.**

To coordinate recovery and salvage of damaged, discarded, condemned, or abandoned allied or enemy material both ashore and at sea. Includes monitoring and management of recovered material from initial identification to disposal, disposition, or repair within JOA. These activities also include disposal and movement of hazardous waste and material. **(JP 0-2, 2-01, 3-02, 4-01.6, 4-04)** (JP 2-0, 3-05, 3-10.1, 3-17, 4-01.6, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Of total losses, items recovered.
M2	Percent	Of items of hazardous material that cannot be processed IAW appropriate regulations.
M3	Weeks	To appropriately dispose of hazardous material.
M4	Percent	Of items recovered salvaged for further use.
M5	Percent	Of items returned to rear areas for additional salvage work.
M6	Percent	Of increase in combat capability.

M7	Weeks	To conduct salvage.
M8	Percent	Of total material disposed of contains hazardous material, i.e., requires hazardous processing.

#### **OP 4.6 Build and Maintain Sustainment Bases in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To build and maintain principal and supplementary bases of support for the JOA sustainment activities in conformance with geographic combatant commander's guidance. This task also includes coordinating common administrative and interservice support for the minimum essential facilities to house, sustain, and support normal or contingency operations from a garrison, base, or bare base site. It may include, if required, a stabilized runway, taxiways, and aircraft parking areas. Lead or dominant service component assigned by the combatant commander provides common servicing or cross servicing (reimbursable or otherwise) as required. **(JP 3-10.1, 4-0, 4-01.1, 4-02.2, 4-04)** (JP 3-0, 3-07.5, 3-17, 4-0, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Days	Between arrival of building supplies and equipment and construction of sustainment facilities.
M2	Percent	Of facilities adequately maintained.
M3	Percent	Of overall cargo and equipment deliveries accommodated by sustainment base.
M4	Square feet/day	Of permanent facilities emplaced or constructed.
M5	Percent	Of required installation throughput capacity available at execution.
M6	Percent	Of supplies under weatherproof cover at sustainment bases.
M7	Square feet/day	Of temporary facilities emplaced or constructed.
M8	Days	To complete construction of sustainment facilities.
M9	Days	To initiate construction of facilities (from final project approval and authorization).
M10	Percent	Of facilities hardened against NBC.
M11	Hours	To validate asset requests.
M12	Days	To have assets at requesting location.
M13	Days	To have bases identified in OPLAN operational.

#### **OP 4.6.1 Determine Number and Location of Sustaining Bases in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To identify lines of support and location of sustaining bases to best support the campaign plans. This task includes actions of the Joint Facilities Utilization Board. **(JP 3-10.1, 4-0, 4-04)** (JP 3-0, 3-10.1, 4-0, CJCSM 3500.05)

**Note:** A related activity is to allocate space and facilities in the theater of operations rear (as well as the combat zone) for sustainment operations in conformance with the geographic combatant commander's guidance. See also OP 4.6.5 *Provide for Real Estate Management*.

M1	Percent	Of required sustainment personnel and equipment in place to maintain logistics support.
M2	Percent	Of required sustainment facilities available at execution.
M3	Percent	Of required supplies actually delivered at execution.
M4	Percent	Of theater level sustainment equipment and supplies protected from elements.
M5	Hours	Required to provide information on sustainment bases to combatant commander, upon request.

#### **OP 4.6.2 Provide Civil-Military Engineering.**

To dismantle fortifications and to construct and maintain facilities and communications networks that give physical structure to the lines of communication. This activity includes the following: building/maintaining forward staging bases; restoring rear to include sustainment infrastructure, such as repair of water supply and sewage treatment structures; area, sustaining LOC; supporting construction; and acquiring or producing construction material. Environmental protection and restoration will be accomplished in accordance with DOD environmental policy, SOFAs, international treaties, and other binding guidance to which the US Government is a party. **(JP 3-10.1, 4-0, 4-01.7, 4-04)** (JP 3-08v2, 4-0, 4-01, 4-04, 5-00.2, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Of supplies under weatherproof cover.
M2	Percent	Of tasks correctly assigned (correct engineers/location/time).
M3	Percent	Of theater level maintenance facilities protected from elements.
M4	Days	To construct theater field hospital after forces identified and marshaled.
M5	Days	To reestablish damaged LOCs.
M6	Days	To restore essential utilities in rear areas.
M7	Days	To restore APOD to handle required shipping.
M8	Days	To restore SPOD to handle required shipping.

#### **OP 4.6.3 Expand Capacity of Ports of Debarkation and Allocate Space in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To increase the capacity of ports of debarkation in operational areas to accommodate the throughput necessary to support the joint forces and multinational forces campaign, major operations, and routine support requirements. To acquire, maintain, and parcel out to subordinate organizations the real estate to conduct operations and provide services. **(JP 3-10.1, 4-0, 4-01, 4-01.7, 4-04)** (JP 4-01, 4-01.3, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Tons/Day	Increase in POD throughput capacity (to support current operation).
M2	Days	To achieve required POD clearance capacity.
M3	Days	To expand POD throughput capacity to meet required levels.

#### **OP 4.6.4 Provide Law Enforcement and Prisoner Control.**

To collect, process, evacuate, and intern enemy prisoners of war (EPW) and to enforce military law and order in the COMMZ and in support of operational level commander's campaigns and major operations. This task includes providing specialized technical, forensic, and polygraph support to resolve criminal issues or to investigate acts of sabotage and subversion which impact on the ability of the forces to perform their mission. **(JP 1-05, 2-01, 3-0, 3-10, 3-10.1, 3-57, 4-02.2)**  
(JP 3-0, 3-10, 3-10.1, 3-11, 5-00.2, CJCSM 3500.05)

**Note:** For battle area circulation control see OP 4.5.1, *Provide for Movement Services in the Joint Operations Area (JOA)*.

M1	Casualties/ day	Among EPWs detained by friendly forces.
M2	EPWs	Detained by friendly forces awaiting final disposition.
M3	Instances/ Week	Involving off-duty US military personnel that involve alcohol or drugs.
M4	Instances/ Week	Of accidents involving military vehicles.
M5	Instances/ Week	Of crimes reported.
M6	Percent	Of crimes/incidents resolved within 30 days.
M7	Percent	Of EPW compounds guarded by security forces versus combat troops.
M8	Percent	Of EPW movements to collection points conducted by security versus combat unit personnel.
M9	Percent	Of felony cases cleared within first month.
M10	Percent	Of requests for rail and road movement escorts met.
M11	Percent	Of security units performing in secondary role as infantry.
M12	Percent	Of security force requirement available to meet operational needs.
M13	Months	Since EPW policy last reviewed by legal personnel.
M14	Hours	EPWs detained for final disposition.
M15	Instances	Of law and order incidents not covered by existing/established policy/SOP.
M16	Percent	Of security forces committed to EPW operations versus combat support.



**OP 4.6.5 Provide for Real Estate Management.**

To coordinate the use and purchase of real assets in support of the operational campaign. **(JP 3-10.1, 4-0, 4-04)** (JP 3-07.3, 3-08v1, 3-50.21, 5-00.2, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Change in quality of local environmental conditions from joint force solid and liquid waste management.
M2	Percent	Of commercial price paid for real estate transaction.
M3	Percent	Of difference between market value of real estate and cost paid by US forces.
M4	Percent	Of real estate/real property acquired by lease or host-nation donation versus short term rental.
M5	Percent	Of real estate/real property assets acquired to support operational campaign later found to be unsuitable or inappropriate to original purpose.
M6	Percent	Of records and titles for real estate acquired by joint force cleared by end of joint force operation.
M7	Percent	Of Service components with authority to conduct real estate transactions.
M8	Days	To coordinate (within joint force headquarters) component requests for use of real estate in support of operational campaign.
M9	Days	To correlate component requests for real estate purchases to eliminate component duplication of effort.
M10	Days	To prioritize component requests for real estate purchases in support of operational campaign.
M11	Days	To prioritize component requests for use of real property assets in support of operational campaign.

**OP 4.6.6 Manage Contracts and Contract Personnel.**

To ensure performance of contract support supports the joint operations area (JOA). This task requires inclusion of support contractors in the JOA sustainment planning. It also includes monitoring contract performance. This task includes properly adjusting required deliverables in light of requirements and allowable scope of effort. It also includes providing required DOD support, to include support to individual contractor personnel. **(JP 3-0, 3-08v1, 3-10.1, 4-0, 4-01, 4-01.2, 4-01.7, 4-04)** (JP 2-01, 3-08v2, 4-01.3, 4-04, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Weeks	Delay in providing support services to theater forces (awaiting finalization of contracts).
M2	Weeks	Delay in providing support services to theater forces (awaiting required changes to contracts or award of new contracts).
M3	Percent	Increase in contract costs in crisis or conflict.
M4	Percent	Addition to military/DOD civilian personnel monitoring contractor performance in active JOA (crisis or conflict).
M5	Percent	Of contracting officers deploy with appropriate warrants.

M6	Percent	Of contracts terminated for cause (after issuance of more than one cure notice).
M7	Percent	Of contracts with more than one current cure notice against them.
M8	Percent	Of theater support resources required to support individual contractor personnel in the JOA.
M9	Days	To include contractor representatives in the JOA sustainment planning.
M10	Days	To modify existing contract deliverables and scope(s) of effort to support crisis or conflict requirements.
M11	Weeks	To receive and review contractor comments on theater sustainment plans and adequacy of existing contracts to meet theater sustainment requirements in peacetime.
M12	Hours	To receive and review contractor comments on theater sustainment plans and adequacy of existing contracts to meet theater sustainment requirements in crisis or war.
M13	Hours	To review existing contracts for adequacy in supporting requirement in the JOA in a crisis.
M14	Days	To process and deploy strategic base contractors.
M15	Percent	Of contractors not deployable.
M16	Percent	Of contingency clause contractors not providing support by the required time.
M17	Percent	Of logistic support provided by contracts and contract personnel.

**OP 4.7 Provide Politico-Military Support to Other Nations, Groups, and Government Agencies.**

To provide assistance to other nations, groups, or government agencies that supports strategic and operational goals within the joint operations area (JOA). This task includes security assistance, civil-military operations support (such as humanitarian assistance, environmental cleanup, disaster relief), and other assistance from military forces to civilian authorities and population. The assistance can be personnel, materiel, or services. **(JP 3-0, 3-08v1, 3-57, 4-0, 4-04)** (JP 3-0, 3-07, 3-08v1, 4-0, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Of funds provided for HCA, SA and MCA operations accounted for.
M2	Hours	After declaration of disaster (FEMA or DOS/OFDA) to initiate deployments.
M3	Percent	Of approved assistance projects completed.
M4	Hours	For joint force to establish liaison with Country Team, host-nation, other USG agencies, PVO/NGO/IO, and coalition forces.
M5	Instances	Of insufficient support provided to other nations, groups, or agencies.
M6	Percent	Of NGOs receiving US military support.
M7	Percent	Of NGOs with liaison with joint force.

M8	Percent	Of PVOs receiving US military support.
M9	Percent	Of PVOs with liaison with joint force.
M10	Instances	Of shortfall in supplies and materiel provided in response to requests by nations, agencies, or groups.
M11	Tons/day	Of supplies and materiel provided in assistance.
M12	Personnel	Provided to support other nations, groups, or agencies.
M13	Hours	To respond to Country Team request for assistance.

**OP 4.7.1 Provide Security Assistance in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To provide friendly nations or groups with defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives within the JOA. **(JP 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-08v1, 3-08v2, 3-53, 4-0)** (JP 0-2, 3-07.1, 3-07.2, 3-10, 3-10.1, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Personnel	From allied nations enrolled in US provided military training.
M2	Percent	Of valid requests for security assistance met.
M3	Days	To respond to request for security assistance.

**OP 4.7.2 Conduct Civil Military Operations in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To conduct activities in support of military operations in a JOA that foster the relationship between the military forces and civilian authorities and population, and that develop favorable emotions, attitudes, or behavior in neutral, friendly, or hostile groups. This task includes establishing a joint civil military operations center (CMOC). Types of CMO include Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA), populace and resource control (PRC), nation assistance operations, Military Civic Action (MCA), civil preparedness/emergency operations, civil administration (friendly and hostile/occupied territory), and domestic support operations. **(JP 3-07.1, 3-08v1, 3-57, 3-61, 4-04)** (JP 3-07.1, 3-07.4, 4-0, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	To establish CMOC or JCMOTF (after arrival).
M2	Hours	To establish liaison with appropriate foreign nation civilian government officials (after mission assignment).
M3	Hours	To establish liaison with Country Team, host-nation and other USG agencies, PVO/NGO/IO and coalition forces (after standing up joint force).
M4	Hours	To provide completed Annex G (after warning order).
M5	Days	To deploy civil military engineering units.
M6	Hours	To distribute supplies and services.
M7	Days	To organize relief effort in country.
M8	Hours	To assess situation and define assistance needed.

**OP 4.7.3 Provide Support to DOD and Other Government Agencies.**

To provide support to DOD, Joint Staff, other Services, DISA, DLA, DTRA, DOS, USAID, USIA, civil governments, and other related agencies. This task includes controlling civil disturbances, countering illegal drugs, combating terrorism, and conducting joint exercises and operations. **(JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-07, 3-08v1, 3-57, 4-0, 4-01, 4-01.1, 4-04)** (JP 3-0, 3-07, 3-07.2, 3-08v1, 3-08v2, 3-57, 3-61, 4-01.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Of governmental requests for support met by joint force.
M2	Percent	Of DOD and other US governmental requests for support not tied to joint force assigned mission met by joint force.
M3	Percent	Of DOD and other US governmental requests for support resolved without involving joint force commander.
M4	Hours	To respond to a combat support agency's formal request for assistance.
M5	Hours	To respond to US civil agency request for support.
M6	Hours	To respond to in-theater request for support from ambassador or Country Team.
M7	Days	To respond to request for support.
M8	Percent	Of potential drug smuggling aircraft coordinate with appropriate law enforcement agencies.
M9	Percent	Of reports on aircraft scramble and intercept-monitor or ID of potential drug smuggling aircraft forwarded IAW directives.
M10	Percent	Of special tracks forward told IAW directives.
M11	Percent	Of airspace management issues/requirements coordinated with FAA.
M12	Percent	Of potential/imminent terrorist actions/situations coordinated with local law enforcement agencies.
M13	Percent	Of hijacking and defecting aircraft events coordinated and reported with appropriate civil, military and government agencies IAW directives and procedures.
M14	Percent	Of region/sector checklists, guides, operating Instructions and plans provide proper guidance on coordination and reporting (with other DOD and government agencies).
M15	Hours	To respond to request for support.

**OP 4.7.4 Transition to Civil Administration.**

To implement the transition from military administration in a region to UN and/ or civil administration in the region. This task pertains to situations when the NCA have directed the military to become directly involved in the executive, judiciary, or legislative functions of a host-nation government. **(JP 3-07.1, 3-08v1, 3-57)** (JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-05.3, 3-07.1, 3-57, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Of CA planning (e.g. Annex G, CA area study, CA estimate) completed by execution of CA mission.
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M2	Percent	Of essential services/facilities damaged/destroyed during hostilities returned to operation prior to transition from US military administration.
M3	Percent	Of US forces CA personnel required to remain in country to coordinate post transition activities with local government/UN administration.
M4	Percent	Of US forces redeployed prior to transition to local government/UN administration.
M5	Percent	Of US forces, other than CA assets, retained in theater to support civil administration after transition from military administration.
M6	Days	To coordinate transition between US forces and local government/UN administration.
M7	Days	To determine US post conflict policy objectives.
M8	Days	To properly account for funds and equipment expended during military administration and to close outstanding claims against military administration.
M9	Hours	To receive direction or approval from NCA to become directly involved in executive, judiciary, or legislative functions of host nation government.

#### **OP 4.7.5 Coordinate Politico-Military Support.**

To coordinate and support politico-military activities among military commands, DOD, and other US Government-agencies, and friendly governments and groups within the joint operations area (JOA). This activity is analyzed under OP 5.4.5. **(JP 3-0, 3-07.4, 3-08v1, 3-57, 4-0)** (JP 3-0, 3-07, 3-07.2, 3-07.4, 3-08v1, 4-0, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Days	From submission of plan for coordination until final concurrence.
M2	Percent	Of CS and CSS assets dedicated to CMO employment in the JOA.
M3	Percent	Of support requirements filled at execution.
M4	Percent	Of USG organizations, foreign governments and NGOs that support operation through to completion.
M5	Days	To transition facilities and operations from US forces to host nation authorities.
M6	Days	To establish CMOC to establish liaison and coordination with other USG agencies and friendly government/groups in the JOA.
M7	Days	To identify CA requirements and resources to support USG agency operations in the JOA.
M8	Days	To plan for redeployment of US forces not required to support transition activities in the JOA.

#### **OP 4.7.6 Coordinate Civil Affairs in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To coordinate those activities that foster relationships between operational forces and local civil authorities and people in a friendly country or area. It also includes coordinating activities necessary to maintain the civilian population in an occupied country or area when US or allied military forces are present. **(JP 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-**

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**08v1, 3-10.1, 3-57, 3-61)** (JP 0-2, 1-05, 3-05, 3-07.5, 3-08v1, 3-10.1, 3-50.3, 3-57, 4-01.7, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Days	For review of CA plan by competent legal authority.
M2	Days	Lead time to mobilize RC personnel to support CA mission.
M3	Percent	Of local populace able to maintain normal activities.
M4	Percent	Of local populace able to remain in their homes.
M5	Percent	Of personnel conducting civil affairs tasks drawn from Reserve Components.
M6	Percent	Of total US military forces involved in any form of civil affairs activities in the JOA.
M7	Percent	Of US military supplies and resources used in civil affairs activities in the JOA.
M8	Days	To achieve agreement with local authorities on maintaining local populace.
M9	Days	To determine requirements for CA assets.
M10	Days	To establish CMOC to conduct liaison with and to coordinate activities with NGOs and PVOs in the JOA.
M11	Days	To establish liaison with allied military forces.
M12	Days	To identify and integrate CA support and appropriate CA priority information requirements into command intelligence programs.
M13	Days	To include comments of Country Team review in revised civil affairs plan.
M14	Days	To prepare estimates of impact of military operations on civilian environment in the JOA.
M15	Days	To submit plan for civil affairs operations to Country Team for review and comment.
M16	Days	To determine specific CA assets required to support subordinate joint and Service component headquarters and forces.

#### **OP 4.7.7 Conduct Foreign Internal Defense (FID).**

To provide assistance in the operational area to friendly nations facing threats to their internal security. FID focus is to support the host-nation's program of internal defense and development (IDAD). FID is the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Programs may include multinational exercises, exchange programs, civil-military operations, intelligence and communications sharing, logistic support of security assistance, and combat operations. **(JP 3-05, 3-05.3, 3-05.5, 3-07, 3-07.1, 3-52, 3-57)** (JP 3-0, 3-09, 4-02, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Days	To begin arriving in the objective area (after receipt of warning order).
M2	Hours	To secure US personnel in country.
M3	Percent	Accuracy in accounting for funds used in FID.
M4	Percent	Of FID funding later found to not be authorized by law.

M5	Percent	Of FID effort effectively absorbed by threatened nation.
M6	Percent	Of FID effort effectively absorbed by threatened nationals AOR.
M7	Hours	To initiate FID activities (after warning order).
M8	Days	For unit to begin training (upon arrival in theater).
M9	Hours	To establish liaison with appropriate foreign nation military officials (after mission assignment).
M10	Percent	Of risks identified and implemented in the force protection plan.

#### **OP 4.7.8 Establish Disaster Control Measures.**

To take measures before, during, or after hostile action or natural disasters to reduce probability of damage, minimize its effects, and initiate recovery. **(JP 3-07.1, 3-10, 4-01.5)** (JP 3-08v1, 3-08v2, 3-10.1, 3-57, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Days	To restore normal ground lines of communication following hostile action or disaster.
M2	Days	To restore public utilities to pre-event levels, following hostile action or disaster.
M3	Gallons	Of water available to each individual per day for human consumption.
M4	Gallons	Of water available per day for livestock consumption.
M5	Gallons	Of water available to each individual per day to support sanitation measures.
M6	Minutes	Fire fighting response at fixed bases in JOA.
M7	Percent	Difference in disease incidence in affected civil populace compared to before hostile action or disaster.
M8	Percent	Difference in mortality rates in affected civil populace, compared to before hostile action or disaster.
M9	Percent	Difference in water availability to individuals in affected civil populace compared to before hostile action or disaster.
M10	Percent	Of affected civil populace displaced, as consequence of hostile action or disaster.
M11	Percent	Of affected civil populace without access to normal markets, to buy or sell, compared to before hostile action or disaster.
M12	Percent	Of affected civil populace without public utilities, compared to before hostile action or disaster.
M13	Percent	Of casualties to civil populace joint force prepared to treat (without impacting operational tempo).
M14	Percent	Of casualties to civil populace joint force prepared to treat.
M15	Percent	Of fires being covered by initial firefighting response at fixed base in JOA.
M16	Percent	Of fixed installations in JOA with firefighting equipment.
M17	Percent	Of JOA fixed bases with backup energy sources which survive hostile action or natural disaster.
M18	Percent	Of JOA fixed bases with backup energy sources.
M19	Hour	To provide commander with technical expertise on impact of disaster.

M20	Hours	To coordinate for additional assets for theater.
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#### **OP 4.8 Acquire, Manage, and Distribute Funds.**

Provide advice to commanders on financial management implications and costs of preparing for and conducting operations. Track and report costs of battlefield operations to support efforts of reimbursement of costs initially paid from available training and readiness funds. Obtain guidance on fund citations and funding levels and provide to tactical resource managers and supporting finance elements. Provide fund control, monitor fund execution, track and report costs and obligations. Operational finance functions include providing policy guidance and centralized currency funding support. Finance and accounting functions include capturing of the costs of operations via standard accounting systems and other means, and operating systems that pay personnel and providers (contractors, host-nation suppliers, etc.). **(JP 3-05.3, 3-07.4, 4-02.1, 4-05)** (JP 3-04.1, 3-07.1, 3-08v2, 4-01.7, 4-05, CJCSI 5261.01, CJCSI 6211.03, CJCSI 7401.01, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Days	To refine the financial management support plan after receipt of the warning order.
M2	Percent	To determine personnel with access to adequate financial support services.
M3	Days	To procure local contracted.
M4	Number	Of personnel services contracted with host nation elements.
M5	Cost	Per week in dollars spent on completing the operation.
M6	Cost	Per month in dollars for foreign labor in the JOA.
M7	Percent	Of personnel experiencing pay problems in the JOA.
M8	Days	To establish and maintain non-appropriated fund accounting after establishment of the JOA .
M9	Days	To establish and maintain central currency fund support after establishment if the JOA.
M10	Days	To establish electronic funds transfer accounts.
M11	Dollars	Per month transacted in foreign currency exchange.
M12	Dollars	Per month disbursed in US Treasury checks.
M13	Number	Of local depository accounts established and maintained per month.
M14	Days	To provide guidance to commands on funding procedure operations after established of the JOA.

#### **OP 5 PROVIDE OPERATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2).**

To exercise authority and direction by a joint force commander over assigned and attached joint and multinational forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Provides operational guidance, direction, and vision to assigned forces. Follows the theater strategy and links operational and tactical end states. Joint force commanders employ assigned single service, joint and multinational forces to accomplish assigned missions. When directed, a joint force commander will



standup a joint task force to plan, direct, and coordinate operations. Joint force commanders may develop and execute policies, plans, and programs. They provide interoperable C4 systems support for joint operations. This task is applicable across the range of military operations, including military operations other than war. **(JP 0-2, 1, 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-09, 3-09.3, 3-10.1, 3-50.21, 3-56.1, 4-02.2, 6-0)** (JP 0-2, 2-01, 3-0, 3-02, 3-07.5, 3-10.1, 3-54, 4-06, 5-00.2, 6-02, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	Prior to execution, plan published and delivered.
M2	Percent	Of communications nodes in place.
M3	Percent	Of units receive orders in time to plan and execute.
M4	Hours	Delay to direct, establish, and control the means by which the various staffs and forces send and receive operationally significant data/information, in order to minimize operations delayed/affected because of lack of information.
M5	Hours	Lag between the joint force common operational picture and the real world situation, in order to maintain operational information, force status, and the capability to respond to an emerging crisis and/or project branches/sequels.
M6	Minutes	To communicate all approved orders and plans to subordinate and adjacent units.

#### **OP 5.1 Acquire and Communicate Operational Level Information and Maintain Status.**

To obtain information on the joint operations area (JOA) military objectives, enemy operational forces and centers of gravity, friendly operational forces, terrain, and weather for JFCs, staffs, and subordinates. To translate this information into usable form and to retain and disseminate it to subordinate JTFs and functional and Service components. This activity includes informing and advising the operational level commander and securing an understanding of strategic guidance or an understanding of national and multinational policy, objectives, strategic aims, other elements of national and multinational power (for example, political, economic, informational), and theater strategic objectives. This task includes interfacing with friendly and enemy (in occupied territory) civilian government authorities in the JOA. This activity includes disseminating any type of information via necessary C4 systems. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-07.1, 3-13.1, 6-0, 6-02)** (JP 3-07.5, 3-13.1, 3-55.1, 3-56.1, 6-02, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3141.01, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	Since latest information collected.
M2	Hours	To establish connectivity with component intelligence agencies, unified command and national intelligence agencies (after arrival).
M3	Minutes	To process and disseminate status information (to subordinate units).
M4	Percent	Of available information examined and considered in latest status reporting.

M5	Percent	Of critical information acquired and disseminated to subordinate commanders.
M6	Percent	Of organizations or units receiving latest information.
M7	Percent	Of subordinate commanders with uninterrupted communication with joint force headquarters.
M8	Percent	Of subordinate commanders in communication with joint force headquarters.
M9	Percent	Of C4 support systems, operational.
M10	Percent	Of C4 support systems meet command reliability standards.
M11	Percent	Of combatant command plans, reports, and other information, passed error free.
M12	Percent	Of C4 support systems equipment, down for unscheduled maintenance.
M13	Percent	Of information, not passed to or received by allies (lack of equipment interoperability).
M14	Percent	Of traffic, sent on non-dedicated or non-DOD lines or circuits.
M15	Percent	Saturation of DOD communications circuits.
M16	Percent	Of time required expansion into other sectors accomplished.
M17	Percent	Of needed information not passed to bilateral or multinational nations due to classification restraints.
M18	Hours	To account for 100% of personnel after last arrival at final destination.
M19	Yes/No	Develop CONOPS for global connectivity in time to execute supported CINC's COA.
M20	Yes/No	Organizations or units are provided the latest information.

#### OP 5.1.1 Communicate Operational Information.

To send and receive operationally significant data from one echelon of command to another by any means. (JP 2-01, 3-07.1, 3-09, 3-56.1, 6-0) (JP 2-01, 3-05.5, 3-07.5, 6-02, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	After approval, all orders and plans received by components and adjacent units.
M2	Minutes	Queuing time for high precedence messages.
M3	Percent	Accuracy of data transmitted/disseminated.
M4	Percent	Accuracy of deployment orders and notification requirements transmitted/ disseminated within reporting criteria.
M5	Percent	Of addressees received message.
M6	Percent	Of time information passed within established time criteria.
M7	Percent	Of time information on CCIRs passed within established time criteria.
M8	Percent	Of time mission-essential intelligence and threat assessments passed within established time criteria.
M9	Percent	Of Service and functional component addressees received critical planning messages (e.g. warning order).

M10	Hours	For LNOs to communicate new orders or information to allies and friendly elements of force.
M11	Percent	Of messages sent outside doctrine/Service channels for message classification.
M12	Percent	Of messages go outside normal communications channels.
M13	Hours	To establish one or more secure communication means to send both voice and data traffic to JSOTF components and higher JTF headquarters after activation/alert.
M14	Hours	To establish and maintain an internal JSOTF LAN setting up the JSOTF.
M15	Hours	To establish communications with deployed advance forces once operational.
M16	Hours	To transfer information from GDSS to JOPEs.
M17	Percent	Accuracy of deployment orders and notification requirements transmitted/disseminated within reporting criteria.

### **OP 5.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Operational Information.**

To manage (determine, establish, direct, or control) the means used in sending or receiving operational information of any kind and to use DOD standard communication networks and modes, where possible, for obtaining or sending operational information. Produce Annex K for all deliberate plans and operations orders and monitor execution. Monitor and integrate JTF transmission, message, and switching systems to achieve information superiority. C4 systems support other agencies of the US Government and friendly nations and groups in military operations other than war. This task includes ensuring interoperability (through theater policies for transmission, message, and switching systems), anticipating information requirements, and utilizing existing systems to best support information requirements. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-09, 6-0, 6-02)** (JP 2-01, 3-56.1, 6-0, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Days	To integrate new headquarters into existing SIPRNET network.
M2	Hours	For ad hoc joint force HQ to be connected to GCCS (after arrival at HQ facility).
M3	Hours	To establish integrated communications system.
M4	Percent	Of communications equipment, circuits, and connectivity with status accurately displayed.
M5	Percent	Of C2 nodes possess required communications capabilities.
M6	Percent	Of required C4 systems resources identified.
M7	Percent	Of communications outages had adequate backup communications paths.
M8	Percent	Of essential JTF C4 systems accessible from all component locations.
M9	Percent	Of time, essential JTF C4 systems accessible from all locations.
M10	Percent	Of joint force classified systems networked together.
M11	Percent	Of joint force headquarters LANs capable of interoperating (e.g., CTAPS, GCCS, JDISS, DJTFAC).

M12	Percent	Of OPLANs address existing terminals and lines of communications and known or estimated throughput capability.
M13	Percent	Of time, accurate common operational picture maintained within sector/region.
M14	Percent	Of time communication and radar equipment maintained within established systems reliability and maintenance criteria.
M15	Percent	Of time communications connectivity maintained with all units.
M16	Percent	Of time communications networks fully operational.
M17	Percent	Of time voice and data communications (unsecure and secure) maintained.
M18	Percent	Of equipment interoperability problems result in late or lost data.
M19	Hours	To establish both data and voice communication with unified command and its components.
M20	Percent	Of time joint force subordinate commanders in communication with joint force headquarters.
M21	Percent	Of resources requested to fill all shortfalls.

### OP 5.1.3 Determine Commander's Critical Information Requirements.

To determine the critical information that a commander requires to understand the flow of operations and to make timely and informed decisions. The commander specifies the critical information needed to support a decision making process to retain the initiative. This information may be derived from one or more of three broad information categories of friendly, enemy, and environmental. The joint force staff, functional and Service components may identify, analyze, and submit nominations to the commander for approval. This list of information requirements is both situationally dependent and time-sensitive. This task includes identification, management, and promulgation of critical information requirements to the joint force staff and components. These information requirements are the most important in the joint force and serve to prioritize information flow. Meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) information (includes ocean, surface, upper atmosphere, and space observations as well as human-or computer-generated forecasts) is relevant to understanding residual civil and military capabilities and the consequences of execution decisions.

**(JP 3-02, 6-02)** (JP 3-0, 3-09, 3-54, 4-01.1, 6-0, CJCSM 3500.05)

**Note:** There are several tasks that are either related to or supportive of this task. They include OP 2.1.1, *Determine and Prioritize Operational Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR)*, OP 2.2.1, *Collect Information on Operational Situation*, and OP 5.1.4, *Maintain Operational Information and Force Status*.

M1	CCIRs	Active.
M2	Percent	Of CCIRs are answered.
M3	Hours	Since CCIR last update.
M4	Percent	Of CCIRs initiated by JFC.
M5	Percent	Of CCIRs initiated by Joint Staff.

M6	Percent	Of CCIRs initiated by components.
M7	Hours	To promulgate CCIR for collection during.
M8	Weeks	Into the future CCIRs look.

#### **OP 5.1.4 Maintain Operational Information and Force Status.**

To screen, process, circulate, store, and display operational data in a form suitable for the decision making and planning processes of the joint force commander (JFC) and staff. The purpose is to enable execution functions of subordinate task forces and components and for supporting other US governmental agencies, friendly nations, and groups in the region. This task includes tracking the movement of friendly forces into and within the joint operations area. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 6-0)**  
(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-54, 3-61, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	Lag between joint force common operational picture and real world situation.
M2	Instances	Of incoming information (which could affect outcome of operation) not getting to person responsible for action.
M3	Instances	Of critical information not reaching person responsible for action.
M4	Minutes	To post unit reports to appropriate databases or pass to work centers (from receipt).
M5	Minutes	To access and display shared remote databases.
M6	Minutes	To enter most current information on force status.
M7	Percent	Accuracy of information on essential logistics, maintenance, aircraft, missile and personnel requirements and reports.
M8	Percent	Accuracy of information on deployment bases and deployment options.
M9	Percent	Accuracy of information regarding subordinate unit deployments.
M10	Percent	Accuracy of intelligence situation displays maintained with mission-essential information.
M11	Percent	Accuracy of mission-essential information maintained on situation displays.
M12	Percent	Accuracy of data used by operations staff.
M13	Percent	Accuracy of subordinate unit aircraft and missile status.
M14	Percent	Of decisions delayed awaiting appropriate data.
M15	Percent	Of friendly units/organizations and personnel with current status known.
M16	Percent	Of information gets to appropriate people.
M17	Percent	Of time, data presented to decision maker in suitable format.
M18	Percent	Of operational data displays are current.
M19	Percent	Of reinforcing or supporting forces, JFC has accurate information.
M20	Percent	Of reports processed and disseminated to all agencies within time limits.
M21	Percent	Of reports with no significant errors.
M22	Percent	Accuracy of information in essential logistics, maintenance, aircraft, missile and personnel reports.

M23	Seconds	To access and display shared local databases.
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### OP 5.1.5 Monitor Strategic Situation.

To be aware of and to understand national and multinational objectives, policies, goals, other elements of national and multinational power (diplomatic, economic, informational), political aim, and the geographic combatant commander's strategic concept and intent. **(JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-09)** (JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-08v1, 3-09, 3-10.1, 3-50.21, 3-50.3, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	Lag in currency of information on adjacent military forces or non-DOD agencies.
M2	Incidents	Where commander surprised by critical/emerging political, economic, or military event (not briefed).
M3	Instances	Of commander learning of emerging theater political, economic, or military event from source outside his staff.
M4	Minutes	To obtain information on changes to operational or strategic situation.
M5	Percent	Of time, commander learns of emerging theater political, economic, or military event from staff.

### OP 5.1.6 Preserve Historical Documentation of Joint/Combined Operations or Campaigns.

To collect paper and safeguard, photographic images, electronic documentation, and artifacts of key events, decisions, and observations of joint/combined operation(s) or campaigns to support lessons learned analysis; public affairs efforts, doctrine development, and historical retention and writing. This task includes attending key briefings and meetings, interviewing key personnel to gather first hand observations, facts, and impressions. This task further includes keeping a daily journal of personal observations and key events and packaging and forwarding collected information to appropriate agencies. Prepare and submit contingency historical reports that include required data. **(JP 1-03, 3-07.2, 4-02.2, 5-00.2, 5-03.1, CJCSM 3122.03)** (JP 3-05.3, 3-07.1, 3-08v1, 3-13.1, 3-50.21, 3-50.3, 3-57, 5-03.1, CJCSI 5320.01, CJCSM 3500.05)

**Note:** This task may also support ST 7.2.3, *Conduct Joint After-Action Reporting*.

M1	Percent	Of decision documents with pre-decisional material available.
M2	Percent	Of key leaders interviewed after the event.
M3	Percent	Of key staff members interviewed after the event.
M4	Percent	Of official documentation (maps, orders, photos) preserved in historical accounts.
M5	Percent	Of operations have enemy versions or accounts available.
M6	Percent	Of records retired or retained (rather than destroyed).
M7	Percent	Of SF 135s properly completed.

M8	Weeks	From termination of major event until all key personnel interviewed.
M9	Percent	Of battles and engagements with photographic images and electronic documentation available.
M10	Months	Before documents available for lessons learned analysis.
M11	Hours	Before initial status reports are submitted to higher echelons.
M12	Days	Before contingency historical reports and supporting documents are sent to central collection point.
M13	Days	Before after-action reports are submitted to higher echelons.

#### **OP 5.1.7 Coordinate Combat Camera Activities.**

To coordinate combat camera teams and personnel in the joint operations area (JOA) to acquire imagery in support of ongoing operations. Supported activities include intelligence, battlefield damage assessment, IO, PA, deception, training, civil affairs, legal, and history functions. **(JP 3-61, CJCSM 3122.03)** (JP 3-05, 3-56.1, 5-03.1, DODD 5040.4, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	To dual hat combat camera detachment commander as member of JIB when determined necessary.
M2	Hours	To process media and produce imagery for short notice tasking (within JOA).
M3	Hours	To provide finished imagery products to customers in theater.
M4	Hours	To provide finished imagery products to customers in US.
M5	Hours	To respond to and be on scene for short notice tasking (within JOA).
M6	Hours	To review selected combat camera materials (for release, until release, including products to be released by public affairs representatives, prior to delivery to the releasing agency).
M7	Percent	Of presented coverage deemed suitable by customer (i.e., audience attention and share).
M8	Percent	Of subject coverage requests filled.

#### **OP 5.1.8 Execute C4 Policies and Procedures for the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To implement tactics, techniques, and procedures to ensure integrated C4 systems for contingency operations. Implement theater information security policies to support daily C4 systems activities. Develop JTF programs and guidance for information security. **(JP 2-01, 3-05, 3-09, 6-0, 6-02)** (JP 3-07.4, CJCSI 6212.01A, CJCSI 8100.01, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Yes/No	Do commands responsible for C4 systems have policies and procedures for operation and maintenance of these systems?
M2	Instances	Of delay, disruption, or corruption of operational C4 systems due to failure to follow established policies and procedures.
M3	Percent	Of total "down" time for operational C4 systems attributed to failure to follow established policies and procedures.

M4	Yes/No	Commands have restoration plans for critical circuits.
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#### OP 5.1.9 Coordinate Information Assurance (IA) Procedures.

To coordinate IA procedures established by the joint force commander for forward deployed operations. (JP 3-13, CJCSI 6510.01B, CJCSM 3141.01) (JP 6-0, 6-02, CJCSI 3141.01, DODD 3600.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Yes/No	Commands responsible for operation and maintenance of information systems perform risk assessment of potential threats and take appropriate action to respond to those risks which meet the appropriate criteria.
M2	Yes/No	Commands responsible for operation and maintenance of information systems have IA or defensive IO memorandums of understanding with commercial communications providers who support information systems.
M3	Yes/No	Commands responsible for design, operation and maintenance of information systems use "red teams" to identify vulnerabilities in those systems.
M4	Percent	Of operational information systems not protected by firewalls, virus detection software and other appropriate defensive IO measures.
M5	Percent	Of operational information system hardware and software components that have backup components to replace them if they fail or are corrupted.
M6	Number	Of redundant communications paths available to connect operational information systems.
M7	Instances	Of operational information systems being disabled, corrupted or compromised through identified adversary IO actions or criminal mischief.
M8	Hours	For appropriate computer emergency response teams (CERTs) to respond, identify and correct operational information system failures attributed to adversary IO action or criminal mischief.

#### OP 5.1.10 Implement Electromagnetic Spectrum Management, Policy, Plans, Programs, and Direction.

To provide JTF electromagnetic spectrum management. Submit coordinate, and deconflict frequency and host-nation support requests. Anticipate JTF frequency requirements. Disseminate theater/JTF techniques and procedures for frequency management during contingency operations. This task includes developing JTF communications electronic operation instructions (JCEOI), coordinating with subordinate units to ensure effective frequency management, and developing the joint restricted frequency list. (JP 3-0, 3-09, 3-13.1, 6-0, 6-02, CJCSI 3220.01) (JP 3-51, 3-58, CJCSM 3141.01, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	To submit theater frequency requests.
M2	Hours	To submit host-nation supportability requests.
M3	Days	To obtain theater frequency approval.



M4	Days	To obtain host-nation supportability approval.
M5	Days	To develop the JTF communications electronic operating instructions (JCEOI).
M6	Days	To develop the joint restricted frequency list (JFRL).
M7	Hours	To submit satellite access requests (SARs).
M8	Days	To obtain satellite access approval.
M9	Days	To deconflict theater spectrum assignments.

#### **OP 5.1.11 Provide Positive Identification of Friendly Forces Within the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To determine discretely and positively, by any means the individual identity of forces, objects (military formations), or phenomena (such as communications electronic patterns). The objective of this task is to protect friendly and neutral forces, objects, or phenomena from attack by operational level forces or systems. This task facilitates the concentration of effort against the adversary. **(JP 3-01.1, 3-03, 3-09, 3-09.3, 3-10.1, 3-52, 3-56.1)** (JP 3-01.1, 3-07.3, 3-09, 3-09.3, 3-54, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	Before enemy begins to mimic identification or recognition procedure.
M2	Minutes	To confirm identity of unidentified friendly target.
M3	Percent	Of coalition nations accurately reporting force locations.
M4	Percent	Of force with passive identification interrogation capability employing capability.
M5	Percent	Of friendly aircraft destroyed by friendly air defense.
M6	Percent	Of friendly aircraft destroyed by friendly fire.
M7	Percent	Of friendly casualties from friendly fire.
M8	Percent	Of friendly fire incidents cross-national.
M9	Percent	Of friendly fire incidents cross-service.
M10	Percent	Of friendly forces with procedures or equipment to allow positive identification, employ such procedures or equipment.
M11	Percent	Of positive identification false negatives (friendly identified as enemy).
M12	Percent	Of positive identification false positives (enemy identified as friendly).
M13	Percent	Of friendly casualties, caused by friendly weapon systems.

#### **OP 5.2 Assess Operational Situation.**

To evaluate information received through reports or the personal observations of the commander (commander's critical information requirements) on the general situation in the theater of operation and conduct of the campaign or major operation. In particular, this activity includes deciding whether different actions are

required from those that would result from the most recent orders issued. This includes evaluating operational requirements of subordinate task forces and components. **(JP 0-2, 2-0, 2-01, 3-01.1, 3-03, 3-08v1, 3-09, 3-50.21)** (JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-08v1, 3-10.1, 3-55, 4-0, 5-00.2, 6-0, CJCSM 3500.05)

**Note:** See also ST 7.1, *Recommend Warfighting and Other Requirements and Test Concepts*.

M1	Hours	For joint force to review or develop flexible deterrent options (after request or occurrence).
M2	Hours	Since update of joint force situation.
M3	Minutes	For commander to forward and disseminate crisis assessment.
M4	Minutes	To access current situation and formulate plan of action.
M5	Percent	Of enemy actions or operations forecast.
M6	Instances	Of time commander/senior staff made aware of emerging political, economic, or military event (which could impact theater) from outside source.
M7	Percent	Of time theater political event of interest occurs without options available.
M8	Hours	For commander to formulate crisis assessment.
M9	Weeks	Before OPLAN submitted, JFC develops FDOs.

#### **OP 5.2.1 Review Current Situation (Project Branches).**

To examine operational information developed by senior headquarters, the JFC's staff, and subordinate components and/or task forces. This includes analyzing the assigned mission (includes assigned strategic military and politico-military objectives) and related tasks in the context of the next higher echelon's campaign plan or operation order, the strategic aim. It also involves combining on hand with incoming information while separating critical from noncritical information. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-07.5, 3-09, 3-50.21, 3-54)** (JP 1-05, 2-01, 3-05.3, 3-07.5, 3-54, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Days	Into future, planning branches have been developed.
M2	Percent	Of decision points have branches.
M3	Percent	Of enemy actions or operations affected course of battle, but not forecast.
M4	Percent	Of forecast branches appeared at execution.

#### **OP 5.2.2 Formulate Crisis Assessment.**

To analyze the situation through available intelligence and determine whether a military option should be prepared. **(JP 2-01, 3-01.1, 3-08v1, 5-0, 5-00.2)** (JP 2-01, 3-54, 5-00.2, 5-03.1)

M1	Hours	Following voice report, hard copy OPREP 3 (PINNACLE) report submitted.
M2	Hours	From receipt of intelligence to complete analysis of situation.
M3	Hours	To identify forces available.
M4	Hours	To send voice report to unified commander (after occurrence of crisis).
M5	Hours	To send voice report to commander (upon request).
M6	Minutes	To forward and disseminate crisis assessment.
M7	Percent	Of available forces identified.
M8	Time	To formulate crisis assessment.

### **OP 5.2.3 Project Future Campaigns and Major Operations (Sequels).**

To see beyond immediate battles and estimate enemy's future actions and to anticipate friendly actions for employment of operational forces after each phase of a current campaign or major operation (sequels). This includes consideration of possible local reversals or tactical failures. **(JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-03, 3-09)** (JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-08v1, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Days	Of future planning is completed and available.
M2	Percent	Of decision points have sequels.
M3	Percent	Of enemy actions or operations forecast.
M4	Percent	Of identified sequels with COAs developed.
M5	Percent	Of possible follow-on operations have preplanned sequels.

### **OP 5.3 Prepare Plans and Orders.**

To make detailed plans, staff estimates, and decisions for implementing the geographic combatant commander's theater strategy, associated sequels, and anticipated campaigns or major operations. Plans and orders address, among other things, centers of gravity, branches, sequels, culminating points, and phasing. Planning includes organizing an effective staff, structuring and organizing the force, considering multinational capabilities/ limitations, and cross-leveling or balancing Service component, joint, and national C4 means. Plans should address specific missions and tasks for subordinate joint or multinational task forces, Service and functional components and supporting commands and agencies. Plans should specify main effort(s) and supporting and supported relationships by phase. Planning also should address rules of engagement for force employment. This activity includes determining solutions to operational level needs. All plans and orders must maximize the operational capability while simultaneously minimizing the risk to the force. **(JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-09, 3-10, 3-54, 5-0, 5-00.2)** (JP 1-05, 3-0, 3-03, 3-04.1, 3-07.5, 3-09, 3-17, 3-50.21, 4-06, CJCSI 3100.01, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	After constitution of JPG (or equivalent) to publish joint force HQ "daily battle rhythm."
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M2	Hours	To adjust original plan for decisive operations (after recognizing planning assumptions invalid).
M3	Hours	To compile appropriate reports.
M4	Hours	To issue joint force commander's intent and end state (after CJCS or combatant commander's warning order).
M5	Minutes	To generate and forward commander's situation reports (SITREP).
M6	Percent	Of enemy actions or operations forecast.
M7	Seconds	To respond to emergency aircraft.
M8	Percent	Of time from activation to C-Day used to provide commander's intent.
M9	Minutes	To dispatch emergency action message (EAM).
M10	Minutes	To receive and respond to EAM.
M11	Percent	Accuracy of information in region/sector and gained unit supplemental plans.
M12	Percent	Currency of information in region/sector and gained unit supplemental plans.
M13	Percent	Of time from activation to C-Day used to provide concept of operations.
M14	Yes/No	COAs evaluated to find which were suitable, feasible, acceptable variable, and complete.
M15	Yes/No	Milestone criteria for plan development met.
M16	Yes/No	CONOPS developed in time to execute supported CINC's COA.
M17	Hours	To complete executable operational plans and orders (after receipt of commander's estimate).

### OP 5.3.1 Conduct Operational Mission Analysis.

To analyze the assigned mission (includes assigned strategic military and politico-military objectives) and related tasks in the context of the next higher echelon's campaign plan or operation order, and the strategic aim. **(JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-02, 3-07.1, 3-08v1, 3-09, 4-06, 5-0)** (JP 3-01.4, 3-05.3, 3-07, 3-10.1, 3-50.21, 3-58, 5-03.1, 6-02, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Of critical intelligence reports and JOA-related CINC intelligence estimates reviewed prior to mission analysis/end state assessment.
M2	Percent	Of major topics within the joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace (JIPB) for which assessments are conducted.
M3	Percent	Of apportioned forces reviewed for their readiness status.
M4	Yes/No	Time/distance analysis conducted.
M5	Percent	Of available planning time allowed for subordinate planning (after COA selected).
M6	Yes/No	Assumptions developed to replace missing or unknown facts that are necessary for continued planning.
M7	Percent	Of assumptions proved to be either invalid or unrealistic and significantly affect the operation (i.e., are valid assumptions).

M8	Percent	Of principal JTF staff members who review the CINC's planning directive.
M9	Percent	Of limitations (constraints and restraints) identified that significantly affect the operation.
M10	Yes/No	Enemy centers of gravity identified at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.
M11	Yes/No	Friendly centers of gravity identified at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.
M12	Percent	Of CINC stated tasks derived in operational mission analysis and carried into planning.
M13	Percent	Of implied tasks derived in operational mission analysis and carried into planning.
M14	Percent	Of essential tasks derived in operational mission analysis and carried into planning. Of stated and implied tasks that are identified as essential tasks and included in either the mission statement, commander's intent or concept of operations paragraphs of the OPOD.
M15	Percent	Of forces identified as required to accomplish the essential tasks.
M16	Percent	Of identified risks have a written risk assessment. Of identified significant risks to mission accomplishment and force protection.
M17	Percent	Of identified risks that are determined to be acceptable by the commander.
M18	Yes/No	Mission statement includes who, what, when, where, and why of the mission.

### OP 5.3.2 Issue Planning Guidance.

To establish guidance for planning tasks to be accomplished by subordinate commanders and their staffs. This includes initial and subsequent planning guidance. Among other things planning guidance might include constraints and restrictions such as rules of engagement for force employment and risk acceptance guidance. **(JP 3-0, 3-02, 3-07.1, 3-08v1, 3-09, 3-54, 4-06, 5-0, 5-00.2, 6-0)** (JP 3-0, 3-05.3, 3-07.1, 3-07.5, 3-13.1, 3-50.21, 3-58, 4-02.1, 5-03.1, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Days	In advance of execution, planning guidance issued to subordinate commands.
M2	Hours	After being notified of mission, JFC issued or approved initial planning guidance.
M3	Hours	From request for change to ROE until approval/denial.
M4	Instances	Of amendments issued to planning guidance (due to requests for clarification).
M5	Incidents	Of misunderstood ROE.
M6	Instances	Of requests for clarification of planning guidance/commander's guidance received from subordinate headquarters.
M7	Percent	Completeness of commander's guidance (i.e., coverage of functional areas).
M8	Percent	Of planning time used by higher HQ to issue guidance.

M9	Percent	Of ROE clearly understood.
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### OP 5.3.3 Determine Operational End State.

To determine the military end state and set of required conditions that achieve the strategic objectives. There may be a preliminary end state, described by a set of military conditions, when military force is no longer the principal means to the strategic objective. There may be a broader end state that typically involves returning to a state of peace and stability and may include a variety of diplomatic, economic, informational, and military conditions. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-0, 3-08v1, 3-09)** (JP 1, 3-0, 3-07, 3-08v1, 4-02.1, 6-02, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Days	To pass control of operations area to local government or appointed transitional administrative authority (after achieving end state).
M2	Days	Delay in turnover of control of operations area to legitimate or transitional administrative authorities.
M3	Days	To transition control of operations area to civil authority.
M4	Instances	Of revisions to end state conditions.
M5	Percent	Of commanders accepting end state conditions without requests for clarification.

### OP 5.3.4 Develop Courses of Action/Prepare Staff Estimates.

To anticipate and define multiple, feasible employment options within the framework of the next senior commander's concept. **(JP 0-2, 2-01, 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-08v1, 3-09, 3-54, 5-0)** (JP 2-01, 3-02, 3-08v1, 3-09, 4-0, 4-01, 5-0, 5-03.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Instances	Of COAs developed.
M2	Percent	Of non-selected COAs considered for deception.
M3	Percent	Of available planning time allotted for subordinate planning.
M4	Percent	Of COAs acceptable.
M5	Percent	Of COAs distinguishable.
M6	Percent	Of COAs feasible.
M7	Percent	Of COAs presented to commander were suitable, feasible, acceptable and distinct from one another.
M8	Percent	Of COAs suitable.
M9	Hours	To complete a staff estimate after receipt of the warning order.
M10	Hours	To provide the commander with a minimum of three COAs which are suitable, feasible, and acceptable after receipt of the warning order.
M11	Hours	To provide the JTF or unified commander with a commander's estimate after receipt of the warning order.

**OP 5.3.5 Analyze Courses of Action.**

To examine or wargame each course of action to determine its advantages and disadvantages. Each friendly course of action is examined or wargamed against each enemy course of action. **(JP 0-2, 2-0, 2-01, 3-0, 3-07.1, 4-01, 5-0, 5-03.1)** (JP 1, 2-0, 2-01, 3-05.5, 3-07.1, 3-08v1, 3-54, 4-01, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Instances	Of limitations (ultimately identified during execution) identified during analysis.
M2	Percent	Of branches and sequels experienced identified in COAs.
M3	Percent	Of capabilities ultimately required identified in planning.
M4	Percent	Of COAs analyzed against potential enemy COAs.
M5	Y/N	Advantages/disadvantages of courses of action identified during analysis.

**OP 5.3.6 Compare Courses of Action.**

To analyze the various courses of action against each other. This can be done by comparing the advantages and disadvantages of each course of action previously analyzed or by isolating and comparing decisive factors that are selected based on each situation. **(JP 0-2, 3-0, 3-07.1, 5-0)** (JP 3-07.1, 3-12.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Of comparison criteria eliminated before comparison.
M2	Percent	Of comparison criteria eventually used, defined and weighted before comparison began.
M3	Yes/No	Comparison criteria selected allowed for definitive comparison of COAs.

**OP 5.3.7 Select or Modify Course of Action.**

To decide on the course of action that offers the best prospect for success. This also includes modifying a course of action previously selected. This is a cyclical process. The courses of action not selected potentially become sequels and contingencies to phases of the operation as the situation evolves. This enables the commander to respond rapidly to changing situations. **(JP 0-2, 2-01, 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-09, 5-0)** (JP 2-01, 3-07.1, 3-07.4, 3-09, 3-13.1, 3-50.3, 4-01.7)

M1	Days	In advance of execution, COAs selected.
M2	Days	Since COAs reviewed.

**OP 5.3.8 Issue Commander's Estimate.**

To restate the mission (includes assigned strategic military objectives), develop the concept of operations (operational movement and firepower), give clear statement of commander's initial intent (aim of entire campaign or major operation), and identify subordinates' tasks and objectives. This task pertains to air, space, land, sea, and special operations forces and those of a supported US governmental agency or

nation in military operations other than war (that is, the supported organization's concept and intent). The concept of operations could include: allocation of forces, phasing, means of reinforcing maneuver, firepower, air operation requirements, priorities by phase, naval support, use of combat area (and space systems), SOF employment, special weapons employment, and deception. Special types of operations, for example, amphibious, may include other elements. This task could include a restatement of rules of engagement, risk acceptance authority levels, and other restrictions and constraints. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-0, 3-07.1, 4-06, 5-0)** (JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-02, 3-05.5, 3-07.1, 3-07.4, 3-07.5, 3-09, 3-54, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	Before execution, commander's concept and intent issued.
M2	Hours	Before execution, commander's estimate issued.
M3	Hours	To issue commander's estimate (after receipt of warning order).
M4	Percent	Of planning time available, used to issue commander's concept and intent.
M5	Yes/No	Commander's estimate adequately addresses commander's intent, subordinate tasks and objectives, and concept of operations for all mission areas.

#### **OP 5.3.9 Prepare Campaign or Major Operations and Related Plans and Orders.**

To make a plan or order that reflects the concept and intent of the geographic combatant commander's campaign plan or that of a supported commander. Plans include intelligence collection, logistic plans, and rules of engagement. **(JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-08v1, 3-09, 3-54, 4-01.1, 5-0, 5-00.2)** (JP 2-01, 3-08v1, 3-09, 3-13.1, 3-17, 3-50.21, 4-01, 4-01.2, 5-0, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Days	Prior to hostilities, SOF allowed to conduct cross-border operations.
M2	Hours	For complete set of executable operational plans and orders (following receipt of commander's estimate).
M3	Hours	To establish Joint Information Bureau (following execute order).
M4	Hours	To prepare plans and orders (after deciding on mission concept and intent).
M5	Percent	Of critical C4I architecture nodes identified in OPLAN.
M6	Percent	Of functional areas covered in OPLAN.
M7	Percent	Of operations in plan conform to US and International Law.

#### **OP 5.4 Command Subordinate Operational Forces.**

To promulgate the interrelated responsibilities between commanders, as well as the authority of commanders in the chain of command. Clear delineation of responsibility among commanders up, down, and laterally ensures unity of command which is a foundation for trust, coordination, and the teamwork necessary for unified military action. All lower echelon commanders must



understand their mission (and communicate to their subordinates), their contribution to achievement of the commander's concept and intent, and their relationship to attainment of a higher or supported commander's operational objectives. This facilitates maximum decentralized conduct of campaigns and major operations utilizing either detailed or mission-type plans and orders as the situation and time permit. **(JP 0-2, 3-0, 3-03, 3-08v1, 3-09, 3-10.1, 3-50.21, 5-0, 5-00.2)** (JP 3-07.5, 3-08v1, 5-03.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Accuracy of information in plans and orders issued and disseminated to subordinate units.
M2	Percent	Of completed planning documents (e.g., mission analysis, COA decision, synchronization matrix) passed to components to allow parallel planning.
M3	Percent	Of planning time joint force allows components.
M4	Percent	Of subordinate commands clear about their immediate objectives.
M5	Percent	Of time JFC positioned to best affect accomplishment of operational end state for each operational phase.
M6	Percent	Of time joint force staff issued "battle rhythm" SOP for planning use of available time.
M7	Percent	Of time mission-essential intelligence and threat assessments passed within established criteria.
M8	Percent	Of time during crisis action procedures, execution orders initiated or warning relayed.
M9	Percent	Of units visited personally by commander to convey concept and intent.
M10	Minutes	To issue and disseminate threat conditions (THREATCONs) and attack warnings.
M11	Percent	Of time, required expansion into other sectors accomplished.
M12	Minutes	To dispatch deployed weapons teams (DWTs).

#### **OP 5.4.1 Approve Plans and Orders.**

To obtain the commander's approval and the next higher commander's approval of fully rationalized joint/multinational plans and orders prior to issuance. **(JP 3-0, 3-03, 3-07.1, 3-61, 4-01, 5-0, 5-00.2)** (JP 1-05, 2-01, 3-50.3, 3-54, 4-01.1, 4-06, 5-0, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	To complete plan or campaign plan review and approval.
M2	Hours	To obtain approval of plans and orders.
M3	Instances	Of OPLAN conflicting with standards under conduct of war and international convention.
M4	Percent	Accuracy of information in commander's operations plan to meet established objectives.
M5	Percent	Of accurate deployment orders and notification requirements disseminated within reporting criteria.

#### OP 5.4.2 Issue Plans and Orders.

To submit orders, plans, and reports for transmission to subordinate, supporting, or attached units for execution and to adjacent and higher units for coordination.

(JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-50.21, 3-54, 4-01.2, 5-0, 5-00.2, 5-03.1) (JP 1-05, 3-07.5, 3-08v1, 3-54, 3-57, 4-01.1, 4-01.2, 6-0, 6-02, CJCSM 3500.05)

**Note:** The transmission of the orders and plans by any means is part of the activity, OP 5.1.1, *Communicate Operational Information*.

M1	Hours	To issue plan or order (after approved).
M2	Minutes	For commander to forward and disseminate plan of action.
M3	Minutes	To initiate or relay warning or execution order.
M4	Percent	Of commander's threat conditions (THREATCONs) and attack warnings issued and disseminated.

#### OP 5.4.3 Provide Rules of Engagement.

To provide operational commander's directive which delineates the circumstances and limitations under which US forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement. (JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-03, 3-07.1, 3-09, 3-10.1, 3-56.1, 5-00.2,

5-03.1) (JP 3-0, 3-03, 3-07, 3-07.1, 3-07.5, 3-08v1, 3-10, 3-10.1, 3-50.21, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Days	Prior to hostilities, SOF allowed to conduct cross-border operations.
M2	Hours	From receipt of warning order to submission of rules of engagement (ROE) request.
M3	Hours	To develop general order regarding prohibited and permitted actions for deploying joint force.
M4	Percent	Accuracy of information in ROE changes.
M5	Percent	Of ROE exception determinations followed all procedures.
M6	Percent	Of target attacks violate rules of engagement.

#### OP 5.4.4 Synchronize and Integrate Operations.

To arrange land, air, sea, space, and special operations forces in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at the decisive point. This activity includes the vertical and the horizontal integration of tasks in time and space to maximize combat output. Synchronization ensures all elements of the operational force, including supported agencies' and nations' forces are efficiently and safely employed to maximize their combined effects beyond the sum of their individual capabilities. This includes synchronizing support to a supported command. Synchronization permits the friendly commander to get inside the enemy commander's decision cycle. (JP 1, 3-0, 3-03, 3-08v1, 3-09, 3-50.21, 3-54, 5-0) (JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-03, 3-07.1, 3-08v1, 3-09.3, 3-10.1, 3-52, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	Delay in initiating phase of operation.
M2	Hours	Prior to execution, joint force has execution matrix with sequence and timing of each component task throughout operation.
M3	Incidents	Of operational missions (e.g., SOF, PSYOP, military deception) executed without coordinating with operating forces in target area.
M4	Incidents	Of potential cross component boundary fratricide identified and eliminated by joint force headquarters.
M5	Percent	Of friendly forces actively contributing to conduct of operation.
M6	Percent	Of joint force or component missions carried out as planned.
M7	Percent	Of subordinate missions executed with requested joint force or component support.
M8	Percent	Of subordinate orders reviewed by joint force staff for compliance with JFC's intent.
M9	Percent	Of assigned and supporting forces commence operation on time (right people, right place, right time).

#### **OP 5.4.5 Coordinate/Integrate Components, Theater, and Other Support.**

To coordinate with allies/coalition partners; US component commands; the geographic combatant commander; and adjacent, subordinate, higher, and supporting organizations to ensure cooperation and mutual support, a consistent effort, and a mutual understanding of the joint force commander's priorities, support requirements, concept and intent, and objectives. This task includes coordinating with ambassadors and Country Teams (as appropriate), other US agencies, and leaders of supported nations. This activity includes but is not limited to coordinating concept development, sustainment support, and supporting component operation plans. Coordination of air, land, sea, space, and special operations support begins early in the process. (**JP 0-2, 2-01, 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-08v1, 3-09, 3-10.1, 3-50.21, 4-0, 4-01.1**) (JP 0-2, 1, 1-05, 2-01, 3-07.4, 3-08v1, 4-02.1, 5-00.2, CJCSM 3500.05)

**Note:** See also OP 4.7.5, *Coordinate Politico-Military Support*, as a related task.

M1	Percent	Of local customs, laws, and policies concerning presence of media in AOR nations addressed in OPLAN or other document.
M2	Percent	Of policies and procedures for establishment and coordination of logistics, maintenance, and transportation support completed using JOPES.
M3	Percent	Of requests for support sent directly to CINC's Service component.
M4	Percent	Of allies/coalition partners, component commands, combatant commanders, government agencies and supporting organizations adequately represented on the supported headquarters staff.

#### **OP 5.4.6 Conduct Operational Rehearsals.**

To coordinate rehearsals for operational level operations or to actually conduct commander and/or staff rehearsals within the headquarters. Rehearsals provide a venue for learning, understanding, and practicing a plan/order in the time available before actual execution. Rehearsing key combat and logistical actions allows participants to become familiar with the operation and visualize the plan. **(JP 3-0, 3-01.5, 3-02, 3-02.1, 3-05, 3-05.3, 3-05.5, 3-07.5, 3-08v1 3-50.21)** (JP 3-0, 3-02.2, 3-07.2, CJCSM 3500.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Yes/No	Type of rehearsal (e.g., Staff Only, Cdr & Staff, Partial Force, or Full Force) is specified.
M2	Yes/No	Technique of rehearsal (e.g., Map/Chart, Area/Terrain Board, Models/Simulations Supported, Similar Area, or Actual Area) is specified.
M3	Yes/No	Roles and responsibilities of participants are specified.
M4	Yes/No	Events to be rehearsed are identified and prioritized.
M5	Percent	Of the operation's phases/objectives are rehearsed.
M6	Yes/No	Components reviewed their mission, commander's intent, and concept of operations in relationship to time (i.e., by timelines or phases).
M7	Percent	Of Commander's Critical Information Requirement are reviewed by phase of the operation.
M8	Yes/No	Operational movement and maneuver issues are discussed & resolved.
M9	Yes/No	Operational Intelligence issues are reviewed & resolved. Enemy actions are realistically portrayed (most likely or most dangerous enemy courses of action).
M10	Yes/No	Operational Firepower issues are reviewed & resolved.
M11	Yes/No	Operational Support issues are reviewed & resolved.
M12	Yes/No	Operational Command & Control issues are reviewed & resolved.
M13	Yes/No	Operational Protection issues are reviewed & resolved.
M14	Percent	Of developed branch (or contingency) plans are reviewed.
M15	Yes/No	Operations security is maintained throughout the rehearsal.
M16	Yes/No	Major changes are made to the existing plan.
M17	Hours	To document and distribute changes to the original plan as a result of the rehearsal.

#### **OP 5.5 Establish, Organize, and Operate a Joint Force Headquarters.**

To establish, organize, and operate a headquarters for the command and control of designated and organized joint and multinational forces under the duly authorized, single, joint force commander. This task includes establishing a joint task force and applies to all levels of war. **(JP 0-2, 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-08v1, 3-09, 5-00.2)** (JP 0-2, 3-05.3, 3-07.5, 3-08v1, 3-08v2, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	For joint force commander to request DOT TOR of USCG (after receipt of warning order).
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M2	Hours	To form joint force staff (from activation order).
M3	Percent	Of joint force actions or operations affected by late arrival of staff augmentees.
M4	Percent	Of joint force augmentees received and integrated into joint force staff LAW established procedure.
M5	Days	From activation order until headquarters fully staffed.
M6	Yes/No	Joint force key billets, distributed on proportionate basis with major forces assigned?
M7	Days	To approve augmentation to newly formed Joint Staff.
M8	Days	To determine and approve JTF structure.
M9	Days	To establish and approve C2 architecture for JTF.
M10	Percent	Of time from activation to C-Day used to determine and approve joint force command arrangements.
M11	Time	To approve Joint Staff augmentation in key positions of responsibility from each Service having significant forces assigned.

#### OP 5.5.1 Develop a Joint Force Command and Control Structure.

To establish a structure for command and control of subordinate forces. This task includes assigning or establishing the range of responsibilities for the various boards, centers, cells, and bureaus that aid the commander in exercising command and control of a joint force. **(JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-03, 3-08v1, 3-09, 3-10.1, 4-01.1, 5-00.2, 6-02, CJCSM 3122.03)** (JP 3-08v1, 3-08v2, 3-10, 3-10.1, 3-50.21, 4-01, 4-01.1, 6-0, 6-02, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Days	Until joint force headquarters staff augmented and in full operation (from alert order).
M2	Days	To issue joint force OPORD or plan (from alert order).
M3	Hours	For joint force to identify elements and boards to establish within headquarters.
M4	Hours	For joint force staff to select specialized equipment required from joint force establishing commander.
M5	Hours	For joint force staff to select specialized personnel required from joint force establishing commander.
M6	Hours	To complete notification of joint force core staff (after alert order).
M7	Hours	To establish joint force headquarters boards, centers, cells, and bureaus.
M8	Hours	To form joint planning group (after alert order).
M9	Hours	To form joint force staff.
M10	Hours	To issue tasking to initial augmentees for newly formed joint task force.
M11	Hours	To obtain approval of joint force command and control OPLAN/OPORD annex.
M12	Hours	To obtain approval of joint force command and control structure.

M13	Hours	Until joint force headquarters staff, to include boards, cells, centers, and committees, augmented and in full operation (after alert order).
M14	Incidents	Of friendly forces orders/taskings significantly delayed because of unclear relationships within HQ.
M15	Incidents	Of friendly forces orders/taskings significantly delayed.
M16	Incidents	Of modifications to command structure taking place during execution (combat attrition excepted).
M17	Instances	Of new sections and boards established within joint force (after initial organization).
M18	Minutes	For new joint force staff sections and boards to establish initial communication with opposite numbers on CINC staff and in Supporting commands.
M19	Percent	Of required augmentees identified in joint force SOP by rank and duty position.
M20	Percent	Of combined force headquarters staff composed of non-US personnel.
M21	Percent	Of components with allocated or apportioned forces, suitably represented on combined force staff.
M22	Percent	Of components, involved foreign governments, and NGOs/PVOs (suitably) represented on designated joint force staff.
M23	Percent	Of joint force actions or operations affected by late arrival of augmentees.
M24	Percent	Of joint force headquarters staff composed of augmentees.
M25	Percent	Of joint force primary subordinate commander's and functional commander's responsibilities identified prior to Phase V of crisis action planning.
M26	Percent	Of joint force staff elements, represent force makeup as to numbers, experience, influence of position, and rank among concerned Services making up joint force.
M27	Percent	Of non-DOD agencies and forces participating in operation, identified in command and control annex of joint force OPORD.
M28	Percent	Of required staff positions filled.
M29	Percent	Of required subordinate joint force staff positions filled.
M30	Percent	Of joint force staff augmentees previously trained as augmentees.
M31	Yes/No	Employment of E-3 and NORAD Airborne Battle Staff (NABS) operations conforms to established directives.
M33	Percent	Of joint force staff augmentees previously trained as augmentees in same position.
M34	Hours	To establish a JSOTF command and control structure after arrival at a forward staging base (FSB).

### OP 5.5.2 Develop Joint Force Liaison Structure.

To establish a structure to maintain contact or intercommunication between elements of the joint force to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. **(JP 2-0, 3-0, 3-08v1, 3-09, 3-10.1, 3-50.21, 6-0)** (JP 1, 3-02, 3-03,

3-07.1, 3-07.5, 3-08v1, 3-10.1, 3-61, 4-01.2, 4-02.1, 5-00.2, 6-0, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	Until joint force liaison structure established (from alert order).
M2	Hours	Since LNOs attached to joint force HQ last received situation update from own unit.
M3	Incidents	Of friendly forces orders/taskings significantly delayed.
M4	Minutes	For joint force HQ LNOs to contact joint force HQ on behalf of unit to which sent.
M5	Minutes	For joint force staff sections to contact LNO attached to joint force HQ.
M6	Minutes	For parent unit to contact their LNO.
M7	Percent	Of adjacent units or agencies with liaison to joint force.
M8	Percent	Of joint force liaison personnel have required security clearances and identification credentials.
M9	Percent	Of unit or agency information missing or late.

#### OP 5.5.3 Integrate Joint Force Staff Augmentees.

To integrate augmentees into existing staff structure to form a Joint Staff to support a joint force commander. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-09, 3-56.1, 5-00.2)** (JP 2-01, 3-05.3, CJCSM 3122.01, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Days	Before joint task force HQ prepared to release DJTFAC.
M2	Percent	Of augmentee requests issued during execution for immediate augmentation to fill unforeseen needs.
M3	Percent	Of required augmentees identified in joint force SOP by rank and duty position.
M4	Percent	Of required staff positions filled.
M5	Hours	To provide specialized staff personnel.
M6	Percent	Of joint force staff augmentees previously trained as augmentees.

#### OP 5.5.4 Deploy Joint Force Headquarters Advance Element.

To deploy elements of the headquarters into the operational area in advance of the remainder of the joint force. This activity includes collecting and updating information relevant to the predeployment site survey. **(JP 3-08v1, 5-00.2)** (JP 3-07.1, 3-08v2, 4-02.1, 4-02.2, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	For joint force headquarters ADVON to establish in-country communications with host-nation and US DOS representatives (after arrival at deployed site).
M2	Hours	For joint force headquarters advance element to establish communication links up, down, across (after arrival in operational area).
M3	Hours	For joint force headquarters to issue joint force OPORD (from receipt of alert order).

M4	Hours	To deploy forward and establish in theater joint force headquarters element.
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#### **OP 5.5.5 Establish Command Transition Criteria and Procedures.**

To establish continuous, uninterrupted, and unambiguous guidance and direction for command transition. To ensure possession of adequate C4I capabilities, specific procedures, adequate communications, connectivity, manning, intelligence support, and C2 capability for command transitions. **(JP 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-08v1)** (JP 3-07, 3-08V1, 3-56.1, 5-00.2, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	Before beginning of transition and redeployment to publish redeployment plan.
M2	Hours	Before execution, command transition plans provided to units.
M3	Percent	Of transitioning units have no gaps in command.

#### **OP 5.5.6 Establish or Participate in Task Forces.**

To establish, or participate in, a functional or single service task force established to achieve a specific limited objective. This task force may be single service, joint, or multinational. **(JP 3-0, 3-08v1, 3-50.21, 5-00.2)** (JP 1-05, 3-05, 3-07.5, 3-08v2, 3-10.1, 3-50.21, 4-01.1, 4-06, 5-0, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Days	For joint force to be dissolved (following achievement of end state).
M2	Days	To recommend organizations to fund various aspects of joint force.
M3	Hours	For functional (multinational) task force to be prepared to conduct operations (from decision to stand up).
M4	Hours	For functional or joint task force to be prepared to conduct operations (from decision to stand up).
M5	Hours	To appoint joint force commander.
M6	Hours	To define JOA.
M7	Hours	To name commander (after decision taken to stand up subordinate functional or single Service task force).
M8	Hours	To provide directive or mission (after decision taken to stand up subordinate functional or single Service or task force).
M9	Hours	To provide directive with purpose, in terms of desired effect and scope of action required.
M10	Percent	Change in initial HQ manning allocation for functional or single Service task force, without change in mission.

#### **OP 5.5.7 Conduct Joint Force Staff Operations.**

To organize, direct, and coordinate the activities of the joint force staff to efficiently support the joint force commander and execute the theater military strategy. This task includes developing staff operating procedures, delimiting watchbill



responsibilities, and determining facility support requirements. **(JP 0-2, 3-56.1, 5-00.2)** (JP 3-07.1, 3-13.1, 3-58, CJCSM 3500.05)

TBD		
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#### **OP 5.5.8 Provide Joint Staff Facilities and Equipment.**

To provide the facilities and equipment to conduct joint force staff operations. This task includes providing the communications equipment, computer systems, working spaces, and life support facilities necessary for the joint force staff to perform command, control, asset visibility, and planning tasks during all operations. **(JP 3-10, 3-10.1, 4-0, 5-00.2)** (JP 3-10, CJCSM 3500.05)

TBD		
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#### **OP 5.5.9 Establish a Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL) for a Joint Force.**

To analyze applicable tasks derived through mission analysis of joint operation plans and external directives and select for training only those tasks that are essential to accomplish the organization's wartime mission. To establish supporting conditions and standards for each task in the JMETL for collective joint, individual, and leader training. This activity also pertains to missions associated with military operations other than war. **(JP 3-0, 3-05, 3-05.3, CJCSI 3500.01A, CJCSM 3500.03)** (JP 3-59, CJCSM 3500.05)

TBD		
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#### **OP 5.6 Coordinate Operational Information Operations (IO).**

To coordinate the use of operations security, military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare, and physical destruction, mutually supported by intelligence, in order to deny information, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary information, information-based processes, and information systems, and to protect one's own against such actions. **(JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-09, 3-13, 3-13.1, 3-58, 6-02)** (JP 2-01, 3-09, 3-51, 3-53, 3-54, 6-0, CJCSI 3110.09, CJCSI 3210.01, CJCSI 6510.01B, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Yes/No	Do operational IO coordination policies and procedures exist?
M2	Yes/No	Does an operational IO planning/coordination cell exist?
M3	Yes/No	Are organizational IO planners from all appropriate elements, activities, joint directorates, supporting agencies and organizations involved in development and coordination of operational IO plans and actions?

M4	Hours	To identify qualified personnel from various elements, activities, joint directorates, supporting agencies and organizations and augment operational IO cell after onset of planning requirements.
M5	Hours	To identify required operational IO information necessary for IO planning after onset of planning.
M6	Hours	To task intelligence community and other operational support organizations and agencies to fill information requirements for IO planning.
M7	Percent	Of identified operational IO information requirements unfilled at time-critical points in the planning process.
M8	Yes/No	Are appropriate allied and coalition IO resources and capabilities factored into operational IO plans and actions?
M9	Hours	To get JFC approval for proposed operational IO plans and actions.
M10	Instances	Of uncoordinated IO actions causing disruption or delay of operational plans and objectives.
M11	Hours	To modify operational IO plans and actions due to operational contingencies.
M12	Instances	Of operational IO plans or objectives being delayed, defeated, or disrupted due to adversary offensive IO actions.
M13	Percent	Of operational IO cell nominated "targets" struck with lethal or nonlethal means during the timeframe planned for in the IO appendix or other planning document.
M14	Hours	To conduct combat assessment of operational IO "targets" struck with lethal and nonlethal means.
M15	Percent	Of operational IO cell nominated "targets" restructured when called for after combat assessment of initial strike.
M16	Percent	Of operational IO objectives verifiably achieved.

### OP 5.6.1 Integrate Operational Information Operations.

To integrate the offensive and defensive actions involving information, information-based processes, information systems, and PSYOP activities. This includes IO actions to prevent effective operational command and control of adversary forces by influencing, degrading, or destroying their operational C2 system and protecting friendly C2 through a planned protection effort. This task includes the integration of such activities with the other elements of the campaign plan and major operations and their execution. **(JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-09, 3-13, 3-13.1, 3-54, 6-02)** (JP 2-01, 3-58, CJCSI 3210.01, CJCSI 6510.01, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Instances	Of uncoordinated operational IO element or activity actions causing disruption or delay of US or allied plans and objectives.
M2	Hours	To modify operational level IO plans and actions due to operational contingencies.
M3	Instances	Of US or allied plans or operational objectives being delayed, defeated, or disrupted due to adversary offensive IO actions.
M4	Percent	Of operational IO cell nominated "targets" struck with lethal or nonlethal means during the timeframe planned for in the IO appendix or other planning document.

M5	Hours	To conduct combat assessment of IO "targets" struck with lethal and nonlethal means.
M6	Percent	Of operational IO cell nominated "targets" restruck when called for after combat assessment of initial strike.
M7	Percent	Of operational IO objectives verifiably achieved.

### **OP 5.6.2 Plan and Integrate Operational C2W.**

Deleted as duplicate of OP 5.6.1 *Integrate Operational Information Operations.*

### **OP 5.6.3 Control Information Operations.**

To monitor and adjust the operational information operations efforts during execution. This task includes controlling information operations efforts.

**(JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-13, 3-13.1, 6-0, 6-02)** (JP 3-54, CJCSI 3110.09, CJCSI 3210.01, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Instances	Of uncoordinated operational IO element or activity actions causing disruption or delay of US or allied plans and objectives.
M2	Hours	To modify operational IO plans and actions due to operational contingencies.
M3	instances	Of operational plans or objectives being delayed, defeated, or disrupted due to adversary offensive IO actions.
M4	Percent	Of operational IO cell nominated "targets" struck with lethal or nonlethal means during the timeframe planned for in the IO appendix or other planning documents.
M5	Hours	To conduct combat assessment of operational IO "targets" struck with lethal and nonlethal means.
M6	Percent	Of operational IO cell nominated "targets" restruck when called for after combat assessment of initial strike.
M7	Percent	Of operational IO objectives verifiably achieved.

### **OP 5.7 Coordinate and Integrate Joint/Multinational and Interagency Support.**

To coordinate with elements of the joint force, allies/coalition partners, and other government agencies to ensure cooperation and mutual support, a consistent effort, and a mutual understanding of the joint force commander's priorities, support requirements, concept and intent, and objectives. **(JP 2-0, 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-08v1, 3-09, 3-50.21, 5-0)** (JP 1-05, 3-0, 3-07, 3-08v1, 4-01.2, 4-02.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Days	For joint force to successfully integrate coalition force doctrinal differences.
M2	Days	To obtain commitment of support from allies (after submitting request).
M3	Hours	To establish coordination process with AMEMBASSY and allied coalition partners (after establishment of joint force).

M4	Percent	Of agencies found in operations area at execution, known to joint force during planning.
M5	Percent	Of allied support requirements filled at time of execution.
M6	Percent	Of allies/coalition partners or other government agencies, participate in operation.

#### OP 5.7.1 Ascertain National or Agency Agenda.

To bring out the unstated agendas of each participant in a joint or multinational effort; to understand each nation or agency's individual goals within the framework of a joint or multinational effort; to adjust to the perceptions and needs of each participant in a joint or multinational effort. This task includes understanding how a member's individual goals can affect conflict termination and the desired end state. **(JP 3-0, 3-07, 3-08v1)** (JP 3-0, 3-05, 3-07, 3-08v1, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Instances	Of coalition nation or non-DOD agency goals, of which joint force commander was unaware.
M2	Incidents	Of refusal by coalition or agency partner to support operation.
M3	Percent	Of allied and coalition support requirements identified at (or after) execution.
M4	Percent	Of allies or coalition partners provide their proposed end state.
M5	Percent	Of US government agencies provide their proposed end state.

#### OP 5.7.2 Determine National/Agency Capabilities and Limitations.

To take action to determine multinational force or agency capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses in order to match missions with capabilities and exploit special or unique capabilities of member forces or agencies. **(JP 3-0, 3-08v1)** (JP 2-0, 3-03, 3-08v1, 3-10.1, 6-02, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Days	To obtain commitment of support from allies (after submitting request).
M2	Percent	Of allies/coalition partners or other government agencies actively contributing to conduct of operation.
M3	Percent	Of execution taskings to coalition partners or agencies accepted.
M4	Percent	Of allies or coalition partners or other US government agencies, share their concept of operations and plans with joint force.

#### OP 5.7.3 Develop Multinational Intelligence/Information Sharing Structure.

To optimize each member nation's intelligence and information capabilities, incorporate and exploit those capabilities, determine what information may be shared with multinational partners, and to provide member forces a common intelligence picture tailored to their requirements and consistent with disclosure policies of member nations. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-08v1, 3-10.1)** (JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-07.1, 3-07.4, 3-08v1, 3-08v2, CJCSM 3500.05)

**Note:** This task supports OP 2, *Provide Operational Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance*.

M1	Days	From receipt of request for support from allies to determination of releasability.
M2	Days	From receipt of request for support from non-DOD US agencies to determination of releasability.
M3	Days	To obtain commitment of support from allies (after submitting request).
M4	Days	To obtain commitment of support from non-DOD US agency (after submitting request).
M5	Percent	Of intelligence information shared among all multinational partners.
M6	Percent	Of intelligence information shared with one multinational partner shared with all partners.
M7	Percent	Of national forces and agencies operating with JTF have intelligence sharing arrangement.
M8	Percent	Of needed information, not passed to allies (because of classification).
M9	Percent	Of needed information passed to allies.

#### **OP 5.7.4 Coordinate Plans with Non-DOD Organizations.**

To facilitate exchange of operational information, ensure coordination of operations among coalition or agency forces, and provide a forum where routine issues can be resolved informally among staff officers. This task is facilitated by robust liaison (see OP 5.5.2). It specifically involves the exchange of plans prior to publication to obtain feedback from other members of the coalition or agencies for incorporation into the final plans. Procedures such as control of attacking aircraft, maneuver control, and fire support coordinating measures, and requests for supporting fires should be standardized as part of the plan to prevent fratricide. **(JP 3-0, 3-08v1, 3-57, 5-0)** (JP 3-0, 3-07.2, 3-08v1, CJCSM 3500.05)

**Note:** Coordination of intelligence sharing is covered by OP 5.7.3, *Develop Multinational Intelligence/Information Sharing Structure*. Inclusion contractor organizations in plan preparation and coordination is covered under OP 4.6.6, *Manage Contracts and Contract Personnel*.

M1	Days	Before execution, plans released to coalition members.
M2	Days	From determination of releasability to actual receipt of information by allies.
M3	Days	From receipt of request for support from allies to determination of releasability.
M4	Days	From receipt of request for support from non-DOD US agencies to determination of releasability.
M5	Days	To respond to request for support from allies.
M6	Percent	Of agencies in operations area at execution known to joint force during planning.

M7	Percent	Of coalition partners reviewed plans prior to publication.
M8	Percent	Of validated allied support requirements filed at execution.

### OP 5.7.5 Coordinate Host-Nation Support.

To coordinate host-nation support in the joint operations area (JOA) to ensure the most effective fit with military and contracted support capabilities. As part of this task the JFC supports the host nation with training and equipment as necessary. **(JP 0-2, 1-05, 3-0, 3-08v1, 3-10.1, 3-50.21, 4-0)** (JP 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-07.5, 3-08v1, 3-10.1, 4-01, 4-02.1, 4-02.2, 6-02, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	For HNS response to request for support under existing agreement.
M2	Percent	Of DOD time standard, taken by HNS to accomplish job.
M3	Percent	Of joint force support personnel administer HNS (e.g., trainers, supervisors, security).
M4	Percent	Of joint force support requirements met by HNS.
M5	Percent	Of requests for HNS rejected.
M6	Percent	Of available host-nation maintenance supply replenishment and distribution assets integrated into meeting operational requirement.
M7	Percent	Of replenishment requirements met by host-nation support.
M8	Personnel	Supplied by host nation to support facilities construction.
M9	Percent	Of lease/rental costs of real estate/real property assets paid by host nation.
M10	Percent	Of real estate acquired by HNS, lease or rent.
M11	Days	To coordinate for host nation support in providing facilities and real estate in support of operational campaign.

### OP 5.7.6 Coordinate Coalition Support.

To coordinate coalition support activities to provide the combined force commander the means to acquire coalition force status and capabilities. Accomplished through C4 systems or liaison teams between elements of a coalition, these activities are often focused on efficient command and control and prevention of fratricide. **(JP 3-0, 3-08v1, 3-10.1, 3-50.21, 4-0, 6-0)** (JP 2-0, 3-08v1, 3-09, 3-10.1, 6-0, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	Since coalition nation last reported force status.
M2	Percent	Of coalition nations accurately reporting force locations.
M3	Percent	Of coalition nations allowing audit of force status or capability reporting.
M4	Percent	Of coalition nations fully reporting force capability.
M5	Percent	Of coalition nations fully reporting force status.
M6	Percent	Of coalition forces have required interoperable C4I systems in place.

M7	Percent	Of coalition nations represented on combined force staff.
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### OP 5.7.7 Conduct Civil Administration Operations.

To conduct, when approved by the NCA, certain functions of civil government. In friendly territory, with the agreement of the government of the area concerned, the task is to exercise certain authority normally the function of local government. In occupied hostile territory, to exercise executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established. **(JP 3-07.1, 3-57)** (JP 3-0, 3-05.3, 3-08v1, 3-57, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Days	To establishment of military government (after occupation of area).
M2	Hours	To develop request for NCA guidance.
M3	Hours	Before required, NCA guidance or direction requested.
M4	Months	To prepare plan for local self-government.
M5	Months	To prepare populace for local self-government.
M6	Percent	Nutrition improvement in civil populace in hostile territory. after establishment of military government.
M7	Percent	Of children attending school.
M8	Percent	Of day under curfew.
M9	Percent	Of indigenous forces trained to conduct civil administration within contested areas.
M10	Percent	Of joint force dedicated to civil administration activities.
M11	Percent	Of population under curfew.

### OP 5.7.8 Coordinate Consequence Management in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).

To coordinate support for interagency essential services and activities required to manage and mitigate damage resulting from the employment of WMD or release of NBC or high explosive weapons and/or contaminants. Services and activities can include population evacuation, decontamination, transportation, communications, public works and engineering, fire fighting, information and planning, mass care, resource support, health and medical services, urban search and rescue, hazardous materials, food, and energy. **(JP 3-11)** (JP 3-0, 3-07.2, 3-08v1, 4-06, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	To establish JTF-CM (after WMD incident).
M2	Hours	To establish coordination process with American Embassy and HN (after establishment of joint force).
M3	Hours	To establish liaison with the appropriate HN civilian government officials and agencies (after establishment of joint force).
M4	Hours	To establish liaison with Country Team and other USG agencies, PVO/NGO/IO and coalition forces (after standing up joint force).

M5	Hours	To provide joint force commander with CM technical expertise relating to WMD/NBC matters (after USJFCOM Joint CM Cadre receives warning order for deployment).
M6	Yes/No	Are appropriate US CM resources and capabilities factored into operational CM plans and actions?
M7	Yes/No	Are appropriate HN CM resources and capabilities factored into operational CM plans and actions?
M8	Yes/No	Are appropriate coalition CM resources and capabilities factored into operational CM plans and actions?
M9	Percent	Of critical US facilities destroyed, damaged, or rendered inoperable by WMD employment, release, and/or contamination.
M10	Percent	Of critical HN facilities destroyed, damaged, or rendered inoperable by WMD employment, release, and/or contamination.
M11	Casualties	To US military personnel attributed to the WMD incident.
M12	Casualties	To US noncombatants attributed to the WMD incident.
M13	Casualties	To HN personnel attributed to the WMD incident.
M14	Hours	For joint force to be prepared to conduct CM operations (after decision to stand up joint force).
M15	Hours	To coordinate for additional US assets for theater.
M16	Hours	To coordinate for additional coalition assets for theater.
M17	Hours	For joint force to be prepared to conduct CM operations (after decision to stand up joint force).
M18	Days	Time to mobilize US Reverse Component personnel/units to support CM mission.
M19	Days	To restore public utilities/services to pre-event levels, following WMD incident.

#### **OP 5.8 Provide Public Affairs in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To advise and assist the commander in the JOA and coalition partners in telling the command's story to both internal and external audiences, by originating and assisting civilian news media in originating both print and broadcast news material and assisting with community relations projects. This task includes establishment of a Joint Information Bureau (JIB) and support of the DOD National Media Pool until open media coverage is possible. **(JP 3-0, 3-07, 3-08v1, 3-10.1, 3-50.21, 3-57, 3-61, 4-06)** (JP 0-2, 1, 3-07.1, 3-07.5., 3-08v1, 3-11, 3-50.21, 3-54, 3-56.1, 3-61, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Days	In advance to provide PAG for scheduled events.
M2	Hours	After event to release news.
M3	Hours	To establish Joint Information Bureau (after execute order).
M4	Hours	To obtain agreement on PAG from other coalition forces with whom joint force working.
M5	Hours	To obtain approval of PAG from Unified Command and non-DOD agencies with whom joint force directly working.
M6	Hours	To provide an initial theater position on breaking news story.
M7	Hours	To provide PAG (after crisis event).



M8	Hours	To transmit print journalist stories during crisis or combat (from receipt).
M9	Instances	Of information classified or withheld from press to avoid embarrassment.
M10	Minutes	To prepare for and conduct first news conference on crisis or major event.
M11	Percent	Of local customs, laws, and policies concerning presence of media researched and included in planning.
M12	Percent	Of media requests for access to key senior officials accepted.
M13	Percent	Of media support requests answered.
M14	Percent	Of plan phases have incorporated public affairs strategy.
M15	Percent	Of press operational access rules and security procedures incorporated in OPLAN.
M16	Percent	Of releases error free.
M17	Percent	Of requests for information from organizations and private citizens answered.
M18	Percent	Of PA guidance coordinated with operations, plans and policy, and other interagencies as needed.
M19	Percent	Of unclassified units, media personnel allowed access.
M20	Number	Of press releases per week.
M21	Instances	Of internal news releases per week for the first two weeks of the operation sent to AMC and Air Force News Service.
M22	Days	To establish newsletter or newspaper for deployed troops.
M23	Days	To set up Hometown News Release program to publicize troops' accomplishments.

#### **OP 5.8.1 Manage Media Relations in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To provide support to the commander in ensuring the timely and correct telling of the command's story. This task includes actions taken to provide the command story to civilian news media as well as military information sources. This task can be performed in a stand-alone US environment, with coalition partners or a host nation or in conjunction with a Country Team. This task also includes establishment and operation of a JIB and support for the DOD National Media Pool as directed by the joint force commander. **(JP 3-07, 3-07.1, 3-08v1, 3-61)** (JP 0-2, 3-0, 3-07.5, 3-08v1, 3-54, 3-57, 3-61, 4-06, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Days	Since last national media pool classified briefing.
M2	Days	To close required media equipment (e.g. CNN ground station) to JOA.
M3	Days	To get DOD media pool into JOA.
M4	Hours	For staff to research and respond to media questions.
M5	Hours	In advance of deployment, media guidance developed and distributed.
M6	Hours	Prior to deployment, media policy established and disseminated.
M7	Hours	To develop public opinion baseline.
M8	Hours	To develop PA mission analysis.

M9	Hours	To issue interim media guidance.
M10	Hours	To stand up JIB.
M11	Minutes	To provide an initial briefing to media on "Bad News" story.
M12	Percent	Favorability rating of US operations in local mass media since crisis/operations began.
M13	Percent	Of accredited media have appropriate field gear, quarters and rations.
M14	Percent	Of indigenous and locally available international mass media favorable or neutral to joint force operations.
M15	Percent	Of international mass media favorable or neutral to joint force operations.
M16	Percent	Of JOA personnel submitted hometown news release.
M17	Percent	Of joint force and component senior officials offered predeployment media relations refresher course.
M18	Percent	Of media in JOA accredited.
M19	Percent	Of media in JOA attend JIB course on military terms and doctrine.
M20	Percent	Of media in JOA sign agreement to follow ground rules.
M21	Percent	Of media personnel, JIB has location data.
M22	Percent	Of PA objectives focus on behavior desired from target audience(s).
M23	Percent	Of Q&A submitted arrive OSD (PA) by deadline.

#### **OP 5.8.2 Coordinate Command/Internal Information Programs in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

Coordinate with subordinate and component commands to ensure that internal information requirements are being addressed. This includes supporting employment of Armed Forces Radio and Television Services (AFRTS) in theater and assisting in the coordinated distribution of *Stars & Stripes* or similar print media products. In addition, coordination for the production of command information products and the procurement and distribution of Service publications may be accomplished. **(JP 3-07.3, 3-10.1, 3-13.1, 3-61, CJCSM 3122.03)** (JP 3-05.3, 3-61, 5-03.1, CJCSM 3141.01, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Days	To deploy AFRTS capability to JOA.
M2	Days	To deploy and distribute AFRTS palletized receivers into JOA.
M3	Days	To deploy and distribute print media products into the JOA.

#### **OP 5.8.3 Conduct Community Relations Programs in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

Within the joint operations area (JOA) conduct community relations programs in coordination with civil affairs that support direct communication with local, national, and international publics, as applicable. This effort requires close coordination with the Service components and host nations. The program may also include the use of military equipment and units such as military aircraft/vehicles for static display, vessels for ship visits, military bands, and

marching units. Plans may include speaking engagements by selected senior commanders and individuals within the commands as well as unit participation in civic activities. **(JP 3-07.3, 3-10.1, 3-13.1, 3-61, CJCSM 3122.03)** (JP 3-61, 5-03.1, CJCSM 3141.01, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Of requests for information from organizations and private citizens answered.
M2	Percent	Of requests for official representation at local events honored.
M3	Yes/No	Community relations program implemented.

## **OP 6 PROVIDE OPERATIONAL FORCE PROTECTION.**

To conserve the force's fighting potential so that it can be applied at the decisive time and place. This activity includes actions taken to counter the enemy's forces by making friendly forces (including operational formations, personnel, etc.), systems, and operational facilities difficult to locate, strike, and destroy. This task includes protecting joint and multinational air, space, land, sea, and special operations forces; bases; A/SPODs and essential personnel; and LOCs from enemy operational maneuver and concentrated enemy air, space, ground, and sea attack; chemical and biological warfare; and terrorist attack. This task also pertains to protection of operational level forces, systems, and civil infrastructure of friendly nations and groups in military operations other than war. **(JP 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-07.2, 3-08v1, 3-09, 3-10.1, 3-11, 4-0, 4-01.2)** (JP 1, 2-01, 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-01.5, 3-07.2, 3-09, 3-10.1, 3-50.21, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

**Note:** Some tasks associated with the protection of the force are included under other related operational level activities. Survivability and protection activities regarding individuals health and welfare are covered in OP 4.4.1, *Coordinate Field Services Requirements* and OP 4.4.3, *Provide for Health Services in the Joint Operations Area (JOA)*. Dispersion and mobility actions are covered in OP 1.3 *Provide Operational Mobility* and OP 1.4, *Provide Operational Countermobility*. Offensive counterair activities are included under OP 3.2.3 *Attack Aircraft and Missiles (Offensive Counterair (OCA))*. Operational protection includes defensive IO measures that division of IO comprising actions taken to maintain the integrity of friendly information, despite adversary offensive IO actions. Also, see OP 5.6, *Coordinate Operational Information Operations (IO)*.

M1	Percent	Of friendly communications hardened or redundant.
M2	Percent	Reduction in friendly LOC capacity.

### **OP 6.1 Provide Operational Air, Space, and Missile Defense.**

To protect operational forces from missile and air attack (including attack from or through space) by direct defense and by destroying the enemy's missile and air attack capacity. This task includes use of aircraft (including helicopters), interceptor

missiles, air defense artillery, and weapons not used primarily in an air defense role. **(JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-01.5, 3-09, 3-10.1)** (JP 3-10.1, 3-12, 3-12.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

**Note:** This task pertains to defensive counterair, antiair, and theater missile defense (TMD) activities. Offensive counterair and antiair activities are included under operational firepower and include TMD attack operations. At the operational level of war, air defense concerns protecting critical points, facilities (for example, ports, key bridges, operational C2 facilities) in the COMMZ (joint force commander's operational area), support forces in the COMMZ, forces transiting the COMMZ, or critical facilities in the combat zone with operational significance. This activity also includes the protection of operational forces moving to a major operation or campaign to the point of concentration for deployment to battle (tactical) formation and during operational maneuver. Operational air and missile defense is nearly always joint and may be a multinational activity. Missile defense operations include all forces and activities that support active defense, passive defense, and attack operations. See OP 3.2.3 *Attack Aircraft and Missiles (Offensive Counterair (OCA))* and OP 3.2.4 *Suppress Enemy Air Defenses*.

M1	Errors	In performance of air surveillance, identification and track monitor procedures.
M2	Hours	Since last enemy attack.
M3	Minutes	To scramble fighters and/or alert appropriate attack systems.
M4	Minutes	To tell air tracks to appropriate echelons.
M5	Percent	Disruption of friendly centers of gravity.
M6	Percent	Of attacking aircraft penetrate air defense network.
M7	Percent	Of attacking enemy aircraft destroyed.
M8	Percent	Of fighters directed against declared hostile aircraft.
M9	Percent	Of hostile aircraft and missiles engaged and destroyed.
M10	Percent	Of incoming SSMs penetrate defenses.
M11	Percent	Of joint operations delayed, disrupted, canceled or modified.
M12	Percent	Of threat warning estimates concerning attack timing and numbers considered accurate.
M13	Percent	Of tracks told to appropriate echelons.
M14	Percent	Of units arrive at point of employment later than planned.
M15	Percent	Reduction in LOC capacity.
M16	Percent	Of enemy NBC delivery systems identified, targeted, and engaged/destroyed by friendly forces.
M17	Percent	Of enemy TM ground forces engaged/destroyed by friendly forces.
M18	Percent	Of losses caused by hostile air activities.
M19	Hours	To dispatch deployed weapons teams (DWTs).
M20	Percent	Of battle staff and operations control center personnel completing annual re-certification training.
M21	Percent	Of E-3 and NORAD Airborne Battle Staff (NABS) operations directed in optimum fashion.
M22	Percent	Of time required expansion into other sectors accomplished.

M23	Percent	Of battle staff and operations control center decisions accurately discussed in checklists, guides, operating instructions and plans.
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### OP 6.1.1 Process/Allocate Operational Aerospace Targets.

To select offensive air and space threats to the operational environment and match these as targets for friendly systems. This action is taken to ensure freedom of action for campaigns and major operations and protection of key assets. To allocate specific targets to operational air defense forces for interception or engagement. **(JP 3-01.1, 3-09)** (JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-01.5, 3-03, 3-09, 3-56.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

**Note:** Detection of incoming targets is covered under OP 2.2, *Collect and Share Operational Information*

M1	Minutes	Of early warning provided joint force of imminent aerospace attack.
M2	Percent	Of enemy offensive air threats to which friendly forces assigned.
M3	Percent	Of enemy air attacks for which early warning provided.
M4	Percent	Of joint force aerospace defense system successfully negates incoming enemy aerospace targets.
M5	Percent	Of joint force has early warning of incoming missiles or aircraft to allow initiation of passive air defense.
M6	Percent	Of time joint force early warning system and nodes operational.

### OP 6.1.2 Integrate Joint/Multinational Operational Aerospace Defense.

To implement an integrated air defense system from all available joint and multinational operational defense forces (aircraft, missiles, ADA). **(JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-01.5, 3-09, 3-10.1)** (JP 3-09, 3-12, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	To designate AADC and ACA (upon recognition of a significant air threat and prior to employment of forces).
M2	Minutes	For AADC to pass targeting allocation decisions to designated systems and units.
M3	Minutes	To provide early warning indication of enemy air attack.
M4	Minutes	To task friendly attack systems to new aerospace target.
M5	Percent	Of TM attack operations missions flown/fired that achieved desired target damage.
M6	Percent	Of executed attack operations missions requested by components.
M7	Percent	Of air defense kills attributed to air component.
M8	Percent	Of air defense kills attributed to land component
M9	Percent	Of air defense kills attributed to sea component.
M10	Percent	Of allocated aerospace defense assets assigned to enemy targets.

M11	Percent	Of target information received by air defense systems and units in the joint operations area.
M12	Percent	Of time AADC and ACA designated upon recognition of a significant air threat and prior to employment of forces.
M13	Percent	Of allocated aerospace defense assets capable of being assigned to enemy targets.
M14	Percent	Of allocated aerospace targets to which friendly assets have been assigned.

### OP 6.1.3 Provide Airspace Control.

To provide for safe transit of air mobility aircraft and the prevention of mutual interference between the air mobility aircraft and other aircraft operating in the joint operations area. This task includes providing for the coordination, integration, and regulation of airspace of defined dimensions. **(JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-02, 3-03, 3-09, 3-10.1, 3-52, 4-01.1)** (JP 3-52, 3-55.1, 4-01.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Attacks/Day	By enemy air forces.
M2	Incidents	Of air-to-air mishaps in the joint operations area (JOA).
M3	Kills/Day	By friendly weapons systems.
M4	Percent	Of fixed wing sorties receive clearances needed to complete mission.
M5	Percent	Of friendly air sorties interfered with by friendly ground fires.
M6	Percent	Of operational area for which a complete air picture available.
M7	Percent	Of rotary wing sorties receive clearances needed to complete mission.
M8	Percent	Of tracks cross told.
M9	Percent	Of friendly sorties receive clearances needed to complete mission.

#### OP 6.1.3.1 Employ Positive Control Measures.

To establish direct controls that minimize mutual interference between operational air defense and other operations. **(JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-01.4, 3-09, 3-52, 3-56.1)** (JP 3-01.1, 3-04.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	Since last publication of air control orders.
M2	Hours	To establish airspace control authority (upon entry in theater).
M3	Percent	Of air defense operations did not interfere with other operations.

#### OP 6.1.3.2 Employ Procedural Control Measures.

To establish procedures which will allow aircraft (to include helicopters) to be readily identified based on their routing, altitude, blind radio calls, or other actions, in the event positive control measures fail. **(JP 3-01.1, 3-01.4, 3-09, 3-52, 3-56.1)** (JP 3-01.1, 3-04.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

**Note:** Task OP 6.2.5, *Provide Positive Identification of Friendly Forces within the Joint Operations Area (JOA)*, applies to this task.

M1	Percent	Of friendly aircraft not positively identified as friendly.
M2	Percent	Of friendly aircraft respond to friendly IFF interrogation.
M3	Percent	Of time AWACS monitors airspace to positively identify friendly aircraft.
M4	Percent	Of air defense operations did not interfere with other operations.

#### **OP 6.1.4 Counter Enemy Air Attack (Defensive Counterair (DCA)) in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To conduct operations to defeat the enemy's offensive plan and inflict unacceptable losses on attacking enemy forces. DCA consists of active and passive operations to defend friendly airspace and protect friendly forces, material, and infrastructure from enemy air and missile attack. It includes detection, identification, and destruction of attacking enemy air and missiles. It is normally conducted near or over friendly territory and generally is a reaction to the initiative of the enemy air forces. **(JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-01.4, 3-01.5, 3-10, 3-10.1, 3-56.1)** (JP 3-01.1, 3-12.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

**Note:** The provision of standing rules of engagement for establishing standard control procedures applicable to combat engagements with other forces is covered in OP 5.3, *Prepare Plans and Orders*, OP 5.3.9, *Prepare Campaign or Major Operations and Related Plans and Orders*, and OP 5.4.3, *Provide Rules of Engagement*.

M1	Minutes	To notify friendly counterair forces (to gain intercept position).
M2	Percent	Of COMMZ in which friendly freedom of movement allowed.
M3	Percent	Of enemy air attacks detected early enough to allow engagement.
M4	Percent	Of enemy air defense targets successfully engaged.
M5	Percent	Of enemy aircraft penetrate air defenses.
M6	Percent	Of first-shot kills by friendly fighters in air-to-air combat.

#### **OP 6.1.5 Conduct Joint Operations Area (JOA) Missile Defense.**

To identify and integrate joint and coalition forces supported by national and theater capabilities to detect and destroy enemy theater missiles directed toward the JOA in flight or prior to launch. This task includes disrupting the enemy's theater missile operations through an appropriate mix of mutually supportive passive missile defense, active missile defense, attack operations, and supporting C4I measures. This task includes providing early warning of theater missile attack to the JOA as well as distribution of this warning to joint and multinational forces within the operational area. The term "theater missile" applies to ballistic missiles, air-to-surface missiles, and air-, land-, and sea-launched cruise missiles whose targets are

within the joint force commander's operational area. **(JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-01.5, 3-10.1, 3-12, 3-56.1)** (JP 3-01.1, 3-01.5, 3-10.1, 3-12.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Casualties	To civilians attributed to missile attack.
M2	Casualties	To military personnel attributed to missile attack.
M3	Minutes	Warning provided to friendly assets prior to threat arrival.
M4	Percent	Of attacking missiles successfully penetrated friendly defenses.
M5	Percent	Of launched air-to-surface missiles destroyed before impact.
M6	Percent	Of launched ballistic missiles destroyed before impact.
M7	Percent	Of launched cruise missiles destroyed before impact.
M8	Percent	Of theater assets defensible against theater missile threat.
M9	Percent	Of TMD capability damaged by incoming missile attacks.
M10	Percent	Of defended asset list (DAL) locations defensible against theater missile threat.
M11	Percent	Of DAL locations, successfully defended.
M12	Instances	Of failure to apply passive missile defense procedures.

#### **OP 6.1.6 Conduct Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To integrate JOA-based warning systems that provides data and information necessary for tactical warning and attack assessment (TW/AA) of an atmospheric, space, or ballistic attack on the operating area or assigned region. This task also includes the integration of TW/AA data into the JOA aerospace and missile defense system. Further, it includes participation in an event conference by JOA commands. **(JP 3-01, 3-01.1, 3-01.5, 3-03, 3-12, 6-0)** (JP 3-01.1, 3-01.5, 3-09, 5-0, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Minutes	To forward and disseminate tactical warning and attack assessment (TW&AA) reports.
M2	Minutes	To forward threat warning estimates after attack determination.
M3	Percent	Deviation from actual of threat warning estimates concerning attack timing and numbers.
M4	Percent	Of estimated probability of arrival time (EPAT) calculations provided on air tracks are correct.
M5	Minutes	To plot or brief EPATs after information received.
M6	Minutes	Of early warning provided joint force of imminent aerospace attack.
M7	Percent	Of enemy air attacks for which early warning provided.
M8	Percent	Of joint force has early warning of incoming missiles or aircraft to allow initiation of passive air defense.
M9	Percent	Of time joint force early warning systems and nodes operational.



## **OP 6.2 Provide Protection for Operational Forces, Means, and Noncombatants.**

To safeguard friendly centers of gravity and operational force potential by reducing or avoiding the effects of enemy operational level (tactical risks) actions. In military operations other than war, this activity includes protection of governmental and civil infrastructure and populace of the country being supported; this includes antiterrorism. This task includes supporting Department of State evacuation of noncombatants from areas of responsibility. **(JP 3-0, 3-01.5, 3-07, 3-08v1, 3-09, 3-10.1, 4-01.2, 4-04, CJCSM 3122.03)** (JP 2-01, 3-01.1, 3-07.5, 3-08v1, 3-10.1, 3-11, 4-01.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Casualties	To military personnel.
M2	Casualties	To US noncombatants.
M3	Incidents	Of damage to APOD and APOE facilities by enemy action (that impact scheme of maneuver).
M4	Incidents	Of friendly aircraft damaged or destroyed on the ground.
M5	Incidents	Of friendly ships damaged or sunk in port (not in action).
M6	Minutes	To construct simplified fallout prediction and calculate zone I/II distance.
M7	Minutes	To construct simplified fallout prediction and plot ground zero.
M8	Minutes	To determine nuclear detonation (NUDET) yield in kilotons.
M9	Minutes	To orient simplified fallout prediction.
M10	Minutes	To provide NBC I nuclear report/series of reports or NORAD Form 46.
M11	Minutes	To relay to units warning of expected NUDET contamination.
M12	Percent	Actual nuclear damage exceeds assessment.
M13	Percent	Actual radiation dose exceeds calculated current/expected total dose.
M14	Percent	Actual radiation levels exceed limited radiological survey.
M15	Percent	Nuclear vulnerability exceeds analysis.
M16	Percent	NUDET decay rates exceed estimates.
M17	Percent	Of attacking missiles successfully penetrated friendly theater defenses, culminating in warhead delivery or function on target.
M18	Percent	Of friendly casualties, caused by friendly weapon systems.

### **OP 6.2.1 Prepare Operationally Significant Defenses.**

To provide construction hardening for operational forces and key facilities to include C2, logistic rear area, assembly areas, and fighting positions. **(JP 3-01.1, 3-01.5, 3-11, 4-04)** (JP 3-10, 3-10.1, CJCSM 3122.03)

M1	Percent	Of critical fixed facilities hardened.
M2	Percent	Of fixed facilities in JOA with prepared defensive fighting positions with cleared fields of fire.
M3	Percent	Of JOA fixed base external communications hardened.

M4	Percent	Of JOA fixed base external communications have redundant backup.
M5	Percent	Of JOA fixed base internal communications hardened.
M6	Percent	Of JOA fixed bases with an integrated sensor and obstacle physical perimeter defense.
M7	Percent	Of JOA fixed bases with hardened storage of ammunition, food, water and medical supplies.
M8	Percent	Of planned facility hardening completed (at execution).
M9	Weeks	Since last review of fixed base physical security in JOA.
M10	Days	To prepare fortified positions, battlements, shelters.
M11	Percent	Of rear area facilities secure from attack.
M12	Percent	Of rear area facilities with assigned security forces (versus using internal operational assets).

### OP 6.2.2 Remove Operationally Significant Hazards.

To eliminate or reduce hazards that adversely affects execution of the operational level joint force commander's plan. **(JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-11)** (JP 3-0, 3-02, 3-13.1, 4-01.2, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Casualties	Caused by operationally significant hazards (per week).
M2	Hours	Delay in executing scheme of maneuver.
M3	Percent	Of casualties attributed to operationally significant hazards.
M4	Percent	Of identified strategically significant hazards successfully removed or neutralized.
M5	Percent	Of joint force exposed to or affected by operationally significant hazard.
M6	Percent	Of operationally significant hazards identified by joint force staff.

### OP 6.2.3 Protect Use of Electromagnetic Spectrum in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).

To ensure friendly force use of the electromagnetic spectrum despite the enemy's use of electronic warfare. This is a division of electronic warfare called electronic protection and includes deconflicting friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum. **(JP 3-0, 3-09, 3-13.1, 3-51, 6-0, 6-02)** (JP 6-02, CJCSI 3220.01, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Incidents	Of electronic fratricide.
M2	Instances	Of meaconing, intrusion, and jamming events detected and reported by components.
M3	Minutes	Queuing time for message traffic.
M4	Percent	Of communications systems and assets supporting joint force in JOA destroyed by enemy action.

**OP 6.2.4 Protect Use of the Acoustic Spectrum in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To ensure friendly effective use of the acoustic spectrum by establishing procedures that prevent mutual interference between friendly units and counter the enemy's use of acoustic warfare. **(N/A)** (JP 3-09, 3-50.3, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Of time action must be taken to curtail friendly activities to ensure optimal use of acoustic spectrum.
M2	db	Loss due to transit of friendly ships.
M3	Hours	To recover an optimal acoustic spectrum after passage of friendly ships.
M4	Hours	Search time lost due to enemy actions to degrade the acoustic spectrum.
M5	Percent	Of time units observe acoustic emission plan.

**OP 6.2.5 Provide Positive Identification of Friendly Forces Within the Joint Operations Area (JOA).** Task moved to: *OP 5.1.11***OP 6.2.6 Conduct Evacuation of Noncombatants from the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To use JOA military and host-nation resources for the evacuation of US military dependents, US Government civilian employees, and private citizens (US and third-country nationals). Organizations at various echelons provide support (medical, transportation, religious, and security) to the noncombatants; the support provided is analyzed under the appropriate activity. This task includes protection of noncombatant evacuees prior to departure from the joint operations area. **(JP 3-0, 3-07, 3-07.5, 3-08v2, 3-10, 3-11, 4-01)** (JP 3-07.1, 3-57, 4-01, 4-01.1, 4-02.2, 5-00.2, 5-03.1, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Days	To return NEO JTF to normal duties and readiness following evacuation of evacuees.
M2	Days	To transfer evacuees from US Navy ship to land based safe haven.
M3	Hours	After JTF formed or notified of NEO before FCE in place.
M4	Hours	Before all evacuees afforded medical attention (after evacuation).
M5	Hours	Before designated CJTF in direct contact with concerned ambassador.
M6	Hours	Between evacuation departure and arrival at temporary safe haven.
M7	Hours	For force to initially respond to NEO tasking (ready to depart home station).
M8	Percent	Of AMCITs and designated foreign nationals accounted for by name during evacuation.
M9	Percent	Of baggage approved for movement with evacuees delivered to temporary safe haven.
M10	Percent	Of evacuees reporting or located and agreeing to evacuation successfully evacuated.

M11	Percent	Of known AMCITs not reporting for evacuation located by search squad operations.
M12	Plans	Developed as NEO alternatives.
M13	Hours	Difference between actual execution time and EXORD scheduled start time.
M14	Percent	Of volunteering American citizens and designated third-country nationals, evacuated safely.
M15	Percent	Of evacuees (requiring medical or other care), receive adequate care.
M16	Casualties	Suffered by seizing force (opposed).
M17	Casualties	Suffered by seizing force (unopposed).
M18	Percent	Of objectives seized within planned times.
M19	Percent	Degradation of mission effectiveness (lack of equipment interoperability).
M20	Percent	Of needed information not passed to multinational nations due to classification restraints.

#### OP 6.2.7 Establish Disaster Control Measures.

Task moved to: OP 4.7.8 *Establish Disaster Control Measures*.

#### OP 6.2.8 Establish NBC Protection in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).

To ensure protection against NBC threats in the JOA through detecting, warning, and reporting (e.g., individual and collective protection, decontamination, preventive medicine, casualty treatment, consequence management, etc.). (**JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-10.1, 3-11**) (JP 3-0, 3-07.3, 3-11, 4-02.1, 4-06, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	To establish an NBC Warning and Reporting System for the JOA.
M2	Hours	To position operational detectors for optimum protection of the forces.
M3	Percent	Of operational forces and means trained and equipped to operate in an NBC environment.
M4	Percent	Of enemy attacks detected.
M5	Instances	Of operational forces and facilities effected by an off-target attack without warning.
M6	Instances	Of operational forces and facilities with NBC casualties.
M7	Hours	To provide commander with technical expertise relating to NBC matters.
M8	Hours	To coordinate for additional assets for theater.
M9	Instances	Of false alarms.
M10	Instances	Of medical facilities not able to treat contaminated casualties.
M11	Instances	Of decontamination capability being insufficient for the situation.
M12	Days	To decontaminate a base area attacked with chemical weapons.
M13	Days	To inoculate personnel under a biological threat.
M14	Percent	Of base areas with dedicated NBC monitoring teams.
M15	Percent	Of enemy attacks detected.

**OP 6.2.9 Coordinate and Conduct Personnel Recovery.**

Provide for the support of isolated US military personnel and US civilians and other designated personnel within the theater of operations/JOA. This task includes reporting, locating, supporting the person and their family, recovery and return of the isolated person to their family or duty. The task further includes conducting civil and combat search and rescue missions and providing support to evasion and escape. To coordinate the use of aircraft, surface craft, submarines, specialized rescue teams and equipment, to include unconventional assisted recovery (UAR), for returning isolated personnel to US control. **(JP 3-05, 3-50, 3-50.2, 3-50.21, 3-50.3, 4-06)** (JP 0-2, 3-04.1, 3-05, 3-05.3, 3-07.5, 3-50.2, 3-50.3, 3-05.5, 3-55.1, 4-06, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

**Note:** This task includes coordinating the location, tracking, and reporting isolated or captured personnel, which is covered by OP 2.2, *Collect and Share Operational Information*.

M1	Hours	To reach area of isolated personnel after go decision.
M2	Hours	To rescue aircrew after ejection or bailout.
M3	Minutes	From notification person missing until rescue units prepared to authenticate identity of isolated personnel.
M4	Percent	Of aircrews missing behind enemy lines recovered.
M5	Percent	Of aircrews shot down rescued.
M6	Percent	Of escapees recovered.
M7	Percent	Of ground personnel declared missing later recovered.
M8	Percent	Of isolated personnel enter UAR system.
M9	Percent	Of personnel missing behind enemy lines recovered.
M10	Percent	Of personnel sending SAR/CSAR distress signal rescued.

**OP 6.2.9.1 Provide Civil Search and Rescue.**

To initiate and coordinate efforts to recover isolated US personnel, both military and civilian. This task also includes, on a not-to-interfere with military missions basis, support to the efforts of non-US civil SAR efforts. **(JP 3-50, 3-50.1, 3-50.2, 3-50.21, 3-50.3)** (JP 3-04.1, 3-07.5, 3-50, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	From initial action until individual returned to friendly control.
M2	Minutes	To respond to request for civil SAR assistance by host nation.
M3	Minutes	For initial action (from awareness of emergency situation which might require search and rescue).
M4	Minutes	From initial action in potential search and rescue until planning allows sending SRVs to scene.
M5	Percent	Of joint force commander initiated civil SAR for joint force personnel or dependents protested by host nation.

**OP 6.2.9.2 Provide Combat Search and Rescue.**

To provide for combat search and rescue (CSAR), primarily in support of flight operations, with capability to support other personnel recovery requirements. It also includes providing planning and guidance to subordinate organizations, including areas such as host-nation policies, laws, regulations, and capabilities. **(JP 3-05, 3-50.2, 3-50.21, 3-50.3, 3-56.1, 4-02)** (JP 3-04.1, 3-07.5, 3-55.1, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	To return to friendly control isolated aircrews and passengers downed beyond FLOT.
M2	Hours	To return to friendly control isolated ground force personnel (less those in aircraft beyond FLOT).
M3	Hours	To return to friendly control isolated individual.
M4	Minutes	For component RCC to respond to report of downed or isolated individual (commence search and rescue effort).
M5	Minutes	For unit to respond to report of isolated unit member (commence search and rescue effort).
M6	Percent	Of isolated personnel returned to friendly control and their previous duties.
M7	Percent	Of isolated personnel returned to friendly control.
M8	Percent	Of joint force ACC resources tasked to support CSAR.
M9	Percent	Of aircrews transmitting location rescued within 24 hours (of being shot down).
M10	Months	Prior to hostilities an assisted recovery system is established.

**OP 6.2.9.3 Support Evasion and Escape in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To support isolated US personnel in evasion and recovery and captivity support and recovery. This task also includes those activities involved in supporting those isolated individuals who, due to unique circumstances, are effecting their own recovery. **(JP 3-50.2, 3-50.21, 3-50.3)** (JP 2-0, 3-04.1, 3-05, 3-05.3, 3-07.5, 3-50.21, 3-51, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	NM	Distance between two most distant evadee caches.
M2	Percent	Of caches compromised within six months of emplacement.
M3	Percent	Of identified evadees beyond range of pickup systems provided resupply by cache or air-delivered package.
M4	Percent	Of identified evadees captured at cache locations.
M5	Percent	Of personnel entered into assisted evasion subsequently returned to friendly control.
M6	Weeks	After outbreak of hostilities cache system established.

**OP 6.2.10 Develop and Execute Actions to Control Pollution and Hazardous Materials.**

To develop and implement actions to prevent pollution generation and hazardous substance spills to avoid exposing friendly personnel to human health hazards, disrupting operations, adversely affecting indigenous or refugee populations and national economies; and to avoid damaging the natural environment. Plan and conduct environmental compliance program with appropriate consideration of the effect on the environment in accordance with applicable US and HN agreements, environmental laws, policies, and regulations. For hazardous substance spills, ensure prompt reporting and cleanup while avoiding operational interference and ensuring adequate protection of the environment. Ensure all hazardous materials are removed and managed correctly, prior to final transportation to a permitted treatment, storage, or disposal facility. **(JP 3-07, 3-07.2, 3-10.1, 4-01.7, 4-04, 4-05, 4-06)** (JP 3-07.2, 3-07.3, 3-08v2, 3-50, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Cubic Yards	Of earth cleaned/replaced.
M2	Days	Delay in operation.
M3	Days	River closed as source of drinking water.
M4	Days	River closed to traffic.
M5	Dollars	For hazardous material removal or disposal.
M6	Dollars	To complete spill recovery.
M7	Gallons	Of hazardous material spilled.
M8	Instances	Of species endangered as result of pollution or spill.
M9	People	With newly polluted drinking water.
M10	Percent	Of operations canceled or delayed.
M11	Percent	Of population with newly polluted drinking water.
M12	Percent	Of wildlife killed as a result of pollution/spill.
M13	Pounds	Of hazardous material spilled.
M14	Spills	Reported per week.
M15	Wildlife	Killed as result of pollution/spill.
M16	Hour	To provide commander with technical expertise relating to hazardous materials (HAZMAT) incidents.
M17	Days	To provide training guidance to the field as needed.

**OP 6.2.11 Provide Counterdeception Operations.**

To neutralize, diminish the effects of, or gain advantage from, a foreign deception operation. These activities contribute to awareness of adversary posture and intent, and also serve to identify adversary attempts to deceive friendly forces. **(JP 3-13.1, 3-58, CJCSI 6510.01B)** (CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Time	To identify adversary attempts to deceive friendly forces.
M2	Percent	Of adversarial deception attempts detected.
M3	Time	To develop counterdeception operations options as required.

M4	Percent	Of potential multi-crisis situations where counterdeception operations were wargamed.
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#### **OP 6.2.12 Provide Counter-Psychological Operations.**

Conduct activities to identify adversary psychological warfare operations contributing to situational awareness and serve to expose adversary attempts to influence friendly populations and military forces. Use organizations and activities (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, etc.) to identify adversary psychological warfare operations. Counter these operations using public affairs, civil affairs, or internal information dissemination means to convey accurate information to friendly forces. **(CJCSI 6510.01B)** (JP 3-53, 3-57, 3-61, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Time	To identify adversary psychological warfare operations.
M2	Percent	Of adversarial psychological operation attempts detected and countered.
M3	Time	To expose adversary attempts to influence friendly population and military forces.
M4	Percent	Of potential multi-crisis situations where counter-psychological operations were wargamed.
M5	Time	To disseminate accurate information to friendly forces as to counter adversarial psychological attempts.

#### **OP 6.2.13 Conduct Countermining Activities.**

To conduct countermining activities to reduce or eliminate the threat to noncombatants and friendly military forces posed by mines, boobytraps, and other explosive devices by training host nations forces in the location, recognition, and safe disposal of mines and other destructive devices, as well as countermining program management. **(JP 3-05, 3-15)** (CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Days	To begin arriving in the objective area (after receipt of warning order).
M2	Days	To establish national demining office (after arrival in country).
M3	Percent	Accuracy in accounting for funds used in countermining operations.
M4	Percent	Of accuracy in accounting for funds used in countermining operations.
M5	Days	To establish lines of communications in country.
M6	Percent	Of risks identified and implemented in the force protection plan.
M7	Hours	To initiate countermining activities (after warning order).
M8	Days	For unit begin training (upon arrival in theater).
M9	Hours	To establish liaison with appropriate foreign nation military officials (after mission assignment).



### OP 6.2.14 Employ Operations Security (OPSEC) in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).

To employ operations security (OPSEC) measures to deny critical information necessary by an adversary commander to accurately estimate the military situation. To employ the five actions of OPSEC during planning and conducting campaigns and major operations to protect friendly forces and system capabilities from exploitation by an adversary. This task includes determining essential elements of friendly information (EEFI), identifying critical information from the EEFI, conducting vulnerability analysis, selecting and implementing appropriate OPSEC measures, and finally monitoring OPSEC actions and comparing the results with desired results. **(JP 2-0, 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-07.1, 3-10.1, 3-13.1, 3-54, 6-0)** (JP 3-05, 3-07.5, 3-10.1, 3-54, 3-58, 3-61, CJCSI 3213.01A, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

**Note:** See also OP 5.6, *Coordinate Operational Information Operations (IO)*, OP 2.4.1.2, *Determine Enemy's Operational Capabilities, Course of Action, and Intentions*, OP 3.2.2 *Conduct Attack on Operational Targets using Nonlethal Means* and OP 6.4, *Conduct Military Deception in Support of Subordinate Campaigns and Major Operations*.

M1	Days	Since senior officers and official changed daily movement patterns.
M2	Days	To complete OPSEC assessment.
M3	Hours	Before joint force knows of possible compromise of EEFI.
M4	Hours	To conduct preliminary assessment of OPSEC efforts.
M5	Hours	To develop critical info list from EEFI.
M6	Hours	To identify EEFI for an operation.
M7	Instances	A friendly attack pattern repeated (consecutively).
M8	Items	Of information (pieces or types) commander needs to make decision listed as FFIR.
M9	Items	Of information (pieces or types) commander needs to make decision listed as PIR.
M10	Items	Of information (pieces or types) joint force needed to protect itself listed as EEFI.
M11	Percent	Of critical information items covered by two or more measures.
M12	Percent	Of enemy attacks on previously identified (EEFI) joint force vulnerability.
M13	Percent	Of enemy capabilities not covered by OPSEC measures covered by other elements (i.e., PSYOP, deception, EW).
M14	Percent	Of friendly plan determined from self monitoring of EEFI.
M15	Percent	Of identified friendly vulnerabilities exploited by enemy action.
M16	Percent	Of joint operations disrupted as result of enemy detection and response.
M17	Percent	Of operational movements conducted outside enemy overhead surveillance.

M18	Percent	Of operational support facilities protected from enemy observation.
M19	Percent	Of OPSEC and Deception coordinated at measure level of detail.
M20	Percent	Of OPSEC measures previously assessed unsatisfactory improved based on assessment.
M21	Percent	Of OPSEC Measures selected tied to Vulnerability Analysis.
M22	Percent	Of OPSEC planners accommodate measures required to protect trusted agent planning (e.g., given access).
M23	Percent	Of OPSEC planners have access to compartmented planning efforts.

M24	Percent	Of OPSEC planners input to and receive guidance and results from higher HQ OPSEC plans and surveys.
M25	Percent	Of OPSEC Surveys reflected in OPSEC Plans.
M26	Percent	Of routine actions with timing or location changed at least weekly.
M27	Percent	Of units equipped with anti-surveillance sensor and sensor jamming devices.
M28	Percent	Of vulnerabilities tied to specific enemy capabilities by planners.
M29	Percent	Of vulnerability items covered by two or more OPSEC measures.

### **OP 6.3 Protect Systems and Capabilities in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To identify critical information and subsequently analyze friendly actions attendant to planning and conducting campaigns and major operations to identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems. To determine indicators adversary intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted to derive critical information. To select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. **(JP 2-01, 3-01.1, 3-13.1, 3-54, 6-0)** (JP 3-10.1, 3-13.1, 3-54, 5-03.1, CJCSI 3210.01, CJCSM 3500.05)

**Note:** See also OP 5.6, *Coordinate Operational Information Operations (IO).*

M1	Percent	Increase in security violations on command nets over time.
M2	Percent	Of adversary's trusted sources (systems and personnel) under friendly control.
M3	Percent	Of allies with which joint information security agreements exist.
M4	Percent	Of attempted adversary penetrations of friendly information systems successful.
M5	Percent	Of enemy's sensor coverage known.
M6	Percent	Of information systems within high security area.
M7	Percent	Of protection and deception operations with user cooperation.
M8	Percent	Of system administrators with full OPSEC training.
M9	Percent	That source of adversary penetrations of friendly information systems identified and targeted.
M10	Percent	Of systems with provisions for smoke and obscuration concealment.
M11	Percent	Of command net secured.
M12	Percent	Of licensed system administrators.

#### **OP 6.3.1 Employ Operations Security (OPSEC) in JOA.**

Task moved to: OP 6.2.14 *Employ Operations Security (OPSEC) in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).*

**OP 6.3.2 Supervise Communications Security (COMSEC).**

To supervise the protection resulting from all measures designed to deny unauthorized persons information of value that might be derived from the possession and study of telecommunications, or to mislead unauthorized persons in their interpretation of the results of such possession and study. COMSEC includes: cryptosecurity, transmission security, emission security, and physical security of communications security materials and information. This task includes COMSEC monitoring (collection, analysis, and reporting) of DOD telecommunications and automated information systems and monitoring of related noncommunication signals. Vulnerabilities that are exploitable by potential adversaries will be identified and recommendations concerning countermeasures and corrective action will be submitted to the commander. **(JP 2-01, 3-02, 3-07.2, 3-13.1, 3-54, 6-0)** (JP 3-05.3, 3-07.2, 3-13.1, 5-00.2, CJCSI 3210.10, CJCSI 6510.01B, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Of communications encrypted.
M2	Percent	Of communications sent by secure means.
M3	Percent	Of joint force required to maintain more than one encryption system.
M4	Percent	Of time in restrictive EMCON condition.
M5	Percent	Of friendly emitters known to have been exploited by enemy.
M6	Teams	Fielded to monitor friendly emitters.
M7	Instances	Of frequency allocation or frequency management failing to prevent signal fratricide.
M8	Instances	Of interceptions of friendly communications during planning and execution.
M9	Percent	Of multinational units operating from a common JCEOI.
M10	Percent	Of US joint force units operating from common JCEOI.

**OP 6.3.3 Employ Electronics Security in the Joint Operations Area (JOA) for Operational Forces.**

To protect all forms of noncommunications electromagnetic radiation's (e.g., radar) from interception and study by unauthorized persons seeking information of value. **(JP 2-01, 3-13.1, 3-54)** (JP 3-07.2, 3-51, CJCSI 3210.01, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Percent	Of time in restrictive EMCON condition.
M2	Percent	Of friendly emitters known to have been exploited by enemy.
M3	Teams	Fielded to monitor friendly emitters.
M4	Instances	Of procedures to prevent or disrupt the collection of ELINT by foreign intelligence agencies.
M5	Instances	Of procedures to reprogram noncommunications electromagnetic systems software in response to identified threats.
M6	Hours	To generate an operational change request message based on possible threat to noncommunications electromagnetic systems.

M7	Hours	To respond to operational change request on emergency basis.
M8	Days	To respond to operational change request on urgent basis.
M9	Months	To respond to operational change request on routine basis.

#### **OP 6.3.4 Protect Information Systems in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To take actions to protect information and defend information systems. This task includes integrating and synchronizing indigenous and national IO defensive capabilities with joint force capabilities, ranging from technical security measures (such as INFOSEC) to procedural measures (such as OPSEC, counterintelligence, physical security, and hardening of communications nodes). Information protection includes producing JOA policies and procedures designed to ensure integrity, authenticity, availability, and confidentiality of information. Information system defense includes measures to detect and report attacks or intrusions, and a process to locate, identify, isolate, and recover all affected systems. **(JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-51, 3-54, 3-58, 6-0, 6-02)** (JP 3-13.1, CJCSI 3210.01, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Yes/No	Do commands responsible for operation and maintenance of information systems perform risk assessments of potential threats and take appropriate action to respond to those risks which meet the appropriate criteria?
M2	Yes/No	Do commands responsible for operation and maintenance of information systems have IA or defensive IO Memorandums of Understanding with commercial communications providers who support information systems?
M3	Yes/No	Do commands responsible for operation and maintenance of information systems use "Red Teams" to identify vulnerabilities in those systems?
M4	Percent	Of operational information systems not protected by firewalls, virus detection software and other appropriate defensive IO measures.
M5	Percent	Of operational information system hardware and software components that have backup components to replace them if they fail or are corrupted.
M6	Number	Of redundant communications paths available to connect operational information systems.
M7	Instances	Of operational information systems being disabled, corrupted or compromised through identified adversary IO actions or criminal mischief.
M8	Hours	For appropriate computer emergency response teams (CERTs) to respond, identify and correct operational information system failures attributed to adversary IO action or criminal mischief.

#### **OP 6.3.5 Coordinate Concealment of Forces/Facilities.**

To coordinate camouflage and concealment to deny enemy observation and surveillance of forces and facilities. **(JP 3-01.1, 3-09.3, 3-10, 3-11, 3-17, 3-54, 4-01.1, 4-04, 4-06, CJCSM 3122.03)** (JP 3-02, 3-07.2, 3-07.4, CJCSM 3500.05)

TBD

#### **OP 6.4 Conduct Military Deception in Support of Subordinate Campaigns and Major Operations.**

To manipulate enemy operational level commander's perceptions and expectations into a false picture of reality that conceals friendly actions and intentions until it is too late for enemy forces to react effectively within the context of the geographic combatant commander's deception plan. Several measures are available for conducting deception, to include physical, technical or electronic (imitative, manipulative, and simulative), and administrative. **(JP 2-0, 3-0, 3-03, 3-10.1, 3-13.1, 3-50.21, 3-50.3, 3-54, 3-58, CJCSM 3122.03)** (JP 2-01, 3-01.1, 3-02, 3-09, 3-10.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

**Note:** This task supports OP 5.6, *Coordinate Operational Information Operations (IO)*, OP 6.3, *Protect Systems and Capabilities in the Joint Operations Area (JOA)* OP 6.5, *Provide Security for Operational Forces and Means*; OP 2, *Provide Operational Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance*, (intelligence support for deception planning and supervision); and OP 5, *Provide Operational Command and Control, (C2)* (various organizing, planning, and directing tasks, and resource allocation).

M1	Percent	Of desired time deception plan holds enemy's attention.
M2	Percent	Of EEFI/Critical Information addressed in deception plan.
M3	Percent	Of enemy forces deployed to deal with deception threat.
M4	Instances	Of deception plans not including smoke and obscurants.

##### **OP 6.4.1 Develop Operational Deception Plan.**

To develop a plan with measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce a reaction in a manner prejudicial to the enemy's own interests. The focus of the deception is on the enemy counterpart to the friendly operational level commander. To develop and disseminate the deception plan and story. To deceive the enemy commander of the true friendly intentions regarding the campaigns and major operations, the plan must be consistent with the strategic deception plan and focused on enemy expectations, preconceptions, and fears concerning friendly intent. The deception plan should use the entire joint and multinational operational forces and strategic means, as appropriate, to deceive the enemy. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-0, 3-15, 3-50.21, 3-54, 3-58)** (JP 1, 3-02, 3-50.21, 3-54, 6-02, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	To provide deception plan to support evolving branch or sequel (during campaign execution).
M2	Instances	Discrepancies between operational deception story and targets and tactical deception story and targets.

M3	Instances	Of reinforcing indicators with deception plan.
M4	Percent	Discrepancies between joint force deception plan and other joint force operational concepts (e.g., concept of operations, logistics support).
M5	Percent	Discrepancies between strategic deception story and targets and operational deception story and targets.
M6	Percent	Of tactical forces not available for major operations.
M7	Percent	Of time a deception operation uses an asymmetric application of force.
M8	Weeks	To fully coordinate a deception annex in peacetime.

#### OP 6.4.2 Conduct Operational Deception.

To prevent the enemy from learning the true intent of the joint force commander's campaigns and major operation plans and deception plans. This activity includes limiting, to the last possible moment, the number of people aware of friendly plans; delaying or masking operational movements and preparations; and deceiving friendly leaders and personnel where necessary. **(JP 2-0, 3-0, 3-03, 3-10.1, 3-13.1, 3-50.21, 3-54, 3-58, CJCSM 3122.03)** (JP 3-01.1, 3-02, 3-09, 3-10.1, 3-54, CJCSM 3500.05)

**Note:** The movement and maneuver of operational forces for deception purposes are analyzed under OP 1.1, *Conduct Operational Movement*, and OP 1.3, *Provide Operational Mobility*, respectively.

M1	Hours	After actual operation H-Hour enemy identifies deception.
M2	Hours	Before enemy effectively reacts to actual operation.
M3	Hours	To implement preplanned deception plan.
M4	Hours	To plan and implement ad hoc deception plan.
M5	Percent	Of enemy force decoyed away from main attack.
M6	Instances	Of news stories report deception operation as legitimate.
M7	Percent	Of staff knows campaign plan execution details from planning stage.
M8	Percent	Of time enemy takes desired action/inaction or reaction (or lack thereof).
M9	Percent	Of time joint force deception operation results in enemy misallocating resources (in time, place, quantity and /or effectiveness).
M10	Percent	Of time joint force incorporates deception in campaigns and major operations.

#### OP 6.4.3 Assess Effect of Operational Deception Plan.

To determine the extent to which the deception story and related actions have had on the plans and actions of the opposing operational level commander and staff. **(JP 2-0, 3-0, 3-13.1, 3-54, 3-58)** (JP 2-0, 3-10.1, 3-54, CJCSM 3500.05)

**Note:** The organization responsible for deception planning and supervision requires intelligence support. Those activities relating to intelligence support or operational deception should be analyzed under OP 2, *Provide Operational Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance*.

M1	Days	To complete deception assessment.
M2	Hours	To conduct preliminary assessment to determine if deception target received and acted upon desired perception.
M3	Percent	Of deception actions for which criteria were developed.
M4	Percent	Of deception measures assessed unsatisfactory, successfully employed later, after adjustment based upon assessment.

### **OP 6.5 Provide Security for Operational Forces and Means.**

To enhance freedom of action by identifying and reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. This includes measures to protect from surprise, observation, detection, interference, espionage, terrorism, and sabotage. This task includes actions for protecting and securing the flanks and rear area of operational formations, and protecting and securing critical installations, facilities, systems and air, land, and sea LOCs. **(JP 3-0, 3-03, 3-10, 3-10.1, 3-11)** (JP 3-0, 3-01.5, 3-03, 3-07.3, 3-07.5, 3-10.1, 4-02.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Incidents	By enemy troops, or partisans, affecting security of force and means in joint operations area.
M2	Percent	Of LOCs secure.
M3	Percent	Of total troops used to secure critical facilities and LOCs in COMMZ.
M4	Hours	To coordinate for additional assets for theater.
M5	Instances	Of security plans not including smoke and obscuration.

### **OP 6.5.1 Provide Counterreconnaissance in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To provide counterreconnaissance that will prevent hostile observation of operational forces and operational area. **(JP 3-0, 3-10, 3-10.1, 3-54)** (JP 3-01.1, 3-13.1, 3-55, 3-58, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Instances	Of compromise of friendly intentions (causing joint operations to be delayed, disrupted, canceled or modified).
M2	Percent	Of components that receive a counterreconnaissance plan prior to execution.
M3	Percent	Of joint operations delayed, disrupted, canceled or modified.
M4	Percent	Of impending joint operations in which enemy takes no counter-action.
M5	Percent	Of joint operations judged not compromised (based upon EPW interrogations or captured documents).



M6	Percent	Of requirements for priority intelligence assigned to counter-reconnaissance elements.
M7	Percent	Of time operational actions taken to disrupt enemy reconnaissance.

### **OP 6.5.2 Protect and Secure Flanks, Rear Areas, and COMMZ in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To protect operational forces and means from attack throughout the JOA. (JP 3-09, 3-10, 3-10.1, 3-11, 4-0, 4-01.1) (JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-01.5, 3-09, 3-10.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Casualties	Attributed to enemy actions (including terrorist attacks) in rear area.
M2	Instances	Of rear area attacks graded as level III (which delay, disrupt, cancel or modify an operation in joint operations area).
M3	Instances	Of threats to joint force flanks, rear areas, or COMMZ by enemy forces.
M4	Percent	Of tactical units diverted to deal with rear area threat.
M5	Percent	Of total troops used to secure critical facilities and LOCs in operational area.

### **OP 6.5.3 Protect/Secure Operationally Critical Installations, Facilities, and Systems.**

To protect operationally critical installations, facilities, and systems from attack in the operational area. Task includes performing a force protection site survey for beddown of assets and personnel prior to arrival of forces. Survey will provide a threat assessment and, based on that assessment, recommend sites for housing, supplies, ammunition and ordnance, aircraft parking, operations, maintenance, etc. (JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-09, 3-10, 3-10.1, 3-11, 4-0, 4-01.1) (JP 3-01.1, 3-01.5, 3-07.5, 3-09, 3-10.1, CJCSM 3122.03, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	For internal/external reaction force to reach installation or facility under attack.
M2	Instances	Of operations delayed, disrupted, canceled or modified.
M3	Instances	Of terrorists acts against coalition forces in OA.
M4	Instances	Of terrorists acts against US forces in OA.
M5	Percent	Of communications in operational area supporting operation hardened.
M6	Percent	Of communications in operational area supporting operation with alternate paths.
M7	Percent	Of critical friendly facilities (e.g., PODs, command posts) destroyed, damaged, or rendered inoperable by sabotage or insurgents or terrorist actions.
M8	Percent	Of critical friendly facilities hardened or protected against hostile acts.

M9	Percent	Of terrorist attacks penetrate security in operational area.
M10	Percent	Reduction in LOC capacity resulting from enemy attacks.
M11	Hours	To coordinate for additional assets for theater LOCs.
M12	Percent	Of threat assessments passed within established criteria.

#### **OP 6.5.4 Protect and Secure Air, Land, and Sea LOCs in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).**

To protect the LOCs which connect an operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move. **(JP 3-0, 3-09, 3-10, 3-10.1, 4-0, 4-01.1)** (JP 3-02, 3-08v2, 4-01.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	To restore LOC following interruption.
M2	Minutes	For rapid reaction forces to reach point of LOC attack.
M3	Percent	Of traffic flow on LOCs (air, land, sea) interrupted by hostile action.
M4	Percent	Reduction in LOC capacity (resulting from enemy attack in operational area).
M5	Percent	Of LOC reduction that will affect combat operations/campaign.

#### **OP 6.5.5 Integrate Host-Nation Security Forces and Means.**

To integrate and synchronize host-nation police, fire departments, military internal security forces, communications infrastructure, constabulary, rescue agencies, and penal institutions into the security plan for the operational area. This task includes the planning and execution of operational tasks that involve operations of two or more nations' forces including the forces of the host nation. **(JP 3-0, 3-07.1, 3-07.2, 4-01.6)** (JP 2-0, 3-05, 3-07, 3-08v1, 3-10.1, CJCSM 3500.05)

M1	Hours	Delay between requisitioning agreed support and receiving it.
M2	Hours	Delay in host-nation response awaiting translator or liaison officer.
M3	Incidents	Involving US forces and host-nation security personnel (per week).
M4	Instances	Of communications systems capability, damaged by enemy forces, being repaired by host-nation damage control elements.
M5	Incidents	Require liaison officer to resolve (per week).
M6	Minutes	Delay in host-nation response awaiting translator or LNO.
M7	Minutes	Difference in response time between host-nation and US fire and rescue forces.
M8	Minutes	Difference in response time between US and host-nation forces.
M9	Percent	Of civil unrest incidents handled by host-nation forces without US backup.
M10	Percent	Increase in availability of combat forces through use of host-nation security in joint force plans.

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M11	Percent	Increase in availability of tactical forces through use of host-nation security in joint force plans.
M12	Percent	Increase in availability of Air Force forces through use of host-nation security in joint force plans.
M13	Percent	Increase in tactical force strength by using host-nation to fulfill security in joint plans.
M14	Percent	Of civil unrest incidents handled jointly by host-nation forces and US forces.
M15	Percent	Of communications capacity from host-nation infrastructure.
M16	Percent	Of host-nation incident responses require liaison officer or NCO.
M17	Percent	Of requirements delayed or disrupted.
M18	Percent	Of significant hazards removed by host nation.
M19	Percent	Of total combat service support supplied by host nation.
M20	Percent	Of total combat support supplied by host nation.
M21	Percent	Of US plans have host-nation supporting plans.
M22	Percent	Reduction in loss of communications systems capability after addition of host-nation damage control elements.
M23	Personnel	Of total number of combat service support personnel reduced by host-nation support.
M24	Percent	Reduction in combat service support personnel through host-nation support.
M25	Percent	Of communications systems capacity provided by host-nation damage control and restoral.
M26	Percent	Of communications redundancy from host-nation common infrastructure.
M27	Percent	Of C3I capacity provided by host-nation infrastructure.

## JOINT/INTEROPERABILITY TACTICAL TASKS

1. These tasks are performed by more than one Service component to meet the mission-derived conditions and approved standards of the combatant commands. These requirements will be addressed by the combatant commands, in coordination with respective Service components, to facilitate scheduling and improve focus on joint doctrine. These tasks are used by USJFCOM in their Category 2 training programs for assigned forces.

2. This is not intended to be an exhaustive list of joint/interoperability tactical tasks. These tasks will change as a result of command interaction between USJFCOM and the organizations participating in Category 2 training. USJFCOM will staff changes to this task list and update as necessary.

3. The hierarchy of UJTL tactical tasks, joint/interoperability tactical tasks, and the respective Service tasks that support them is shown below. The tactical task titles and descriptions are followed by the joint/interoperability tactical tasks that are in turn defined by the respective Service tasks that follow it. The Service tasks are identified using the following acronyms.

- a. Army Tasks
  - (1) Army Tactical Missions (ATM)
  - (2) Army Tasks (ART)
- b. Naval Tasks (NTA)
- c. Air Force Tasks (AFT)

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## **TA 1 DEPLOY/CONDUCT MANEUVER.**

To move forces to achieve a position of advantage with respect to enemy forces. This task includes the employment of forces on the battlefield in combination with fire or fire potential. Maneuver is the dynamic element of combat, the means of concentrating forces at the decisive point to achieve the surprise, psychological shock, physical momentum, and moral dominance which enables smaller forces to defeat larger ones. This task includes the movement of combat and support units. **(JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-02.2, 3-03, 3-09, 3-50.21)** (JP 3-05, 3-05.3, 3-07.1, 3-15, 5-0, CJCSI 3202.01, CJCSM 3122.03)

### **TA 1.1 Position/Reposition Tactical Forces.**

AFT 6.4.1	Position the Force
ART 1.2	Conduct Tactical Maneuver
NTA 1.1.2	Move Forces

#### **TA 1.1.1 Conduct Tactical Airlift Operations.**

AFT 5.1.1	Perform Airlift
ATM 7.1	Conduct Airborne Assault into AO
ATM 7.2	Conduct Air Assault into AO
ART 4.3.3.2	Move by Air
NTA 4.6.6	Provide Air Delivery

#### **TA 1.1.2 Conduct Shipboard Deck Helicopter Landing Qualifications.**

AFT 6.1.1.13	Train a Quality Force
NTA 1.1.2	Move Forces

#### **TA 1.1.3 Conduct Infiltration/Exfiltration of Special Operations Forces.**

AFT 4.4.1	Perform SOF Employment
ART 1.2.3.5	Conduct an Infiltration/Exfiltration

#### **TA 1.1.4 Conduct Sea and Air Deployment Operations.**

AFT 1.1.2	Deploy Units
AFT 6.4.1	Position the Force
ART 1.1	Perform Tactical Actions Associated with Force Projection and Deployment

ART 4.3.2	Conduct Terminal Operations
ART 4.3.3.2	Move by Air
ART 4.3.3.3	Conduct Water Transport Operations
NTA 1.1	Deploy Naval Tactical Forces

## **TA 1.2 Conduct Joint Forces Passage of Lines.**

ATM 6.3	Conduct Passage of Lines
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### **TA 1.2.1 Conduct Joint Air Assault Operations.**

AFT 4.2.1	Perform Counterland Functions
ATM 7.2	Conduct Air Assault into Area of Operations

### **TA 1.2.2 Conduct Joint Airborne Operations.**

AFT 4.2.1.3	Conduct Airborne Operations
ATM 7.1	Conduct Airborne Assault into Area of Operations

### **TA 1.2.3 Conduct Joint Amphibious Assault and Raid Operations.**

AFT 4.2.1.4	Support Amphibious Operations
ATM 7.3	Conduct Amphibious Assault into Area of Operations
ATM 1.2.6	Conduct a Raid
NTA 1.5.6.4	Conduct an Amphibious Raid
NTA 1.5.6.2	Conduct an Amphibious Assault

### **TA 1.2.4 Conduct Counterdrug Operations.**

AFT 4.4.1	Perform SOF Employment
AFT 6.5.1.4	Support External Organizations
ATM 3.3	Support to Counterdrug Operations
ATM 4.1.1	Provide Military Support for Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies (MSCLEA)
ART 5.7.2.2	Provide Law and Order
NTA 1.4.7	Conduct Maritime Counterdrug Operations

## **TA 1.3 Conduct Countermine Operations.**

AFT 6.2.1	Protect the Force
ART 1.3.1	Overcome Barriers/Obstacles/Mines
NTA 1.3.1	Perform Mine Countermeasures

#### **TA 1.4 Conduct Mine Operations.**

AFT 4.3.1.3	Conduct Aerial Minelaying Operations
ART 1.4	Conduct Countermobility Operations (Disrupt, Fix, Turn, and Block)
NTA 1.4.1	Conduct Mining

#### **TA 1.5 Gain/Maintain Control of Land Areas.**

AFT 4.2.1	Perform Counterland Functions
ATM 1.0	Conduct Offensive Action
ATM 2.0	Conduct Defensive Actions
NTA 1.5	Dominate the Combat Area

##### **TA 1.5.1 Gain and Maintain Maritime Superiority.**

AFT 4.3.1	Perform Countersea Functions
NTA 1.5	Dominate the Combat Area

##### **TA 1.5.2 Gain and Maintain Air Superiority.**

AFT 1.1.1	Perform Counterair Functions
ART 6.1	Conduct Tactical Air/Missile Defense
NTA 1.5	Dominate the Combat Area

#### **TA 2 DEVELOP INTELLIGENCE.**

To develop that intelligence that is required for planning and conducting tactical operations. Analyzing the enemy's capabilities, intentions, vulnerabilities, and the environment (to include weather and the application of tactical decision aids and weather effects matrices on friendly and enemy systems, and terrain) derives it. This task includes the development of counterintelligence information. **(JP 2-0, 2-01, 3-07.1, 3-09)** (JP 2-0, 3-07.1, 3-07-4, 3-09, 3-10, 3-55)

#### **TA 2.1 Develop Tactical Intelligence Requirements.**



AFT 3.1.4	Plan Information Operations Functions
ART 5.4.3	Develop CCIR Recommendations
ART 2.1.1	Conduct Collection Management/Plan Reconnaissance and Surveillance
NTA 2.1.1	Determine and Prioritize PIR
NTA 2.1.2	Determine and Prioritize IR

**TA 2.2 Obtain and Access Intelligence Information (National/Theater/Service Assets).**

AFT 7.1.1	Receive, Maintain, Integrate, and Display Data From All Sources
ART 2.2	Collect Intelligence
NTA 2.2	Collect Information

**TA 2.3 Process Tactical Warning Information and Attack Assessment.**

AFT 7.2.1	Determine and Assess the Nature and Impact of Critical Events
ART 2.3.3	Provide Indications and Warnings
NTA 2.4.4.1	Provide Indication and Warning of Threat

**TA 2.4 Disseminate Tactical Warning Information and Attack Assessment.**

AFT 7.2.1	Determine and Assess the Nature and Impact of Critical Events
ART 5.2.5	Disseminate Common Operational Picture and Execution Information to Higher, Lower, Adjacent, Supported, and Supporting Organizations
NTA 2.5	Disseminate and Integrate Intelligence

**TA 2.5 Conduct Joint Tactical Combat Assessments.**

AFT 7.2.3	Assess Friendly and Nonfriendly Operations and Results
ART 5.3.3	Provide Combat Assessment
NTA 2.4.5	Provide Battle Damage Assessment
NTA 3.1.5	Conduct Tactical Combat Assessment

**TA 3 EMPLOY FIREPOWER.**

To apply firepower against air, ground, and sea targets. The collective and coordinated use of target acquisition data, direct and indirect fire weapons, armed

aircraft of all types, and other lethal and nonlethal means against air, ground, and sea targets. This task includes artillery, mortar, and other nonline-of-sight fires, naval gunfire, close air support, and electronic attack. It includes strike, air/surface/undersea warfare, naval surface fire support, counter air, and interdiction. **(JP 3-01.5, 3-03, 3-09, 3-09.3, 3-10.1)** (JP 1, 3-0)

### **TA 3.1 Process Targets.**

AFT 7.3	Plan Military Operations
ART 3.1	Decide Surface Targets to Attack
ART 3.2	Detect and Locate Surface Targets
ART 3.3	Employ Fires to Influence the Will, Destroy, Neutralize, or Suppress Enemy Forces
ART 5.3.3.3	Provide Reattack Recommendation
ART 5.4.4	Establish Target Priorities
ART 5.6.4	Synchronize Actions to Produce Maximum Effective Application of Military Power
NTA 3.1	Process Targets

### **TA 3.1.1 Request Joint Fire Support.**

AFT 7.4.2	Disseminate Information
ART 3.3.1	Conduct Lethal Fire Support
ART 3.3.1.1	Conduct Surface to Surface Attack
ART 3.3.1.2	Conduct Air -to- Surface Attack
ART 3.3.1.3	Conduct Naval Surface Fire Support
ART 5.4.2	Integrate Requirements and Capabilities
NTA 3.1.1	Request Attack

### **TA 3.2 Engage Targets.**

AFT 2.1.1	Perform Lethal Protection
ART 1.2.2	Conduct Direct Fires
ART 3.3.1	Conduct Lethal Fire Support
ART 3.3.2	Conduct Nonlethal Fire Support/Offensive Information Operations
NTA 3.2	Attack Targets
NTA 3.2.8.1	Engage Targets

### **TA 3.2.1 Conduct Joint Fire Support.**

AFT 4.2.1.2	Conduct CAS
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ART 3.3	Conduct Fire Support
ART 3.3.1	Conduct Lethal Fire Support
ART 3.3.1.1	Conduct Surface to Surface Attack
ART 3.3.1.2	Conduct Air- to- Surface Attack
ART 3.3.1.3	Conduct Naval Surface Fire Support
NTA 3.2.8	Conduct Fire Support
NTA 5.4.3.3	Coordinate NSFS

**TA 3.2.2 Conduct Joint Close Air Support.**

AFT 4.2.1.2	Conduct CAS
ART 3.3.1.2	Conduct Air-to-Surface Attack
ART 3.3.1.2.1	Request Air-to-Surface Attack
ART 3.3.1.2.2	Employ Close Air Support
NTA 3.2.8	Conduct Fire Support

**TA 3.2.3 Conduct Joint Interdiction Operations.**

AFT 4.2.1.1	Interdict Enemy Land Power
AFT 4.3.1.1	Interdict Enemy Sea Power
ART 3.3.1.2	Conduct Air-to- Surface Attack
ART 3.3.1.2.1	Request Air-to-Surface Attack
ART 3.3.1.2.3	Employ Air Interdiction
NTA 3.2.6	Interdict Enemy Operational Forces/Targets

**TA 3.2.4 Conduct Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses.**

AFT 1.1.1.1	Conduct Offensive Counterair
AFT 1.1.1.2	Conduct Defensive Counterair
ART 3.4	Conduct Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses
ART 6.2.1.8	Conduct Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD)
NTA 3.2.4	Suppress Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD)

**TA 3.2.5 Strategic Attack.**

AFT 4.1.1	Perform Strategic Attack
NTA 3.2.2	Attack Enemy Land Targets

**TA 3.2.6 Conduct Joint Attacks using Nonlethal Means.**

AFT 2.2.1	Perform Nonlethal Precision Engagement Functions
ART 3.3.2	Conduct Nonlethal Fire Support/Offensive Information Operations
NTA 3.2.9	Conduct Nonlethal Engagement

### **TA 3.2.7 Conduct Air and Missile Defense Operations.**

AFT 1.1.1.2	Conduct Defensive Counterair
ART 6.1	Conduct Tactical Air/Missile Defense
NTA 3.2.7	Intercept, Engage, and Neutralize Enemy Aircraft and Missile Targets

### **TA 3.3 Coordinate Maneuver and Integrate with Firepower.**

AFT 6.5.4	Plan to Employ the Force
ART 5.6.4	Synchronize Actions to Produce Maximum Effective Application of Military Power
NTA 5.4.3	Synchronize Tactical Operations and Integrate maneuver with Firepower

### **TA 3.4 Integrate Joint Tactical Firepower.**

AFT 7.4	Execute Military Operations
ART 5.4.2	Integrate Requirements and Capabilities
NTA 3.3	Integrate Tactical Fires

## **TA 4 PERFORM LOGISTICS AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT.**

To sustain forces in the combat zone by arming, fueling, fixing equipment, moving, supplying, manning, maintaining visibility over, and by providing personnel and health services. Includes logistic support, as necessary, to US agencies and friendly nations or groups. (JP 1-05, 3-01.1, 3-07.1, 3-08v1, 3-09, 4-0, 4-01, 4-01.4, 4-01.7) (JP 3-0, 3-09, 4-0, 4-02, 4-03)

### **TA 4.1 Conduct Land-Based Intermediate Support Base Operations.**

AFT 6.4.1.4	Position En route Support
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### **TA 4.2 Distribute Supplies and Provide Transport Services.**

AFT 6.6.1	Sustain the Force
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ART 4.1	Provide Supplies
ART 4.3	Provide Transportation Support
NTA 4.5	Provide Transport Services
NTA 4.6	Supply the Force

#### **TA 4.2.1 Arm.**

AFT 6.1.1	Provide Munitions
ART 4.1.5	Provide Arms (Class V)
NTA 4.1	Arm

#### **TA 4.2.2 Fuel.**

AFT 6.1.1.8	Provide Repairables and Consumables
ART 4.1.3	Provide Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants (POL) (Class III Bulk and Package)
NTA 4.2	Fuel

#### **TA 4.2.3 Conduct Joint Air Refueling Operations.**

AFT 5.2.1	Perform Air Refueling
ART 4.1.3.4	Conduct Aerial Refueling
NTA 4.2.1.2	Conduct Aerial Refueling

#### **TA 4.2.4 Conduct Joint Forward Area Refueling Operations.**

AFT 5.2.1	Perform Air Refueling
ART 4.1.3.1	Provide Bulk Fuel
ART 4.1.13	Conduct Forward Arm and Refuel Point (FARP) Activities
NTA 4.2.1	Conduct Fuel Management

#### **TA 4.3 Man the Force.**

AFT 6.1.1.15	Maintain and Enhance a Quality Force
ART 4.6.1	Man the Force
NTA 4.4.1.1	Provide Personnel Readiness Management

#### **TA 4.4 Conduct Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore Operations.**

ART 4.7.3	Move/Evacuate Cargo, Equipment, and Personnel
ART 4.3.3	Conduct Mode Operations
NTA 4.5.6	Construct, Maintain, and Operate LOTS

#### **TA 4.5 Perform Civil Military Engineering Support.**

AFT 6.6.1.6	Perform Civil Engineering Support
ART 4.11	Provide General Engineering Support
NTA 4.7	Perform Civil Military Engineering Support

#### **TA 4.6 Conduct Joint Civil Affairs.**

AFT 3.1.1.7	Perform Public Affairs Activities
ART 4.15	Conduct Civil-Military Operations (CMO) in Area of Operations
NTA 4.8	Conduct Civil Affairs in Area

#### **TA 5 EXERCISE COMMAND AND CONTROL.**

To exercise authority and direction over assigned or attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. C2 involves maintaining visibility over and arranging personnel, equipment, and facilities during the planning and conducting of military operations. **(JP 3-0, 3-01.1, 3-03, 3-09, 4-01.1, 5-00.2, CJCSM 6120.05)** (JP 0-2, 3-03, 3-05, 3-08v2, 3-09.3, 3-10.1, 4-01.1, 4-01.3, 6-0, 6-02)

#### **TA 5.1 Acquire and Communicate Information and Maintain Status and Force Reporting.**

AFT 7.1.1	Receive, Maintain, Integrate and Display Data from All Sources
ART 5.2	Manage Tactical Information
ART 5.3	Assess Tactical Situation and Operations

#### **TA 5.2 Process Emergency Action Messages.**

AFT 7.4.2	Disseminate Information
ART 5.2.5	Disseminate Common Operational Picture and Execution Information to Higher, Lower, Adjacent, Supported, and Supporting Organizations
NTA 5.1.1	Communicate Information
NTA 5.1.1.1.2	Provide Communication for Own Unit

### **TA 5.2.1 Establish, Operate and Maintain Baseline Communications.**

AFT 6.6.1.2	Perform Communications and Information Support Activities
AFT 7.1.1	Receive, Maintain, Integrate, and Display Data from All Sources
ART 5.2.1.4	Establish a Tactical Information Network and Systems
NTA 5.1	Acquire, Analyze, Communicate Information and Maintain Status
NTA 5.1.1.1.1	Maintain Data Link/Inter-Unit Communications

### **TA 5.2.2 Operate Baseline Communications.**

AFT 6.3.1.1.4	Determine Communications Capability
ART 5.2.1.4	Establish a Tactical Information Network and Systems
NTA 5.1.2	Manage Means of Communicating Information

### **TA 5.3 Conduct Force Deployment Planning and Execution and Integrate with JOPES.**

AFT 7.1.1	Receive, Maintain, Integrate, and Display Data from All Sources
ART 5.2	Manage Tactical Information
ART 5.3	Assess Tactical Situation and Operations
NTA 5.1.3	Maintain Information and Naval Force Status

### **TA 5.4 Determine Actions.**

AFT 7.3.3	Develop Potential COAs/Plans
ART 5.3	Assess Tactical Situation and Operations
ART 5.4	Plan Tactical Operations Using the Military Decision Making Process/Troop Leading procedures
NTA 5.3	Determine and Plan Actions and Operations

### **TA 5.5 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces.**

AFT 5.4 7.4	Execute Military Operations
ART 5.5	Prepare for Tactical Operations
ART 5.6	Execute Tactical Operations
ART 5.7	Support Commander's Leadership Responsibilities for Morale, Welfare, and Discipline
ART 5.8	Conduct Continuous Operations
ART 5.9	Develop and Implement Command Safety Program
NTA 5.4	Direct, Lead, and Synchronize Forces

### **TA 5.5.1 Conduct Joint Force Link-up Operations.**

AFT 7.4	Execute Military Operations
ATM 6.2	Conduct Linkup with other Tactical Forces
NTA 5.4.3	Synchronize Tactical Operations and Integrate maneuver with Firepower

### **TA 5.6 Employ Tactical Information Operations.**

AFT 3.1.1.2	Perform Information Warfare
ART 3.3.2	Conduct Nonlethal Fire Support/Offensive Information Operations
ART 6.4	Conduct Defensive Information Operations
NTA 5.5	Plan and Employ C2W

### **TA 6 PROTECT THE FORCE.**

To protect the tactical forces fighting potential so that it can be applied at the appropriate time and place. This task includes those measures the force takes to remain viable and functional by protecting itself from the effects of or recovery from enemy activities. **(JP 2-01, 3-0, 3-03, 3-07.1, 3-07.2, 3-09, 3-10.1, 3-11, 3-17)** (JP 3-01.5, 3-02, 3-07.2, 3-07.5, 3-10.1, 3,61)

### **TA 6.1 Conduct Antiterrorism Operations.**

AFT 4.4.1	Perform SOF Employment
ATM 3.2.2	Conduct Antiterrorism Activities
NTA 6.1.6	Combat Terrorism

### **TA 6.2 Conduct Joint Search and Rescue Operations.**

AFT 2.3.1	Perform CSAR Functions
ATM 5.27	Conduct Combat Search and Rescue
NTA 6.2.2	Perform Combat Search and Rescue
NTA 6.2.3	Perform Search and Rescue (SAR)

### **TA 6.2.1 Establish and Operate a Joint Search and Rescue Center.**

AFT 2.3.1	Perform CSAR Functions
ART 5.1	Establish Command Post (CP) Operations (TAC/MAIN/Sustainment/Combat Trains/Field Trains/Assault



	CP/Coordinating Centers)
NTA 6.2.2	Perform Combat Search and Rescue
NTA 6.2.3	Perform Search and Rescue (SAR)

### **TA 6.3 Conduct Joint Rear Area Security Operations.**

AFT 6.2.3	Provide Air Base Defense
ATM 6.1.4	Conduct Area Security Operations
NTA 6.3.1.1	Establish and Maintain Rear Area Security

### **TA 6.4 Conduct Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.**

AFT 5.1.1	Perform Airlift
ATM 3.5	Perform Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)
NTA 6.2.1	Evacuate Noncombatants from Area

#### **TA 6.4.1 Establish and Operate Joint Evacuation Control Center.**

AFT 2.3.1	Perform CSAR Functions
ART 5.1	Establish Command Post (CP) Operations (TAC/MAIN/Sustainment/Combat Trains/Field Trains/Assault CP/Coordinating Centers)
NTA 6.2.1	Evacuate Noncombatants from Area

### **TA 6.5 Provide for Combat Identification.**

AFT 7.1.4	Monitor Status of Friendly Forces
ART 6.2.1.4	Provide Positive Identification of Friendly Forces
NTA 6.1.1.3	Positively Identify Friendly Forces

### **TA 6.6 Coordinate Chemical and Biological Defense.**

AFT 6.2.1	Protect the Force
ART 5.4	Plan Tactical Operations Using the Military Decision Making Process/Troop Leading procedures
ART 5.5	Prepare for Tactical Operations
ART 5.6	Execute Tactical Operations
ART 6.2.2	Conduct Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense
NTA 6.1.1.1	Protect Individuals and Systems

**TA 6.7 Guard Nuclear Weapons.**

AFT 6.2.1	Protect the Force
ART 6.3.2	Conduct Critical Installations and Facilities Security
NTA 6.1.1.1	Protect Individuals and Systems

## **Index for UJTL Chapter 2**

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